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LUDENDORFF^S    OWN    STORY 


CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Preface       ^ 

My  Thoughts  and  Actions i 

The  Nature  of  the  War — The  Army  and  the  Home  Cotmtry — 
My  Attitude  toward  Political  Questions — Field-Marshal 
von  Hindenburg — Life  on  the  Staff — My  Colleagues. 

Liege 28 

Work  on  the  General  Staff  in  Peace-time — In  Command  of 
a  Regiment  and  a  Brigade — Deputy  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff,  Second  Army— The  Battle  of  Li^e— The  Capture  of 
the  Forts. 

AS   CHIEF   OF   THE   GENERAL   STAFF,    EASTERN    FRONT, 
From  August  22,  1914,  to  Augtist  28,  1916 

Tannenberg 49 

Summoned  to  the  Eastern  Front— The  Plan  of  Battle — 
The  Battle — The  Concentration  against  Renncnkampf — 
The  Battle  of  the  Masurian  I>akes — The  Behavior  of  the 
Russian  Army — The  Swing  of  the  Pendulum  in  the  West. 

The  Campaign  in  Poland,  Autumn  1914 87 

At  General  Headquarters,  Austro-Hungarian  Army — The 
Concentration  in  Upper  Silesia — The  ITieater  of  Opera- 
tions— The  Advance  on  the  Vistula — The  Battles  of  the 
Vistula — The  Retreat  from  Warsaw — The  Withdrawal  to  the 
German  Frontier — ^The  Commander-in-chief  on  the  Eastern 
Front — The  Concentration  of  All  Available  Forces — The  Plan 
of  Operations — The  Battles  in  North  Poland. 

The  Winter  Campaign  in   Masuria,  February-March   1915     134 
Chief  of  Staff,  Southern  Army — The  Plan  of  Operations — 
The  Campaign — The  Result  of  the  Campaign — ^The  Russian 
Counter-offensives — East  Prussia  Finally  Liberated. 

The  Summer  Campaign  against  Russia,  191 5 163 

Scheme  for  a  Decisive  Battle  in  the  East — The  Thrust  toward 
Lithuania  and  Courland — ^The  Break-through  in  Galicia — 
The  Offensive  Over  the  Narew — The  Battles  East  of  the 
Vistula — The  Occupation  of  Novo  Georgievsk — The  Advance 
into  Eastern  Poland — The  Passage  of  the  Niemen — The 
Attack  of  the  Niemen  Army — The  Conclusion  of  the  Summer 
Campaign. 

The    Headquarters    of   the    Commander-in-chief    on    the 

Eastern  Front  in  Kovno,  October  1915  to  July  igi6  .     203 
The  Period  of  Inactivity — The  General  Situation  in  Autumn 


CONTENTS 

PAOB 

19 1 5 — Historical  Memories — Consolidating  the  Front — The 
Country  and  the  People — Duties  of  the  Administration — ■ 
The  Area  to  be  Admimstered — The  Organization  of  the  Ad- 
ministrative System — The  Battles  and  the  Crisis  in  the  East 
— Plans  for  the  Campaign  of  1916 — Fighting  at  Lake  Narotch 
— Operations  around  the  Lake — Russian  Offensives — Con- 
ferences at  General  Headquarters. 

Unity  of  Command  on  the  Eastern  Front,  August  1916    .    270 
Visits  to  Our  Colleagues — Renewed  Russian  Offensives. 

MY  APPOINTMENT  AS  FmST  QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL 
From  August  29,  19 16,  to  October  26,  191 8 

The  Entente  Offensive  in  the  Autumn  of  191 6  .  .  .  .  283 
Germany  and  Her  Allies — The  Reasons  for  the  Campaign 
against  Rumania — Bulgaria's  Conduct  of  the  War — Turkey's 
Conduct  of  the  War — The  General  Conduct  of  the  War — 
The  Military  and  Political  Direction  of  the  German  Empire 
— Impressions  of  the  Western  Front — ^The  Battle  of  the 
Somme  and  the  First  Operations  against  Rumania — On  the 
Eve  of  a  Decision  in  Rumania — The  Wallachian  Campaign. 

The  Situation  at  the  End  op  1916 .    301 

The  Superiority  of  the  Enemy  in  Man-power  and  War  Ma- 
terial— ^The  Question  of  Peace — The  Question  of  Submarine 
Warfare — President  Wilson  as  an  Intermediary  for  Peace — 
The  Emperor  Charles  and  Hia  Counselors. 

The  Reasons  for  the  Further  Prosecution  of  the  War, 

AND  the  Condition  of  the  Forces 388 

The  AuxiUary  Service  Law — ^The  Hindenbtirg  Program — 
The  SuppUes  of  Raw  Material — The  Question  of  Food  Sup- 
plies— 'The  Importance  of  Rumania  in  the  Conduct  of  the 
War — ^The  Fight  against  the  Home  Front — ^The  Deteriora- 
tion of  the  People's  Morale  and  the  Control  of  the  Press — 
Propaganda — ^Tlie  Troops  and  Their  Leaders — ^The  Polish 
Question. 

MAPS 

I. — ^Tannenberg,  1914^ Vol.  I  page  49 

II. — ^Additional  Map  of  Tannenberg  Region,  Ad-  1 

vance,  August  1914 Vol. 

III. — ^The  Battle  of  the  Masurian  Lakes,  1914     .  Vol. 

rV. — The  Campaign  in  South  Poland,  Autumn  1914  Vol. 

V. — The  Campaign  in  North  Poland,  Autumn  19 14  Vol. 

VI. — Sketch  of  the  Campaign  in  North  Poland    .  Vol. 

VII.— The  Winter  Battle  in  Masuria Vol. 

VIII.— Additional    Map   of   the   Winter   Battle   in 

Masuria Vol. 

IX. — ^The  Summer  Campaign  against  Russia,  191 5  Vol. 

X. — General  Map  of  the  World  War     .    .    .     •  <  y°|' 

XI. — The  Campaign  against  Rumania,  1916  .  .  Vol. 
XII.— The  German  Drive  in  the  West,  1918  .  .  Vol. 
XIII. — German  Retreating  Movement,  1918     .     .    .     Vol. 


49 

'  49 

'  «7 

'  87 

;  87 

'  134 

!  ^'^4 

163 

203 

11  ' 

;  326 

203 

11  ' 

'  219 

II  • 

'  326 

PREFACE 

IT  has  been  my  destiny  to  hold  various  high  appoint- 
ments. Upon  Field-Marshal  von  Hindenburg  and 
myself,  in  conjunction  with  other  men,  devolved  the 
task  of  conducting  the  defense  of  the  Fatherland. 

In  these  pages  I  propose  to  give  an  account  of  those 
deeds  of  the  German  people  and  their  army  with  which 
my  name  will  for  all  time  be  associated.  I  shall  tell 
of  my  strivings  and  of  all  that  I  lived  through  in  this 
struggle  of  the  nations — how  the  German  people  fought 
as  men  have  never  fought  before,  how  they  endured, 
and  how  their  efforts  were  gradually  paralyzed. 

Germany  has  not  yet  had  time  for  introspection  and 
heart-searching.  She  is  too  heavily  weighted  down. 
And  yet  she  can  take  heart  from  the  magnificent  deeds 
of  her  army,  and  from  all  they,  too,  accomplished  who 
worked  at  home.  But  if  she  wishes  to  learn  anything 
from  the  succession  of  events  which  culminated  in  her 
undoing  she  has  no  time  to  lose,  for  the  world's  history 
strides  ruthlessly  on  and  tramples  underfoot  those 
nations  who  tear  themselves  to  pieces  by  internal 
conflict. 

LUDENDORFF. 

Written  at  Hessleholmsgard,  in  Sweden,  between 
November  191 8  and  February  191 9;  completed  in 
Berlin  by  June  23,  the  day  on  which  we  accepted  (!)  the 
Peace. 


LUDENDORFF'S    OWN    STORY 


LUDENDORFF'S 
OWN    STORY 

MY   THOUGHTS    AND   ACTIONS 

The  Nature  of  the  War — The  Army  and  the  Home  Country — My 
Attitude  Toward  Political  Questions — Field-Marshal  von  Hinden- 
burg — Life  on  the  StafE — My  Colleagues. 


THE  coup  de  main  at  Lihge  was  the  first  of  the 
series  of  German  victories.  The  decision  was  a 
bold  one,  and  the  execution  extremely  daring. 

The  campaigns  of  191 4,  1915,  and  the  summer  of 
1 91 6  in  the  East  were  tremendous  achievements,  equal 
to  the  greatest  military  feats  of  any  age.  They  made 
the  highest  demands  both  on  the  commanders  and  the 
troops.  The  Russians  were  then  greatly  superior  in 
numbers  to  the  allied  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
armies  opposed  to  them. 

But,  indeed,  the  operations  which  Field-Marshal  von 
Hindenburg  and  I  had  to  conduct  from  August  29, 
1916,  the  day  we  assumed  supreme  command,  rank 
among  the  most  formidable  in  history.  Nothing  more 
awe-inspiring  and  destructive  has  ever  been  seen  on 
earth.  Germany,  inferior  in  numbers  and  with  weak 
allies,  was  contending  against  the  world.  Decisions  of 
the  highest  importance  had  to  be  made.  They  were 
the  inevitable  and  logical  result  of  the  situation,  our 


2  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

general  conception  of  war,  and  the  particular  circum- 
stances of  this  war. 

The  armies  and  fleets  fought  as  they  had  fought  in 
days  past,  even  though  numbers  and  equipment  were 
mightier  than  ever  before.  What  made  this  war  dif- 
ferent from  all  others  was  the  manner  in  which  the 
nations  supported  and  reinforced  their  armed  forces 
with  all  the  resoiu-ces  at  their  disposal.  Only  in  France, 
in  1870-71,  had  anything  of  the  kind  been  seen  before. 

In  this  war  it  was  impossible  to  distinguish  where 
the  sphere  of  the  army  and  navy  began  and  that  of  the 
people  ended.  Army  and  people  were  one.  The  world 
witnessed  the  War  of  Nations  in  the  most  literal  sense 
of  the  word.  The  great  powers  of  the-earth  faced  one 
another  in  united  concentrated  strength.  And  not  only 
between  the  armed  forces  did  the  combat  rage  along 
those  huge  fronts  and  on  distant  oceans ;  the  very  soul 
and  vital  force  of  the  enemy  were  attacked  in  order  to 
corrode  and  paralyze  them. 

With  big  battalions  it  is  neither  difficult  nor  very 
risky  to  wage  war  and  fight  battles.  But  in  the  first 
three  years  of  the  war  the  Field-Marshal  and  I  never 
foimd  oiurselves  in  that  enviable  position.  We  could 
but  act  according  to  oiu*  duty  and  conscience,  and  adopt 
the  measiu-es  we  deemed  necessary  to  gain  the  victory. 
And  diuing  this  period  success  crowned  our  efforts. 

When,  in  March  191 8,  we  attacked  with  the  balance 
of  numbers  more  in  our  favor  than  had  previously  been 
the  case,  our  strength  sufficed  to  win  great  victories, 
but  not  to  bring  about  a  rapid  decision.  Then  it 
dwindled,  while  the  enemy  grew  stronger. 

II 

This  world-wide  War  of  Nations  made  enormous  de- 
mands on  us  Germans,  on  whom  its  whole  overwhelm- 


MY  THOUGHTS  AND  ACTIONS  3 

ing  burden  fell.  Every  individual  had  to  give  his  very 
utmost,  if  we  were  to  win.  We  had  literally  to  fight 
and  work  to  the  last  drop  of  blood  and  sweat,  and  with 
it  all  maintain  our  fighting  spirit  and,  above  all,  oiu* 
confidence  in  victory — a  hard  but  imperative  necessity 
in  spite  of  the  dearth  of  food  which  the  enemy  inflicted 
upon  us,  and  the  onslaught  of  his  propaganda,  which 
was  of  amazing  force,  if  unobtrusive. 

Our  army  and  navy  are  rooted  in  the  nation  as  is 
the  oak  in  German  soil.  They  Hve  upon  the  home- 
land, and  from  it  they  draw  their  strength.  They  can 
keep,  but  cannot  produce,  what  they  need,  and  can 
only  fight  with  the  moral,  material,  and  physical  means 
which  the  country  provides.  These  means  make  vic- 
tory possible — faithful  devotion  and  unselfish  self- 
sacrifice  in  the  daily  contest  with  the  miseries  of  war. 
They  alone  could  secure  Germany's  final  success. 
With  them  our  country  waged  the  titanic  conflict 
against  the  world,  even  allowing  for  tihe  assistance  of 
our  allies  and  the  exploitations  of  occupied  territories 
as  far  as  the  laws  of  land  warfare  permitted. 

The  army  and  navy  had  thus  to  look  to  the  home- 
land for  its  constant  renewal  and  rejuvenation  in 
morale,  niimbers,  and  equipment. 

It  was  essential  to  maintain  the  morale  and  war 
spirit  of  those  at  home  at  the  highest  pitch.  Woe  to 
us  if  they  should  fail!  The  longer  the  war  lasted  the 
greater  were  the  danger  and  the  difficulties,  and  the 
more  imperious  grew  the  demands  of  the  army  and 
navy  for  spiritual  and  moral  reinforcement. 

The  very  last  resoiu-ces,  both  in  men  and  material, 
had  to  be  made  available,  and  devoted  to  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war. 

These  were  enormous  tasks  for  the  country.  The 
homeland  was  not  only  the  basis  on  which  oiu"  military 
power  rested,  and  which  must  therefore  be  carefully 


4  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

safeguarded;  it  was  the  life-giving  source  which  had 
to  be  kept  clear,  lest  it  lose  anything  of  that  virtue 
wherewith  it  steeled  the  nerves  and  renewed  the  strength 
of  the  army  and  navy.  The  nation  was  in  need  of  that 
inner  spiritual  strength  which  alone  enabled  it  to  rein- 
force the  army  and  navy.  The  power  of  the  nation 
and  that  of  the  armed  forces  were  so  intermingled 
that  it  was  impossible  to  separate  them.  The  fight- 
ing efficiency  of  the  forces  before  the  enemy  depended 
absolutely  upon  that  of  the  people  at  home. 

That  meant  that  at  home  every  one  must  work  and 
live  for  the  war  in  a  way  that  had  never  been  known 
before.  It  was  the  duty  of  the  Government,  and  espe- 
cially the  Imperial  Chancellor,  to  direct  and  foster 
that  spirit. 

Upon  this  Minister  devolved  another  important  war 
task — the  direction  of  operations  against  the  enemy's 
home  fronts.  Should  Germany  neglect  to  use  this 
powerful  weapon,  the  effects  of  which  she  daily  expe- 
rienced in  her  own  body?  Should  we  not  attack  the 
morale  of  oiu-  enemies  in  the  same  way  as  they  were, 
unfortunately  but  so  successfully,  attacking  ours? 
This  contest  had  first  to  be  transferred  to  neutral 
countries,  and  thence  into  hostile  territory.  But  Ger- 
many always  lacked  one  mighty  means  of  propaganda — • 
starvation  of  the  enemy  peoples  by  blockade. 

The  Government  had  great  problems  to  solve  if  the 
war  was  to  be  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion.  No 
greater  demand  has  ever  been  made  on  a  German 
government  than  to  place  the  united  strength  of  the 
German  people  at  the  disposal  of  the  Emperor  in  order 
to  secure  victory  in  the  field  and  carry  on  the  war 
against  the  spirit  and  morale  of  the  enemy  nations. 
Thus  the  action  and  conduct  of  the  Government  at- 
tained decisive  importance.  This  meant  that  Govern- 
ment, Reichstag,  and  people  must  devote  themselves 


MY  THOUGHTS  AND  ACTIONS  5 

utterly  to  the  idea  of  war.  That  was  the  only  way : 
the  power  to  wage  war  had  its  source  at  home  and 
found  its  expression  at  the  front. 

The  great  aim  of  peace  could  be  attained  only  by 
relentless  prosecution  of  the  war.  By  working  for  the 
war,  therefore,  the  Government  at  the  same  time  paved 
the  way  for  peace. 

Soon  after  we  were  summoned  to  assume  the  supreme 
command,  and  had  time  to  consider  the  situation  in  all 
its  bearings,  the  Field-Marshal  and  I  laid  our  views  as 
to  the  requirements  of  the  army  and  navy  before  the 
Imperial  Chancellor,  and  discussed  the  problems  which 
they  raised  for  the  country.  We  called  upon  him  to 
co-operate  in  prosecuting  the  war,  and  were  buoyed  up 
with  hope  in  spite  of  the  menacing  aspect  of  the 
situation. 

The  Government  had  welcomed  our  appointment  to 
the  supreme  command.  We  met  the  authorities  with 
frank  confidence.  Soon,  however,  two  schools  of 
thought,  represented  by  their  views  and  ours,  began 
to  come  into  conflict.  This  divergence  of  view  was 
a  great  disappointment  to  us  and  vastly  increased  our 
burden. 

In  Berlin  they  w^re  unable  to  accept  our  opinion  as 
to  the  necessity  of  certain  war  measures,  or  to  steel 
their  wills  to  the  point  of  magnetizing  the  whole  nation 
and  directing  its  life  and  thought  to  the  single  idea  of 
war  and  victory.  The  great  democracies  of  the  Entente 
achieved  this.  With  an  iron  will,  Gambetta  in  1870- 
71,  and  Clemenceau  and  Lloyd  George  in  this  war, 
enrolled  their  peoples  in  the  service  of  victory.  Our 
Government  failed  to  recognize  this  inflexible  purpose, 
and  the  definite  intention  of  the  Entente  to  destroy 
us.  It  should  never  have  doubted  it.  Instead  of  con- 
centrating all  our  resources  and  using  them  to  the 
utmost  in  order  to  achieve  peace  on  the  battle-field,  as 


6  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

the  very  natiire  of  war  demands,  the  authorities  in 
Berlin  followed  a  different  path :  they  talked  more  and 
more  about  reconciliation  and  understanding,  without 
giving  our  own  people  a  strong  warlike  impetus  at  the 
same  time.  In  Berlin  they  believed,  or  deceived  them- 
selves into  believing,  that  the  hostile  nations  were 
longing  to  hear  words  of  reconciliation  and  would  urge 
their  governments  toward  peace.  So  little  did  they 
understand  the  mind  of  our  enemies,  both  people  and 
governments,  their  strong  national  feeling,  and  unbend- 
ing will.  In  Berlin  they  had  learned  nothing  from  his- 
tory. They  only  felt  their  own  impotence  in  face  of 
the  enemy's  spirit;  they  lost  the  hope  of  victory,  and 
drifted.  The  desire  for  peace  became  stronger  than 
the  will  to  fight  for  victory.  The  road  to  peace  was 
blocked  by  the  will  of  the  enemy,  whose  aim  was  our 
destruction;  in  seeking  it  the  Government  neglected 
to  lead  the  nation  by  the  hard  road  to  victory. 

The  Reichstag  and  the  people  found  themselves 
without  that  strong  leadership  which,  generally  speak- 
ing, they  longed  for,  and  slid  with  the  Government 
down  the  slippery  way.  The  tremendous  questions 
arising  out  of  the  war  were  more  and  more  thrust  on 
one  side,  for  people's  minds  were  occupied  with  ques- 
tions of  internal  politics  and  thoughts  of  self.  This 
meant  the  ruin  of  our  country. 

Possibly  the  revolution  which  is  now  shattering 
Europe  may  usher  in  a  new  world  order  and  make  the 
thoughts  and  feelings  of  the  nations  more  ready  for 
a  peace  of  justice  and  reconciliation.  But  certainly 
the  armistice  and  peace  conditions  point  the  other 
way.  In  any  case,  during  the  time  I  v/as  First  Quarter- 
master-General there  were  no  signs  of  any  change. 

The  Supreme  Command  took  the  same  view  as  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  who  supported  his  demand  for  a  great 
American  naval  program  with  the  comment  that  he 


MY  THOUGHTS  AND  ACTIONS  7 

would  think  it  senseless  for  America  to  adjust  her 
naval  program  to  a  future  world  policy,  since  the  latter 
had  not  yet  been  decided. 

In  November  191 8  the  president  of  the  Soldiers' 
Coimcil  of  the  Fourth  Army  wrote: 

"Some  people  may  think  that  the  Revolution  can  be 
btiilt  up  on  ideals.  Those  who  are  at  the  front  must 
agree  that  the  world-policy  of  the  Entente  at  the  pres- 
ent time  is  infected  by  materiaHsm." 

The  astonished  world,  its  ideals  shattered,  now  per- 
ceives this  clearly.  The  German  nation  has  been  mis- 
led, and  is  now  paying  for  its  delusion  with  its  life. 

General  Headquarters  urged  the  view  that  it  would 
be  time  enough  for  us  to  lay  down  our  arms  and  think 
about  understandings  when  human  nature  had  under- 
gone a  change;  otherwise  we  w^ere  bound  to  suffer. 
The  palm  of  peace  is  no  defense  against  the  sword. 
As  long  as  human  beings,  and,  above  all,  our  enemies, 
remained  the  same  as  mankind  has  ever  been,  Germany, 
and  in  any  event  the  Field-Marshal  and  I,  as  the  re- 
sponsible military  commanders,  must  retain  our  hold 
of  the  sword  and  keep  it  sharp.  It  was,  therefore,  oiu- 
serious  duty,  in  dealing  with  the  Government,  to  insist 
on  the  necessary  war  measures  being  carried  out,  and 
to  try  to  infuse  into  it  that  degree  of  determina- 
tion which  we  thought  was  required. 

In  all  questions  General  Headquarteis  addressed 
itself  to  the  constitutional  authorities.  The  war 
required  rapid  and  far-reaching  decisions  at  any 
moment,  and  thus  stimulated  that  quality  of  resolu- 
tion on  which  it  was  always  making  demands.  In 
Berlin  the  old  peace  routine  held  sway.  Replies,  even 
to  the  most  important  questions,  often  did  not  arrive 
for  weeks.  In  consequence  of  this  extraordinary  dila- 
toriness  on  the  part  of  the  Berlin  authorities,  and  of 
their  failure  to  grasp  the  necessities  of  the  war,  the  tone 


8  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

of  our  correspondence  at  times  became  somewhat  acri- 
monious. This  we  regretted,  but  we  were  consumed 
with  justifiable  impatience.  Immediate  action  was 
called  for,  since  it  was  often  a  question  of  averting 
some  irreparable  disaster. 

In  peace-time  the  Imperial  Government  was  supreme. 
The  Foreign  Office  considered  itself  above  all  criticism. 
The  Government  departments  only  gradually  accus- 
tomed themselves  to  the  idea  that  on  the  outbreak  of 
war  a  new  authority,  General  Headquarters,  had  come 
into  being,  which  not  only  shared  the  responsibility 
with  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  but  bore  such  an  enor- 
mous proportion  of  it  that  it  had  necessarily  to  try  to 
make  up  for  their  inertia  by  displaying  greater  energy 
on  its  own  part.  I  could  have  wished  that  the  Govern- 
ment had  recognized  this  simple  situation  as  clearly. 
The  position  of  General  von  Moltke  and  General  von 
Falkenhayn  in  relation  to  the  Government  was  essen- 
tially the  same  as  that  of  the  Field-Marshal  and  myself. 

The  Government  went  its  own  way,  and,  as  regards 
the  wishes  of  General  Headquarters,  neglected  nothing 
which  it  considered  essential.  But  much  was  left  un- 
done that  had  been  insisted  on  as  urgently  necessary 
for  the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

Right  after  war  broke  out.  General  Headquarters 
was  obliged  to  take  action  in  connection  with  several 
matters  which  were  really  the  sphere  of  other  authori- 
ties. The  press,  the  censorship,  precautions  against 
spies  and  sabotage  at  home,  dealing  with  revolution- 
aries— all  these  wide  fields  were  left  to  the  unaided 
efforts  of  the  military  authorities,  to  the  detriment  of 
the  conduct  of  the  war.  Uncertainty  as  to  their  powers 
and  lack  of  personnel  checked  the  initiative  of  the 
authorities  concerned.  Their  strong  sense  of  responsi- 
bility urged  the  General  Staff  to  creative  work.  It  was 
better  able  to  meet  the  requirements  in  personnel  than 


MY  THOUGHTS  AND  ACTIONS  9 

other  departments,  particularly  from  among  officers  of 
the  reserve  on  leave  with  previous  training.  And  so 
the  direction  of  this  work  fell  into  the  hands  of  the 
General  Staff.  The  execution,  however,  often  re- 
mained in  the  hands  of  the  home  authorities.  The 
line  of  demarcation,  within  which  these  authorities 
considered  themselves  to  be  solely  responsible,  was 
not  clearly  defined.  Friction  was  unavoidable.  This 
would  have  been  avoided  by  that  resolute  leadership 
at  home  for  which  General  Headquarters  often  asked. 

III 

As  First  Quartermaster-General  it  was  often  my  duty, 
personally,  to  lay  the  demands  of  General  Headquar- 
ters before  the  Government. 

Of  pohtical  personages  and  parties  I  took  no  ac- 
count. Those  parties  which  were  forever  talking 
about  "understanding,"  instead  of  fostering  the  war- 
like spirit  of  the  nation,  did  not  recognize  the  need 
for  the  demands  put  forward.  The  Government  shared 
their  views.  And  thus  the  Government  and  the 
Majority  parties  found  themselves  in  agreement  and 
adopted  an  antagonistic  attitude  toward  me  and  my 
military  ideas  and  wishes. 

It  was  obvious  that  I  had  more  supporters  among 
those  parties  which,  like  myself,  regarded  an  under- 
standing as  impossible  in  view  of  the  enemy's  deter- 
mination to  destroy  us,  and  therefore  wished  the  war 
to  be  carried  on  with  the  greatest  energy.  I  never 
asked  for  their  support,  but  they  trusted  me.  These 
parties  belonged  to  the  Right — the  Minority.  And  so, 
although  I  thought  only  of  the  war,  the  rest  labeled  me 
"Reactionary."  Had  I  found  my  own  ideas  accepted 
by  the  democratic  parties,  I  should  have  found  sup- 
porters among  them  also;   in  which  case  the  "Right" 


lo  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

would  perhaps  have  abused  me  as  a  "Democrat,"  and 
as  a  matter  of  fact  this  happened  often  enough. 

I  am  neither  a  "Reactionary"  nor  a  "Democrat." 
All  I  stand  for  is  the  prosperity,  the  cultural  progress, 
and  national  strength  of  the  German  people,  authority 
and  order.  These  are  the  pillars  on  which  the  future 
of  otu*  country  rests.  During  the  war  this  was  oiu* 
aim — to  develop  the  greatest  energy  in  its  prosecution 
and  so  secure  our  military  existence,  and  with  it  our 
equally  important  economic  existence,  both  during  and 
after  the  war. 

The  inertik  of  the  Imperial  Government  in  so  many 
matters  had  unpleasant  consequences  for  me,  in  that 
ill-wishers,  and  sometimes  even  over-zealous  friends, 
dragged  me  into  the  strife  of  parties,  although  I  was 
in  no  way  concerned  and  never  put  myself  forward  in 
any  way.  What  I  did  was  misrepresented  and  criti- 
cized without  reference  to  circumstances.  My  actions 
and  statements  were  misinterpreted.  Vague  and  totally 
unfounded  assertions  were  spread  broadcast.  At  first, 
my  frank  and  soldierly  way  of  thinking  prompted  me 
to  dismiss  all  this  with  a  shrug  of  the  shoulders ;  it  was 
not  worth  notice  in  view  of  the  great  work  in  which  I 
was  engaged.  Later  on  I  regretted  these  occurrences, 
but  was  unable  to  do  anything  to  prevent  them.  I 
repeatedly  asked  the  press  to  leave  me  alone.  Beyond 
that,  I  was  too  busy  to  take  any  action  myself.  Be- 
sides, I  had  no  platform  from  which  to  speak,  and, 
above  all,  I  gave  the  German  nation  credit  for  more 
sense  of  the  stem  reality  of  affairs.  But  it  suited  the 
authorities  to  have  discovered  a  lightning-conductor. 
Instead  of  protecting  me  they  gave  free  rein  to  the  agi- 
tators, represented  me  as  a  dictator,  put  everything 
down  to  General  Headquarters,  and  thus  embittered  the 
feeling  against  me.  That  was  the  position,  broadly 
speaking.     The  two  Chancellors,  Doctor  Michaelis  and 


MY  THOUGHTS  AND  ACTIONS  ii 

Count  von  Hertling,  were  far  above  any  such  intrigues, 
but  the  irreparable  mischief — in  view  of  my  military 
position,  it  was  nothing  short  of  a  national  disaster — 
was  already  done. 

It  became  more  and  more  the  fashion  to  hold  General 
Headquarters — which  in  this  case  meant  myself — re- 
sponsible for  our  troubles  and  miseries.  For  example, 
my  name  was  associated,  not  only  with  the  unavoidable 
hardships,  but  even  with  some  of  the  abominations  of 
the  home-rationing  system.  Indeed,  I  was  represented 
as  their  author  and  blamed  accordingly.  Neither  the 
Quartermaster-General  nor  the  Intendant-General,  nor 
I,  had  anything  to  do  with  the  food-supply  at  home, 
which  was  entirely  in  the  hands  of  the  War  Ministry 
and  the  Food  Control  Office. 

After  my  resignation  I  heard  from  leaders  of  the 
Social  Democratic  party  that  I  had  been  responsible 
for  the  manner  in  which  the  military  governors  had 
administered  the  regulations  dealing  with  the  right  of 
public  meeting.  This  was  entirely  outside  my 
province. 

The  following  case  is  typical.     In  the  winter  of  1916- 

1 7  I  was  blamed  for  the  shortage  of  transport  and  coal. 
This  was  mainly  due  to  insufficient  provision  having 
been  made  before  I  was  appointed  to  General  Head- 
quarters. In  February  191 7  I  urged  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  Coal-Controller.  Unfortunately  the  right 
man  was  not  discovered  at  once,  and  another  had  to 
be  selected  later  on.  In  the  summer  of  191 7  fifty 
thousand  miners  were  released  by  General  Headquar- 
ters from  service  at  the  front.     In  the  winter  of  191 7- 

18  house-fuel  was  more  plentiful  than  in  the  previous 
one;  but  General  Headquarters,  which  had  taken  de- 
cisive measures  and  was  certainly  more  responsible  for 
the  improved  situation  than  for  the  bad  conditions  of 
191 6-1 7,  got  neither  thanks  nor  credit.     That  did  not 


12  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

fit  in  with  the  ideas  of  those  who  were  agitating  against 
me,  or  of  those  others  who,  though  better  informed 
themselves,  allowed  the  agitation  to  go  on. 

The  enormous  responsibility  I  had  to  bear  made  mi 
long  for  the  conclusion  of  hostilities ;  how  could  it  hava 
been  otherwise?  I  often  expressed  myself  in  that 
sense.  But  unless  we  got  a  peace  which  safeguarded 
the  existence  of  our  country,  the  war  would  be  lost.  I 
could  not  see  how  peace  was  possible  unless  the  enemy 
also  was  ready  for  it.  I  thought  it  very  dangerous  for 
us  to  be  alone  in  announcing  a  desire  for  peace. 

I  was  fully  aware  that  nations  do  not  get  peace  merely 
by  talking  about  it,  or  even  heartily  longing  for  it.  The 
pacifist  idea  of  a  peace  by  understanding  was  considered 
by  many  to  be  a  weapon  against  us.  Many  others 
sincerely  believed  in  it,  being  moved  by  that  spirit  of 
exalted  idealism  which  has  not  yet  been  realized  in  this 
world  of  strife.  But  did  these  idealists  know  whether 
the  enemy  thought  as  they  did,  and  if  he  did  not,  was 
it  not  clear  that  by  spreading  the  notion  that  they  could 
obtain  such  a  peace  at  any  time,  they  were  leading  the 
way  to  irreparable  disaster,  because  since  human  natiire 
is  made  that  way  they  were  inevitably  weakening  our 
war  spirit,  which  should  at  all  costs  have  been  strength- 
ened ?  They  made  our  people  yearn  for  peace,  without 
making  the  enemy  ready  for  it.  In  fact,  they  made 
peace  more  difficult  of  attainment,  as  the  Entente 
knew  all  about  the  state  of  feeling  in  our  country,  and 
used  it  for  its  own  purposes.  These  idealists  also 
impeded  the  efforts  of  General  Headquarters  to  make 
the  enemy  more  inclined  for  peace  by  those  means 
which  alone  lead  to  success  in  war.  In  spite  of  all  their 
idealism,  they  are  responsible  for  the  misfortune  of  our 
country. 

I  know  of  no  time  when  the  attitude  of  the  enemy 
justified  our  hope  for  a  fair  and  just  peace  of  under- 


LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY  13 

standing.  Everything  that  has  been  said  or  written 
on  this  subject  is  wide  of  the  mark.  The  Government 
never  indicated  to  General  Headquarters  a  possible 
opening  for  such  a  peace. 

No  doubt  we  could  at  any  moment  have  had  such  a 
peace  as  has  now  been  forced  upon  us.  What  Chan- 
cellor, what  statesman,  what  man  with  true  German 
feeling  in  his  blood  would  have  even  thought  of  it? 
But  every  one  might  have  known  perfectly  well  that  no 
other  peace  was  to  be  had,  and  so  there  was  nothing 
for  it  but  to  fight  for  victory,  once  the  war  had  started. 

Toward  the  end  Count  Czernin  evidently  thought  as 
I  did,  although  he,  too,  would  not  admit  the  truth.  In 
his  speech  of  December  11,  191 8,  he  said: 

"The  best  we  could  hope  for  was  to  take  advantage 
of  a  favorable  military  situation,  such  as  might  still 
be  expected,  to  propose  a  peace  which,  while  involving 
considerable  sacrifices,  would  have  perhaps  had  a  chance 
of  being  accepted  by  the  enemy.  But  the  more  brilliant 
their  successes  the  more  exacting  did  the  German  mili- 
tary leaders  become,  and  after  their  great  victories  it 
was  less  possible  than  ever  to  persuade  them  to  such  a 
policy  of  renunciation. 

"I  believe  that  there  actually  was  one,  and  only  one, 
moment  in  the  course  of  this  war  when  such  an  attempt 
really  seemed  very  likely  to  succeed,  and  that  was  after 
the  famous  battle  of  Gorlice." 

The  battle  of  Gorlice  was  fought  in  May  191 5. 
Subsequently,  therefore — according  to  Count  Czernin 
— there  was  no  chance  of  peace  at  all,  even  at  the  cost 
of  considerable  sacrifices.  And  even  if  there  had  been 
a  chance,  either  in  May  19 15  or  later,  not  only  the 
German  military  party,  but  almost  the  whole  German 
people  would  have  refused  it  so  long  as  they  felt  proudly 
confident  of  their  strength.  This  confidence  and 
strength  should  have  been  fostered  by  the  statesmen, 


14  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

to  keep  the  will  to  victory  alive  in  the  country,  and 
preserve  it  from  the  immeasurable  disaster  of  defeat. 
The  determination  of  our  enemies  being  what  it  was, 
there  could  be  no  middle  course.  Our  will  in  the 
matter  was  of  no  account.  That  of  the  enemy  was 
not  yet  broken.  When  this  had  been  effected  by  mili- 
tary victory  the  diplomats  might  talk  about  recon- 
ciliation— if  they  still  wanted  to. 


IV 

For  four  years  the  Field-Marshal  and  I  worked 
together  like  one  man,  in  the  most  perfect  harmony. 
With  the  most  profound  satisfaction  I  saw  him  become 
the  German  national  hero  of  this  war,  the  very  per- 
sonification of  victory  for  every  German. 

The  Field-Marsha]  permitted  me  to  participate  in  his 
glory.  At  the  celebration  of  his  seventieth  birthday, 
on  October  2,  191 7,  he  expressed  this  sentiment  in  par- 
ticularly touching  words. 

The  Commander-in-chief  bears  the  final  responsi- 
bility. He  bears  it  before  the  world,  and,  what  is 
harder,  before  himself,  his  own  army,  and  his  own 
country.  As  Chief  of  Staff  and  First  Quartermaster- 
General  I  shared  his  responsibility  to  the  fullest  extent, 
and  have  always  been  fully  conscious  of  the  fact.  I 
am  ready  to  answer  for  my  actions  at  any  time. 

Our  strategical  and  tactical  views  were  in  complete 
agreement,  and  harmonious  and  confident  co-operation 
was  the  natiu-al  result.  After  discussion  with  my 
assistants  I  used  to  lay  my  ideas  for  the  initiation  and 
conduct  of  all  operations  briefly  and  concisely  before 
the  Field-Marshal.  I  have  the  satisfaction  of  knowing 
that  from  Tannenberg  to  my  resignation  in  October 
19 1 8  he  always  agreed  with  my  views  and  approved 
my  draft  orders. 


MY  THOUGHTS  AND  ACTIONS  15 

Our  conception  of  the  character  of  this  War  of  Nations 
and  the  necessary  measures  it  involved  were  also 
identical,  and  so  were  oiu*  views  on  the  peace  question. 
Like  me,  he  strove  to  secure  the  life  of  the  German 
people  against  fresh  aggression.  He  put  the  whole 
weight  of  his  personality  behind  these  views. 

Those  to  whom  the  authority  of  General  Headquar- 
ters was,  or  might  be,  an  obstacle  in  the  attainment  of 
their  own  selfish  ends  sought  to  drive  a  wedge  between 
the  Field-Marshal  and  myself.  They  dared  not  attack 
him,  so  they  thought  it  politic  to  strike  at  me.  They 
invented  differences  between  his  views  and  actions  and 
mine.  According  to  them,  he  personified  the  good  prin- 
ciple, I  the  evil  one.  Those  who  spread  such  notions 
should  at  least  have  made  him  jointly  responsible  for 
all  the  alleged  mischief.  Otherwise  they  undermine 
his  position  and  obviously  present  him  as  a  man  who 
could  not  possibly  possess  all  the  great  qualities  they 
ascribe  to  him,  qualities  he  does  most  certainly  possess. 

The  reputation  of  the  Field-Marshal  stands  secure 
enough  in  the  hearts  of  the  German  people. 

I  have  always  held  him  in  honor  and  served  him 
faithfully,  and  I  esteem  his  noble  qualities  of  mind  not 
less  highly  than  his  devotion  to  his  king  and  his  readi- 
ness to  assume  responsibility. 


Mine  has  been  a  life  of  work  for  our  country,  the 
Emperor,  and  the  army.  During  the  four  years  of 
war  I  lived  only  for  the  war. 

My  days  followed  a  regular  plan.  All  the  time  I 
was  Chief  of  the  Staff  in  the  East  and  had  direct  control 
of  troops,  everything  was  determined  by  the  require- 
ments of  the  military  situation.  I  was  in  the  office 
from  six  or  seven  in  the  morning  until  late  at  night. 


i6  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

When  I  was  First  Quartermaster-General  I  used  to 
start  work  when  the  front  was  quiet — about  eight 
o'clock.  The  Field-Marshal  arrived  perhaps  an  hour 
later,  and  we  would  briefly  discuss  military  events  and 
plans  and  any  pending  questions. 

At  twelve  noon  we  made  our  report  to  His  Majesty 
the  Emperor. 

At  one  sharp  we  went  to  luncheon,  which  lasted  half 
or  three-quarters  of  an  hour.  Before  half  past  three 
I  was  again  in  the  office.  At  eight  we  had  dinner,  and 
after  an  interval  of  an  hour  and  a  half  we  resumed 
work  until  twelve  or  one  at  night. 

This  monotony  was  but  seldom  interrupted.  Even 
during  my  four  or  five  days'  war  leave  I  was  not  alto- 
gether free  of  duty. 

I  was  in  telephonic  and  telegraphic  communication 
with  all  parts  of  the  front  and  with  the  General  Head- 
quarters of  otir  allies.  The  armies  sent  in  regular 
morning  and  evening  reports,  but  continuous  reports 
were  furnished  when  anything  unusual  occurred. 

The  Chief  of  Field  Telegraphs  in  the  East,  Colonel 
Lehmann,  and  later  the  Chief  of  Field  Telegraphs  for 
the  whole  army,  Major-General  Hesse,  rendered  me 
comprehensive  and  effective  assistance.  The  tele- 
phone formations  belonging  to  the  staff  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-chief in  the  East,  and  the  Field  Telegraph 
Service  of  General  Headquarters,  which  were  respon- 
sible for  the  details  of  intercommunication,  worked 
extraordinarily  well. 

On  the  one  hand  it  was  necessary  to  obtain  a  clear 
idea  of  all  events  that  took  place  on  any  part  of  the 
enormously  extended  fronts,  but  on  the  other  hand 
it  was  uncommonly  difficult  to  feel  the  pulse  of  the 
fighting  immediately.  But  it  was  absolutely  essential 
that  General  Headquarters  should  be  informed  of  all 
important  events  at  once,  as  only  too  often  the  shortage 


MY  THOUGHTS  AND  ACTIONS  17 

cf  reserves  obliged  us  to  make  immediate  decisions  of 
the  very  greatest  importance. 

The  work  of  commanding  the  troops,  looking  after 
the  welfare  of  the  army,  and  maintaining  fighting 
efficiency  at  home,  took  precedence  of  everything  else. 
Questions  of  future  military  and  poHtical  policy  were 
regarded  as  secondary. 

The  working  hours  were  absorbed  by  my  own  work, 
reports  by  my  subordinate  directors  and  heads  of  de- 
partments and  services,  and  discussions. 

I  have  the  pleasantest  memories  of  our  work  and 
social  life  together,  both  on  my  staff  in  the  East  and 
at  General  Headquarters. 

The  enormous  amount  of  work,  together  with  the 
heavy  responsibility  which  devolved  upon  me  made 
it  imperative  for  me  to  surround  myself  with  indepen- 
dent, upright  men,  on  whom  I  could  call  to  express  their 
opinions  freely  and  frankly.  They  certainly  did  so — 
very  emphatically,  too,  on  occasions.  Our  co-operation 
was  based  upon  mutual  confidence,  and  my  collaborators 
ever  stood  faithfully  and  firmly  by  me.  They  were  my 
active  and  devoted  assistants,  imbued  with  the  highest 
sense  of  duty.  The  final  decision,  of  course,  rested 
with  me,  for  responsibility  permitted  of  no  hesitation. 
War  demanded  rapid  action.  But  decision  did  not 
mean  despotism,  and  when  I  did  disagree  with  the 
proposals  of  my  assistants  I  never  hurt  their  feelings. 
In  such  cases,  and  when  divergent  views  had  to  be 
reconciled,  I  endeavored,  without  being  vague,  to  recog- 
nize the  justification  for  different  opinions.  The  fame 
and  great  reputations  of  my  associates  have  always  been 
a  matter  for  sincere  satisfaction  to  me.  I  always  was, 
and  am  still,  of  the  opinion  that  this  war  was  so  tre- 
mendous and  made  such  great  demands  that  one  man 
alone  could  not  possibly  cope  with  it.  It  gave  plenty 
of  opportunity  for  brilliant  work. 


18  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

My  chief  assistant  in  the  East  was  Lieutenant- 
Colonel,  now  Major-General,  Hoffmann,  an  intellectual 
and  progressive  officer.  My  opinion  of  him  as  a  soldier 
is  best  shown  by  the  fact  that  I  suggested  him  as  my 
successor  when  I  was  appointed  to  General  Head- 
quarters at  the  end  of  August  191 6.  In  that  position 
he  justified  his  selection  as  brilliantly  as  he  had  when 
acting  as  my  senior  staff -officer. 

At  General  Headquarters  I  selected  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Wetzel]  to  supervise  operations.  I  had  met 
him  previously  and  knew  his  value.  He  was  famiJiar 
with  the  Western  front,  where  he  had  distinguished 
himself  as  senior  staff-officer  and  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff  of  the  3d  Corps,  and  had  done  particularly 
well  before  Verdun.  He  has  a  splendid  soldierly  spirit 
and  a  strong  and  faithful  character.  With  his  enter- 
prising and  fertile  mind  and  the  care  he  put  into  his 
work,  he  proved  an  excellent  and  valued  assistant.  In 
September  191 8  I  found  it  necessary  to  redistribute 
the  staff  in  order  to  allow  myself  a  little  more  leisure; 
for  this  reason,  and  no  other,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wet- 
zeU  had  to  leave  me.  We  separated  with  the  highest 
regard  on  both  sides. 

He  was  succeeded  by  Colonel  Heye  and  Major  von 
Stulpnagel.  The  latter  had  served  on  my  staff  in  Ber- 
lin for  a  long  time.  They  were  both  strong-minded 
and  clear-headed  soldiers.  With  them  I  passed  through 
the  hardest  time  a  soldier  can  experience;  it  was  the 
period  when  it  became  clear  that  we  could  no  longer 
win  the  war  in  a  military  sense.  To  have  to  leave 
them  just  then  was  the  greatest  trial  I  had  to  bear. 

Questions  of  organization  were  dealt  with  chiefly  by 
Majors  von  Vollard-Bockelberg,  Freiherr  von  dem 
Bussche  and  Frahnert,  both  of  them  men  with  enor- 
mous enthusiasm,  foresight,  and  capacity  for  work. 
Their  work  was  of  a  high  order. 


MY  THOUGHTS  AND  ACTIONS  19 

Three  of  my  assistants  came  prominently  before  the 
public.     This  was  due  to  the  nature  of  their  work. 

Colonel  Bauer,  a  man  of  remarkable  personality, 
shared  my  view  that  the  foundations  of  ultimate  suc- 
cess were  to  be  sought  in  the  war  efficiency  of  the  peo- 
ple at  home,  and  did  all  he  could  to  foster  and  increase 
it.  He  played  a  decisive  part  in  developing  the  artil- 
lery. It  was  his  duty  to  submit  demands  for  war 
material  to  the  home  authorities,  and  to  obtain,  with 
the  assistance  of  employers  and  workmen,  a  clear  idea 
of  the  capability  of  our  industries.  His  work  was 
closely  related  to  that  of  the  War  Ministry. 

His  co-operation  and  advice  were  also  of  the  greatest 
value  in  matters  of  military  economy  and  tactics. 

The  head  of  the  Political  Department  was  General 
von  Bartenwerffer,  a  calm  and  clear-headed  officer,  im- 
bued with  fervid  patriotism.  One  important  duty  of 
the  General  Staff  in  the  field  was  to  keep  an  eye  on  the 
military  policy  of  neutrals  and  enemies,  and  refer  all 
political  questions  to  which  it  gave  rise  to  the  Im- 
perial Chancellor;  it  also  dealt  with  political  events  in 
the  occupied  territories,  in  so  far  as  they  were  adminis- 
tered by  General  Headquarters.  The  frontiers  which 
we  might  acquire  by  the  war  were  a  matter  of  the 
greatest  concern  to  the  future  security  of  the  country, 
and  all  questions  connected  with  them  formed  an  im- 
portant part  of  the  work  of  General  Headquarters.  All 
correspondence  relating  to  peace  questions  was  con- 
ducted by  the  Political  Department. 

The  third  was  Lieutenant-Colonel  Nicolai,  a  man  of 
unfailing  industry  and  devotion  to  duty,  and  gifted 
with  organizing  talent.  His  duties  were  multifarious, 
perhaps  too  much  so.  He  was  responsible  for  the 
military  direction  of  the  press,  and  the  cognate  duty 
of  watching  and  fostering  the  morale  of  the  army  and 
the  people  at  home,  so  far  as  this  could  be  done  by 


20  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

military  authority.  In  both  these  functions  collabora- 
tion with  the  Government  authorities  was  essential. 
We  were  unsuccessful.  And  so,  as  we  knew  only  too 
well,  the  direction  of  the  press  and  the  enlightenment 
of  the  public  remained  mere  patchwork.  The  military 
censorship  of  the  press  was  another  of  the  functions  of 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Nicolai  and  his  subordinates.  This 
is  one  of  the  necessary  evils  of  war,  and  from  its  very 
i  nature  satisfies  nobody.  I  was  very  sorry  that  Gen- 
eral Headquarters  had  to  undertake  this  duty,  but  all 
other  authorities  refused  to  have  anything  to  do  with  it. 

The  other  great  branch  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Nico- 
lai's  work  consisted  of  the  Secret  Intelligence  Service, 
prevention  of  spying,  supervision  of  post,  telegraph, 
and  telephone  services,  and  the  adoption  of  measures 
against  industrial  spying  and  sabotage.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Nicolai's  Intelligence  Service  was  of  the  greatest 
value  to  the  supreme  command.  Uncertainty  is  of  the 
very  nature  of  war.  Even  the  enemy,  in  spite  of  his 
far  more  extensive  agencies,  never  knew  our  intentions. 
We  always  surprised  him,  except  on  July  15,  191 8 — • 
an  occasion  when  we  made  things  too  easy  for  him. 

Major  von  Ranch,  an  experienced  and  careful  staff- 
officer,  was  at  the  head  of  the  "Foreign  Armies"  sec- 
tion, whose  duty  it  was  to  collect  information  about 
the  enemy  and  make  it  available  for  the  framing  of  our 
plans.  He  proved  himself  equal  to  his  responsible  task. 
In  this  direction  also  the  General  Staff  did  all  that 
could  reasonably  be  expected  of  it. 

On  my  staff  there  were  many  other  faithful  assistants, 
and  I  must  more  particularly  specify  Colonels  von 
Tieschowitz  and  von  Mertz,  Majors  von  Waldow, 
Crantz,  von  Harbou,  Hofmann,  Bartenwerffer,  Muths, 
Captains  Wever,  Gabriel,  Geyer,  von  Fischer-Treuen- 
feld,  von  Goszler,  von  Posek.     There  were  many  others. 

We  all  met  together  for  meals,  which  were  marked 


MY  THOUGHTS  AND  ACTIONS  ii 

by  peculiarly  intimate  and  pleasant  intercourse.  The 
Field-Marshal  was  fond  of  amusing  stories  and  lively 
conversation.  I  used  to  join  in,  but  liked  to  dis- 
cuss service  matters  also.  Of  course  we  took  the 
greatest  care  not  to  mention  anything  connected  with 
operations. 

We  often  had  visitors,  either  at  meals  or  only  in  the 
office.  Sometimes  guests  appeared  during  very  critical 
times.  I  remember  in  October  1914  some  gentlemen 
arrived  at  Radom  with  a  train-load  of  gifts  for  the 
troops,  and  talked  about  the  prospective  capture  of 
Warsaw,  while  at  that  very  moment  I  was  already 
contemplating  retreat.  On  such  occasions  guests  rather 
got  on  our  nerves,  but,  generally  speaking,  they  cheered 
us  up. 

From  officers  of  all  branches  and  belonging  to  all  the 
divisions  on  the  front  we  heard  how  things  were  going 
in  the  army,  sometimes  with  clearer  understanding 
than  from  long  official  reports.  I  attached  the  greatest 
importance  to  our  keeping  in  close  touch  with  the 
front,  and  received  many  hints  which  I  always  followed 
up.  I  was  particularly  fond  of  these  military  visits  and 
greatly  valued  them. 

Often  we  had  members  of  the  Government  from  Ber- 
lin and  the  states  of  the  Empire.  The  Imperial  Chan- 
cellor, Von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  paid  us  a  visit  at  Posen 
in  the  autumn  of  19 14,  and  again  in  February  191 5 
at  Lotzen.  The  other  Chancellors  also  came  to  see 
us  often.  Sometimes  we  had  visits  from  members  of 
the  Reichstag.  I  always  had  the  impression  that  these 
gentlemen  enjoyed  being  with  us,  whatever  party  they 
belonged  to.  Toward  them  and  other  private  individ- 
uals I  naturally  observed  the  necessary  discretion  in 
speaking  of  the  military  situation  and  of  my  ideas  on 
the  subject  of  peace. 

Representatives    of   industry,    commerce,    and    the 


22  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Employers'  and  Workmen's  Unions,  came  occasionally 
and  sat  at  our  table. 

Neutral  military  attaches  and  military  missions  were 
visiting  the  front;  German  and  foreign  reporters,  repre- 
sentatives of  the  press,  scientists,  and  artists,  all  visited 
us  at  various  times. 

At  the  table  of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East 
representatives  from  all  parts  of  East  and  West  Prussia 
were  particularly  frequent  visitors. 

Many  princes  were  our  guests  at  various  times. 

A  visit  from  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  was,  of 
course,  a  special  honor.  Even  then  conversation  was 
unrestrained,  and  we  felt  that  His  Majesty  liked  to 
be  with  us. 

I  was  particularly  pleased  to  have  guests  at  meals, 
because  it  gave  me  an  opportunity  of  bringing  up 
various  questions  that  required  discussion.  In  this 
way  I  saved  time  later  for  other  mihtary  duties. 

VI 

Strength  of  will  and  foresight  are  needed  for  the 
command  of  armies;  but  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the 
composition  and  organization  of  the  mighty  instru- 
ment is  also  necessary,  and  this  can  be  acquired  and 
maintained  only  by  unremitting  work.  There  is  yet 
another  requirement — an  understanding  of  the  morale 
of  one's  own  troops  and  of  the  peculiarities  of  the 
enemy.  That  cannot  be  acquired  by  work;  it  is,  like 
so  many  other  things,  a  matter  of  personality.  The 
greater  the  task  the  more  important  do  these  moral 
factors  become.  Confidence  and  faith  in  ultimate  vic- 
tory are  the  bonds  which  unite  the  commander  and 
his  troops. 

The  group  and  army  commands  displayed  initiative 
and  imderstanding  in  assisting  us  in  our  extremely 


MY  THOUGHTS  AND  ACTIONS  23 

arduous  task.  We  always  maintained  a  constant  inter- 
change of  views  with  them,  although  the  final  decision 
rested  with  us.  General  Headquarters  had,  further, 
to  smooth  out  difficulties  and  to  preserve  a  certain 
unity  of  view  on  the  many  matters  which  make  up 
the  life  of  an  army.  The  frequent  transfer  of  troops 
made  this  particularly  important. 

Subject  to  these  necessary  limitations,  each  command 
was  independent  within  its  own  sphere.  This  was  more 
the  case  during  the  war  of  movement  or  attack  than 
in  stationary  warfare  and  defense.  Tactical  situations 
did,  of  course,  arise  in  which  the  views  of  the  commands 
did  not  agree  in  matters  of  detail  with  those  of  General 
Headquarters.  The  local  command  was  in  such  cases 
often  allowed  to  decide  the  question.  For  me  this 
al"ways  involved  a  mental  struggle;  if  they  were  suc- 
cessful I  was  pleased,  but  if  they  were  not  I  felt  it  was 
my  fault. 

I  attached  the  greatest  importance  to  verbal  discus- 
sion and  gathering  direct  impressions  on  the  spot.  I 
used  to  like  going  to  the  front,  and  as  First  Quarter- 
master-General always  had  a  special  train  with  separate 
office  and  telegraph  coaches.  Work  did  not  cease  dur- 
ing the  journey.  At  prearranged  stations  the  daily 
reports  were  handed  in  as  they  were  at  General  Head- 
quarters, and  if  necessary  we  could  communicate  with 
anywhere  and  everywhere. 

My  personal  relations  with  both  staffs  and  troops 
were  harmonious.     I  enjoyed  much  confidence. 

Among  my  happiest  recollections  are  my  relations 
with  the  headquarters  of  the  German  Crown  Prince. 
He  showed  a  great  aptitude  for  the  profession  of  arms, 
and  asked  clever  and  very  infortned  questions.  He 
was  fond  of  the  men  and  did  all  he  could  for  them. 
He  was  not  in  favor  of  the  vrar,  but  advocated  peace. 
This  is  the  truth,  whatever  others  may  say  to  the  con- 


24  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

trary.  The  Crown  Prince  always  regretted  that  he 
had  been  insufficiently  prepared  for  his  future  office  as 
Emperor,  and  took  all  possible  pains  to  make  good  this 
deficiency.  He  once  told  me  that  he  "was  worse  off 
than  a  clerk  in  that  respect.  He  drew  up  a  memoran- 
diim  on  the  subject,  which  he  handed  to  his  Imperial 
father  and  the  Imperial  Chancellor. 

The  Crown  Prince  was  the  victim  of  the  false  im- 
pression he  produced;  there  "was  more  in  him  than 
appeared  on  the  surface. 

The  Chief  of  the  Staff  of  the  German  Crown  Prince's 
army  group,  Colonel  Count  von  der  Schulenbua-g,  a 
very  clear-headed  and  energetic  officer,  always  gave 
me  sound  and  reliable  support. 

I  often  visited  the  army  group  of  Crown-Prince  Rup- 
precht  of  Bavaria,  also.  His  alert  and  uncommonly 
industrious  Chief  of  Staff,  General  von  Kuhl,  was  an 
acquaintance  of  long  standing;  I  had  more  than  one 
opportunity  of  admiring  his  calm  self-possession,  even 
in  very  serious  situations. 

It  would  take  too  long  to  jnention  by  name  the  other 
groups  and  armies.  But  I  cannot  omit  a  reference  to 
General  von  Loszberg.  This  eminent  officer  and  tac- 
tician often  rendered  the  greatest  assistance  to  the 
army  and  his  country.  His  confidence  in  me  afforded 
me  special  satisfaction. 

During  my  visits  to  the  front  the  various  chiefs  of 
staff  explained  the  situation  to  me,  in  the  presence  of 
their  army  commanders.  They  always  spoke  as  freely 
as  if  they  had  been  officers  at  General  Headquarters. 
They  knew  I  wanted  to  hear  their  real  views  and  have 
a  clear  idea  of  the  true  situation,  not  a  favorable  report 
made  to  order.  Sometimes  the  armies  were  instructed 
only  to  report  bare  facts,  whether  favorable  or  un- 
favorable. 

After  the  general  statement  we  would  discuss  mat- 


MY  THOUGHTS  AND  ACTIONS  25 

ters  and  the  army  commanders  would  join  in,  unless 
they  had  explained  matters  themseVves,  a  thing  for 
which  I  was  always  particularly  grateful.  As  a  rule 
I  used  to  extend  my  visit,  and  this  enabled  me  to  dis- 
cuss every  kind  of  question  with  the  army  commanders. 

My  intercourse  with  the  armies  was  not  limited  to 
the  weekly  journeys.  Every  morning  I  spoke  on  the 
telephone  with  the  chiefs  of  staff  of  the  armies,  and  was 
admitted  to  their  apprehensions  and  their  hopes.  They* 
often  had  requests  to  submit,  and  they  knew  that  I 
would  help  them  if  I  could.  I  have  often  had  to  give 
them  encouragement,  but  I  always  felt  that  they  went 
back  to  their  heavy  task  with  all  the  more  confidence. 
At  times  one  got  a  better  and  fairer  general  impression 
of  the  strategical  and  tactical  situation  from  the  office 
chair  than  one  could  on  the  spot  where  personal  im- 
pressions had  so  much  greater  influence. 

My  conversations  on  the  telephone  were  for  the 
purpose  of  collecting  information.  Only  in  cases  of 
emergency  did  I  issue  orders  on  these  occasions,  and 
then  they  were  always  confirmed  in  writing  to  the 
headquarters  concerned. 

It  was  an  understood  thing  that  these  conversations 
were  reported  to  the  army  commanders.  I  strongly 
objected  to  a  **Staff  Officers'  Command" — ^besides,  the 
army  commanders  themselves  were  men  of  far  too 
independent  character  to  tolerate  such  a  situation. 

I  did  hear  of  cases  where  orders  were  given  on  the 
authority  of  General  Headquarters  which  I  would 
never  have  approved  of;  whenever  it  occurred  I  took 
strong  measures. 

When  I  was  unable  to  see  for  myself,  General  Head- 
quarters despatched  officers  of  the  General  Staff  to  col- 
lect reports  from  the  front,  or  from  army  headquarters, 
so  that  we  might  obtain  as  clear  a  picture  as  possible 
of  the  situation  on  the  spot. 


26  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Changes  in  the  personnel  of  the  higher  commands 
were  unavoidable.  They  were  submitted  by  the  army 
commands  to  the  Chief  of  the  Mihtary  Cabinet,  in  the 
case  of  the  General  Staff  to  the  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff.  On  occasions  General  Jleadquarters  suggested 
changes. 

This  had  to  be  done  when  it  became  necessary  to 
have  specially  experienced  officers  at  the  most  critical 
points.  It  was  beneficial  to  the  operations,  and  par- 
ticiilarly  to  the  troops,  as  it  saved  many  fives. 

Exchanges  between  army  and  other  superior  com- 
manders also  took  place  during  particularly  prolonged 
periods  of  fighting,  more  especially  if  things  were  going 
against  us.  Such  periods  imposed  a  terrible  nervous 
strain  upon  them.  Worn-out  corps  headquarters  were 
replaced  by  others.  The  change  was  awkward,  but 
its  drawbacks  were  not  insuperable.  Complete  army 
headquarters  could  not  be  reHeved,  as  this  would  have 
caused  too  much  dislocation  in  every  direction,  espe- 
cially in  the  work  of  supply.  The  only  remedy  was  to 
relieve  individuals.  The  difficulties  involved  were  the 
lesser  evil  of  the  two. 

Occasionally,  at  the  suggestion  of  General  Head- 
quarters, army  commanders  and  their  chiefs  of  staff 
were  relieved  when  we  could  be  reasonably  certain  that 
neither  the  command  nor  the  troops  would  suffer  from 
the  change.  In  a  war  of  this  duration  a  certain  loss 
of  energy  in  individual  cases  was  inevitable.  To  our 
great  satisfaction,  however,  such  cases  were  a  rarity. 
It  is  always  a  most  difficult  task  to  deal  with  them, 
and,  however  conscientious  one  wishes  to  be,  it  is  im- 
possible to  perform  it  at  all  without  inflicting  hardship, 
and  even  an  injustice,  at  times.  As  far  as  possible  I 
accepted  any  counter-suggestions  put  forward,  but  if 
our  cause  suffered  thereby  I  incurred  blame  of  which 
no  one  could  relieve  me. 


MY  THOUGHTS  AND  ACTIONS  27 

Deeply  moved  by  the  events  of  August  8,  191 8,  I 
placed  my  post  at  the  disposal  of  the  Field-Marshal. 
There  is  no  question  that  the  terrible  disappointments 
toward  the  end  of  the  war  had  worn  me  out,  but  my 
nerves  never  gave  way  under  the  strain. 


li£ge 

Work  on  the  General  Staff  in  Peace-time — In  Command  of  a  Regiment 
and  a  Brigade — Deputy  Chief  of  the  General  vStaff,  Second  Army — 
The  Battle  of  Liege — The  Capture  of  the  Forts. 


THE  favorite  recollection  of  my  life  as  a  soldier  is 
the  coup  de  main  on  the  fortress.  It  was  a  bold 
stroke,  in  which  I  was  able  to  fight  just  like  any  soldier 
of  the  rank  and  file  who  proves  his  worth  in  battle. 

At  the  outbreak  of  war  I  was  brigade  commander  at 
Strasburg.  For  a  long  time  I  had  been  on  the  General 
Staff,  and  latterly,  from  March  1904  to  January  19 13, 
with  only  one  short  interval,  in  the  Operations  Depart- 
ment, of  which  I  was  then  chief.  There  I  gained  an 
insight  into  our  preparations  for  war  and  the  relative 
strength  of  the  opposing  forces.  My  principal  work 
was  strategic  plans,  the  directions  for  which  were  given 
by  the  Chief  of  the  Staff  himself. 

The  plan  of  campaign  which  was  inaugurated  in 
August  1 914  was  conceived  by  General  Count  von 
Schlieffen,  one  of  the  greatest  soldiers  who  ever  Lived. 
It  was  planned  by  him,  in  the  event  of  France  not 
respecting  Belgium's  neutrality,  or  of  Belgium  joining 
France.  On  this  assumption  the  advance  of  the 
German  main  forces  through  Belgium  followed  as  a 
matter  of  course.  Any  other  plan  of  campaign  would 
have  been  crippled,  owing  to  the  danger  from  Belgium 
to  the  German  right  flank,  and  would  have  precluded 
a  quick  and  decisive  blow  at  France,  which  was  essen- 


LI£GE  29 

tiaJ  in  order  to  meet  in  time  the  great  danger  of  a 
Russian  invasion  into  the  heart  of  Germany.  In  the 
assumed  miHtary  situation,  as  countless  war-games  had 
abundantly  demonstrated,  an  offensive  against  Russia, 
with  simultaneous  defensive  operations  in  the  West, 
impHed,  as  a  matter  of  course,  a  long  war,  and  was, 
therefore,  rejected  by  Count  von  Schlieffen. 

When  there  was  no  longer  any  doubt  as  to  the  atti- 
tude of  France  and  Belgium,  Count  von  Schlieffen 's 
scheme  was  carried  into  execution. 

As  to  how  far  General  von  Moltke  conferred  with 
Imperial  Chancellor  von  Bethmann  on  the  question 
of  a  march  through  Belgium  I  do  not  know.  In  any 
case,  no  such  negotiations  were  ever  conducted  through 
my  department,  as  it  was  not  a  matter  with  which 
it  was  concerned.  Whether  the  question  had  been 
delegated  to  the  General  Staff  is  also  unknown  to  me. 
We  were  all  convinced  of  the  soundness  of  this  plan. 
Nobody  believed  in  Belgiimi's  neutrality. 

In  our  unfavorable  military-poHtical  position,  in  the 
center  of  Europe,  surrounded  by  enemies,  we  had  to 
reckon  with  foes  greatly  superior  in  numbers,  and  pre- 
pare ourselves  accordingly,  if  we  did  not  wish  to  allow 
ourselves  to  be  crushed.  It  was  well  known  how 
Russia  pressed  for  war  and  continually  increased  her 
army.  She  was  intent  on  humbling  Austria-Hungary 
once  and  for  all  and  becoming  mistresc  of  the  Balkans. 
In  France  the  thought  of  revenge  had  revived  with 
renewed  vigor;  the  old  German  Reichsland  was  to 
become  French  again.  Among  many  other  events  in 
France,  the  reinstatement  of  the  three  years'  compulsory 
service  left  no  doubt  of  that  country's  intentions. 
England  contemplated  our  economic  ascendancy,  our 
cheap  labor,  and  our  restless  industry  with  distinct 
uneasiness.  Moreover,  Germany  was  the  greatest 
land  Power  in  Europe,  and,  at  the  same  time,  she  had 


30  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

a  good  fleet  in  course  of  expansion.  This  is  what  made 
England  fear  for  her  world  hegemony.  The  Anglo- 
Saxon  felt  his  ancient  supremacy  threatened.  The 
English  Government  concentrated  its  fleet,  which  had 
had  its  base  of  operations  until  recently  in  the  Medi- 
terranean, in  the  North  Sea,  and  English  Channel. 
Lloyd  George's  menacing  speech  on  July  21,  191 1, 
threw  a  vivid  and  sudden  light  on  England's  intentions 
which  had  hitherto  been  concealed  with  great  skill. 
It  became  increasingly  certain  that  war  would  be  forced 
upon  us  and  that  it  would  be  a  struggle  the  like  of 
which  the  world  had  never  seen.  The  fact  that  in 
non-military  circles  the  probable  strength  of  the  enemy 
was  underestimated  constituted  a  real  danger. 

At  the  eleventh  hour,  in  the  autumn  of  191 2,  when 
there  was  no  longer  any  doubt  as  to  the  enemy's  in- 
tentions, and  the  army  was  working  with  might  and 
main  with  truly  German  devotion  to  duty,  I  drew  up 
a  plan  for  an  important  increase  in  our  effectives, 
which  met  with  approval  from  both  the  more  discern- 
ing sections  of  the  public  and  the  more  far-sighted 
among  our  parliamentary  parties.  I  was  able  to  in- 
duce General  von  Moltke  to  approach  the  Imperial 
Chancellor  with  the  plan,  who  must  himself  have  con- 
sidered the  situation  exceedingly  serious,  for  he  im- 
mediately agreed  to  it.  He  instructed  the  Minister 
of  War  to  prepare  a  bill,  without,  however,  carrying 
on  at  the  same  time  any  clearly  defined  and  systematic 
political  campaign  calculated  to  gage  correctly  the 
attitude  of  the  various  Powers.  This  should  have  oc- 
curred to  him  as  a  necessary  conclusion.  Consider- 
ing the  purposes  for  which  it  was  conceived,  this 
army  estimate  for  a  milliard  marks  was  not  of  an  ag- 
gressive character.  It  merely  aimed  at  adjusting  the 
disproportion  in  the  numerical  strength,  and  had  in 
view  the  absolute  enforcement  of  universal  compulsory 


Ll£GE  31 

service,  for  there  were  still  thousands  of  able-bodied 
men  who  did  not  serve  their  country.  The  budget 
provided  for  personnel,  but  more  especially  for  the 
strengthening  of  our  fortifications  and  for  more  ma- 
terial. All  this  was  voted,  but  what  I  had  most  earnestly 
desired — the  addition  of  three  new  army  corps — ^was 
given  no  consideration;  it  did  not  even  appear  in  the 
estimate.  The  failure  to  provide  these  three  additional 
army  corps  was  paid  for  dearly  later  on.  At  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war  these  additional  corps  were  sorely 
missed,  and  the  new  formations  which  were  added  in 
the  autumn  of  19 14  displayed  all  the  defects  of  im- 
provisation. Later  on,  the  new  formations  were  made 
stronger  at  the  start,  but  the  existing  corps,  on  the  other 
hand,  were  weakened  by  the  contributions  they  were 
called  upon  to  make. 

However,  before  the  whole  bill  was  passed  I  was 
transferred  to  Dusseldorf,  as  commanding  officer  of 
the  39th  Fusileers;  I  attributed  the  change  partly  to 
my  having  pressed  for  those  three  additional  army 
corps. 

II 

Regimental  work  is  fuU  of  life  and  activity.  Animated 
intercoiu-se  and  constant  and  close  co-operation  with  and 
for  men  who  were  intrusted  to  my  care,  the  training  of 
commissioned  officers,  non-commissioned  officers,  and 
men,  and  the  military  education  of  the  youth  to  man- 
hood, particularly  attracted  me  after  a  long  period  of 
staff  work.  For  thirteen  years  I  had  had  nothing  to  do 
with  the  routine  of  a  regiment.  Now  my  chief  work  was 
the  inspection  of  recruits.  In  the  'eighties  of  the  last 
century  I  had  on  seven  different  occasions  had  charge 
of  recruits — with  the  57  th  Infantry  Regiment  in  old 
Wesel,  and  with  the  Marine  Infantry  in  Wilhelmshaven 
and  Kiel.     Later  on  I  had  done  several  weeks'  service 


32  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

with  the  8th  Leib-Grenadier  Regiment  in  Frankfort- 
on-the-Oder,  and  from  1898  to  1900  I  was  in  charge  of 
a  company  of  the  6ist  Infantry  Regiment  in  Thorn — 
a  time  I  shall  never  forget.  Now  that  I  was  in  Dussel- 
dorf,  I  was  glad  of  the  experience  gained  during  those 
years. 

I  realized  all  the  more  the  great  responsibility  which 
rested  on  me  as  commanding  officer  of  the  regiment, 
as  I  saw  the  coming  war  rapidly  approaching.  In 
various  addresses  to  my  officers  I  pointed  out  what 
extremely  serious  times  we  lived  in.  In  the  army  I 
saw  not  only  the  assurance  of  Germany's  safety  and 
future,  but  also  a  guaranty  of  internal  peace.  In 
1 9 13 — thank  God! — there  was  not  the  least  sign  that 
the  army  would  have  to  be  used  in  this  capacity. 

Discipline,  to  which  officer  and  private  alike  were 
subjected,  was,  in  my  opinion,  the  only  basis  on  which 
an  army  could  be  effectively  trained  for  war.  Such  a 
training  could  be  acquired  only  through  long  service. 
It  is  only  what  discipline  makes  second  nature  in  a 
man  that  is  lasting  and  outlives  even  the  demoralizing 
impressions  of  the  battle-field  and  the  psychological 
changes  wrought  by  a  long  campaign.  It  was  our 
thorough  discipline  and  training  in  peace-time  which 
was  to  make  up  for  our  inferiority  in  numbers  in  the 
coming  war. 

My  aim  was  to  turn  highly  disciplined  troops  into 
responsible  men  possessed  of  initiative.  Discipline  is 
not  intended  to  kill  character,  but  to  develop  it.  The 
purpose  of  discipline  is  to  bring  about  uniformity  in 
co-operating  for  the  attainment  of  a  common  goal, 
and  this  uniformity  can  be  obtained  only  when  each 
one  sets  aside  the  thought  of  his  own  personal  incerests. 
This  common  goal  is — Victory.  Words  fail  to  describe 
the  demands  that  are  made  of  a  soldier  in  battle.  To 
go   "over    the    top"   under   enemy  fire   is,   indeed,    a 


LI£GE  33 

heroic  act,  but  it  is  by  no  means  the  most  difficult. 
How  much  resolution  and  readiness  to  shoulder  re- 
sponsibility is  required  of  a  man  who  either  has  to 
lead  or  send  others  to  certain  death.  Those  are  acts 
the  appalling  nature  of  which  no  one  can  imagine  who 
has  not  himself  had  to  perform  them. 

Besides  the  care  of  the  men  and  the  education  of  the 
non-commissioned  officers — an  education  which  was 
also  calculated  to  assist  them  in  their  future  callings — 
I  attached  the  greatest  importance  to  increasing  the 
efficiency  of  the  Officers'  Corps  and  the  training  of  the 
younger  officers.  While  the  personnel  of  the  Regular 
Officers'  Corps  is  always  the  same,  the  officers  of  the 
Reserve,  the  non-coms  and  men  change  continually.  So 
the  Officers'  Corps  is  the  mainspring  of  the  army.  The 
officers  must,  therefore,  be  thoroughly  conversant  with 
the  army's  great  deeds,  and  possess  a  comprehensive 
knowledge  of  their  country's  history,  as  it  is  expected  of 
all  men  who  have  to  lead  others.  Nothing  can  be  torn 
from  its  historical  context  without  serious  prejudice. 
No  one  should  forget  that  in  times  of  danger  the  guar- 
dianship of  the  fortunes  of  the  State  devolves  upon  the 
commissioned  officer,  supported  by  the  non-commis- 
sioned officer.  This  explains  the  exclusiveness  of  the 
Officers'  Corps  and  its  holding  aloof  from  political  life. 

I  aimed  at  making  my  officers  conversant  with  the 
conditions  of  modem  warfare,  and  endeavored  to 
strengthen  in  them  that  self-assurance  which  is  essential 
to  the  fulfilment  of  their  difficult  task,  but  must  not 
develop  into  arrogance. 

I  zealously  devoted  myself  to  the  training  and  edu- 
cation of  the  regiment,  and  had  afterward  the  satis- 
faction of  learning  that  it  proved  its  worth  in  the  face 
of  the  enemy.  It  was  a  great  pleasure  to  me  when, 
in  the  coiu-se  of  the  war,  I  was  first  placed  d,  la  suite 
of  my  regiment,  and  later  appointed   its  colonel.     At 


34  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

the  time  of  my  resignation  it  was  named  after  me;  I 
am  indeed  proud  of  the  General  Ludendorff  Fusileer 
Regiment. 

In  April  19 14  I  went  to  Strasburg,  where  General 
von  Deimling's  presence  insured  an  active  military  life 
for  every  man  in  his  command.  The  position  as 
brigade  commander  was  quite  different  from  that  of 
regimental  commander  in  Diisseldorf.  I  missed  the 
direct  intercourse  with  the  troops  and  the  Officers' 
Corps,  and  was  occupied  chiefly  with  organization. 
Before  the  outbreak  of  war  I  had  the  pleasure  of 
parading  my  brigade  for  inspection  at  Bitsch. 

There  was  again  a  question  of  my  being  appointed 
as  Quartermaster-General  on  the  Great  General  Staff; 
I  was,  of  course,  doing  General  Staff  work.  In  May  I 
took  part  in  a  tour  of  inspection,  which  began  in  Frei- 
burg in  Breisgau  and  ended  in  Cologne.  His  Imperial 
Highness  the  Crown  Prince  was  with  us.  He  devoted 
himself  with  great  zeal  to  his  work  and  showed  both 
sound  understanding  of  military  affairs  and  insight 
into  large-scale  operations.  In  August  I  had  to  conduct 
a  so-called  "supply  tour,"  in  which  the  strategical 
plan  for  the  supply  of  an  army  was  examined. 

Austria-Hungary's  note  to  Serbia  at  the  end  of  July 
came  as  a  shock  to  me  in  Strasburg;  nobody  could 
ignore  its  seriousness.  War  was  soon  a  certainty. 
Diplomacy  presented  the  German  Army  with  an  ex- 
tremely difficult  task.  In  great  anxiety  I  followed 
events  in  Berlin  then,  as  I  still  do,  feeling  that,  so  far 
as  I  was  concerned,  I  was  not  responsible  for  whatever 
happened. 

Ill 

General  mobilization  was  decreed  on  August  i. 
My  wife  went  to  Berlin  immediately,  for  the  families 
of  all  officers  and  officials  were  ordered  to  leave  Stras- 


LIEGE  35 

burg.  During  the  whole  four  years  of  war  we  were 
unable  to  set  up  a  home  of  our  own,  and  I  was  never 
able  to  pay  any  but  short  flying  visits  to  my  wife.  My 
fanuly  had  little  consideration  during  these  momentous 
days,  for  all  my  time  was  occupied  by  my  work. 

Early  on  August  2  I  traveled,  with  my  horses, 
via  Cologne,  to  Aix-la-Chapelle,  which  I  reached  on 
the  same  evening.  Under  mobilization  orders  I  was 
appointed  Quartermaster-General  of  the  Second  Army, 
then  commanded  by  General  von  Bulow,  with  General 
von  Lauenstein  as  his  chief  of  staff. 

Next  I  had  to  join  General  von  Emmich,  who  had 
been  given  the  task  of  taking  the  fortress  of  Liege  by 
surprise,  the  troops  for  this  purpose  being  composed 
of  some  quickly  mobilized  mixed  infantry  brigades 
which  had  not  been  brought  up  to  full  strength.  By 
this  move  it  was  intended  to  clear  a  way  through 
Belgium  for  the  army. 

I  took  up  my  quarters  in  Aix-la-Chapelle  at  the 
Hotel  Union. 

On  August  3  General  von  Emmich  arrived.  I  had 
not  previously  met  this  distinguished  soldier,  but  from 
that  time  onward  I  cherished  a  feeling  of  deep  esteem 
for  him,  which  lasted  until  the  day  of  his  death.  His 
Chief  of  Staff  was  Colonel  Count  von  Lambsdorff,  a 
brilliant  officer,  who  won  great  distinction  at  Li^ge  and 
elsewhere. 

On  August  4  the  advance  over  the  Belgian  frontier 
began,  while  in  Berlin  the  Reichstag,  in  a  patriotic 
demonstration,  voted  its  support  to  the  Government; 
and  the  party  leaders,  after  the  speech  from  the  throne 
had  been  read,  vociferously  proclaimed  their  uncondi- 
tional allegiance  to  the  Kaiser,  come  what  might.  The 
same  day  I  had  my  first  experience  of  fighting  in  an 
engagement  near  Vise,  close  to  the  Dutch  frontier. 
It  was  evident  that  Belgium  had  long  been  prepared 


36  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

for  our  advance.  The  roads  had  been  systematically 
destroyed  and  barricaded,  showing  that  a  great  deal 
of  work  had  been  done  beforehand.  No  such  obstacles 
could  be  found  on  the  southwest  frontier  of  Belgium. 
Why  had  Belgium  not  taken  similar  precautions  against 
France? 

The  question  as  to  whether  we  could  secure  the 
bridges  at  Vise  intact  was  one  of  special  importance. 
I  went  on  to  visit  Von  der  Marwitz's  cavalry,  which 
was  then  on  its  way  to  the  town,  but  was  able  to  ad- 
vance only  slowly,  because  one  barricade  after  another 
barred  the  way.  At  my  request  a  cyclist  company  was 
sent  to  reconnoiter.  After  a  short  while  a  cyclist 
returned  with  the  news  that  the  company  had  entered 
Vis6  and  had  been  completely  annihilated.  I  went 
with  two  men  to  see  for  myself,  and  to  my  joy  I  found 
the  company  intact  with  the  exception  of  the  leader, 
who  had  been  badly  wounded  by  a  shot  fired  from  the 
opposite  bank  of  the  Meuse.  This  little  episode  was 
useful  to  me  later  on,  for  it  taught  me  to  be  more 
skeptical  of  such  canards,  or,  as  they  were  subsequently 
called,  Etappen  rumors. 

The  beautiful  Meuse  bridges  had  been  destroyed; 
Belgium  was  ready  for  war. 

I  was  in  Herve  the  same  evening,  my  first  head- 
quarters on  enemy  soil.  We  spent  the  night  at  an 
inn  opposite  the  station.  The  whole  town  was  intact, 
and  we  went  to  bed  with  a  quiet  mind.  During  the 
night  I  was  awakened  by  brisk  firing,  some  of  which 
was  directed  on  our  house.  The  franc-tireur  warfare 
of  Belgium  had  begun.  It  broke  out  everywhere  the 
next  day,  and  it  was  this  sort  of  thing  which  aroused 
that  intense  bitterness  that  during  those  first  years 
characterized  the  war  on  the  Western  front,  in  contrast 
to  the  feeling  prevailing  in  the  East.  The  Belgian 
Government  took  a  grave  responsibility  upon  itself. 


Ll£GE  37 

It  had  systematically  organized  civilian  warfare.  The 
Garde  Civique,  which  in  the  days  of  peace  had  its  own 
arms  and  special  uniforms,  was  able  to  appear  some- 
times in  one  garb  and  sometimes  in  another.  The 
Belgian  soldiers  must  also  have  had  a  special  civilian 
suit  in  their  knapsacks  at  the  commencement  of  the 
war.  In  the  trenches  near  Fort  Barchon,  to  the  north- 
east of  Li^ge,  I  myself  saw  imiforms  which  had  been 
left  behind  by  soldiers  who  had  fought  there. 

Such  action  was  not  in  keeping  with  the  usages  of 
war;  our  troops  cannot  be  blamed  if  they  took  the 
sternest  measures  to  suppress  it.  It  is  true  that  in- 
nocent persons  may  have  had  to  suffer,  but  the  stories 
of  "Belgian  atrocities  "  are  nothing  but  clever,  elaborate, 
and  widely  advertised  legends,  and  the  Belgian  Govern- 
ment can  alone  be  held  responsible.  For  my  part,  I 
had  taken  the  field  with  chivalrous  and  humane  con- 
ceptions of  warfare.  This  franc-tireur  warfare  was  bound 
to  disgust  any  soldier;  it  caused  me  personally  bitter 
disillusionment. 

IV 

The  advance  brigades  had,  indeed,  a  difficult  task  to 
accomplish  before  Li^ge.  It  was  certainly  an  extraor- 
dinarily bold  plan  to  penetrate  the  girdle  of  forts  right 
into  the  heart  of  a  modem  fortress.  The  troops  felt 
nervous;  from  conversations  with  the  officers,  I  gath- 
ered that  their  faith  in  the  success  of  this  undertaking 
was  only  slight. 

In  the  night  of  August  5  the  advance  on  Li^ge 
through  its  fortifications  began.  The  action  in  all  its 
details  has  already  been  described  by  the  General  Staff 
in  a  pamphlet  pubHshed  by  Stalling  of  Oldenburg.  It 
is  not  my  intention  to  go  over  this  ground  again,  for  I 
wish  to  set  down  my  personal  experiences  only. 

Toward  midnight  of  the  sth  General  von  Emmich 


38  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

left  Herv6.  We  rode  to  Micheronx,  about  two  or 
three  kilometers  from  Fort  F16ron,  where  the  14th 
Infantry  Brigade,  under  Major-General  von  Wussow, 
was  assembling.  Under  cover  of  the  darkness  the 
troops,  taking  with  them  the  unfamiliar  but  invalu- 
able field  kitchens,  were  collecting  in  a  very  unsoldierly 
manner  on  a  road  which  could  easily  have  been  swept 
by  the  guns  of  the  fort.  As  it  was,  they  were  shot  at 
from  a  house  to  the  south  of  the  road.  A  regular  battle 
ensued,  but  the  fort  itself  did  not  open  fire,  which  was 
a  miracle.  About  one  o'clock  the  advance  began.  It 
was  to  take  us  north  of  Fort  Fleron  via  Retinne  through 
the  Hne  of  forts,  and  then  on  to  the  heights  of  La  Char- 
treuse, on  the  outskirts  of  the  town.  We  were  due 
there  early  in  the  morning.  The  other  brigades  which 
were  to  break  through  the  girdle  of  forts  at  other  points 
were  to  reach  the  town  at  the  same  hour. 

General  von  Emmich's  staff  was  almost  at  the  end 
of  the  column.  Suddenly  it  came  to  a  standstill.  I 
pushed  my  way  to  the  front.  There  was  no  apparent 
reason  for  the  halt,  which  proved  to  have  been  due  to 
a  most  regretable  misunderstanding  of  the  situation. 
I  myself  was  really  only  a  spectator,  and  had  no  author- 
ity to  give  orders.  I  was  there  only  to  report  on  the 
operations  at  Liege  to  my  army  command,  which  was 
to  arrive  later,  and  also  to  co-ordinate  General  von 
Emmich's  plans  with  General  von  Billow's  anticipated 
scheme.  I  put  the  column  into  motion  again  and  re- 
mained at  its  head.  In  the  mean  time  we  had  lost 
touch  with  the  troops  in  front.  We  had  considerable 
trouble  in  finding  our  way  in  the  pitch  darkness,  but 
at  length  reached  Retinne.  We  were  still  out  of  touch 
with  the  others.  I  started  out  from  the  village  at  the 
head  of  the  column,  and  took  the  wrong  road.  We 
were  immediately  fired  at,  and  men  fell  right  and  left. 
I  shall  never  forget  hearing  the  thud  of  bullets  striking 


LI£GE  39 

human  bodies.  We  made  a  few  attacks  on  the  in- 
visible enemy,  but  the  firing  became  more  intense. 
It  was  not  easy  to  take  our  bearings  in  the  dark,  but 
there  was  no  doubt  that  we  had  taken  the  UTong  turn- 
ing. The  essential  thing  was  to  get  out  of  range,  and 
this  was  imfortunate,  because  the  men  could  think  only 
that  I  was  afraid.  But  there  was  nothing  else  to  be 
done — more  important  things  were  at  stake.  I  crept 
back  and  gave  my  men  the  order  to  follow  me  to  the 
outskirts  of  the  village. 

Once  back  at  Retinne,  I  foimd  the  right  road.  Here 
I  saw  General  von  Wussow's  orderly  with  his  horses. 
He  thought  that  the  general  had  fallen.  With  a  hand- 
ful of  men  I  took  the  right  road,  a  metaled  road  lead- 
ing to  Queue  du  Bois.  Suddenly  there  was  firing  ahead. 
Machine  gim  bullets  swept  the  road,  but  did  not  harm 
us.  A  little  farther  on  we  came  across  a  heap  of  dead 
and  wounded  German  soldiers,  who  proved  to  be 
some  of  the  advance  party  with  General  von  Wussow. 
They  must  have  run  into  machine  gun  fire  earlier  on. 
I  collected  some  men  of  the  4th  Jager  Battalion  and 
the  27th  Infantry  Regiment,  who  were  gradually  arriv- 
ing, and  decided  to  take  over  the  command  of  the 
brigade.  The  first  thing  to  be  done  was  to  clear  the 
road  of  the  enemy's  machine  guns.  Captains  von  Har- 
bou  and  Brinckmann,  of  the  General  Staff,  pushed  their 
way,  with  a  few  brave  men,  through  the  hedges  and 
farms  on  both  sides  of  the  road,  and  fell  upon  the  guns. 
The  strong  gun  team  surrendered  and  the  road  was 
clear. 

We  continued  on  our  way  and  soon  were  engaged  in 
heavy  house-to-house  fighting  in  Queue  du  Bois.  Grad- 
ually it  became  light.  I  went  on  ahead  with  a  few 
men,  the  two  staff  captains,  ^/lajor  von  Alarcard,  com- 
manding the  4th  Rifles,  Major  von  Greiff ,  commanding 
the  2d. Detachment  of  the  4th Field  Regiment,  and  his 


CiJ.Br. 

II  Uuwagnt      ^i 


u.Bp: 

38J.Br. 

1 :  175000 


r    T     f     y* 


(I  Km.  =:  %  mile)  40 

FIG.    I.      LIBGB.      SITUATION  ON  THE  EVENING  OF   AUGUST  6,    I914 


Ll£GE  41 

excellent  adjutant,  Lieutenant  Neide.  A  field  howitzer 
was  brought  up ;  then  a  second.  They  fired  right  and 
left  into  the  houses  and  so  cleared  the  streets.  Little 
by  little  we  advanced.  The  men  were  reluctant  to 
proceed,  and  I  was  often  compelled  to  exhort  them  not 
to  leave  me  and  thus  compel  me  to  go  on  alone.  At 
last  the  village  lay  behind  us.  The  inhabitants  had 
fled,  and  it  was  now  a  question  of  fighting  the  regular 
Belgian  Army. 

As  we  came  out  of  the  village  we  could  distinguish 
a  column  marching  along  the  Meuse  in  the  direction 
of  Li^ge.  I  hoped  it  was  the  27th  Infantry  Brigade,  but 
it  turned  out  to  be  Belgians,  who,  rather  than  face  us, 
were  retreating  over  the  Meuse  in  a  panic.  It  was 
a  long  time  before  the  situation  was  clear,  and  in 
the  mean  while  my  forces  were  strengthened  by  the 
arrival  of  the  men  who  had  been  left  behind. 

We  had  successfully  broken  through  the  girdle  of 
forts.  The  165th  Infantry  Regiment,  under  its  dis- 
tinguished commanding  officer,  the  then  Colonel  von 
Oven,  pushed  on  in  close  formation;  General  von  Em- 
mich  arrived,  and  the  advance  on  La  Chartreuse  was 
continued. 

General  von  Emmich  placed  at  my  disposal  parts  of 
the  nth  Infantry  Brigade,  who  were  farther  south, 
in  the  belief  that  they  also  had  broken  through.  Our 
advance  continued  without  incident. 

We  could  see  the  works  on  the  north  side  of  Li^ge 
as  we  climbed  out  of  the  Meuse  Valley  to  the  heights 
east  of  La  Chartreuse.  It  was  about  two  o'clock  when 
the  brigade  arrived  there.  Guns  were  at  once  trained 
on  the  town,  and  a  shot  was  fired  now  and  then, 
partly  as  a  signal  to  the  other  brigades,  partly  to  in- 
timidate the  governor  of  the  fortress  and  the  inhabi- 
tants. But  I  had  to  be  exceedingly  sparing  of  the  am- 
munition, for  we  were  very  short.     The  troops  were 


42  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

exhausted  and  much  weakened  by  the  hard  fighting; 
officers  had  lost  their  horses,  and  the  field  kitchens  had 
been  left  behind.  I  rested  the  brigade  and  provided 
for  it  as  best  I  could  by  commandeering  supplies 
from  the  neighboring  houses.  General  von  Emmich 
soon  rejoined  us. 

From  the  heights  of  La  Chartreuse  we  had  a  fine  view 
of  the  town  lying  at  our  feet.  The  citadel  on  the  far 
bank  of  the  Meuse  stood  out  prominently.  Suddenly 
white  flags  fluttered  from  it.  General  von  Emmich 
wanted  to  send  an  officer  with  a  flag  of  truce.  I  pro- 
posed waiting  for  the  enemy's  envoy,  but  the  General 
adhered  to  his  decision,  and  Captain  von  Harbou  rode 
into  the  town.  He  returned  at  7  p.m.  and  reported 
that  the  white  flag  had  been  flown  against  the  Govern- 
or's will.  It  was  then  too  late  to  march  into  the  town. 
We  had  a  heavy  night  ahead  of  us.  Meanwhile  I  had 
let  the  brigade  take  up  a  position.  Our  situation  was 
exceedingly  serious.  No  news  reached  us  from  the 
other  brigades,  not  even  from  the  nth,  and  no  despatch- 
riders  got  through.  It  became  increasingly  clear  that 
the  brigade  was  isolated  within  the  circle  of  forts,  cut 
off  from  the  outer  world.  We  had  to  reckon  with 
hostile  attacks.  The  thousand-odd  Belgian  prisoners 
we  had  with  us  increased  our  difficulties.  When  we 
found  out  that  the  whole  work  of  La  Chartreuse,  just 
below  us,  was  unoccupied,  I  sent  a  company  there  with 
these  prisoners.  The  company  commander  must  have 
doubted  my  sanity. 

As  darkness  fell,  the  nervousness  of  the  troops  in- 
creased. I  went  up  and  down  the  front,  exhorting 
them  to  keep  steady  and  hold  fast.  The  battle-cry, 
"We  shall  be  in  Liege  to-morrow,"  restored  their  spirits. 

General  von  Emmich  and  his  staff  found  quarters 
in  a  little  farm-house. 

I  shall  never  forget  the  night  of  August  6.    It  was 


LI£GE  43 

cold,  and  as  I  had  left  my  kit  behind,  Major  von 
Marcard  gave  me  his  cloak.  I  was  very  anxious  and 
listened  feverishly  for  the  soimd  of  fighting.  I  still 
hoped  that  at  least  one  brigade  had  broken  through  the 
girdle  of  forts.  But  all  was  quiet,  though  every  half- 
hour  or  so  a  howitzer  shell  fell  into  the  town.  The 
suspense  was  unbearable.  About  lo  p.m.  I  ordered 
Captain  Ott,  with  a  Jager  company,  to  seize  the  bridges 
over  the  Meuse,  in  order  to  make  them  available  for 
our  farther  advance,  and  also  insure  the  safety  of  the 
brigade  later  on.  The  captain  looked  at  me — and 
went.  The  company  reached  its  objective  without 
any  fighting,  but  no  reports  came  back. 

Morning  broke.  I  went  to  General  von  Emmich, 
and  discussed  the  situation  w4th  him.  We  adhered  here 
to  our  decision  to  enter  the  town,  but  the  General 
would  not  at  that  moment  fix  the  time.  His  order  to 
me  to  enter  the  town  reached  me  soon  after,  while 
I  was  doing  something  to  improve  the  position  of  the 
brigade  and  trying  to  reach  the  road  by  which  the  nth 
Brigade  was  to  advance.  Colonel  von  Oven  was  in 
charge  of  the  advance-guard;  the  rest  of  the  brigade, 
with  the  prisoners,  followed  at  a  certain  distance, 
headed  by  General  von  Emmich  with  his  staff  and  my- 
self with  the  brigade  staff.  As  we  entered,  many  Bel- 
gian soldiers  who  were  standing  about  surrendered. 
Colonel  von  Oven  was  to  occupy  the  citadel.  As  a 
result  of  the  reports  he  received,  he  decided  not  to 
do  this,  but  to  take  the  road  toward  Fort  Loncin,  on 
the  northwest  side  of  the  town,  and  take  up  a  position 
at  that  exit  from  Li^ge.  Thinking  that  Colonel  von 
Oven  was  in  possession  of  the  citadel,  I  went  there 
with  the  brigade  adjutant  in  a  Belgian  car  which  I 
had  commandeered.  When  I  arrived  no  German  sol- 
dier was  to  te  seen  and  the  citadel  was  still  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy.     I  banged  on  the  gates,   which  were 


44  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

locked.  They  were  opened  from  inside.  The  few 
hundred  Belgians  who  were  there  surrendered  at  my 
summons. 

The  brigade  now  came  up  and  took  possession  of  the 
citadel,  which  I  immediately  put  in  a  state  of  defense. 

My  self-imposed  task  was  now  at  an  end,  and  I 
could  ask  General  von  Emmich  to  release  me.  I  in- 
tended to  leave  the  fortress  by  the  way  I  had  come, 
as  I  wanted  to  report  what  had  happened  to  Army 
Headquarters,  ascertain  the  whereabouts  of  the  other 
brigades,  and  give  directions  for  the  bringing  up  of  the 
artillery  against  the  forts.  While  I  was  still  in  the 
citadel,  several  hundred  German  soldiers  turned  up  who 
had  been  taken  prisoners  and  were  afterward  released. 
The  leading  units  of  the  34th  Infantry  Brigade  had 
broken  through  to  the  west  bank  of  the  Meuse.  The 
action  had  then  been  broken  off,  so  that  the  successful 
detachment  had  been  taken  prisoner.  This  brigade 
now  arrived,  and  subsequently  the  nth  and  27th,  so 
that  when  I  left  General  von  Emmich  he  had  quite  a 
respectable  force  at  his  disposal.  On  the  other  hand, 
news  reached  us  that  the  French  were  approaching 
from  Namur,  so  the  situation  was  still  extremely  seri- 
ous. In  fact,  it  could  be  regarded  as  saved  only  when 
some  of  the  eastern  forts  had  fallen. 


My  leave-taking  from  General  von  Emmich  moved 
me  deeply.  I  started  at  seven  o'clock  for  Aix-la- 
Chapelle  and  had  a  somewhat  peculiar  journey.  A 
man  of  the  Garde  Civique  offered  to  take  me  there.  He 
selected  a  car,  but  I  declined  it.  The  car  I  ultimately 
took  broke  down  before  we  were  out  of  the  citadel,  and 
so  I  had  no  choice  but  to  trust  myself  blindly  to  the 
Belgian  soldier.    For  a  time  all  went  well.    We  passed 


Ll£GE  45 

through  Herve,  where  I  found  that  my  former  head- 
quarters and  the  station  had  been  burnt  down.  On 
reaching  German  territory,  the  driver  stopped  suddenly 
and  told  me  he  could  not  go  any  farther.  Availing 
myself  of  various  modes  of  conveyance,  I  reached  Aix- 
la-Chapelle  late  at  night  with  my  Belgian  soldier.  At 
the  Hotel  Union  I  was  greeted  as  one  risen  from  the 
dead.  My  orderly,  Rudolph  Peters,  who  served  me 
faithfully  for  six  long  years,  was  still  there  with  my 
baggage.  His  greatest  ambition  was  to  get  the  Iron 
Cross,  but  as  this  would  have  been  contrary  to  my 
views  on  the  subject,  it  was  not  given  him.  I  had  a 
hasty  meal  in  Aix-la-Chapelle,  and  then  started  off 
during  the  night  on  my  search  for  the  brigades.  I 
had  not  had  my  clothes  off  for  nearly  ninety  hours. 
By  chance  I  came  across  my  old  regiment,  which  had 
been  hurriedly  railed  up  to  help  at  Liege.  I  understood 
that  General  Headquarters  in  Berlin  had  been  enter- 
taining the  gravest  fears  for  our  safety. 

The  situation  of  the  troops  in  the  citadel  was  cer- 
tainly critical,  and  I  was  very  anxious  about  them,  but 
the  tension  relaxed  as  the  enemy  remained  inactive. 

The  chronicle  of  the  subsequent  events  at  Li^ge  is 
the  province  of  official  history.  I  may  mention,  how- 
ever, that  I  happened  to  assist  at  the  capture  of  Fort 
Pontisse,  on  the  north  front,  and  arrived  at  Fort 
Loncin  just  as  it  fell.  It  had  been  hit  by  a  shell  from 
one  of  our  42-cm.  howitzers.  The  magazine  had  been 
blown  up  and  the  whole  work  collapsed.  A  number  of 
dazed  and  blackened  Belgian  soldiers  crawled  out  of 
the  ruins,  accompanied  by  some  Germans  who  had 
been  taken  prisoner  on  the  night  of  August  5.  All 
bleeding,  they  came  toward  us  with  their  hands  up, 
stammering  out,  'We  pas  iuer,  ne  pas  iuer  "  ("Don't 
kill,  don't  kill!").  .  .  .  We  were  no  Huns,  and  our  men. 
brought  water  to  refresh  our  enemies. 


46  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

We  gradually  got  possession  of  all  the  works,  just 
in  time  to  enable  the  right  wing  of  the  German  Army 
to  continue  its  march  over  the  Meuse  into  Belgium 
without  hindrance.  A  great  load  was  taken  off  my 
mind. 

I  have  always  regarded  it  as  a  great  piece  of  luck  that 
I  was  able  to  be  present  at  the  taking  of  Liege,  if  only 
because  I  had  worked  on  the  plan  of  attack  in  peace- 
time, and  had  always  been  impressed  with  the  im- 
portance of  the  operation.  His  Majesty  bestowed  on 
me  the  order  Pour  le  M^rite  for  my  leadership  of  the 
brigade.  Of  course  General  von  Emmich  received  it, 
too,  as  general  officer  in  command,  for  his  was  the 
responsibihty.  Besides,  the  taking  of  Liege  was  not 
a  one-man  feat,  but  the  result  of  the  co-operation  of 
a  number,  and  the  glory  of  reducing  the  fortress  must 
be  divided  among  them. 

I  took  part  in  the  farther  advance  into  Belgium  in 
my  capacity  as  Quartermaster-General,  and  thus  had 
an  opportunity  of  gaming  a  thorough  insight  into  all 
questions  affecting  the  supply  of  an  army,  knowledge 
which  made  my  subsequent  position  as  Chief  of  Staff 
much  easier.  In  my  joumeyings  through  the  country, 
I  came  to  Andenne,  where  I  saw  a  gruesome,  distress- 
ing example  of  the  devastation  that  follows  jranc- 
tireur  operations. 

On  August  21  I  was  present  at  the  crossing  of  the 
Sambre,  by  the  2d  Guards  Division,  west  of  Namur. 
The  preliminaries  of  the  great  colHsion  were  carried 
through  with  perfect  ease.  It  was  wonderful  to  see  the 
magnificent  men  of  the  Augusta  Regiment  go  into 
battle. 

On  the  morning  of  August  22  I  received  my  call  to 
the  East. 


AS   CHIEF    OF    THE    GENERAL    STAFF, 
EASTERN    FRONT 

From  August  22,  191 4,  to  August  18,  IQ16 


TANNENBERG 

Summoned  to  the  Eastern  Front— The  Plan  of  Battle— The  Battle — 
The  Concentration  Against  Rennenkampf — The  Battle  of  the 
Masurian  Lakes — The  Behavior  of  the  Russian  Army — The  Swing 
of  the  Pendulum  in  the  West. 

(Maps  I,  II,  and  III) 


THE  letters  from  General  von  Moltke  and  General 
von  Stein  summoning  me  to  General  Headquarters 
at  Coblenz,  and  informing  me  that  I  had  been  appointed 
Chief  of  Staff  to  the  Eighth  Army  in  East  Prussia, 
were  handed  to  me  by  Captain  von  Rochow  at  9  p.m. 
on  the  morning  of  August  22,  at  the  Headquarters  of 
the  Second  Army,  half-way  between  Wavre  and  Namur. 
General  von  Moltke 's  letter  ran : 

You  have  before  you  a  new  and  difficult  task,  perhaps  even 
more  difficult  than  that  of  storming  Li^ge.  ...  I  know  no  other 
man  in  whom  I  have  such  absolute  trust.  You  may  be  able  to 
save  the  situation  in  the  East.  You  must  not  be  angry  with  me 
for  calling  you  away  from  a  post  in  which  you  are  perhaps  on  the 
threshold  of  a  decisive  action,  which,  please  God,  will  be  con- 
clusive. This  is  yet  another  sacrifice  you  are  called  upon  to  make 
for  the  Fatherland.  The  Kaiser,  too,  has  confidence  in  you.  Of 
coin-se  you  will  not  be  made  responsible  for  what  has  already 
happened,  but  with  your  energy,  you  can  prevent  the  worst  from 
happening.  So  answer  this  new  call,  which  is  the  greatest  compli- 
ment that  can  be  paid  any  soldier.  I  know  that  you  will  not 
belie  the  trust  reposed  in  you. 

General  von  Stein,  who  was  at  that  time  Quarter- 
master-General, and  later  became  Minister  of  War, 
concluded  his  letter  by  saying: 


so  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

You  must  go,  therefore.  The  interests  of  the  State  make  it 
imperative.    Your  task  is  a  difficult  one,  but  you  are  equal  to  it. 

From  Captain  von  Rochow  I  learned  that  General 
von  Hindenburg  was  to  be  Commander-in-chief,  but 
that  it  was  not  yet  known  where  he  was  to  be  found 
or  whether  he  would  accept  the  post. 

I  was  proud  of  my  new  task  and  of  the  trust  placed  in 
me,  as  revealed  by  the  two  letters.  I  was  exalted  at 
the  thought  of  serving  my  Emperor,  the  army,  and  the 
Fatherland,  and  in  a  position  of  great  responsibility  at  a 
most  critical  juncture.  Love  of  country,  loyalty  to  my 
sovereign,  appreciation  of  the  truth  that  the  duty  of 
every  one  is  to  devote  his  life  to  his  family  and  the 
State — these  were  the  inherited  principles  which  ac- 
companied me  into  the  world  when  I  left  my  parents* 
roof.  My  parents  were  not  wealthy;  their  long  and 
faithful  work  had  brought  them  no  material  reward. 
Our  happy  and  harmonious  family  life  was  conducted 
on  very  economical  and  simple  lines.  Both  my  father 
and  my  mother  sacrificed  their  all  in  providing  for 
their  six  children.  I  take  this  opportunity  of  thanking 
them  before  the  whole  world. 

I  had  a  hard  struggle  to  make  ends  meet  when  I 
was  a  young  officer,  but  my  enjoyment  of  life  did  not 
suffer  on  that  account.  Much  of  my  time  was  spent 
in  my  simple  subaltern's  apartments  in  Wesel, 
"Wilhelmshaven,  and  Kiel,  reading  works  on  history, 
military  history,  and  geography.  I  extended  and 
developed  the  knowledge  I  had  acquired  as  a  boy. 
I  learned  to  be  proud  of  my  Fatherland  and  its  great 
men,  and  ardently  worshiped  at  the  shrine  of  Bis- 
marck's powerful  and  passionate  genius. 

The  work  of  our  reigning  house  for  Prussian 
Germany  stood  out  in  the  clearest  relief.  The  allegiance 
I  had  pledged  on  oath  developed  into  a  feeling  of  deep 
personal  devotion.    As  I  followed  history  step  by  step, 


•    TANNENBERG  51 

I  became  more  and  more  convinced  that  the  safety 
of  the  country  essentially  depended  on  the  army  and 
navy,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  Germany  had  again  and 
again  been  the  battle-field  of  Europe.  At  the  same 
time,  my  experience  of  life  enabled  me  to  appreciate 
and  realize  all  that  the  Fatherland  had  done  and  was 
doing  in  times  of  peace  in  the  cause  of  culture  and 
humanity. 

My  practical  work  for  the  army  began  in  1904,  when 
I  was  appointed  to  the  Operations  Department  of  the 
Great  General  Staff.  The  culmination  of  my  work 
there  was  my  proposal  for  the  milliard-mark  bill. 

For  a  long  time  my  mobilization  orders  had  appointed 
me  Director  of  Military  Operations  at  General  Head- 
quarters; but,  of  course,  this  was  changed  when  I 
took  over  the  command  of  the  regiment  in  Dusseldorf. 
My  successor  on  the  staff  was  appointed  to  that  posi- 
tion. I  valued  my  position  as  Quartermaster-General 
of  the  Second  Army  (to  which  I  was  appointed  on 
mobilization)  because  of  Liege,  but  otherwise  it  was 
not  particularly  attractive. 

Under  the  leadership  of  General  von  Moltke,  I  had 
taken  part  in  many  General  Staff  tours  of  inspection, 
and  had  there  gained  deep  insight  into  the  art  of  war 
on  a  large  scale.  My  new  position  offered  me  an  op- 
portunity, though  only  in  a  comparatively  small  field 
of  action,  of  proving  whether  I  understood  how  to 
apply  the  teachings  of  that  great  teacher  of  the  General 
Staff,  General  Count  von  Schlieffen.  No  soldier  could 
have  had  a  better  chance  given  him.  But  I  was  deeply 
distressed  that  my  appointment  was  the  outcome  of 
such  a  serious  situation  for  my  country.  My  patriotic 
feelings  and  heartfelt  convictions  spurred  me  to  action. 

Within  a  quarter  of  an  hour  I  was  on  my  way  in  a 
car  to  Coblenz.  I  passed  through  Wavre.  Only  the 
day  before  it  had  been  a  peaceful  town.     Now  it  was 


52  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

in  flames.  Here,  also,  the  populace  had  fired  on  our 
troops.    That  was  my  farewell  to  Belgium. 

I  arrived  at  Coblenz  at  six  o'clock  in  the  evening 
and  immediately  reported  to  General  von  Moltke, 
who  was  looking  tired.  Here  I  learned  further  details 
of  the  situation  in  the  East.  On  August  20  the  Eighth 
Army  had  attacked  the  Russian  Nieman  Army,  under 
General  Rennenkampf,  near  Gtunbinnen.  This  offen- 
sive had,  in  spite  of  initial  successes,  not  resulted  in 
any  decisive  victory,  and  had  to  be  broken  off.  Since 
then  the  army  between  Lake  Mauer  and  the  river 
Pregel  was  in  full  retreat  westward  over  the  river 
Angerapp,  and  to  the  north  of  the  Pregel,  behind  the 
river  Deime,  the  first  Une  of  defense  of  the  fortress 
of  Konigsberg.  The  ist  Army  Corps  was  to  be  brought 
by  rail  from  stations  west  of  Insterburg  to  Gosslers- 
hausen,  and  be  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  army  com- 
mand, while  the  3d  Reserve  Division  was  to  be  taken 
from  Angerberg  to  the  Allenstein-Hohenstein  front 
to  reinforce  the  20th  Army  Corps. 

The  line  of  lakes  from  Nikolaiken  to  Lotzen,  which 
was  only  slightly  fortified,  was  in  our  hands;  only 
weak  enemy  forces  had  approached  it. 

General  von  Scholtz,  commanding  the  20th  Army 
Corps,  was  in  charge  on  the  southern  frontier  of  East 
Prussia.  In  the  course  of  continuous  engagements 
with  the  Russian  Narew  Army,  under  Samsonoff,  he 
had  concentrated  around  and  to  the  east  of  Gilgenburg, 
his  own  divisions,  the  70th  Landwehr  Brigade  (which 
was  still  under  his  command)  and  part  of  the  garrisons 
of  Thorn  and  the  other  Vistula  fortresses.  The  enemy 
was  pressing  him  very  heavily. 

There  was  a  possibility  of  the  two  enemy  armies 
advancing  on  both  sides  of  the  chain  of  lakes.  General 
von  Moltke  informed  me  that  the  Eighth  Army  was 
pronosing  to  evacuate  the  whole  country  east  of  the 


TANNENBERG 


S3 


Vistula;  only  the  fortresses  were  to  retain  their  war 
garrisons  and  be  defended.  The  Eighth  Army  had  no 
doubt  adopted  this  plan  in  the  expectation  of  a  speedy 
decision  in  the  West,  when  East  Prussia  could  be  re- 


)     Ldvfenbtjrg  , 


FIG.  2.      TANNENBERG.      SITUATION   ON   AUGUST   22,  I9I4 


conquered  with  the  help  of  reinforcements  from  the 
West,  and  the  invading  army  driven  back.  This 
scheme  had  often  been  practised  by  Coimt  von  Schlieff en 
in  strategical  maneuvers.  If  the  assumption  was  cor- 
rect, the  decision  of  the  Eighth  Army  to  spare  itself 
for  later  operations  was  sound. 


54  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

But  it  did  not  allow  for  the  realities  of  war,  nor  did 
it  take  into  account  the  immense  responsibility  of 
exposing  part  of  one's  country  to  invasion.  The 
amount  of  suffering  inflicted  on  countries  that  form 
the  actual  theater  of  operations,  even  under  the  most 
humane  conditions  of  warfare,  has  once  more  been 
brought  home  to  humanity  by  this  World  War. 

As  events  were  shaping,  retreat  behind  the  Vistula 
would  have  spelled  ruin.  We  should  not  have  been  able 
to  hold  the  Vistula  line  against  the  numerically  superior 
forces  of  the  Russians,  and  it  would  certainly  have  been 
impossible  for  us  to  support  the  Austrian  Army  in 
September;  its  collapse  would  then  have  f  one  wed  as 
a  matter  of  course.  The  situation,  as  I  found  it,  was 
indeed  very  serious,  but,  after  all,  the  problem  was 
not  insoluble. 

At  my  request,  orders  were  immediately  sent  to 
the  East  front  fixing  the  retreat  of  the  main  body  of 
the  Eighth  Army  for  August  23.  The  ist  Reserve 
Corps,  the  17th  Army  Corps,  and  the  main  reserve  of 
the  Konigsberg  garrison  were  to  have  a  rest.  The  ist 
Army  Corps  was  not  to  be  detrained  at  Gosslershausen, 
but  near  General  von  Scholtz's  position,  somewhere 
east  of  Deutsch-Eylau.  Any  available  troops  from 
the  garrisons  of  Thorn,  Kulm,  Grandenz,  and  Marien- 
burg  were  to  go  to  Strasburg  and  Lautenberg.  These 
garrisons  were  composed  only  of  Landwehr  and  Land- 
sturm  formations.  Thus,  in  the  southwest  part  of 
East  Prussia  a  strong  army  was  formed,  which  could 
undertake  an  offensive,  while  the  northern  group  either 
continued  its  retreat  in  a  southwesterly  direction  or 
could  be  brought  straight  down  south  to  assist  in  the 
action  against  the  Narew  Army.  Of  course  an  actual 
decision  as  to  the  plan  to  be  adopted  could  be  given 
only  on  the  spot.  The  Russians  could  not  be  driven 
off  without  a  fresh  engagement.    No  staff-officer  would 


TANNENBERG  55 

miss  such  a  chance  of  turning  to  good  advantage  the 
fact  that  their  two  armies  were  separated  from  each 
other. 

I  also  reported  to  His  Majesty  the  Emperor.  His 
Majesty,  who  was  very  cakn,  spoke  seriously  of  the 
Eastern  situation,  and  deeply  regretted  that  part  of 
the  German  Fatherland  should  suffer  invasion  by  the 
enemy.  He  was  mindful  of  the  sufferings  of  his 
people.  The  Kaiser  decorated  me  with  the  ®rder 
Pour  le  Miritz,  which  had  been  awarded  me  for 
my  work  at  Liege,  and  spoke  appreciatively  of  me. 
All  my  life  this  occasion  will  be  a  proud,  if  sad, 
memory. 

At  nine  o'clock  in  the  evening  I  left  Coblenz  in  a 
special  train  for  the  Eastern  front. 

Shortly  before  my  departure  I  learned  that  General 
von  Hindenburg  had  accepted  the  post  of  Commander- 
in-chief,  and  would  board  the  train  at  Hanover  at 
four  o'clock  in  the  morning. 

The  General  was  at  the  station  at  Hanover,  and  I 
reported  to  him.  It  was  the  first  time  we  had  met. 
All  other  versions  belong  to  the  realm  of  fiction. 

I  explained  the  situation  shortly,  and  we  then  went 
to  bed. 

About  two  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  August  23 
we  arrived  at  Marienburg,  where  the  army  command 
awaited  us.  The  situation  had  changed  and  the  de- 
cision to  retire  behind  the  Vistula  had  been  abandoned. 
It  was  intended  to  hold  the  line  of  the  river  Passarge. 
General  Grunert,  Chief  of  Staiff  of  the  Eighth  Army, 
and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hoffmann  were  responsible  for 
this  change  of  plan. 

Our  reception  at  Marienburg  was  anything  but 
cheerful.  It  seemed  like  entering  another  world  to 
come  into  this  depressing  atmosphere  after  Li^ge  and 
the   rapid   advance   in   the   West.      But   things   soon 


S6  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

changed,  and  the  general  atmosphere  improved.    Staff 
life  was  once  more  what  I  have  already  described. 


II 

Major  Valdivia,  the  distinguished  Spanish  military- 
attache  during  the  war,  asked  me  on  his  first  visit  to 
headquarters  in  Posen  in  October  19 14  whether  the 
battle  of  Tannenberg  had  been  fought  according  to  a 
long-conceived  and  prepared  plan.  I  could  only  answer 
that  it  had  not.  He  was  greatly  surprised,  for,  like 
most  other  people,  he  had  taken  it  for  granted. 

A  plan  of  campaign  can  and  must  be  planned  a 
long  time  ahead.  Battles  in  a  war  of  positions  demand 
similar  treatment,  but  the  rapid  succession  of  events 
in  a  war  of  movement  bring  about  equally  rapid  changes 
in  a  commander's  views  and  impressions.  He  has  to 
be  guided  by  feeling,  intuition.  Thus  the  military 
science  becomes  an  art  and  the  soldier  a  strategist. 

Gradually,  during  the  period  of  August  24-26,  the 
battle  plan  took  shape  in  all  its  details.  The  great 
question  was  whether  it  would  really  be  possible  to 
v/ithdraw  the  ist  Reserve  Corps  and  the  17  th  Army 
Corps  from  their  positions  facing  Rennenkampf,  so  as 
to  unite  them  with  other  units  of  the  Eighth  Army 
for  action  against  the  Narew  Army.  It  depended 
solely  on  Rennenkampf  himself,  for  if  he  knew  how  to 
make  the  most  of  his  success  at  Gumbinnen,  and  ad- 
vance quickly,  my  plan  would  be  unworkable.  Then 
there  would  be  no  alternative  but  to  withdraw  the 
I  St  Reserve  Corps  and  the  17  th  Army  Corps  in  a  more 
southwesterly  direction  toward  Wormditt,  while  the 
other  part  of  the  Eighth  Army  held  up  the  Narew 
Army  in  the  hope,  with  luck,  of  defeating  it  somehow. 
The  idea  of  a  stiff  defense  of  some  line  east  of  the 
Vistula,  if  necessary,  also  entered  into  our  calculations. 


TANNENBERG  57 

We  discovered  by  degrees  that  Rennenkampf  was 
advancing  only  slowly.  The  two  army  corps  could 
therefore  be  gradually  deflected  in  their  retirement 
through  the  Bartenstein-Gerdauen  line,  in  a  sharp 
southerly  direction  to  Bischofsburg-Neidenburg. 

Next,  the  17th  Army  Corps,  protected  by  the  ist 
Cavalry  Division  and  the  ist  Reserve  Corps,  was  moved 
south  via  Schippenbeil  to  Bischofstein,  As  soon  as  it 
had  passed  behind  the  ist  Reserve  Corps,  and  on  the 
26th  advanced  from  Bischofstein  to  Bischofsburg,  the 
ist  Army  Corps  itself  moved,  south  of  Schippenbeil, 
in  the  direction  of  Seeburg.  Only  the  ist  Cavalry 
Division  remained  in  contact  with  Rennenkampf,  near 
Schippenbeil  and  to  the  south.  From  this  division, 
also  on  the  26th,  the  ist  Cavalry  Brigade  received  the 
order  to  advance  via  Rossel  on  Sensburg.  Accordingly, 
from  August  27  onward,  only  two  cavalry  brigades 
stood  between  Lake  Mauer  and  the  river  Pregel,  facing 
twenty-four  very  strong  infantry  and  several  cavalry 
divisions  of  Rennenkampf's.  The  defensive  chain  of 
lakes  was  thus  open,  on  the  west;  and  in  any  case  it 
would  have  been  quite  easy  to  turn  it  and  completely 
isolate  Konigsberg. 

Our  decision  to  give  battle  arose  out  of  the  slowness 
of  the  Russian  leadership  and  was  conditioned  by  the 
necessity  of  winning  in  spite  of  inferiority  in  numbers, 
yet  I  found  it  immensely  difficult  to  take  this  momen- 
tous step. 

The  corps  came  up  here  in  the  rear  of  the  Narew 
Army,  which  was  advancing  from  Neidenburg  to  Allen- 
stein.  In  this  way  they  exposed  their  rear,  without 
adequate  protection  to  Rennenkampf's  army,  which 
was  only  two  or  three  days'  march  away.  When  the 
battle  began  in  real  earnest  on  the  27th  and,  in  con- 
trast to  previous  wars,  was  not  finished  in  one  day,  but 
continued  until  the  30th,  Rennenkampf's  formidable 


58  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

host  hung  like  a  threatening  thunder-cloud  to  the 
northeast.  He  need  only  have  closed  with  us  and  we 
should  have  been  beaten.  But  Rennenkampf  brought 
his  army  forward  over  the  AUenburg  -  Gerdauen  - 
Neidenburg  line  so  slowly  that  we  had  time  to  win  a 
brilliant  victory. 

Few  knew  the  anxiety  with  which  I  watched  the 
Niemen  Army  during  those  long  days. 

In  order  to  allow  the  17  th  Army  Corps  and  the  ist 
Reserve  Corps  to  make  their  full  striking  power  felt, 
the  other  groups  of  the  Eighth  Army  had  of  course  to 
attack.  And,  whatever  happened,  they  had  not  to  let 
themselves  be  beaten. 

The  reinforced  20th  Army  Corps  had  passed  through 
difficult  and  exhausting  days.  On  the  23d  it  stood, 
facing  south,  on  the  heights  northeast  of  Gilgenburg, 
while  the  enemy  was  approaching  from  Neidenburg — 
that  is,  from  the  southeast.  The  3d  Reserve  Division 
was  still  assembling.  The  ist  Army  Corps  had  just 
begun  to  detrain  near  Deutsch-Eylau.  General  von 
Scholtz  was  successful  in  beating  off  superior  enemy 
forces,  but  while  holding  the  heights  east  of  Gilgenburg 
he  was  obliged  to  withdraw  his  left  flank  sharply  west 
of  Hohenstein,  about  as  far  as  Miihlen.  Although 
uncomfortable  for  the  troops,  this  movement  had  its 
good  points,  for  the  Russians  thought  they  had  won. 
They  did  not  believe  in  any  further  German  resistance, 
still  less  in  a  German  attack.  They  saw  the  road  open 
into  German  territory  east  of  the  Vistula. 

On  the  24th  we  got  into  touch  with  General  von 
Scholtz  and  actually  met  him  at  Tannenberg.  He  and 
his  Chief  of  Staff,  Colonel  Hell,  were  to  distinguish 
themselves  in  the  course  of  the  war  and  leave  their 
names  to  history. 

General  von  Scholtz  gave  us  a  lucid  account  of  the 
great  achievements  of  the  troops  under  his  command 


lANNENBERG  59 

since  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  and  the  great 
difficulties  encountered  in  the  last  battles.  He  was 
of  the  opinion  that  the  enemy  wotdd  attack  him  again, 
but  that  he  would  be  able  to  stand  fast. 

On  the  journey  from  Marienburg  to  Tannenberg, 
an  intercepted  enemy  wireless  message  was  sent  us 
which  gave  a  clear  idea  of  our  opponents'  dispositions 
for  the  next  few  days.  The  Narew  Army  was  ad- 
vancing, its  left  wing  in  echelon,  its  6th  Corps  directed 
via  Ortelsbiu-g,  on  Bischofsburg,  which  was  reached  or 
passed  by  the  26th,  and  its  13th  Corps  directed  from 
Neidenburg  through  Passenheim  to  Allenstein.  The 
15th  and  1 8th  Corps,  with  which  General  von  Scholtz 
had  been  engaged  during  these  days,  was  following. 
On  the  26th,  the  most  southerly  echelon  was  to  be 
found  somewhere  near  Waplitz.  Still  farther  back  to 
the  left,  and  pushed  west,  the  ist  Corps,  covered  by 
several  cavalry  divisions,  was  moving  through  Mlawa 
and  Soldau,  against  Lautenberg  and  Strasburg. 

It  was  a  question  of  breaking  up  this  movement  of 
the  enemy  by  an  attack  from  the  west  with  the  southern 
group  of  the  Eighth  Army.  It  was  a  great  temptation 
to  attack  simultaneously  south  of  Soldau,  in  order  to 
surround  the  ist  Russian  Corps  as  well.  The  defeat 
of  the  Narew  Army,  in  conjunction  with  the  advance 
of  the  17th  Army  Corps  and  the  ist  Reserve  Corps, 
could  thus  have  been  absolutely  annihilating,  but  the 
forces  at  my  disposal  were  insufficient.  So  I  proposed 
to  General  von  Hindenburg  that  an  attack  be  made 
in  the  direction  of  Usdau  by  the  ist  Army  Corps  on 
the  line  Deutsch-Eylau-Montowo,  and  by  the  right 
wing  of  the  reinforced  20th  Army  Corps  from  the  direc- 
tion of  Gilgenburg,  so  as  to  throw  back  the  Russian 
ist  Corps  to  the  south,  beyond  Soldau.  Then,  our 
ist  Army  Corps  was  to  break  through  in  the  direction 
of  Neidenburg,  in  conjunction  with  the  ist  and  17th 


6o  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Army  Corps  and  ist  Reserve  Corps,  in  order  to  sur- 
round at  least  the  main  body  of  the  Narew  Army. 
We  had  to  confine  ourselves  to  this  plan  if  we  wished 
to  succeed. 

The  attack  by  the  ist  and  20th  Army  Corps  had  to 
be  postponed  to  the  27th,  though  I  should  have  been 
glad  to  see  it  begin  earlier;  but  the  ist  Army  Corps 
was  not  yet  ready,  the  condition  of  the  railways  in 
East  Prussia  being  far  from  good.  General  von  Fran- 
cois, commanding  the  ist  Army  Corps,  quite  rightly 
insisted  on  concentrating  the  whole  of  his  corps  before 
attacking. 

But  matters  did  not  develop  as  smoothly  as  would 
appear  from  this  short  sketch.  All  the  troops  were 
exceedingly  exhausted,  and  their  vitality  had  been  re- 
duced by  continual  fighting.  Many  difficulties  were 
met  with  in  the  transmission  of  orders  to  the  ist 
Reserve  Corps  and  the  17th  Army  Corps.  Enemy 
cavalry  patrols  rendered  that  zone  unsafe.  It  was 
doubtful  whether  the  enemy  would  give  us  time  to 
carry  out  our  plans. 

But  the  greatest  difficulties  were  due  to  the  refugees, 
numbering  many  thousands,  some  on  foot  and  some  in 
vehicles,  who  blocked  the  roads  behind  Von  Scholtz's 
force.  They  hung  on  to  the  troops,  and  a  sudden 
retreat  on  the  part  of  this  army  group  would  have  had 
the  most  distressing  consequences,  both  for  refugees 
and  for  soldiers.  But  it  could  not  be  avoided,  for  the 
few  police  were  not  sufficient  to  take  charge  of  such 
masses.  We  had  to  put  up  with  them.  The  memory 
of  the  many  sad  sights  I  then  saw  haujits  me  still. 


Ill 

On  August  24  and  25  our  headquarters  were  at  Rosen- 
berg, and  on  the  26th  at  Lobau.    We  took  advantage  of 


TANNENBERG  6i 

these  last  two  days  to  get  into  touch  with  commanders 
and  men  in  various  parts. 

On  the  evening  of  the  26th  the  positions  of  both 
sides  were  somewhat  as  follows: 

General  von  Miihlmann — who  had  the  ist  Army 
Corps  under  his  orders,  with  portions  of  the  garrisons 
of  the  Vistula  fortresses — was  in  Lautenberg  and 
Strasburg,  in  close  touch  with  enemy  cavalry.  The 
ist  Army  Corps  had  been  concentrated  at  the  south 
of  Montowo,  and  had  fought  its  way  as  far  as  Usdau, 
which  was  strongly  held  by  the  Russian  ist  Corps. 
General  von  Frangois  was  ready  to  continue  his  ad- 
vance on  the  27th. 

To  the  right  wing  of  the  reinforced  20th  Army 
Corps  had  been  allotted  the  task  of  attacking  Usdau 
from  the  north,  and  then  joining  hands  with  the  ist 
Army  Corps  in  its  later  advance  upon  Neidenburg. 
The  41st  Infantry  Division  was  to  march  upon  Waplitz 
from  Gross  Gardienen,  while  on  their  left  a  Landwehr 
Brigade,  the  3d  Reserve  Division,  and  the  27th  In- 
fantry Division  were  simultaneously  to  attack  Waplitz 
and  Hohenstein  on  a  line  running  north  from  Muhlen. 
The  enemy  had  pushed  forward  on  the  whole  front 
and  had  occupied  Allenstein. 

Von  der  Goltz's  Landwehr  Division,  which  had  been 
placed  at  our  disposal  by  the  General  Headquarters, 
was  coming  up  near  Osterode  and  Biessellen.  This 
division  came  from  Schleswig-Holstein,  where  up  to 
now  it  had  been  employed  in  guarding  the  canal  and 
the  coast.  It  was  to  take  Hohenstein  from  the  north- 
west. 

The  ist  Reserve  Corps  reached  the  neighborhood  of 
Seeburg  on  the  26th.  The  17th  Army  Corps  had  been 
engaged  with  a  division  of  the  Russian  6th  Corps  be- 
tween Lautem  and  Gr.  Bossau,  north  of  Bischofsburg, 
and  had  driven  it  back  in  the  direction  of  Bischofsburg. 


62  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

The  6th  Landwehr  Brigade,  which  had  advanced  oi> 
the  24th  and  25  th  from  Lotzen  to  the  northwest  of 
Bischofsburg,  had  taken  a  successftd  part  in  the 
action. 

The  attack  on  Usdau  was  to  begin  at  4  a.m.  on  the 
2  7th.  We  wanted  to  be  present  at  this  decisive  battle, 
in  order  to  be  able  to  superintend  on  the  spot  the  co- 
operation of  the  ist  and  20th  Army  Corps,  orders  for 
which  had  already  been  given.  Just  as  we  left  Lobau  for 
Gilgenburg  the  joyous  news  reached  us  that  Usdau  had 
fallen.  I  considered  the  battle  won.  However,  this 
was  somewhat  premature.  Soon  after  it  transpired  that 
Usdau  had  not  yet  been  taken,  and  it  fell  only  late  in 
the  afternoon.  From  a  tactical  point  of  view  the 
Narew  Army  was  now  broken  through.  The  ist  Army 
Corps  threw  the  enemy  back  beyond  Soldau  and 
marched  upon  Neidenburg. 

The  20th  Army  Corps,  greatly  exhausted  as  it  was, 
was  not  so  successful,  and  the  41st  Infantry  Division, 
near  Gr.  Gardienen,  made  no  progress.  Nor  was  any 
ground  won  farther  north. 

Von  der  Goltz's  Landwehr  Division  closed  in  on 
Hohenstein. 

We  returned  to  Lobau  in  the  afternoon  not  altogether 
satisfied. 

On  our  arrival,  news  came  through  that  the  ist 
Army  Corps  had  been  routed  and  that  the  remnants  of 
this  corps  were  arriving  in  Montowo.  Such  news  was 
difficult  to  believe.  A  telephone  inquiry  to  the  rail- 
way commandant  there  brought  out  the  fact  that  troops 
of  the  ist  Army  Corps  were  collecting  at  that  point, 
but  later  on  it  appeared  that  it  was  a  question  of  only 
one  battalion  that  had  found  itself  in  a  very  tight  corner 
and  given  way.  Another  rather  alarming  discovery 
was  that  a  number  of  supply  columns  were  hurriedly 
retreating  through  Lobau. 


TANNENBERG  63 

A  general  has  much  to  bear  and  needs  strong  nerves. 
The  civilian  is  too  inclined  to  think  that  war  is  only 
like  the  working  out  of  an  arithmetical  problem  with 
given  numbers.  It  is  anything  but  that.  On  both  sides 
it  is  a  case  of  wrestling  with  powerful,  unknown  phys- 
ical and  psychological  forces,  a  struggle  which  inferi- 
ority in  numbers  makes  all  the  more  difficult.  It  means 
working  with  men  of  varying  force  of  character  and 
with  their  own  views.  The  only  quantity  that  is  known 
and  constant  is  the  will  of  the  leader. 

All  those  who  criticize  the  dispositions  of  a  general 
ought  first  to  study  military  history,  unless  they  have 
themselves  taken  part  in  a  war  in  a  position  of  com- 
mand. I  should  like  to  see  such  people  compelled  to 
conduct  a  battle  themselves.  They  would  be  over- 
whelmed by  the  greatness  of  their  task,  and  when 
they  realized  the  obscurity  of  the  situation,  and  the 
exacting  nature  of  the  enormous  demands  made  upon 
them,  they  would  doubtless  be  more  modest.  Only 
the  head  of  the  Government,  or  the  statesman  who  de- 
cides on  war,  shoulders  the  same  or  a  bigger  burden 
of  responsibility  than  that  of  the  commander-in-chief. 
In  his  case  it  is  a  question  of  one  great  decision  only, 
but  the  commander  of  an  army  is  faced  with  decisions 
daily  and  hourly.  He  is  continuously  responsible  for 
the  welfare  of  many  hundred  thousands  of  persons, 
even  of  nations.  For  a  soldier  there  is  nothing  greater, 
but  at  the  same  time  more  awesome  and  responsible, 
than  to  find  himself  at  the  head  of  an  army  or  the  entire 
armed  forces  of  his  country. 

Late  that  night  we  received  news  in  Lobau  that  the 
ist  Army  Corps  had  reached  Wartenburg.  The  Rus- 
sian 6th  Corps  was  in  full  retreat  before  the  17th 
Army  Corps  beyond  Ortelsburg,  and  was  again  de- 
feated south  of  Bischofsburg.  Smaller  forces  were 
sent  in  pursuit,  while  the  main  body  of  the  17th  Army 


64  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Corps  bivouacked  at  and  to  the  north  of  Mensguth, 
on  the  evening  of  the  27  th. 

Nothing  remained  to  be  done  on  the  28th  but  to  give 
orders  for  the  ist  Army  Corps  to  occupy  Neidenburg. 
In  the  mean  time  the  corps  had  already  made  a  turning 
movement  in  that  direction.  The  20th  Army  Corps 
was  to  carry  out  the  attack  which  had  been  fixed  for 
the  27th,  and  more  especially  to  push  forward  the  41st 
Infantry  Division.  Von  der  Goltz's  Landwehr  Division 
was  to  attack  Hohenstein.  The  ist  Reserve  Corps 
and  the  17  th  Army  Corps  were  moved  up  west,  covered 
against  attack  from  Ortelsburg,  to  positions  on  a  line 
running  from  Allen  stein  to  Passenheim. 

Early  on  the  28th  we  went  to  Frogenau  and  estab- 
lished ourselves  in  the  open  at  the  eastern  end  of  the 
village.  General  von  Scholtz  was  not  far  off.  A  very 
ineffective  field  telephone  connected  us  with  the  ist 
Army  Corps,  but  no  communication  at  all  was  possible 
with  the  other  forces. 

Our  first  impressions  were  by  no  means  favorable. 
Neidenburg  had  certainly  been  taken,  but  the  41st 
Infantry  Division  had  attacked  Waplitz  in  a  fog  and 
been  driven  back.  This  division,  which  had  suffered 
heavy  casualties,  was  now  holding  positions  west  of 
Waplitz  and  anticipating  a  hostile  counter-attack  with 
the  greatest  anxiety.  I  sent  an  officer  there  by  car 
to  give  me  a  report  on  the  condition  of  the  division, 
and  his  account  was  not  encouraging.  The  Landwehr 
near  Muhlen  were  not  making  progress.  If  the  enemy 
attacked  the  right  wing  of  the  20th  Army  Corps  in 
great  force,  a  grave  crisis  might  result,  and,  at  the 
best,  the  battle  would  be  prolonged. 

Now  there  was  Rennenkampf 's  chance  to  intervene. 
But  the  enemy  made  no  attack  upon  the  41st  Infantry 
Division  and  the  Niemen  Army  did  not  advance. 

Captain  Bartenwerffer,  of  the  staff  of  the  17th  Army 


TANNENBERG 


6S 


Corps,  flew  over  the  enemy  lines,  and  brought  good 
reports  of  the  progress  of  his  corps  in  the  enemy's 
rear. 


Laufern 

I 

oRothflieO 
^Bischofsburg 


tiSoldau 


t=J= 


M/oitg 
o 

1=800000 

10  zo 


EXPLANATION 

Attack  and  breaking 
through  of  the  Ger- 
mans Aug.   29,   1914. 

S  Position  and 

Direction  of  Russian 
attack.  Aug.  29,  1914-  . 


FIG.  3.      TANNENBERG.      SITUATION   ON   AUGUST   29,  I914 


During  the  afternoon  the  situation  changed  to  our 
advantage.  The  3d  Reserve  Division,  and  later  the 
37th    Infantry    Division,    too,    won    ground   west   of 


66  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Hohenstein;  Von  der  Goltz's  Landwehr  Division  en- 
tered Hohenstein  itself.  The  enemy  front  appeared 
to  be  wavering.  General  von  Hindenburg  wanted  to 
go  straight  on  to  Miihlen.  We  ran  right  into  a  mo- 
mentary panic,  created  by  Russian  prisoners  who  were 
being  taken  to  the  rear  in  great  numbers.  This  in- 
cident created  an  unfavorable  impre-<=ision,  as  the  dis- 
order spread  far  to  the  rear. 

In  the  evening  we  went  to  Osterode.  Owing  to  an 
unfortunate  mobilization  order  the  civil  authorities  had 
already  left  the  town.  This  must  have  considerably 
increased  the  anxiety  of  the  civil  population. 

We  were  not  at  all  clear  as  to  how  things  stood  with 
the  individual  units;  but  there  was  no  doubt  that  the 
battle  was  won.  Whether  or  not  it  would  prove  a  real 
Cannae  was  uncertain.  The  ist  Army  Corps  had  orders 
to  send  a  force  to  Willenberg,  whither  the  17  th  Army 
Corps  was  also  to  proceed.  The  retreat  of  the  Russians 
was  to  be  cut  off. 

During  the  night  we  learned  further  details.  The 
Russian  13th  Corps  had  advanced  from  Allenstein  on 
Hohenstein,  and  had  pressed  the  Landwehr  severely. 
The  ist  Reserve  Corps  had  come  down  southwest  of 
Allenstein — its  further  advance  would  close  the  ring 
round  the  Russian  13th  Corps  and  thus  conclude  the 
whole  operation,  while  the  ist  and  17th  Army  Corps 
cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  other  divisions. 

On  the  morning  of  the  29th  1  decided  to  go  to 
Hohenstein  to  try  to  disentangle  the  congestion  caused 
by  the  troops  getting  mixed  up.  Operations  against 
Rennenkampf's  army  had  to  be  initiated,  whether  he 
advanced  or  stood  where  he  was. 

Still  another  incident  occurred  before  we  were  certain 
of  victory. 

Early  on  the  29th  we  received  a  message  by  aero- 
plane  that   a   hostile   army   corps   was   marching   on 


TANNENBERG  67 

Neidenburg  from  the  south  and  was  nearing  the  town. 
It  was  therefore  coming  up  in  the  rear  of  the  ist  Army 
Corps,  which,  with  its  front  facing  north,  was  fighting 
the  retreating  Russians.  Ahnost  at  the  same  moment 
we  were  called  up  from  Neidenburg  and  informed  that 
hostile  shrapnel  was  falling  on  the  town.  Then  we 
were  cut  off.  All  available  troops  were  set  marching 
in  the  direction  of  Neidenburg,  to  support  the  ist 
Army  Corps  in  the  engagement  we  anticipated.  But 
General  von  Frangois  had  saved  himself  already  by 
his  own  energy,  and  the  enemy  displayed  more  hesi- 
tation than  the  situation  justified. 

After  giving  these  orders  I  set  out  for  Hohenstein,  and 
on  the  way  went  over  the  battle-field,  which  made  a 
deep  impression  on  me.  East  of  Hohenstein  our  own 
columns  were  getting  entangled  with  masses  of  Russian 
prisoners,  and  it  was  no  easy  task  to  restore  order. 
The  ist  Reserve  Corps  and  the  20th  Army  Corps  were 
assembled  along  the  road  from  Allenstein  to  Hohen- 
stein, and  the  army  command  had  thus  again  at  least 
two  corps  at  its  disposal. 

The  battle  was  drawing  to  a  conclusion.  The  3d 
Reserve  Division  had  broken  through  the  enemy  lines 
and  reached  Muschaken,  east  of  Neidenburg.  The 
Russians,  retiring  through  the  thick  woods,  tried  to 
break  through  the  German  ring  at  several  points.  At 
Muschaken,  in  particular,  very  heavy  fighting  took 
place  on  the  30th,  but  without  in  any  way  influencing 
the  issue  of  the  battle. 

General  Samsonow  shot  himself  and  was  buried  near 
Willenberg  without  being  recognized.  His  widow,  who 
was  in  Germany  in  connection  with  matters  concerning 
prisoners  of  war,  was  able  to  trace  his  grave  by  a  locket 
which  had  been  taken  for  identification  purposes  from 
the  body  of  the  fallen  general  when  he  was  buried. 

The    Russian    generals    who    were    taken    prisoner 


68  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

arrived   at   Osterode   and   reported   to   General   von 
Hindenburg. 

The  number  of  prisoners  taken  and  the  amount  of 
booty  captured  are  already  well  known. 

The  enemy  losses  in  killed  and  wounded,  too,  were 
extremely  heavy.  The  widely  circulated  report  that 
thousands  of  Russians  were  driven  into  the  marshes 
and  there  perished  is  a  myth ;  no  marsh  was  to  be  found 
anywhere  near. 

One  of  the  most  brilliant  battles  in  the  history  of 
the  world  had  been  fought.  It  had  been  the  achieve- 
ment of  troops  which  had  been  fighting  for  weeks, 
sometimes  unsuccessfully.  To  the  training  of  our  army 
in  peace-time,  alone,  did  we  owe  this  feat.  The  battle 
was  a  glorious  triumph  for  the  generals  and  their 
troops,  indeed,  for  every  officer  and  man,  and  the 
whole  country. 

Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  rejoiced — the  world 
was  silent. 

At  my  suggestion,  the  battle  was  named  the  battle 
of  Tannenberg,  in  memory  of  that  other  battle  long 
ago  in  which  the  Teutonic  Knights  defeated  the  united 
Lithuanian  and  Polish  hosts.  Is  any  German,  as  then, 
ever  going  to  allow  the  Lett,  and  more  especially  the 
Pole,  to  take  advantage  of  our  misfortune  to  do  us 
violence?  Are  centuries  of  old  German  culture  to 
be  lost? 

I  could  not  rejoice  whole-heartedly  at  our  mighty 
victory,  for  the  strain  imposed  upon  my  nerves  by  the 
uncertainty  about  Rennenkampf's  army  had  been  too 
great.  All  the  same,  we  were  proud  of  this  battle. 
The  victory  had  been  brought  about  by  a  break- 
through, an  encircling  movement,  firm  resolution  to 
win,  and  intelligent  limitation  of  aims.  Despite  our 
inferiority  on  the  Eastern  front,  we  had  succeeded  in 
assembling  on  the  battle-field  a  force  nearly  as  strong 


TANNENBERG  69 

as  that  of  the  foe.  I  thought  of  General  Count  von 
Schlieffen  and  thanked  him  for  his  teaching. 

In  the  Protestant  church  at  Allenstein,  General  von 
Hindenburg  and  I  rendered  thanks  to  Almighty  God 
for  this  victory. 

I  had  not  a  moment  to  spare  for  relaxation.  I  had 
to  work  out  the  regrouping  of  the  army  for  further 
operations.  It  was  an  uncommonly  difficult  task 
simultaneously  to  finish  one  battle  and  make  plans  for 
the  next.  Inniimerable  other  matters  had  to  be  at- 
tended to  between  whiles.  One  urgent  matter  was  the 
removal  of  the  prisoners.  Having  regard  for  the  un- 
certainty of  the  situation,  their  numbers  alone  were  a 
heavy  burden. 

I  was  decorated  with  the  Iron  Cross,  Second  Class,  of 
which  I  was  exceedingly  proud.  Even  now,  when  I 
think  of  Liege  and  Tannenberg,  my  heart  swells  with 
pardonable  satisfaction.  The  value  of  the  Iron  Cross, 
Second  Class,  dwindled  in  the  course  of  the  war. 
That  is  quite  natural,  though  regretable.  But  the 
Order  should  be  worn  with  pride  by  any  one  who  has 
honorably  won  it. 

rv 

On  the  Western  front  the  victorious  progress  of  the 
German  arms  was  still  unchecked.  Accordingly,  Gen- 
eral Headquarters  considered  that  it  could  reinforce 
the  Eighth  Army  with  three  army  corps  from  the 
West.  The  telegram  announcing  the  proposed  rein- 
forcements arrived  just  at  the  commencement  of  the 
battle  of  Tannenberg.  Later  I  was  asked  whether  one 
army  corps  could  be  retained  in  the  West,  and  as  I 
had  not  asked  for  reinforcements,  I  assented.  So  only 
two  army  corps  arrived,  the  Guard  Reserve  Corps, 
the  nth  Corps,  and  the  8th  Cavalry  Division. 

The  decision  to  weaken  the  forces  on  the  Western 


70  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

front  was  premature,  but,  of  course,  we  in  the  East 
could  not  know  that,  for  the  reports  from  the  West 
were  favorable.  But  it  was  particularly  fateful  that 
the  reinforcements  destined  for  the  Eastern  front  were 
drawn  from  the  right  wing,  which  was  fighting  for  a 
decision,  instead  of  from  the  left  wing,  which  was 
stronger  than  was  necessary  after  the  battle  in  Lorraine 
had  been  fought.  The  corps  which  was  to  have  been 
the  third  for  the  Eastern  front  was  left  in  Lorraine. 

The  situation  in  Galicia  had  already  become  threat- 
ening. The  Russian  main  forces  had  hurled  themselves 
on  the  Austro-Hungarian  armies  and  beaten  them  east 
of  Lemburg  at  the  end  of  August. 

The  Austrian  Army  was  not,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war,  a  first-class  fighting  instrument.  Had  we  really 
entertained  aggressive  intentions  before  the  war,  we 
would  have  insisted  on  Austria-Hungary's  improving 
her  armaments.  Here  railway  communications,  which 
were  totally  inadequate,  would  also  have  been  extended. 
Our  neglect  in  that  respect  was,  in  any  case,  a  great 
mistake.  The  Triple  Alliance  was  only  a  political 
union,  while  the  Franco-Russian  alliance  was  of  a 
definitely  military  character,  and  this  constituted  a 
great  advantage  to  our  enemies. 

Even  our  arrangements  with  Austria-Hungary  in 
the  event  of  a  joint  war  were  of  the  poorest.  General 
Count  von  Schlieffen  always  feared  a  breach  of  faith, 
which  indeed  actually  occurred.  A  scheme  of  mutual 
operations  existed  only  in  the  roughest  outlines.  The 
deployment  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  armies  on  the 
farther  side  of  the  river  San  was  justified  only  if  they 
felt  themselves  superior  to  the  Russian  Army  without 
outside  help,  as  many  Austro-Hungarian  officers  be- 
lieved, or  if  we  could  cross  the  river  Narew  simultane- 
ously with  strong  forces.  But  this  we  were  not  in  a 
position  to  do,  as  the  last  army  bill  had  not  granted  us 


TANNENBERG  71 

the  three  extra  army  corps  for  which  the  General  Staff 
had  hoped.  Further,  we  now  had  also  to  make  up  on 
the  Western  front  for  Italy's  defection. 

According  to  former  military  agreements  with  Italy, 
three  Italian  army  corps  and  two  cavalry  divisions 
were  to  help  in  Alsace,  while  the  main  body,  of  the 
army,  minus  the  coast-defense  forces,  were  to  be 
assembled  on  the  Franco-Italian  frontier.  Simultane- 
ously, the  fleet  was  to  endeavor  to  cut  France  off 
from  her  colonies  in  North  Africa.  These  arrangements 
were  in  force  for  some  time — but  subsequently  lapsed. 
Then  at  the  express  wish  of  General  PoUio,  Chief  of 
the  Italian  General  Staff,  these  plans  were  once  more 
worked  at. 

General  Pollio  died  in  the  summer  of  1914 — shortly 
before  the  outbreak  of  war.  There  was  not  the  least 
necessity  for  France  to  leave  even  a  single  soldier  on 
her  southeast  frontier;  she  could  employ  every  soldier 
against  us,  for  she  knew  perfectly  well  that  Italy  would 
not  come  into  the  war  on  our  side.  Our  former  ally 
thus  did  us  untold  harm.  Her  attitude  toward  Eng- 
land was  not  to  be  misunderstood.  Animosity  certainly 
existed  between  Italy  and  Austria-Hungary,  but  al- 
though this  was  of  long  standing,  it  did  not  prevent 
Italy  entering  into  an  alliance  with  us  and  Austria- 
Hungary.  This  alliance  brought  Italy  many  ad- 
vantages, and  we  naturally  expected  that  she  would 
feel  under  an  obligation  to  us. 

A  healthy  national  egoism  is  easy  to  understand 
and  is  fotmd  in  every  nation.  But  there  are  certain 
ethical  laws  which  must  not  be  violated,  and  that 
is  precisely  what  Italy  did.  So  she  cannot  complain 
of  the  adverse  criticism  we  leveled  at  her  during  the 
four  years  of  war. 

The  critical  position  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army 
at  the  end  of  August,   opposed  by  greatly  superior 


72  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Russian  forces,  was  not  to  be  misunderstood.  General 
von  Conrad,  Chief  of  the  Austrian  General  Staff,  in- 
sisted, quite  properly  from  his  point  of  view,  that  we 
should  cross  the  river  Narew.  But  seeing  that  the 
Eighth  Army  was  stiU  inferior  in  numbers  to  that  of 
General  Rennenkampf's,  it  was  impossible  to  accede 
to  this  request.  An  advance  in  the  direction  of  Mlawa- 
Pultusk  could  at  any  time  be  stopped  by  the  advance 
of  General  Rennenkampf  toward  the  Allenstein-Elbing 
line.  There  was,  therefore,  no  alternative  but  to  deal 
first  with  the  Russian  Niemen  Army. 

Apparently  still  under  the  influence  of  the  battle  of 
Tannenberg,  Rennenkampf  had  withdrawn  his  ad- 
vanced units  several  kilometers,  but  seemingly  he 
intended  to  stand  between  the  river  Pregel  and  Lake 
Mauer.  The  Eighth  Army  was  compelled  to  fight  a 
second  battle  and  had  to  use  all  its  available  strength. 

In  the  execution  of  this  plan,  the  reinforcements 
from  the  West  were  detrained  on  the  Allenstein-Elbing 
line,  and  the  Eighth  Army  was  concentrated  ready  to 
advance  between  W^illenberg  and  the  AUenstein  front. 

Only  small  forces  were  left  behind  for  the  defense  of 
the  frontier  near  Soldau.  They  were  to  advance  into 
Poland  in  the  direction  of  Mlawa. 

As  soon  as  the  troops  had  been  deployed,  we  in- 
tended to  attack  Rennenkampf  on  a  wide  front  be- 
tween the  river  Pregel  and  Lake  Mauer,  while  envelop- 
ing his  left  wing  beyond  Lotzen  and  farther  south. 
The  task  delegated  to  our  outermost  southern  wing  was 
to  guard  the  army  from  attack  from  Augustovo  and 
Osowiec,  where  hostile  reinforcements  were  expected. 
The  concentrated  Eighth  Army  was  to  fight  in  three 
groups  from  the  river  Pregel  to  Lake  Mauer,  east  of 
Lotzen  and  in  the  direction  of  Lyck. 

At  the  beginning  of  September  the  following  units 
were  up  ready  to  advance: 


TANNENBERG  73 

The  garrisons  of  the  Vistula  fortresses,  near  Soldau. 

Von  der  Goltz's  Landwehr  Division,  near  Neiden- 
burg. 

3d  Reserve  Division  and  ist  Army  Corps,  near 
Willenberg,  Ortelsburg,  ist  Cavahy  Brigade  west  of 
Johannisburg. 

17th  Army  Corps,  Passenheim. 

20th  and  nth  Army  Corps,  and  ist  Reserve  Corps 
in  and  on  both  sides  of  AUenstein. 

Guard  Reserve  Corps  coming  up  from  Elbing  toward 
the  lower  course  of  the  river  Passarge. 

8th  Cavalry  Division  advancing  in  the  direction  of 
Lotzen. 

The  ist  Cavalry  Division,  minus  one  cavalry  brigade, 
was  still  occupying  its  positions  facing  the  Niemen 
Army.     It  was  also  to  advance  via  Lotzen. 

The  main  Konigsberg  Reserve  holding  the  line  of  the 
Deime. 

The  main  Posen  Reserve  and  the  Count  von  Bredow 
Landwehr  Division  were  being  brought  up,  but  did  not 
arrive  in  time  for  the  battle. 

The  supply  columns  and  trains  of  the  ist  Reserve 
Corps  and  the  27th  Army  Corps,  which  were  behind 
the  river  Passarge  when  the  forward  movement  started, 
had  to  carry  out  some  difficult  movements,  but  finally 
succeeded  in  reaching  their  positions  without  too  much 
friction. 

Some  Russian  cavalry,  before  which  our  ist  Cavalry 
Division  had  to  give  way,  had  temporarily  penetrated 
west  right  as  far  as  the  Passarge  and  Wormditt,  with- 
out doing  any  military  damage,  however.  Strange  to 
say,  they  had  not  destroyed  even  the  main  railway  line 
from  Elbing  to  Konigsberg. 

It  was  naturally  of  the  utmost  importance  to  us  to 
get  our  railways  into  working  order  again,  especially 
those  we  had  had  to  destroy  ourselves  during  our  retreat 


74  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

from  Giimbinnen.  This  was  particularly  essential  in 
regard  to  the  station  of  Korschen.  This  station  ought 
to  have  been  thoroughly  demolished;  but  within  forty- 
eight  hours  of  our  recovering  possession  it  could  be 
utilized  again.  It  was  lucky  for  us  that  the  work  of 
destruction  had  not  been  carried  out  as  thoroughly  as 
I  had  expected.  The  troops  as  yet  were  not  sufficiently 
experienced.  It  was  plain  that  special  technical  in- 
struction was  needed.  I  made  a  mental  note  of  this 
for  future  occasions. 


The  advance  against  Rennenkampf 's  army  began  on 
September  4.  On  the  7  th  the  Guard  Reserve  Corps, 
the  ist  Reserve  Corps,  the  nth  and  20th  Army  Corps 
intrenched  a  position  in  front  of  the  enemy  lines  at 
Wehlau-Gerdauen-Nordenburg-Angerburg,  between  the 
river  Pregel  and  Lake  Mauer,  and  attacked  during  the 
following  days  according  to  plan.  The  engagements, 
particularly  those  of  the  20th  Army  Corps,  did  not  go 
well  for  us.  The  Russians  made  a  powerful  counter- 
attack. The  enemy  positions  were  strong  and  cleverly 
constructed,  and  we  should  never  have  got  the  upper 
hand  of  them  with  the  arms  and  ammunition  at  our 
disposal,  had  it  not  been  that  the  projected  enveloping 
movement  near  Lotzen  and  the  fortified  chain  of  lakes 
were  beginning  to  have  their  effect. 

Even  east  of  Lotzen,  which  had  held  out  bravely 
against  enemy  attacks  all  this  time,  things  did  not  look 
promising.  The  17th  Army  Corps  and  the  ist  and  8th 
Cavalry  Divisions,  which  had  advanced  from  the  for- 
tress, made  only  slow  progress  northeast  of  the  lakes, 
on  September  8  and  9.  They  had  some  very  hard 
fighting  round  Kruglauken  and  Possessem.  The  ist 
Army  Corps,  which  had  pressed  forward  from  Nikolai- 
ken  and  Johannisburg,   had  to  be  deflected  sharply 


TANNENBERG  75 

north  from  the  east  side  of  the  lake  line.  By  this 
movement  it  secured  more  room  for  the  17th  Army 
Corps  by  the  evening  of  the  gth.  The  3d  Reserve 
Division,  with  Von  der  Goltz's  Landwehr  Division 
behind  it,  was  still  advancing  in  the  Bialla-Lyck  direc- 
tion. On  September  3  it  had  already  encountered  the 
enemy  in  very  superior  force  near  Bialla. 

This  operation  also  was  extraordinarily  daring.  To 
begin  with,  the  Russian  Niemen  Army,  with  its  twenty- 
four  infantry  divisions,  was  very  much  stronger  than 
the  Eighth  Army,  with  its  fifteen  to  sixteen  divisions. 
Moreover,  the  Russian  divisions  consisted  of  sixteen 
battalions,  and  ours,  at  that  time,  of  twelve.  The 
Russian  fighting  strength  was  further  increased  by  from 
four  to  six  divisions,  which  were  being  assembled  round 
Osowiec  and  Augustovo.  This  immense  superiority 
could  be  concentrated  against  us  at  any  moment  and 
at  any  chosen  point.  Our  right  wing,  in  particular, 
was  in  danger  to  the  east  of  the  lakes.  It  might  be 
overwhelmed.  Even  in  such  a  situation  as  this  we 
did  not  hesitate  for  a  moment  to  venture  a  battle. 
Our  superior  training  was  in  our  favor.  Tannenberg 
had  given  us  a  great  advantage. 

The  army  command  would  have  Hked  the  right  wing 
to  have  been  stronger,  and  a  division  of  the  20th  Army 
Corps,  west  of  the  lakes,  had  been  kept  ready  to  be 
placed  at  our  disposal.  But  this  division  had  to  be 
returned  to  the  corps.  The  front  of  fifty  kilometers, 
on  which  the  four  corps  attacked  the  enemy,  was  cer- 
tainly too  long.  Further,  the  staff  of  the  Guard  Re- 
serve Corps  feared  a  Russian  attack,  and  had  therefore 
concentrated  its  unit.  The  north  wing  had  to  stand 
firm  on  the  Pregel,  otherwise  the  Eighth  Army  might 
be  outflanked  there.  The  attack  of  the  enveloping 
wing  had  to  be  stronger  than  had  originally  been  cal- 
culated.    We  had  to  wait  and  see  whether  our  main 


76  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

attack  would  succeed  or  fail.  Hard  fighting  would 
be  the  decisive  factor  here.  We  could  only  do  every- 
thing in  our  power  to  insure  the  result  for  which  we 
were  striving. 

On  the  morning  of  September  lo  we  received  the 
decisive  news  that  during  the  night  of  the  gth  the  enemy 
had  given  way  before  the  ist  Reserve  Corps  to  the 
north  of  Gerdauen — ^probably  in  consequence  of  the 
continuous  attacks  of  the  ist  and  27th  Army  Corps. 
It  was  said  that  the  corps  had  occupied  their  position, 
and  intended  to  march  on.  The  rejoicing  at  head- 
quarters can  be  imagined.  A  great  success  had  once 
more  been  achieved,  but  still  nothing  decisive.  The 
Russian  Army  was  not  yet  beaten,  by  any  means. 
Northeast  of  Lotzen  we  had  had  only  local  successes. 
It  was  important  to  carry  out  a  frontal  attack  with  all 
our  strength,  and  throw  ourselves  on  the  receding 
enemy  while  the  enveloping  wing  advanced  east  of 
Rominten  Woods  toward  the  Wirballen-Kovno  road. 
In  this  way  we  intended  to  drive  the  Russians  as  far 
as  possible  toward  the  Niemen 

It  had  also  to  be  taken  into  account  that  Rennen- 
kampf ,  who  was  now  in  touch  with  the  reinforcements 
arriving  farther  south,  would  be  able  to  make  a  vigor- 
ous attack  in  any  direction.  Our  lines  were  very  thin 
everywhere,  though  the  two  northern  groups,  which 
had  hitherto  been  separated  by  Lake  Mauer,  had  joined 
up  again.  The  situation  was  extremely  critical  and 
the  tension  was  great. 

The  troops  had  a  fresh  task  before  them.  Keeping 
in  close  touch  with  one  another,  they  had  to  pursue  the 
enemy  unceasingly  by  forced  marches,  and  attack  him 
whenever  he  made  a  stand.  At  the  same  time  they  had 
to  wait  for  the  co-operation  of  neighboring  columns 
before  making  local  enveloping  movements,  so  as  to 
minimize  the  losses.     The  17th  Army  Corps,  and  more 


TANNENBERG  jf 

particularly  the  ist  Army  Corps  on  the  extreme  right, 
and  the  ist  and  8th  Cavalry  Divisions,  had  to  strike 
again  and  again.  The  marching  orders  for  the  different 
sections,  beginning  at  the  left,  were  roughly  as  follows: 

Konigsberg  Main  Reserve:  Konigsberg — Tilsit. 

Guard  Reserve  Corps:  Gross- Audowohnen. 

ist  Reserve  Corps:   Insterburg — Pillkallen. 

nth  Army  Corps:  North  of  Darkehmen,  Gumbin- 
nen — Stalluponen. 

2oth  Army  Corps:  Darkehmen,  half-way  to  Wirbal- 
len — Lake  Wyschtyt. 

17th  Army  Corps:  Due  north  of  Rominten  Woods 
toward  Wyschtynice. 

ist  Army  Corps :  Due  southeast  of  Rominten  Woods 
toward  Mariampol. 

ist  and  8th  Cavalry  Divisions:  In  advance  of  the 
ist  Army  Corps  toward  the  WirbaUen-Kovno  road. 

These  movements  did  not  turn  out  quite  as  I  had 
hoped.  Friend  and  foe  were  difficult  to  distinguish. 
Our  own  columns  occasionally  fired  on  one  another. 
The  troops  made  too  vigorous  frontal  attacks,  and  did 
not  await  the  co-operation  of  neighboring  columns. 
But  the  most  serious  difficulty  was  caused  by  the  fact 
that  on  September  11  the  nth  Army  Corps  thought  it 
was  being  attacked  by  a  very  superior  force.  This 
was  quite  conceivable  and  had  to  be  taken  into  account. 
Under  the  existing  conditions  as  regards  the  strength 
of  the  two  forces,  the  front  line  required  the  close  tacti- 
cal support  of  the  enveloping  corps.  We  had  therefore 
to  decide  to  bring  the  17th  and  ist  Army  Corps  farther 
north  than  was  originally  intended.  After  a  few  hours 
the  belief  of  the  nth  Army  Corps  proved  to  be  un- 
founded. But  the  order  had  already  been  given  to 
the  enveloping  wing.  Later,  the  corps  were  again 
diverted  to  their  original  route,  but  by  then  at  least 
half  a  day  had  been  lost. 


78  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

The  Eighth  Army  did  magnificent  work.  The  whole 
advance,  which  covered  well  over  one  himdred  kilo- 
meters in  four  days,  was  a  brilliant  march  of  victory 
for  these  troops,  exhausted  as  they  were  by  continuous 
fighting  and  strain  of  every  kind.  This  applied  more 
particularly  to  the  original  units  of  the  Eighth  Army; 
the  Guard  Reserve  Corps  and  the  nth  Army  Corps 
had  fought  valiantly  in  the  West  at  Namur,  but  they 
had  certainly  had  an  easier  time  hitherto. 

The  results  of  the  battle  were  not  so  obvious  as  those 
of  Tannenberg.  There  were  no  operations  in  the 
enemy's  rear,  for  they  were  not  possible.  The  enemy 
did  not  make  a  stand,  but  withdrew,  so  that  he  could 
be  forced  back  still  farther  only  by  frontal  and  flanking 
attacks.  While  at  Tannenberg  we  took  over  90,000 
prisoners,  we  could  now  count  only  45,000.  But  what- 
ever could  have  been  done  under  the  circumstances  had 
been  accomplished. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  Rennenkampf  does  not  seem  to 
have  ever  intended  a  serious  stand.  At  any  rate,  he 
began  his  retreat  very  early  in  the  operations  and 
marched  at  night.  Our  airmen  did  certainly  note  the 
course  of  some  retreating  columns,  but  their  reports 
were  too  vague.  The  Russians  knew  how  to  conduct 
retreats  and  move  masses  of  troops  without  using  the 
highroads. 

Our  continuous  movements,  combined  with  the  ever- 
present  menace  of  envelopment,  drove  the  retreating 
Russian  Army  before  us  so  quickly  that  it  crossed 
the  Niemen  in  a  state  of  dissolution.  For  the  next 
few  weeks  it  was  not  to  be  regarded  as  first-class 
fighting  materia],  unless  the  Russians  should  reinforce 
it  with  fresh  troops. 

The  battle  of  the  Masurian  Lakes  has  not  received 
the  recognition  it  deserves.  It  was  a  decisive  engage- 
ment, ambitiously  planned  and  carefully  executed  against 


TANNENBERG  79 

an  extraordinary  numerical  superiority.  It  was  at- 
tended with  grave  risks,  but  the  enemy  did  not  reaHze 
his  strength.  He  did  not  even  attempt  to  fight  it  out, 
but  withdrew  so  very  hastily  that,  under  our  pressure, 
the  retreat  took  on  the  character  of  a  flight. 

Away  from  the  main  battle-field  the  3d  Reserve 
Division,  under  its  energetic  leader,  General  von 
Morgen,  and  Von  der  Goltz's  Landwehr  Division  had 
fought  a  very  successful  action  against  a  superior  enemy 
force  near  Bialla  on  September  8,  and  then  had  beaten 
the  reinforcements  which  were  brought  up.  In  so  doing 
they  had  removed  a  grave  source  of  danger  to  the  army 
fighting  farther  north.  General  von  der  Goltz  was 
held  up  outside  Osowiec.  General  von  Morgen  took 
Augustovo  and  Suwalki  after  heavy  fighting.  The  in- 
tention of  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  to  relieve  the  press- 
ure on  Rennenkampf  from  that  quarter  was  frustrated. 

On  September  13  the  battle  was  practically  over. 
On  that  day  the  situation  was  roughly  as  follows : 

Fortress  garrisons  imder  General  von  Muhlmann  at 
Mlawa. 

Von  der  Goltz's  Landwehr  Division  before  Osowiec. 

3d  Reserve  Division  at  Augustovo-Suwallci. 

ist  and  8th  Cavalry  Divisions  and  ist  Army  Corps, 
far  ahead  toward  Mariampol. 

17th  and  20th  Army  Corps,  beyond  the  Wyschtynice- 
Wirballen  line. 

list  Army  Corps,  to  the  north  of  Wirballen. 

ist  Reserve  Corps,  Vladislavoff. 

Guard  Reserve  Corps,  already  withdrawn  north- 
east of  Wehlau. 

Konigsberg  Main  Reserve,  Tilsit. 

Thus  in  the  center  of  the  field  of  battle  several  corps 
had  closed  in  on  one  another.  In  a  sense,  there  was  no 
room  for  some  of  them,  and  these  would  be  the  first 
available  for  further  operations.     At  the  very  begin- 


8o  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

ning  of  the  advance  against  Rennenkampf  there  could 
be  no  doubt  whatever  that  under  no  circumstances 
would  it  be  continued  beyond  the  Niemen. 

After  settling  with  Rennenkampf  I  had  thoughts  of 
proceeding  with  all  our  available  forces  over  the  south- 
em  frontier  against  the  line  of  the  Narew  (our  flanks 
being  protected  by  the  east  frontier  of  East  Prussia),  so 
as  to  co-operate  more  effectively  with  the  Austrian 
Army,  in  accordance  with  General  von  Conrad's  plan. 
I  had  not  yet  been  informed  of  the  heavy  reverses  which 
had  been  sustained  by  the  Austrian  Army.  Orders 
were  issued  in  conformity  with  this  intention,  but  it 
was  already  too  late  to  put  it  into  execution. 


VI 

During  the  whole  of  the  victorious  advance  of  the 
Eighth  Army  from  the  neighborhood  of  Allenstein  into 
enemy  territory  the  Army  Headquarters  Staff  [had 
followed  close  behind  the  troops.  I  have  always  in- 
sisted that  we  should  be  in  the  closest  possible  touch 
with  both  commanders  and  men.  It  was  particularly 
necessary  for  the  purposes  of  giving  orders  and  receiv- 
ing reports,  as  technical  means  of  commimication  were 
still  defective. 

Telephone  facilities  in  the  province  of  East  Prussia 
were  very  meager.  Some  of  the  officials  had  forsaken 
their  posts.  The  wireless  apparatus  rendered  good 
service,  but  only  the  cavalry  and  the  Army  Headquar- 
ters Staff  possessed  it.  So  I  was  obliged  to  rely  mainly 
on  motor-cars  and  relays  of  staff -officers. 

The  members  of  the  volunteer  motor  corps  did 
magnificent  work  as  despatch-riders.  They  accom- 
plished journeys  which  recalled  the  most  daring  patrol 
work.  I  needed  the  few  airmen  urgently  for  recon- 
noitering,  and  could  not  spare  them  for  despatch-bear- 


TANNENBERG  8i 

ing.  But  in  spite  of  the  scanty  means  of  communi- 
cation, we  always  succeeded  in  being  well  informed 
and  getting  our  orders  through  in  good  time.  I  used 
the  telephone  a  good  deal  also,  giving  encouragement 
where  it  seemed  advisable,  and  blaming  in  no  measured 
tenns  where  the  success  of  the  whole  operation  required 
it.  This  personal  intercourse  with  the  commanding 
officers  was  useful,  as  it  afforded  opportimities  for  per- 
sonal contact  and  co-operation. 

We  made  our  headquarters  in  various  places.  Nor- 
denburg  was  the  first  place  we  came  to  which  had  been 
in  the  hands  of  the  Russians  for  a  considerable  time. 
The  dirt  there  was  incredible.  The  market  was  full 
of  filth.     The  rooms  were  disgustingly  unclean. 

At  Insterburg  we  stayed  at  the  Dessauer  Hotel,  in 
the  same  quarters  which  Rennenkampf  had  left.  The 
Grand  Duke  Nicholas  is  also  said  to  have  left  the  town 
at  the  last  moment. 

We  had  an  opportimity  of  inspecting  the  Russian 
positions  more  closely,  and  were  all  deeply  thankful 
that  we  had  not  been  obliged  to  storm  them.  We 
should  have  paid  a  heavy  price  in  blood. 

Many  of  the  Russian  troops  behaved  in  an  exemplary 
manner  in  East  Prussia  in  August  and  September. 
Wine  cellars  and  provision  stores  were  guarded,  and 
Rennenkampf  kept  strict  discipline  at  Insterburg.  But 
the  war  brought  with  it  endless  hardships  and  terrors. 
The  Cossacks  were  rough  and  cruel.  They  burned  and 
plundered.  Many  inhabitants  were  killed,  women  were 
outraged,  and  civilians  sometimes  carried  off.  These 
actions  were  for  the  most  part  quite  senseless,  and  one 
sought  in  vain  for  any  reason  for  them.  The  people 
had  not  offered  the  slightest  opposition  to  the  Russians ; 
they  were  docile  and  had  not  taken  part  in  the  fighting, 
in  accordance  with  our  wishes.  The  Russians  alone 
must  bear  the  responsibility  for  their  misdeeds. 


82  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

The  Russian  Army  had  been  a  heavy  burden  on  East 
Prussia.  Now  we  felt  proudly  that  we  had  rescued 
German  soil  from  the  enemy.  The  joy  and  gratitude 
of  the  people  were  very  great. 

This  province  was  not  rescued  only  to  come  under 
a  foreign  yoke.  Heaven  preserve  us  from  such  a 
humiliation ! 

On  September  14  we  were  at  Insterburg,  enjoying  to 
the  full  our  satisfaction  over  our  victory  and  splendid 
achievements.  All  the  greater  was  my  surprise  at  my 
appointment  as  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Southern  Army, 
which  was  being  formed  under  General  von  Schubert 
at  Breslau. 

VII 

In  the  West  the  German  advance  had  ended  in  a 
retreat. 

The  right  wing  of  the  German  force  in  the  West  was 
too  weak  and  did  not  extend  far  enough;  the  with- 
drawal of  the  Guard  Reserve  Corps  and  this  nth  Army 
Corps  had  made  itself  felt  with  fatal  results.  Of  course, 
this  Mring  should  have  been  strengthened  by  corps 
drawn  from  Lorraine  and  Alsace.  That  was  provided 
in  General  Count  von  Schlieffen's  plan.  Further,  it 
was  qmte  contrary  to  his  plan  to  let  the  German  forces 
there  advance  so  far  forward  against  the  Luneville- 
Epinal  line  and  be  completely  held  up.  That  would 
have  been  the  fate  of  the  entire  army  if,  instead  of 
advancing  through  Belgium,  we  had  kept  our  right 
wing  south  of  Longwy.  While  we  were  bleeding  to 
death  before  the  fortresses  on  the  Verdun-Belfort  line, 
our  right  wing  would  have  been  attacked  from  Belgium 
and  beaten  by  the  combined  Belgian,  French,  and 
English  armies.  At  the  same  time  we  should  have  lost 
our  industrial  region  on  the  Lower  Rhine.  Our  tdti- 
mate  defeat  would  have  been  certain. 


TANNENBERG  83 

The  order  to  retreat  from  the  Mame  was  issued, 
whether  on  good  grounds  or  not  I  have  never,  been  able 
to  ascertain. 

It  was  obvious  that  the  war  would  now  continue  for 
a  long  time  and  require  enormous  sacrifices  of  the 
Fatherland.  The  hour  had  come  when  everything, 
Hterally  everything,  would  have  to  be  staked  on  the 
war,  and  the  work  of  enlightening  our  people  would 
have  to  be  undertaken  on  a  large  scale.  I  was  aston- 
ished at  the  optimism  I  found  prevailing  in  Berlin 
toward  the  end  of  October  19 14.  There  seemed  to 
be  no  realization  of  the  tremendous  gravity  of  our 
situation. 

It  was  nothing  less  than  a  fatality,  in  view  of  the 
numerical  inferiority  of  the  Dual  Alliance  and  the  fact 
that  Germany  was  surrounded  by  enemies,  that  she 
did  not  win  the  war  which  had  been  forced  upon  her, 
by  some  overwhelming  lightning  stroke,  and  so  lay  low 
an  enemy  superior  in  numbers  but  inferior  in  training. 
We  now  had  to  face  the  prospect  that  in  the  course  of 
the  war  the  training  of  the  armies  would  become 
equalized  to  a  certain  extent,  although  it  was  reason- 
able to  hope  that  the  German  Army  would  long  main- 
tain a  certain  advantage  over  the  others  by  virtue  of 
its  great  traditions.  The  heavy  losses  in  officers  might 
be  a  serious  matter.  At  all  events,  it  was  essential 
that  we  should  do  all  in  our  power  to  maintain  our 
superiority  in  training,  so  that  the  enemy's  superiority 
in  men  might  not  be  felt  so  much. 

In  particular,  we  had  to  face  the  prospect  that  Eng- 
land would  make  use  of  the  time  to  increase  her  arma- 
ments and  raise  a  powerful  army  in  addition  to  her 
fleet.     She  had  quite  enough  men. 

In  view  of  this  we  could  not  neglect  any  means  that 
might  still  enable  us  to  win  the  war.  Germany  had 
to  become  an  armed  camp.     That  was  the  biirden  of 


84  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

the  New  Year's  message  I  sent  to  a  newspaper  on 
January  i,  191 5. 

In  the  autumn  of  19 14  and  the  winter  of  19 14-15 
General  Headquarters  had  raised  from  eighteen  to 
twenty  new  divisions.  We  formed  new  divisions  out  of 
the  Landwehr  and  Landsturm  formations.  We  began 
by  reducing  the  number  of  battaHons  in  a  division  from 
twelve  to  nine,  and  forming  fresh  divisions  out  of  the 
battaHons  thus  liberated,  aUotting  to  each  its  comple- 
ment of  artillery  and  fecial  arms.  We  did  a  great 
deal,  though  in  many  directions  we  did  not  do  enough. 

The  Eighth  Army  at  this  time  could  quite  easily  have 
sent  some  corps  to  the  Western  front.  I  do  not  know 
whether  the  idea  was  ever  considered  by  General  Head- 
quarters, or  whether  the  situation  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Army  made  it  out  of  the  question.  The 
latter,  as  I  now  realized,  was  unfortunately  retreating, 
completely  defeated,  across  the  San,  with  terrible  losses. 
The  Russians  were  following  up  the  Austrians.  A  Rus- 
sian invasion  of  Moravia  and  then  Upper  Silesia  seemed 
possible.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Army  would  have  to 
be  supported  if  it  were  not  to  be  annihilated.  An  ad- 
vance of  the  Eighth  Army  across  the  Narew,  the  opera- 
tion which  had  been  planned  at  the  beginning  of  Sep- 
tember, would  now  have  been  useless.  Help  must  be 
sent  immediately  and  could  not  be  too  powerful.  We 
were  not  able  to  reinforce  the  Western  front. 

In  the  instructions  which  I  received  at  Insterburg  on 
the  evening  of  the  14th  it  was  stated  that  two  corps  of 
the  Eighth  Army  were  to  form  the  Southern  Army  in 
Upper  Silesia.  This  looked  like  nothing  more  than  a 
defensive  measure;  at  any  rate,  it  would  be  quite 
inadequate  to  restore  the  situation  in  Galicia.  We 
had  not  merely  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check;  we  had  to 
act. 

Accordingly,  in  a  conversation  over  the  telephone. 


TANNENBERG  85 

I  suggested,  both  to  General  Headquarters  and  General 
von  Moltke  himself,  that  the  whole  of  the  Eighth  Army 
should  be  sent  to  Upper  Silesia  and  Posen  under  Gen- 
eral von  Hindenburg,  who  had  just  been  put  in  com- 
mand. In  spite  of  the  danger  that  Russia  would  bring 
up  fresh  forces  in  a  further  attempt  to  invade  the  im- 
fortunate  province  of  East  Prussia,  only  weak  forces 
were  to  be  left  for  its  protection.  I  certainly  hoped  that 
such  an  invasion  was  a  long  way  off.  Even  during  the 
operations  arrangements  had  been  made  to  strengthen 
and  extend  the  defenses  of  Lotzen  and  the  lakes.  We 
not  only  insisted  that  a  scheme  should  be  drawn  up, 
but  that  the  work  should  be  put  in  hand  at  once.  The 
Angerapp  hne  was  also  to  be  fortified.  These  measures 
were  the  effect  of  the  altered  situation,  and  subse- 
quently proved  to  have  been  thoroughly  justified. 

General  von  Moltke  promised  that  my  suggestion 
should  be  considered,  and  gave  me  a  short  account  of 
the  sudden  change  in  the  situation  on  the  Western 
front.  Up  to  that  time  we  had  heard  only  rumors  of 
it.  General  von  Moltke  was  deeply  moved  by  the 
state  of  affairs  in  the  West, 

That  was  my  last  official  conversation  with  this 
remarkable  man.  He  had  a  keen  grip  of  military 
affairs,  and  could  handle  a  great  plan  of  campaign  with 
extraordinary  mastery.  But  he  lacked  vigor  and  his 
inclinations  were  more  pacifistic  than  warlike.  I  can 
recall  many  of  my  interviews  with  him.  At  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war  his  health  had  been  seriously  affected 
by  two  treatments  at  Carlsbad,  which  he  underwent 
within  a  period  of  a  few  months. 

At  this  time  the  War  Minister,  General  von  Falken- 
hayn,  began  to  direct  operations. 

On  the  evening  of  September  14  I  took  leave  of  Gen- 
eral von  Hindenburg  and  of  my  comrades.  I  did  not 
find  it  easy  to  leave  the  Commander-in-chief  and  the 


86  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

staff  after  two  victorious  battles.  General  von  Hin- 
denburg  had  always  agreed  to  my  suggestions,  and 
gladly  accepted  the  responsibility  of  consenting  to 
them.  A  fine  sense  of  confidence  had  grown  up  be- 
tween us — the  confidence  of  men  who  think  alike. 
Among  the  staff  there  was  complete  unanimity  of 
view  in  all  military  matters. 

I  left  Insterburg  on  the  morning  of  September  15, 
traveling  by  car  through  Graudenz  and  Thorn  to  Bres- 
lau,  my  destination.  I  knew  absolutely  nothing  about 
my  new  sphere  of  action.  It  seemed  to  me  more 
limited  than  my  previous  one,  but  I  soon  found  that 
I  had  a  great  and  important  field  for  my  activities. 


THE    CAMPAIGN    IN    POLAND, 
AUTUMN    1914 

At  General  Headquarters,  Austro-Hungarian  Army — The  Concentra- 
tion in  Upper  vSilesia — The  Theater  of  Operations — The  Advance 
on  the  Vistula — The  Battles  of  the  Vistula — The  Retreat  from 
Warsaw — The  Withdrawal  to  the  German  Frontier — The  Com- 
mander-in-chief on  the  Eastern  Front — The  Concentration  of 
All  Available  Forces — The  Plan  of  Operations — The  Battles  in 
North  Poland. 

(Maps  IV,  V,  and  VI) 


THE  journey  to  Breslau  was  not  exactly  cheerful. 
I  went  through  Allenstein  and  had  dinner  at  the 
same  hotel  in  which  I  had  lived.  Life  had  already 
resumed  its  old  course  as  in  times  of  peace.  I  was  in 
Graudenz  by  the  afternoon,  and  traveled  through  wind 
and  rain,  via  Bromberg,  to  Posen,  where  I  arrived  in 
pitch  darkness  and  spent  the  night. 

I  was  connected  in  many  ways  with  the  province  and 
town  of  Posen.  My  father,  who  was  descended  from 
a  family  of  Pomeranian  merchants,  lived  there  until 
after  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870-71.  I  myself 
had  been  stationed  at  Posen,  and  was  glad  to  see  it 
again.  I  was  there  from  1902  until  1904,  as  senior 
staff-officer  of  the  corps  command  of  the  5  th  Corps. 
While  holding  this  position  (and  also  my  previous  one 
of  senior  staff -officer  of  the  9th  Division  at  Glogau)  I 
had  an  opportunity  of  seeing  the  difficulties  that  sur- 
round the  administration  of  this  province.  I  had  been 
in  the  district  of  Jarotchin  and  Pleschen  for  maneuvers. 
Poland  has  shown  us  no  gratitude  for  what  we  have 
done  for  her.     Those  who  had  repeatedly  warned  Ger- 


88  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

many  against  her  aspirations  were  quite  right.  With 
deep  grief  I  see  my  native  province  faced  with  a  period 
of  much  difficulty  and  sorrow. 

On  the  morning  of  September  i6  I  arrived  in  Breslau. 
A  telegram  came  almost  immediately,  saying  that  Gen- 
eral Headquarters  agreed  to  my  proposal  of  the  evening 
of  the  14th.  General  von  Hindenburg,  with  the  bulk 
of  the  Eighth  Army,  was  to  march  immediately  to  the 
support  of  the  Austrian  Army  in  Upper  Silesia.  This 
force  was  to  form  the  Ninth  Army. 

The  following  remained  in  East  Prussia,  forming  the 
Eighth  Army:  ist  Cavalry  Division,  ist  Army  Corps, 
ist  Reserve  Division,  3d  Reserve  Division,  Von  der 
Goltz's  Landwehr  Division,  several  Landwehr  brigades, 
the  main  Konigsberg  reserve,  and  also  the  garrisons 
of  the  Vistula  fortresses  with  the  exception  of  the 
35  th  Reserve  Division  which  had  been  formed  mainly 
out  of  the  garrison  of  Thorn.  General  von  Schubert 
was  placed  in  command. 

The  Ninth  Army  was  formed  out  of  the  8th  Cavalry 
Division,  the  nth,  17th,  and  20th  Army  Corps,  the 
Guard  Reserve  Corps,  the  3Sth  Reserve  Division,  and 
Count  von  Bredow's  Landwehr  Division.  The  line  of 
march  had  to  be  settled.  Landsturm  forces,  which  had 
taken  up  extended  positions  on  the  Polish  side  of  the 
frontier  between  Kattowitz  and  Thorn,  were  able  to 
cover  their  movements. 

The  Army  Headquarters  Staff  wanted  to  concentrate 
the  army  somewhere  between  Beuthen  and  Pleschen. 
General  Headquarters,  however,  in  view  of  the  situa- 
tion of  the  Austrian  Army,  thought  it  necessary  that 
the  movement  should  be  more  directly  southeast,  so 
that  the  fact  that  we  were  German  reinforcements  for 
Austria-Hungary  and  the  Austrian  Army  might  be 
more  obvious.  Accordingly,  the  nth  Army  Corps, 
forming  the  right  wing  of  the  Ninth  Army,  went  to 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  POLAND  89 

Cracow,  and  the  left  was  brought  down  farther  south 
to  correspond.  The  proximity  of  the  Austrians  neces- 
sarily had  the  effect  of  cramping  the  movements  of  the 
Ninth  Army,  but  no  serious  disadvantages  ensued. 

On  September  17  General  von  Hindenburg  arrived 
at  Breslau  with  some  of  the  staff.  Once  more  we  had 
been  called  upon  to  work  together  in  an  important 
military  position. 

I  myself  went  on  the  i8th  to  Neu  Sandec,  the  head- 
quarters of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army.  The  journey, 
in  wet,  gloomy  weather,  was  a  new  experience  for  me. 
It  was  my  first  visit  to  Upper  Silesia,  with  its  highly 
developed  culture.  In  Galicia  I  became  acquainted 
with  what  is  probably  the  most  neglected  region  in 
Europe,  and  gained  some  idea  of  Polish  husbandry. 
The  Polish  Jew  is  very  backward,  even  more  so  than 
those  of  his  faith  and  race  in  Poland  proper.  This  is 
not  altogether  the  fault  of  this  people,  but  partly 
attributable  to  their  government 

In  Neu  Sandec  I  reported  myself  to  the  Archduke 
Frederick,  a  man  with  the  warm  heart  of  a  German 
and  a  genuine  soldierly  character.  I  remember  him 
with  feelings  of  the  highest  esteem.  The  "brain"  of 
the  operations  of  the  Austrian  Army  was  General  von 
Conrad,  a  clever  and  distinguished  general  of  great 
mental  adaptability.  He  was  a  strategist  with  an  un- 
usually fertile  mind,  and  always  instilled  fresh  vitality 
into  the  Imperial  and  Royal  Army.  That  must  always 
stand  to  his  credit. 

Unfortunately,  the  Austrian  Army  was  not  always 
strong  enough  to  carry  out  his  bold  plans.  Too  little 
had  been  done  for  the  army  in  times  of  peace.  It  had 
been  openly  neglected,  and,  unlike  our  army  in  Ger- 
many, had  not  that  prestige  in  its  own  country  which 
encourages  energetic  action.  The  flower  of  the  com- 
batant Officers'  Corps,  which  had  held  the  army  together 


90  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

in  spite  of  conflicting  nationalities,  had  fallen  by  that 
time;  those  who  remained  left  much  to  be  desired  in 
many  cases,  and  failed  to  cement  the  fabric  of  the 
army.  The  old  true  and  valiant  soldier-stock  had  also 
fallen  on  the  battle-field. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Army  was  quite  differently 
trained  from  the  German  Army.  Up  to  that  time 
General  von  Conrad  had  not  thought  very  highly  of 
our  peace-time  training.  He  now  acknowledged  to 
me  that  he  was  in  favor  of  its  principles.  In  particular 
he  was  convinced  that  it  is  impossible  to  attach  too 
much  importance  to  anything  that  strengthens  dis- 
cipline. The  General  Staff  of  the  Austrian  Army  gave, 
he  thought,  too  much  time  to  theory  and  neglected 
the  practical  work.  Too  many  orders  were  given  from 
above,  and  any  inclination  for  independent  action  or 
personal  responsibility  was  suppressed. 

Communications  were  well  organized,  but  absorbed 
an  enormous  number  of  officers. 

My  relations  with  General  von  Conrad  were  always 
satisfactory,  especially  at  our  occasional  meetings.  I 
often  had  the  impression  that  the  Austrian  liaison 
officer  on  my  staff  did  not  report  facts  only,  but  gossip 
as  well.  The  liaison  officer  of  an  allied  Power  has  a 
particularly  important  mission.  He  can  easily  do  harm, 
and  for  that  reason  must  be  a  man  of  exceptionally 
strong  character. 

Both  past  and  future  operations  were  discussed.  In 
the  course  of  its  retreat  the  Austrian  Army  had  re- 
tired over  the  San  and  even  the  Wislok.  Its  more 
than  forty  divisions  were  now  crowded  together  on 
the  west  bank  of  the  Wislok,  between  the  Carpathians 
and  the  Vistula.  I  could  not  understand  how  there 
was  room  for  it  there,  but,  as  I  heard  later,  the  large 
number  of  prisoners  explained  the  situation.  The 
army  was  terribly  exhausted.     Acting  on  his  own  re- 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN   POLAND  91 

sponsibility  and  trusting  to  Germany's  help,  General 
von  Conrad  undertook  to  take  the  offensive  again 
early  in  October,  even  if  the  Austrian  Army  had  mean- 
while to  retire  still  farther  under  Russian  pressiu-e. 

The  advance  of  the  Ninth  Army  was  already  pro- 
tecting the  northern  wing  of  the  Austrian  Army  against 
possible  envelopment.  It  was  now  to  come  up  with  the 
latter,  and  to  join  in  its  forward  movement  north  of 
the  Vistula.  The  allied  armies  were  then  to  attack 
the  Russians  wherever  they  found  them.  At  the  same 
time  the  Ninth  Army  was  to  keep  a  sharp  lookout 
on  its  exposed  left  wing  and  left  flank. 

On  the  Russian  side  there  were  only  a  few  cavalry 
divisions  and  rifle  brigades  in  the  broad  bend  of  the 
Vistula  open  to  the  west.  These  had  not  been  able  to 
prevent  the  German  covering  frontier  force  from  tak- 
ing up  positions  on  Polish  soil,  or  Von  Woyrsch's  Land- 
wehr  Corps  from  marching  right  across  Poland  through 
Radom  to  the  Vistula  and  crossing  north  of  the  con- 
fluence of  the  San.  This  corps  had  given  assistance  to 
the  Austrian  Army  on  the  east  side  of  the  river  before 
the  latter's  defeat. 

The  main  body  of  the  Russian  armies  was  still  to 
the  east,  with  weak  forces  on  the  west  bank  of  the 
San.  The  groups  which  had  been  defeated  in  East 
Prussia  were  behind  the  upper  Narew  and  the  Niemen. 
The  Siberian  Army  Corps  had  not  all  arrived  on  the 
western  frontier  of  Russia.  Some  of  them  were  still 
on  the  way.  They  were  particularly  good,  and  gave 
us  a  great  deal  of  trouble. 

It  had  been  a  bitter  disappointment  that  our  diplo- 
macy had  not  succeeded  in  keeping  Japan  from  joining 
our  enemies.  That  was  the  result  of  our  unfortunate 
policy  in  pulling  the  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire  for  Russia 
after  the  peace  of  Shimonoseki  in  1895  and  preventing 
Japan  from  seizing  Port  Arthur.     Russia  never  gave 


92  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

us  any  thanks  for  this,  and  it  did  us  infinite  harm  with 
Japan.  She  naturally  could  not  understand  what  in- 
terest we  had  in  weakening  her  position. 

The  ultimatum  handed  to  us  by  the  Japanese  Govern- 
ment in  August  1 9 14  is  said  to  have  corresponded 
word  for  word  with  our  ultimatum  of  1895.  We  spoke 
at  that  time  of  the  restoration  of  Port  Arthur;  now 
Japan  spoke  of  the  restoration  of  Kiao-chau.  The 
Japanese  knows  how  to  take  his  revenge! 

As  regards  prospective  operations,  it  was  to  be  ex- 
pected that  the  Russians  would  pursue  the  Austrian 
Army,  in  spite  of  all  the  difficulties  an  advance  involved. 
The  space  south  of  the  Sandomir-Cracow  stretch  of 
the  Vistula  was  indeed  much  too  narrow  for  the  Rus- 
sians. An  invasion  of  Hungary  was  out  of  the  question 
for  them  at  that  time,  as  they  ran  the  risk  of  being 
defeated  north  of  the  Carpathians.  It  could  be  taken 
for  granted  that  the  Russians  would  also  advance  below 
the  confluence  of  the  San;  in  what  strength  and  on 
what  extent  of  front  depended  essentially  on  whether 
they  knew  of  the  new  German  reinforcements  and  how 
they  had  taken  their  defeat  in  East  Prussia. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  the  pursuit  by  the  Russians 
across  the  San  and  the  investment  of  Przemysl  were 
undertaken  by  weak  forces  only.  In  the  first  place, 
they  temporarily  reinforced  their  troops  on  the  Niemen. 
Immediately  afterward,  however,  when  they  realized 
the  significance  of  the  German  advance,  all  their 
forces,  including  the  newly  arrived  Siberian  Army 
Corps,  were  employed  for  a  powerful  advance  over  the 
Vistula  on  a  wide  front  from  Warsaw  to  the  conflu- 
ence of  the  San.  The  movement  was  in  course  of  de- 
velopment during  our  discussions  at  Neu  Sandec.  We 
had  to  prepare  for  the  imminent  advance  of  the  Rus- 
sians across  the  San  and  north  of  the  upper  Vistula. 
In  order  to  meet  this,  and  bearing  in  mind  the  possi- 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  POLAND  93 

bility  of  a  flanking  movement  from  Warsaw,  it  seemed 
advisable  to  bring  part  of  the  Austrian  Army,  which 
was  crowded  up,  and  our  own  Landwehr  Corps  to  the 
north  bank  of  the  Vistula.  The  Austrian  Army  south 
of  the  Vistula  was  still  strong  enough  to  meet  any 
demands  that  might  be  made  upon  it. 

Most  of  the  transport  supplied  for  our  columns  and 
trains  was  too  heavy  for  the  Polish  theater  of  war. 
In  any  case,  we  had  not  enough  of  them.  I  therefore 
asked  General  von  Conrad  to  requisition  light  trans- 
port, and  he  let  us  have  all  we  wanted.  It  consisted 
of  quite  light  vehicles,  drawn  by  small,  hardy  horses, 
and  driven  by  peasants.  These  were  soon  given  the 
nickname  of  "Panje"  transport.  "Panje"  horses  and 
"Panie"  wagons  also  distinguished  themselves  on  the 
Western  front.  The  origin  of  the  name  was  the  habit 
of  drivers  addressing  one  another  as  "Panje,"  meaning 
"sir."   Our  men  also  used  to  address  them  in  that  way. 

The  military  conference  at  Neu  San  dec  ended  satis- 
factorily in  complete  harmony  of  views.  A  single 
command  was  not  established,  for  General  von  Hinden- 
burg  and  I  preferred  to  remain  independent. 

In  the  course  of  the  discussions  about  the  delimita- 
tion of  the  prospective  lines  of  communication  it 
looked  as  though  there  would  be  friction.  Austria- 
Hungary,  as  always,  looked  after  her  own  interests 
in  a  measure  which  was  not  justified  by  her  military 
achievements.  She  acted  rightly  from  her  point  of 
view,  but  it  was  certainly  regretable  that  the  Berlin 
authorities  always  gave  way.  They  feared  that  Austria 
would  make  a  separate  peace  with  the  Entente,  which 
I  believed  to  be  a  physical  impossibility.  However,  in 
September  1914  the  demarcation  of  the  lines  of  com- 
munication was  made  in  accordance  with  German  re- 
quirements, and  there  was  no  friction  with  the  Austrian 
High  Command. 


94  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 


II 

The  Ninth  Army  was  ready  for  operations  on  Sep- 
tember 27.  Army  headquarters  were  at  Beuthen.  The 
dispositions  were: 

nth  Army  Corps,  due  northeast  of  Cracow. 

Guard  Reserve  Corps,  \ 

20th  Army  Corps,  f   between    Kattowitz    and 

17th  Army  Corps,  (       Kreuzburg. 

35th  Reserve  Division,  / 

8th  Cavalry  Division,    )  ,    .  y^  -, 

„       ,  -n,     1      /    f  between     Kempen     and 

Count   von    Bredow  s 


Landwehr  Division, 


KaHsz. 


The  last  three  divisions  formed  one  imit  under  Gen- 
eral von  Frommel.  The  Landsturm  formations  guard- 
ing the  frontier  were  made  fit  for  simple  duties  in  the 
line  by  being  formed  into  brigades  and  supplied  with 
artillery  from  the  fortresses. 

To  the  east  of  the  Vistula  the  nearest  strong  German 
force  was  a  part  of  the  Eighth  Army,  near  Mlawa. 
Von  der  Goltz's  Landwehr  Division  was  bombarding 
Osowiec.  The  rest  of  the  Eighth  Army  had  pressed 
forward  as  far  as  the  line  of  the  Niemen  between  Grodno 
and  Kovno,  in  order  to  give  the  impression  that  the 
Germans  intended  to  continue  the  offensive  there. 

On  September  29  Rennenkampf,  who  had  received 
not  inconsiderable  reinforcements,  attacked  here,  and 
during  the  following  weeks  forced  the  Eighth  Army 
back  to  and,  near  Lyck,  over  the  frontier. 

The  Eighth  Army  was,  of  course,  under  the  comx- 
mand  of  General  von  Hindenburg.  But  we  were  so 
m.uch  occupied  with  our  own  affairs,  and,  further, 
communications  became  so  increasingly  difficult,  that 
we  were  unable  to  exercise  any  control  over  the  opera- 
tions of  our  old  army.     This  was  not  possible  until 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN   POLAND  95 

November,  when  the  Ninth  Army  received  a  separate 
army  commander  and  General  von  Hindenburg  was 
reHeved  of  the  direct  command  of  it  in  the  field.  The 
coming  operations  of  the  Ninth  Army  were  in  no  way 
affected  by  events  on  the  front  of  the  Eighth  Army. 

On  our  right  wing  the  situation  of  our  alHes  had 
considerably  improved.  The  Russian  pursuit  across 
the  Wislok  was  only  half-hearted.  The  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Army  was  able  to  take  breath  and  begin  its 
advance  early  in  October.  The  First  Army,  under 
General  von  Dankl  (destined  for  the  advance  north  of 
the  upper  Vistula),  and  the  Landwehr  Corps  were 
waiting  south  of  the  river,  between  the  Dunajec  and 
Cracow,  to  join  in  the  advance  of  the  Ninth  Army. 

This  corps  deserves  more  detailed  notice.  It  was 
composed  of  a  Landwehr  division  from  Posen  and  one 
from  Silesia.  We  had  originally  intended  to  use  it 
principally  for  frontier  defense.  But,  as  always  hap- 
pens, wherever  troops  may  be,  they  get  drawn  in  when 
it  comes  to  fighting.  Thus  in  August  the  Landwehr 
Corps  had  joined  in  the  advance  into  Poland  and  across 
the  Vistula.  This  had  involved  a  good  many  impro- 
vised arrangements  among  the  divisions.  After  the 
crossing  of  the  Vistula  they  joined  in  the  heavy  fight- 
ing in  which  the  Austro-Hungarians  were  engaged 
south  of  Lubiin.  They  then  accompanied  the  Austrian 
Army  in  its  retreat  through  the  Tanew  region,  a  road- 
less w^aste  of  marsh  and  forest  east  of  the  lower  San. 

As  early  as  August  the  Landwehr  Corps  had  been 
placed  under  General  von  Hindenbiu-g's  command. 
But  we  were  unable  to  interfere  and  had  to  allow  the 
corps  commander  complete  freedom  in  maldng  his 
decisions.  This  was  aU  the  easier  for  us  as  that  excel- 
lent officer  General  von  Woyrsch  and  Colonel  Heye, 
his  splendid  Chief  of  Staff,  were  well  known  to  us. 

Shortly  before  my  departure  from  Insterburg  a  motor- 


96  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

driver  turned  up  with  some  documents,  and  reported 
that  these  were  such  of  the  archives  of  the  Landwehr 
Corps  as  had  been  saved.  He  explained  that  the  corps 
had  been  annihilated  and  General  von  Woyrsch  and 
his  Chief  of  Staff  killed.  It  was  not  until  some  days 
later  that  we  were  able  to  ascertain  the  facts  and  realize 
that  the  rumors  were  false. 

The  corps  had  succeeded  in  fighting  its  way  through. 
We,  at  Breslau,  immediately  got  into  touch  with  them 
and  saw  to  it  that  they  were  re-equipped  and  brought 
up  to  strength  as  far  as  possible.  At  their  request  they 
also  received  some  heavy  artillery.  We  were  able  to 
supply  them  only  with  a  Landwehr  battalion  which 
had  old  field-howitzers.  They  were  very  heavy  for 
the  bad  roads.  But  the  value  of  heavy  artillery  was 
estimated  so  highly  that  all  difficulties  were  overcome. 
The  mobility  of  artillery  is  often  sacrificed  to  an  ex- 
cessive regard  for  the  cost  of  employing  it. 

The  achievements  of  the  Landwehr  Corps  may  be 
looked  back  upon  with  pride  by  all  who  took  part  in 
them.  They  afford  conclusive  proof  of  the  high  quality 
of  our  army,  the  perfection  of  its  organization,  and  the 
remarkable  value  of  the  training  and  education  of  our 
soldiers  before  the  war.  These  things  enabled  us  in 
increasing  measure  to  conduct  the  war  in  the  East  with 
Landwehr  and  Landsturm  formations. 


Ill 

The  advance  north  of  the  upper  Vistula  began  on 
September  28. 

The  First  Austrian  Army  wheeled  to  the  right 
toward  the  lower  Nida  and  advanced  against  the 
Sandomir-Opatow  line. 

The  different  units  of  the  Ninth  Army  received  the 
following  instructions  for  the  advance: 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN   POLAND  97 

Landwehr  Corps,  on  the  Proschowitz-Pintschow- 
Opatow  line. 

nth  Army  Corps,  Jendrtscheiev-Lagow. 

Guard  Reserve  Corps,  Chentziny,  Kielce,  Ostrowiec. 

20th  Army  Corps,  Vloszezowo,  Bschin.  Ilsha. 

17th  Army  Corps,  Novo  Radomsk,  Konsk-Radom. 

35th  Reserve  Division,  Petrikov  to  Tomaschow. 

8th  Cavalry  Division  and  Count  von  Bredow's 
Landwehr  Division,  in  the  general  direction  of  Kolin- 
szki,  to  the  east  of  Lodz. 

No  further  news  of  the  enemy  had  been  received, 
and  at  the  start  he  did  not  offer  any  resistance,  but 
retreated  before  our  advance. 

Headquarters  went  to  Wolbrom,  then  to  Miechow 
and  Jendrtscheiev.  Wolbrom  was  only  a  factory;  the 
two  places  had  all  the  characteristics  of  the  small, 
dirty  Polish  towns.  Bugs  were  all  in  the  day's  work. 
At  Miechow  we  were  very  near  the  front.  Cossack 
patrols  were  reconnoitering  in  the  neighborhood,  and 
General  von  Woyrsch,  who  reported  to  General  von 
Hindenburg,  had  to  make  a  detour  to  avoid  them. 

At  Kielce  we  had  decent  quarters  again,  with  good 
rooms  for  offices,  and  that  made  the  work  easier. 

The  strain  to  which  our  troops  were  subjected  during 
the  advance  was  enormous.  The  roads  were  mere  mud 
and  the  weather  bad.  In  spite  of  this,  very  long  marches 
of  thirty  kilometers  and  more  had  to  be  accomplished 
if  the  enemy  was  to  be  caught  crossing  the  Vistula  or 
held  on  the  far  bank. 

Each  day  made  it  more  clear  to  me  that  our  plan 
of  operations  must  be  for  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army 
to  seek  a  decision  south  of  the  Vistula,  relieve  Przemysl 
and  cross  the  San,  while  the  group  to  the  north  of 
the  Vistula  held  back  somewhat.  This  would  be  pos- 
sible only  if  the  enemy  were  retired  behind  the  Vistula. 
If  he  chose  to  make  a  strong  stand  on  the  west  bank, 


98  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

as  he  might  do  at  any  moment,  we  should  be  too  weak 
to  resist  him  successfully.  We  perfected  this  plan  dur- 
ing and  after  the  conference  at  Neu  Sandec.  It  had 
to  be  altered,  both  in  scope  and  details.  This  campaign 
is  distinguished  by  more  vicissitudes  than  any  other, 
and  therefore  deserves  one  of  the  first  places  in  the 
annals  of  war. 

Each  day  presented  the  Headquarters  Staff  with 
some  fresh,  difficult  problem.  The  subordinate  com- 
manders had  to  act  on  their  own  responsibility.  It 
was  a  bold  plunge  into  the  unknown,  and  meant  hard 
fighting  and  cautious  withdrawals.  Our  weak  forces 
were  separated  by  long  distances.  But  all  were  gov- 
erned by  the  same  clear,  determined  aim. 

The  movements  of  the  troops  depended  to  a  great 
extent  on  the  next  step.  The  indescribable  state  of 
the  roads  and  the  bad  weather  were  extremely  unfavor- 
able conditions  for  us.  Even  the  great  highroad  from 
Cracow  to  Warsaw  was  knee-deep.  It  had  a  layer  of 
mud  a  foot  high.  The  work  required  for  restoring  the 
roads  was  enormous  and  labor  was  scarce.  The  troops 
and  road-mending  companies  worked  indefatigably 
and  accomplished  a  great  deal.  When  we  returned,  in 
the  latter  half  of  October,  the  roads  had  a  totally 
different  aspect.  We  had  done  a  great  work  for  civil- 
ization. 

The  conditions  on  the  railway  were  equally  difficult. 
The  Kielce  line,  the  most  important  from  our  point 
of  view,  passed  through  the  Miechow  tunnel,  which 
had  been  destroyed.  A  firm  had  already  been  com- 
missioned to  restore  it,  and  the  work  was  proceeding 
quickly,  considering  the  conditions.  This  tunnel  had 
a  history. 

In  November  it  was  destroyed  by  us.  Then  the  Rus- 
sians rebuilt  it,  but  they  destroyed  it  again  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1Q15 ;  thereupon  we  repaired  it  once  and  for  all. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  POLAND  99 

There  were  other  extensive  works  to  be  carried  out, 
as,  for  example,  the  conversion  of  the  wide  Russian 
gage  to  the  normal  gage,  and  the  building  of  numer- 
ous bridges.  Wonderful  feats  were  accomplished.  The 
railway  to  Kielce,  and  later  to  Radom,  was  ready  con- 
siderably sooner  than  I  anticipated.  The  extension 
of  the  second,  Vienna-Warsaw  line,  which  was  already 
normal  gage,  from  Czestochova  through  Novo  Ra- 
domsk,  in  the  direction  of  Koliuschki  Station,  was  be- 
gun and  speedily  finished.  We  were  also  successful  in 
re-establishing  several  branch  lines.  But  we  were  not 
able  to  complete  the  bridge  near  Sieradz  on  the  Kalisz- 
Lodz  line,  and  in  that  way  secure  through  communica- 
tion between  the  Plish  and  German  railways  in  the 
west. 

Thanks  to  the  untiring  work  of  several  men  on  my 
staff,  Major  Drechsel  and  Captains  von  Waldow  and 
Sperr,  the  communications  with  the  rear  were  soon 
in  shipshape  order.  All  difficulties  were  overcome  so 
promptly  that  operations  did  not  suffer  at  all. 

The  demands  for  technical  material  for  purposes  of 
communication  were  heavier  than  in  East  Prussia. 
The  Russians  had  destroyed  the  few  existing  telegraph 
wires  and  cut  down  the  poles.  A  few  field-telegraph 
wires  were  laid,  and  we  had  to  manage  as  best  we  could 
with  these.  We  were  not  then  so  spoiled  as  we  became 
later,  after  the  establishment  of  the  trench  telegraph 
system  in  the  war  of  positions.  The  safest  means  of 
communication  were  motor-cars  and  despatch-riders, 
the  latter  in  relays.  The  few  wireless  stations  did  good 
service.  Here  again  I  was  always  successful  in  getting 
a  grasp  of  the  situation  and  transmitting  orders  in  time. 

The  inhabitants  gave  us  no  trouble.  They  were 
docile  and  did  not  resist  the  measures  we  took.  The 
idea  of  calling  them  up  for  service  against  the  Russians, 
which  had  frequently  been  mooted,   proved  imprac- 


loo  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

ticable.  The  so-called  Polish  legion  of  the  Austrian 
Army  was  mostly  composed  of  Galician  Poles,  who  were 
liable  to  service  in  that  army.  Only  later  was  the  full 
meaning  of  this  brought  home  to  me. 


IV 

On  October  4  the  main  forces  of  the  Austrian  Army, 
the  First,  Third,  and  Fourth  Armies,  began  the  for- 
ward movement;  on  the  5th  they  crossed  the  Wislok. 
The  Russians  offered  no  serious  resistance.  By  the 
9th  the  Austrian  forces  had  reached  the  river  San, 
and  forced  their  way  into  Przemysl. 

Also  on  October  4  the  Austrian  First  Army  and  the 
right  wing  of  the  Ninth  Army  were  engaged  with  Rus- 
sian rifle  brigades  near  Klimintof  and  Opatoff,  which 
were  let  off  very  hghtly.  The  First  Austrian  Army 
now  shifted  its  center  of  gravity  to  Sandomir,  while  the 
right  wing  of  the  Ninth  Army  continued  its  advance 
toward  the  Vistula  above  its  confluence  with  the  San. 

The  20th  Army  Corps  reached  the  region  northwest  of 
Kielce,  and  the  1 7th  Army  Corps,  after  a  slight  engage- 
ment, reached  Radom  and  concentrated  there.  General 
von  Frommel's  Corps  had  reached  the  Tomaschow- 
KoHuschki  Station  Hne,  and  the  8th  Cavalry  Division 
was  somewhere  near  Rawa.  Between  Kalisz  and  Thorn 
our  frontier-defense  troops  slowly  pushed  their  way  into 
Poland.  We  also  used  them  on  our  line  of  communica- 
tions. 

Meanwhile  we  were  receiving  continuous  reports  that 
the  Siberian  Army  Corps  were  being  detrained  at  War- 
saw, and  that  strong  forces  were  pushing  along  the 
right  bank  of  the  Vistula  north  of  its  junction  with  the 
San.  We  had  an  impression  that  great  enemy  prepara- 
tions were  being  made  against  the  Ninth  Army.  This 
confirmed  me  in  my  view  of  our  own  plans.     We  had 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN   POLAND  loi 

to  win  and  hold  the  Vistula  line  while  the  Austrian 
Army  obtained  a  definite  decision  by  attacking  and 
defeating  the  Russians  on  the  San. 

In  particular,  our  first  task  was  to  reach  the  pros- 
pective crossing-places  between  the  confluence  of  the 
San  and  Ivangorod,  and  to  isolate  and,  if  luck  was 
with  us,  seize  the  bridge-head  on  the  near  side  of  the 
fortress.  Then  we  were  to  watch  the  Une  of  the  Vistula 
between  Ivangorod  and  Warsaw.  Finally,  we  had  to 
strike  a  blow  at  the  Siberian  Army  Corps  assembling 
south  of  Warsaw  and,  in  so  doing,  invest,  and  if  possible 
capture,  the  fortress. 

The  Ninth  Army  alone  was  too  weak  to  carry  out 
these  numerous  tasks.  The  Austrian  First  Army  would 
have  to  be  called  on,  too,  and  be  brought  up  consider- 
ably farther  north. 

The  Ninth  Army  was  now  deflected  sharply  north- 
ward. 

The  17  th  Army  Corps,  under  General  von  Macken- 
sen,  received  orders  to  advance  on  Warsaw. 

General  von  Frommel's  group  was  put  under  his 
orders. 

The  20th  Army  Corps  was  to  watch  Ivangorod, 
and  prevent  any  crossing  of  the  Vistula  north  of 
the  fortress. 

The  Guard  Reserve  Corps  received  similar  instruc- 
tions with  regard  to  the  crossings  of  the  Vistula  south 
of  the  fortress  up  to  Novo  Alexandria,  inclusive. 

The  Landwehr  Corps  was  to  hold  the  Vistula  line 
south  of  this  point. 

The  nth  Army  Corps  was  incorporated  in  the  Aus- 
trian First  Army  in  order  to  stiffen  it.  It  was  to  hold 
the  Vistula  line  south  to  Annopol,  and  attempt  a  cross- 
ing itself  if  and  when  the  San  had  been  crossed  farther 
south.  General  von  Conrad  placed  two  cavalry  divi- 
sions at  our  disposal,  of  which  the  3d  was  placed  under 


102  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

the  command  of  the  20th  Army  Corps  for  observation 
work  on  the  Vistula,  and  the  7th  attached  to  General 
von  Frommel's  Corps. 

While  these  measures  were  being  carried  out,  severe 
fighting  took  place  at  various  points. 

The  17th  Army  Corps  swerved  sharply  to  the  left 
from  Radom  through  Bialobrshegi,  and  as  early  as 
October  9  encountered  Siberian  troops,  who  were  con- 
centrating at  and  to  the  east  of  Grojec.  After  heavy 
fighting  the  enemy  was  thrown  back  on  Warsaw. 
General  von  Mackensen  followed  close  on  his  heels 
and  drew  General  von  Frommel  in  on  his  left  flank. 
Early  on  the  12  th  he  was  close  to  the  south  side  of 
the  fortress. 

On  the  battle-field  of  the  9th,  an  order  was  found  on 
the  body  of  a  dead  or  wounded  Russian  officer  which 
gave  us  information  of  the  greatest  importance. 

One  brigade  of  the  20th  Army  Corps  engaged  the 
enemy  near  Kosjenice,  north  of  Ivangorod,  where  he 
had  crossed  with  weak  forces.  It  was  not  successful 
in  driving  him  back. 

The  Guard  Reserve  Corps  attacked  hostile  forces 
which  had  effected  a  crossing  near  Novo  Alexandria, 
and  threw  them  back  over  the  Vistula  after  very  severe 
fighting  in  which  the  Landwehr  Corps  took  part. 

Farther  to  the  south,  the  Russians  had  not  yet 
crossed  the  Vistula. 

Oiir  headquarters  were  at  Radom. 


The  army  order  found  near  Grojec  gave  us  a  clear 
picture  of  the  enemy's  intentions.  The  Grand  Duke's 
plan  of  operations  was  conceived  on  a  grand  scale, 
exceedingly  dangerous  from  our  point  of  view.  Far 
more  than  thirty  Russian  corps,   densely  massed  to 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  POLAND  103 

the  right,  were  to  sweep  over  the  Vistula  between 
Warsaw  and  the  confluence  of  the  San,  which  was  itself 
to  be  crossed  farther  south  by  other  forces.  Five  divi- 
sions of  Mackensen's  group  had  to  deal  unaided  with 
fourteen  hostile  divisions.  The  Grand  Duke  projected 
a  strong  encircling  movement  from  the  north  against 
the  Ninth  Army,  combined  with  a  simultaneous  frontal 
attack  against  it  and  the  Austrian  armies,  while  he 
held  the  heights  east  of  Przemysl  with  his  left  wing. 
To  carry  out  this  operation  the  Grand  Duke  drew  on 
part  of  Rennenkampf's  army  also.  If  this  plan  suc- 
ceeded, the  victory  of  Russia,  on  which  the  Entente  had 
counted  in  its  strategical  calculations,  was  assured. 

I  had  not  yet  given  up  hope  that  the  Austrian  Army 
would  beat  the  Russians  east  of  Przemysl  and  cross 
the  San.  Yet  the  forces  holding  the  line  north  of  the 
confluence  of  the  San  needed  some,  though  not  neces- 
sarily large,  reinforcements,  and  further  concentration 
toward  Warsaw  and  Ivangorod  was  imperative. 

At  the  same  time  the  Landsturm  of  the  5th,  nth, 
and  17th  Army  Corps,  which  had  marched  into  north- 
west Poland,  were  brought  forward  to  the  lower  Bzura. 

The  communications  in  our  rear  were  subjected  to  a 
special  examination,  for  a  retreat  might  only  too  easily 
be  necessary.  Preparations  were  made  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  railways,  among  other  things,  by  placing 
in  readiness  an  immense  amount  of  explosives. 

While  from  October  15  General  von  Mackensen  was 
defending  himself  south  of  Warsaw  against  strong  en- 
emy attacks,  the  Russians  attempted  again  and  again 
to  cross  the  Vistula  farther  south.  It  was  found  nec- 
essary to  push  forward  the  37th  Infantry  Division  of 
the  20th  Army  Corps  to  Kalvaria.  This  division  pre- 
vented the  river  from  being  crossed  at  this  point,  but 
the  enemy  corps,  which  had  managed  to  place  some 
of  its  units  on  the  left  bank,  came  out  of  the  engage- 


I04  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

ment  without  serious  losses.  The  division  remained  in 
that  neighborhood  and  was  also  placed  under  General 
von  Mackensen's  command. 

The  41st  Infantry  Division  and  the  Austrian  3d 
Cavalry  Divisions  were  posted  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Pilica  and  southward  to  Kosjenice. 

The  Guard  Reserve  Corps  had  taken  over  the  in- 
vestment of  Ivangorod.  This  corps  attempted  to 
throw  back  the  enemy  forces  which  were  still  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Vistula  near  Kosjenice,  and  in  this 
task  received  assistance  from  a  brigade  of  the  nth 
Army  Corps,  which  had  been  placed  at  its  disposal 
by  the  army  command. 

I  shall  never  forget  the  battle  near  Kosjenice.  What 
actually  happened  was  that  four  brigades  were  taken 
into  the  narrow  bend  of  the  Vistula,  which  had  become 
a  swamp,  owing  to  heavy  rain.  The  brigade  in  front 
of  Ivangorod  had  been  thrown  back  by  a  strong  Rus- 
sian sortie,  I  was  afraid  that  the  Russian  attack  might 
strike  into  the  flank  of  those  four  brigades,  which 
were  very  cramped  in  their  defense,  as  they  had  no 
room  to  maneuver.  I  did  not  sleep  a  wink  that  night. 
The  next  morning  the  position  before  Ivangorod  did 
not  appear  so  dangerous.  As  the  Russians  attacked, 
the  fighting  in  the  marshes  near  Kosjenice  continued. 
All  the  troops  who  participated  in  these  engagements 
look  back  on  them  with  horror. 

In  consequence  of  the  northerly  march  of  the  Guard 
Reserve  Corps  the  Landwehr  Corps  had  taken  over  the 
duty  of  watching  the  crossing  near  Novo  Alexandria. 

While  the  battle  at  Kosjenice  was  in  full  swing  I 
received  an  aeroplane  report  that  strong  enemy  forces 
had  crossed  the  Vistula  south  of  Ivangorod  also.  If 
this  were  the  fact  our  position  would  have  been  ex- 
ceedingly serious.  The  army  command  had  no  re- 
serves of  any  kind  at  its  disposal ;  everything  had  been 


THE  CAMPAIGN   IN   POLAND  105 

thrown  in.  It  was  lucky  for  us  that  this  report  proved 
false.  The  aviator  had  wrongly  identified  the  battle- 
field near  Kosjenice  as  lying  south  of  Ivangorod. 

Nothing  particular  was  reported  from  the  Landwehr 
Corps.  The  Russians  had  been  prevented  from  throw- 
ing a  bridge  across  the  river  at  Kasimierz,  south  of 
Novo  Alexandria,  and  higher  up  the  enemy  was  await- 
ing events. 

Our  plan  of  securing  the  line  of  the  Vistula  had  suc- 
ceeded, but  Warsaw  and  Ivangorod  still  remained  in 
the  hands  of  the  enemy,  and  he  had  effected  a  crossing, 
though  a  bad  one,  at  Kosjenice,  north  of  Ivangorod. 


VI 

The  Austrian  Army  to  the  south  of  the  Vistula  had 
not  succeeded  in  crossing  the  river  San,  or  gaining  any 
ground  east  of  Przemysl.  General  von  Conrad  was 
none  the  less  still  hopeful  of  success. 

The  longer  the  decision  south  of  the  river  San  was 
delayed  the  more  urgent  became  the  need  of  reinforc- 
ing the  left  wing  of  the  Ninth  Army,  in  view  of  its  in- 
creasingly critical  situation.  This  question  of  rein- 
forcement was  closely  affected  by  events  on  the  San. 
If  progress  were  made  there,  we  could  stand  a  few  set- 
backs near  Warsaw;  if  not,  we  should  be  crushed  there. 

The  arrival  of  reinforcements  would  save  the  situa- 
tion for  a  while;  but  reinforcements  were  not  to  be 
obtained  from  General  Headquarters,  for  they  had  sent 
the  newly  formed  army  corps  to  Ypres,  and  the  15th 
Reserve  Corps  to  East  Prussia,  where  the  situation 
had  become  more  serious. 

The  army  command  proposed  that  the  Guard  Re- 
serve, the  Landwehr,  and  the  nth  Army  Corps,  de- 
fending the  line  of  the  Vistula,  should  be  relieved  by 
Austrian  troops  and  brought  up  north;  or,  better  still. 


io6  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

that  Austrian  troops  should  be  employed  to  reinforce 
our  left  wing,  in  which  case  the  German  troops  which 
were  by  now  familiar  with  the  Vistula  sector  could  stay 
there,  thus  guaranteeing  the  safety  of  the  Vistula 
line.  Besides,  these  relief  operations  would  take  up 
precious  time,  and  the  situation  permitted  of  no  delay. 

General  von  Conrad  was  also  convinced  of  the  ne- 
cessity of  reinforcing  the  battle-line  north  of  the  river 
Pilica,  but  he  most  emphatically  vetoed  the  utiliza- 
tion of  Austrian  troops,  with  the  exception  of  two 
cavalry  divisions.  We  approached  General  Head- 
quarters and  His  Majesty  the  Kaiser  approached  the 
Emperor  Franz  Joseph,  who  returned  a  favorable  reply; 
but  the  Austrian  High  Command  held  to  its  views, 
and  the  relief  of  the  three  Prussian  corps  was  ordered. 

By  General  von  Conrad's  orders,  the  exchange  was 
to  be  carried  out  by  parts  of  the  First  Army,  in  front 
of  Ivangorod,  in  such  a  way  as  to  leave  the  crossings 
open.  The  Austrian  troops  were  then  to  throw  the 
pursuing  Russians  back  into  the  Vistula.  We  strongly 
opposed  the  plan,  but  Fate  was  to  take  its  course. 

The  Austrian  infantry  divisions  of  the  First  Army 
which  were  to  relieve  the  Landwehr  Corps  and  the 
Guard  Reserve  Corps  on  the  Vistula  came  up  slowly. 
The  relief  of  all  the  units  could  not  be  accomplished 
before  the  20th.  In  the  mean  while  the  situation  before 
Warsaw  had  reached  a  point  at  which  a  decision  was 
urgently  called  for.  The  enemy's  enveloping  move- 
ment became  more  obvious  from  day  to  day,  and  his 
pressure  round  Novo  Georgievsk  and  Warsaw  was  con- 
tinually increasing. 

A  period  of  intense  anxiety  and  apprehension  began. 
To  accept  battle  would  have  been  too  dangerous. 
It  became  evident  that  an  hour  would  soon  come  when 
General  von  Mackensen  and  his  group  would  have  to 
be   withdrawn   from  in   front   of  Warsaw.     But   this 


THE  CAMPAIGN   IN  POLAND  107 

would  have  to  be  done  neither  too  early  nor  too  late. 
It  was  indeed  a  difficult  decision.  What  would  the 
country  say? 

On  the  evening  of  October  17  I  considered  that  the 
moment  had  arrived  to  order  the  retirement.  I  asked 
Field-Marshal  von  Hindenburg  to  withdraw  General 
von  Mackensen's  group  from  Warsaw  west-southwest 
to  the  Rawa-Skiemiwice-Lowicz  line.  There  was  hope 
that  there  would  just  be  time  to  bring  the  relieved 
Landwehr  Corps  into  line  north  of  the  Pilica  between 
Novo  Miassto  and  Rawa.  By  these  movements  a  new 
front  would  have  been  offered  to  the  Russian  attack. 
It  is  true  that  its  left  wing  would  have  been  only  in- 
sufficiently protected  by  Landsturm  and  cavalry,  but 
it  was  possible,  if  necessary,  to  withdraw  it.  If  the 
Russians  took  the  bait  it  was  within  the  bounds  of 
possibility  to  attack  them  in  flank  across  the  Pilica 
east  of  Novo-Miassto,using  the  20th  and  the  nth  Army 
Corps  and  the  Guard  Reserve  Corps,  which  would 
aheady  have  been  concentrated  there,  or  could  not 
be  far  away.  A  decision  might  thus  be  secured.  By 
these  operations  we  would  gain  time.  After  all,  we 
must  know  some  time  whether  the  Austrian  Army  south 
of  the  San  had  been  successful. 

Unfortunately,  this  became  more  and  more  doubtful. 
In  fact,  as  early  as  the  night  of  October  17  it  was  the 
Russians  who  crossed  the  San,  and  thus  did  what  the 
Austrian  army  had  not  been  able  to  accomplish. 

General  von  Mackensen  marched  away  from  Warsaw 
in  the  night  of  the  i8th.  The  movements,  which  had 
long  been  prepared,  were  carried  out  in  exemplary 
order.  The  enemy  took  no  booty,  and  it  was  only  after 
a  time  that  he  took  up  the  pursuit  vigorously. 

On  October  25-26  General  von  Mackensen,  the 
Landwehr  Corps  (which  had  arrived  in  time),  and  the 
37  th  Infantry  Division  were  attacked  very  violently 


io8  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

in  their  new  positions  north  of  Novo  Miassto.  The 
left  wing  had  to  swing  back  in  the  direction  of  Lodz, 
and  the  37th  Infantry  Division  had  to  be  withdrawn 
to  the  south  bank  of  the  Pilica.  For  the  rest,  we  re- 
mained masters  of  the  situation  in  the  following  days 
of  heavy  fighting.  But  the  attack  across  the  Pilica 
was  outside  the  bounds  of  possibility.  The  Austrians 
suffered  a  great  reverse  near  Ivangorod,  and  retreated 
to  Radom. 

So  things  had  turned  out  as  our  headquarters  had 
feared.  The  Austrian  First  Army,  which  had  been  on 
guard  before  Ivangorod  since  October  21,  had  allowed 
too  many  Russians  to  cross  the  Vistula;  instead  of 
driving  the  enemy  back  they  were  driven  back  them- 
selves. 

With  the  Guard  Reserve  Corps  we  did  our  best  to 
prevent  disaster  on  the  Austrian  left;  but  in  vain.  The 
Russians  pressed  forward  from  Novo  Alexandria  and 
Ivangorod  and  crossed  the  Vistula  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Pilica  also. 

I  learned  only  casually  of  the  Austrian  First  Army's 
decision  to  fall  back  on  Radom.  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Hoffman  immediately  entered  a  protest  on  behalf  of  the 
Guard  Reserve  Corps.  The  Austrian  First  Army  man- 
aged to  hold  on  for  a  few  hours,  which  was  something 
to  be  thankful  for.  Help  had  been  sent  to  the  Guard 
Reserve  Corps,  but  an  attack  over  the  PiHca  in  a  north- 
south  direction  was  not  to  be  thought  of,  as  the  troops 
protecting  its  right  flank  were  giving  way. 

The  nth  Army  Corps  was  moved  by  forced  marches 
to  the  region  northeast  of  Lodz,  to  support  the  left 
wing  of  Mackensen's  group. 

The  situation  had  entirely  changed,  owing  to  the 
Austrian  Army  having  retired  from  Ivangorod  to 
Radom.  A  strong  forward  movement  on  the  whole  of 
the  Vistula  front  was  to  be  expected  from  the  enemy. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  POLAND 


109 


We  doubted  whether  the  Austrian  troops  would  be 
able  to  resist  them.  South  of  the  Vistula,  too,  the 
Austrian  position  had  become  increasingly  critical.  All 
hope  of  a  favorable  decision  by  force  of  arms  had  finally 


^IG.  4.      THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  POLAND.      SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF  OCTOBER 
I914,  AFTER  THE  RETREAT  FROM  WARSAW 

vanished.  If  the  Ninth  Army  stood  where  it  was  it 
would  ultimately  be  surrounded  and  defeated.  The 
destruction  of  the  Austrian  Army  would  then  follow 
as  a  matter  of  course.  The  Ninth  Army  had  to  be 
withdrawn  in  order  to  be  able  to  operate  again.  It 
was  clear  that  this  movement  would  affect  the  Austrian 
troops,  but  the  Russian  attacks  would  have  compelled 
them  to  retire  in  any  case. 


no  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

The  subsequent  Austro-Hungarian  claim  that  their 
army  had  retired  because  the  Ninth  Army  was  with- 
drawn is  both  true  and  untrue.  It  conceals  the  fact 
that  the  retirement  of  the  Ninth  Army  was  solely  due 
to  the  breakdown  of  the  Austrian  Army,  which  had 
fought  so  gallantly  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  but 
had  not  yet  recovered  from  the  effects  of  the  battle  of 
Lemberg. 

VII 

The  order  for  the  retreat,  which  had  entered  the 
sphere  of  probability  for  some  time,  was  issued  on  the 
27th.  The  situation  was  highly  critical.  The  opera- 
tions in  October  had  gained  us  time,  but  had  not  been 
successful.  We  had  now  to  expect  that  very  crisis — 
the  probable  invasion  of  Posen,  Silesia,  and  Moravia 
by  Russian  armies  in  superior  force — which  should 
have  been  prevented  by  our  concentration  and  advance 
in  Upper  Silesia  at  the  end  of  September. 

The  general  lines  of  the  retirement  were  already 
familiar  to  the  German  troops.  They  had  been  in- 
structed over  and  over  again  to  send  everything  they 
could  do  without  to  the  rear.  On  the  whole,  this  had 
been  done,  though  here  and  there  there  was  more  in 
the  front  lines  than  there  should  have  been.  The 
problem  of  getting  our  heavy  transport  over  the  bad 
roads  gave  me  the  acutest  anxiety. 

The  retirement  was  to  be  carried  out  in  a  direct 
westerly  direction  if  possible,  thereby  escaping  the 
enemy's  enveloping  movement. 

On  the  whole,  our  "strategic  retreat,"  as  it  was 
christened  by  the  soldiers,  was  carried  out  according 
to  plan  and  in  perfect  order.  The  countryside  was 
spared.  The  retreat  will  be  for  all  time  an  example  of 
safe  and  humane  warfare. 

The  Guards  Reserve  Corps  had  a  hard  time  of  it 


THE  CAMPAIGN   IN   POLAND  m 

on  the  right  wing,  for  the  resistance  of  the  Austrian 
First  Army  was  crumbling  steadily,  and  it  kept  yield- 
ing to  the  enemy's  frontal  attacks. 

The  Austrian  armies  retired  on  both  sides  of  the 
Vistula  till  they  were  on  a  level  with  Cracow,  and  part 
of  their  forces  found  themselves  right  in  the  Car- 
pathians southwest  of  Przemysl. 

Of  the  Ninth  Army  the  following  units  had  to  retreat : 

The  Guard  Reserve  Corps,  20th  Army  Corps,  and 
Landwehr  Corps,  past  the  Kielce-Tomaschow  line,  half- 
way to  the  Cracow-Czestochova  Une  north  of  Czes- 
tochova. 

The  17th  Army  Corps  and  General  von  Frommel's 
Corps,  past  the  Petrikau-Lodz  line,  and  join  hands 
with  the  Landwehr  Corps  at  Wielun, 

Positions  had  been  prepared  round  Czestochova  and 
Wielun. 

The  nth  Army  Corps,  which  withdrew  southwest  of 
Sieradz. 

Between  the  rivers  Prosna  and  Warta,  the  5th 
Cavalry  Division,  which  had  come  from  the  Western 
front,  the  8th  Cavalry  Division,  and  the  7th  Austrian 
Cavalry  Division  were  concentrating  under  General 
von  Frommel,  who  now  gave  up  his  command  of  the 
35th  Reserve  Division  and  Count  von  Bredow's  Land- 
wehr Division. 

The  Landsturm  formations  went  back  to  the  Kalisz- 
Wreschen-Thom  line. 

The  Russians  followed  at  full  strength.  They  also 
attacked  us  very  heavily  in  East  Prussia  and  near 
Mlawa.  The  position  became  very  serious.  We  longed 
for  an  opportunity  of  resuming  the  offensive,  but  with 
the  Austrian  Army  so  near,  such  an  operation  would 
have  been  very  hazardous,  and,  in  any  case,  the  offen- 
sive could  only  have  been  a  frontal  attack.  We  should 
only  have  failed. 


112  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

A  great  decision  had  now  to  be  made.  I  was  more 
and  more  convinced  that  our  only  course  was  to  send 
a  large  part  of  the  army  round  by  rail  to  Hohensalza 
and  Thorn,  and  from  there  bring  it  down  along  the 
Vistula  in  the  Lodz-Lowicz  direction,  so  that  it  could  fall 
on  the  flank  of  the  Russians  and  bring  their  advance 
to  a  standstill.  What  forces  could  be  spared  for  this 
operation  was  a  further  question. 

Our  first  business  was  to  delay  the  Russians  as  long 
as  possible  and  keep  them  away  from  the  German 
railways.  The  destruction  of  railways  and  roads  had 
been  prepared  for  in  a  very  wholesale  manner.  Ex- 
perience had  taught  us  that  a  modern  army  cannot 
operate  more  than  one  hundred  and  twenty  kilometers 
from  its  rail-heads.  If  this  be  true,  and  we  were  able 
to  destroy  the  railways  as  thoroughly  as  I  hoped,  we 
could  count  on  bringing  the  Russian  masses  to  a  tem- 
porary standstill,  even  without  fighting,  before  they 
reached  our  frontier.  In  spite  of  all  our  preparations, 
it  was  not  an  easy  matter  to  carry  out  the  destruction 
of  the  railways,  for  the  troops  were  always  wanting 
to  defer  the  operation.  But  there  was  no  help  for  it. 
I  gave  the  orders  and  saw  that  they  were  carried  out. 
Captain  Sperr  assisted  me  splendidly.  Without  more 
ado  the  troops  demolished  the  road  bridges.  An  im- 
mense amount  of  work  was  accomplished. 

I  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  that  enemy  advance 
gradually  slow  down,  and  actually  come  to  a  standstill 
at  the  very  distance  I  have  mentioned,  and  this  though 
we  had  left  behind  large  stores,  the  destruction  of 
which  I  had  forbidden. 


VIII 

At  the  end  of  October  General  von  FaJkenhayn  sum- 
moned me  to  Berlin.     General  von  Conrad  had  sug- 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  POLAND  113 

gested  to  him  that  large  forces  from  the  West  should 
be  sent  to  the  Eastern  front.  General  von  Falkenhayn 
spoke  hopefully  of  the  attack  near  Ypres  and  wanted 
to  defer  fiu-ther  decisions.  I  was  not  able  to  give  him 
precise  information  as  to  the  plans  of  our  staff.  Noth- 
ing had  yet  been  decided. 

In  Berlin  I  felt  that  I  was  in  another  world.  The 
difference  between  the  immense  strain  under  which  I 
had  been  living  since  the  beginning  of  the  war  and 
the  way  of  life  in  Berlin  was  too  great.  The  passion 
for  amusement  and  pleasure  reigned  supreme.  People 
did  not  seem  to  realize  the  seriousness  of  our  position 
in  the  war.  I  was  unpleasantly  impressed  and  felt 
like  a  stranger.  I  was  glad  to  get  back  to  Czestochova 
and  the  friendly  circle  of  my  comrades. 

On  the  morning  of  November  3  I  was  convinced  that 
our  situation  must  be  handled  differently  altogether. 
I  asked  General  von  Hindenburg  to  agree  to  a  plan 
which  had  been  previou.sly  discussed,  of  taking  our 
forces  round  by  Hohensalza.  Orders  to  this  effect  were 
immediately  given,  and  we  informed  General  Head- 
quarters of  this  decision. 

General  Headquarters  had  watched  the  development 
of  events  in  the  East  with  the  greatest  concern. 

The  situation  round  Mlawa  and  on  the  east  frontier 
of  East  Prussia  became  more  perilous  every  day.  The 
newly  formed  25th  Reserve  Corps,  which  had  been 
sent  to  East  Prussia  as  reinforcements,  had  fought 
heroically.  But  it  soon  became  apparent  that  the 
fighting  value  of  the  new  formations  was  far  below 
that  of  units  composed  of  men  who  had  had  long  service 
with  the  colors  and  were  commanded  by  young  and 
active  officers.  These  new  formations  had  wonderful 
manhood  in  their  rank  and  file,  but  they  were  not  as 
yet  real  soldiers.  Their  courage  and  devotion  did  not 
make  up  for  their  lack  of  training.     Fiu-ther,  the  large 


114  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

number  of  reserve  officers  who  found  fresh  employment 
in  these  new  formations  did  their  level  best,  but  also, 
too,  lacked  experience.  There  were  exceptions,  of 
course. 

An  army  is  not  made  in  a  few  weeks — long  training 
and  tradition  are  required.  Proof  of  this  is  provided 
by  the  example  of  English  and  American  troops.  They, 
too,  have  had  to  pay  very  heavily  for  their  intre- 
pidity. The  25th  Reserve  Corps  had  not  been  able  to 
effect  any  appreciable  change  in  the  situation  on  the 
frontiers  of  East  Prussia. 

It  was  now  to  be  expected  that  the  Grand  Duke, 
with  his  enormously  superior  forces,  would  not  only 
make  a  decisive  attempt  to  drive  Germany  and  Austria 
out  of  the  bend  of  the  Vistula,  but  also  directly  invade 
Germany  east  of  the  Vistula  and  try  to  secure  a  decision, 
or  at  least  prevent  us  from  moving  oiu*  troops  about. 

On  the  whole  eastern  frontier  of  the  kingdom  of 
Prussia  battles  would  soon  be  in  progress  which  would 
obviously  act  and  react  closely  upon  one  another. 
A  strong  single  command  was  called  for.  This  question 
had  already  been  discussed  at  the  time  of  my  meeting 
with  General  von  Falkenhayn  in  Berlin.  On  November 
I  His  Majesty  appointed  General  von  Hindenburg 
Commander-in-chief  in  the  East,  at  the  same  time 
relieving  him  of  his  position  as  commander  of  the 
Ninth  Army.  At  our  suggestion,  General  von  Mack- 
ensen  was  given  this  post.  I  remained  Chief  of  Staff 
to  General  von  Hindenburg.  The  majority  of  my 
colleagues  were  attached  to  this  new  staff. 

The  sphere  of  command  of  the  Commander-in-chief 
in  the  East  now  extended  definitely  over  the  Eighth 
and  Ninth  Armies,  and  the  staffs  of  the  ist,  20th, 
17th,  2d,  5th,  and  6th  Army  Corps  in  the  provinces 
of  East  and  West  Prussia,  Pomerania,  Posen,  and 
Silesia,  and  the  fortresses  situated  there. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  POLAND  115 

Subsequently  Zastrow's  Corps  on  the  Soldau-MIawa 
line,  now  under  the  orders  of  the  Eighth  Army  Head- 
quarters, was  brought  under  the  direct  command  of  the 
Commander-in-chief  in  the  East. 

This  linking  up  of  the  commands  turned  out  well. 
It  relieved  the  Commander-in-chief  of  the  details  of 
army  command  in  the  field.  All  the  same,  there  were 
occasions  when  it  was  necessary  to  encroach  on  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  army  staffs  by  means  of  direct  orders 
to  their  commanders.  This  did  not  much  like  inter- 
vening in  this  way,  and  at  first  perhaps  I  did  so  less 
than  I  should.    I  hope  I  hit  on  the  right  course  later  on. 

The  headquarters  of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the 
East  were  moved  to  Posen.  We  had  our  quarters  in 
the  Royal  Palace,  and  remained  there  imtil  the  begin- 
ning of  February  191 5.  This  was  a  particularly  har- 
assing and  busy  time.  Here  began  that  regular  way 
of  life  which  I  led  until  my  resignation. 

IX 

All  of  us  at  General  Headquarters  were  thoroughly 
inbued  with  a  sense  of  our  enormous  responsibility, 
and  had  no  illusions  as  to  what  was  at  stake.  In  Posen 
it  was  easier  than  in  Poland  to  feel  the  pulse  of  the 
country  and  realize  its  fear  of  a  hostile  invasion  with 
all  its  terrible  consequences.  We  could  not  even  help 
aggravating  that  fear  by  our  military  measures.  The 
issue  of  the  imminent  battles  was  uncertain.  The 
Russian  superiority  in  numbers  was  great,  our  troops 
were  much  exhausted,  and  our  allies  had  but  little 
fighting  strength  left. 

From  the  frontier  provinces  the  youths  capable  of 
bearing  arms  were  removed.  Strategical  positions  were 
reconnoitered  and  orders  given  for  their  construction. 
The  mines  in  several  districts  of  Poland  had  already 


ii6  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

"been  rendered  unworkable,  and  measures  were  now 
taken  for  the  demolition  of  the  German  railways  and 
mines  in  the  frontier  districts.  The  commander  of 
the  6th  Corps,  in  response  to  my  request,  had  ap- 
proached several  mining  experts  in  his  province,  and 
asked  their  advice  as  to  the  best  method  of  destroying 
the  mines  in  Upper  Silesia.  The  execution  of  the 
necessary  measures  was  now  decided  on.  Terror  at 
once  spread  through  the  province.  I  had  to  make  it 
impossible  for  the  Russians  to  use  the  mines  for  a  long 
time.  Military  interests  made  it  imperative.  Later 
on  in  the  war  the  English  destroyed  the  Rumanian  oil- 
fields even  more  ruthlessly.  Coal  is  of  equally  vital 
importance  for  waging  war.  As  it  happened,  the 
opinion  of  a  higher  authority  was  taken,  and  it 
proved  possible  to  modify  the  scheme  of  destruction 
somewhat. 

The  attitude  of  the  Polish  inhabitants  of  our  frontier 
provinces  was  not  conciliatory.  They  were  very  re- 
served and  aloof.  No  clear-sighted  man  could  have 
expected  anything  different. 

In  view  of  our  inferiority  in  niimbers,  it  was  very 
important  for  the  approaching  decision  that  we  should 
draw  on  the  Prussian  eastern  fortresses  and  the  vari- 
ous attached  corps  under  our  command  for  all  such 
available  troops  and  war  m.aterial  as  could  be  utilized 
for  active  operations  in  the  field.  We  had  made  a 
start  with  this  system  as  far  back  as  August  19 14, 
and  in  course  of  time  we  were  able  to  form  as  large  a 
number  of  divisions  in  the  East  out  of  Landsturm, 
Landwehr,  and  former  fortress  troops  as  General  von 
Moltke  had  at  his  disposal  for  the  battle  of  Koniggratz. 
Later,  these  divisions  were  given  numbers,  just  like 
the  active  divisions,  but  this  did  not  change  their 
special  character.  Of  course,  the  demands  made  on 
these    divisions,    especially    as    regards   fighting    and 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  POLAND  117 

marching,  were  not  the  same  as  those  required  of  units 
composed  of  younger  men,  but  in  times  of  great  stress 
it  was  often  impossible  to  give  them  special  treatment. 
These  troops  did  more  than  could  reasonably  be  ex- 
pected of  them.  They  gave  of  their  best  in  defense  of 
hearth  and  home,  wife  and  child. 

The  Eighth  Army,  on  the  eastern  frontiers  of  Prussia, 
had  gradually  been  able  to  form  several  Landwehr 
divisions.  From  the  garrisons  of  the  Vistula  fortresses 
and  the  Landsturm  a  frontier  defense  corps  had  been 
formed,  comprising  the  Zastrow  Corps,  two  divisions 
strong,  which  subsequently  became  the  17th  Reserve 
Corps.  The  fortress  of  Thorn,  which  had  its  first 
Main  Reserve — the  35th  Reserve  Division — in  the 
line  near  Czestochova,  gradually  formed  a  new  main 
reserve — ^known  as  Von  Dicldiuth's  Corps.  This  corps 
was  subsequently  employed  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Vistula  in  the  direction  of  Plock.  The  main  reserve 
of  Thorn  was  now  Von  Westemhagen's  Landsturm 
Brigade,  which  had  been  brought  up  to  the  Bzura* 
and  withdrawn  to  ¥71ozlawek  during  the  retreat  of  the 
Ninth  Army. 

The  fortress  of  Posen  also  had  given  us  one  main  re- 
serve, which  had  formed  part  of  General  von  Frommel's 
Corps,  and  been  briUiantly  led  by  General  Count  von 
Bredow  in  the  campaign  in  Poland.  His  Landwehr 
had  no  field  kitchens;  they  attacked  the  Russians  with 
the  idea  of  procuring  some — and  got  them.  The  for- 
tress and  province  of  Posen  now  produced  further 
forces.  The  Posen  Corps,  which  was  concentrated 
round  KaHsz,  was  a  very  strong  division,  and  had  been 
equipped  with  great  care.  The  Governor  of  Posen, 
General  von  Koch,  and  his  Chief  of  Staff,  Colonel 
Marquard,  took  the  greatest  trouble  in  the  matter. 

The  Headquarters  Staff  of  the  6th  Army  Corps  was 
to  form  the  Breslau  Corps  for  frontier  defense  east  of 


ii8  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Kempen.     It  was  a  long  time  before  this  was  done  and 
the  corps  was  fit  for  the  line. 

Major  von  Bockelberg  distinguished  himself  by  the 
help  he  gave  me  in  building  up  these  new  formations. 


The  more  I  thought  about  the  problem  ahead  of  us, 
and  realized  the  position  and  our  fearful  peril,  the 
firmer  was  my  resolution,  if  possible,  to  turn  the 
Czestochova  operations  into  an  overwhelming  and  an- 
nihilating blow.  That  alone  could  definitely  save  us. 
It  was  not  enough  to  bring  the  enemy  merely  to  a  stand- 
still. The  idea  was  not  a  sudden  inspiration,  but  had 
been  slowly  forming  in  my  mind. 

Such  troops  as  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East 
could  spare  were  assembled  for  the  advance  between 
Wreschen  and  Thorn.  General  von  Conrad,  with  his 
soldierly  insight,  gave  us  all  possible  assistance. 

The  Eighth  Army  had  been  weakened  and  could  no 
longer  fulfil  the  task  of  covering  the  eastern  frontier 
of  East  Prussia.  This  army  found  operative  support 
both  in  the  newly  constructed  positions  between  Lakes 
Spirding  and  Mauer  and  the  fortified  line  of  the  river 
Angerapp.  The  army  successively  surrendered  its  very 
exhausted  25th  Reserve  Corps,  of  whose  condition  we 
learned  only  later,  and  the  ist  Reserve  Corps,  with  the 
ist  and  36th  Reserve  Divisions.  These  troops  were 
sent  to  Thorn,  in  the  direction  of  the  Lodz-Wlozlawek 
line.  The  commander  of  the  Eighth  Army,  General 
Otto  von  Below,  had  now  to  husband  his  resources 
carefully,  in  order  to  be  able  to  hold  the  positions  which 
he  might  have  to  occupy  in  an  emergency.  It  had  to 
be  done,  even  though  the  performance  of  this  task 
made  exceptional  demands  upon  both  commanders  and 
men. 


THE  CAMPAIGN   IN  POLAND  119 

The  Zastrow  Corps  received  orders  to  hoJd  fast  at 
Soldau,  for  the  existence  of  the  Eighth  Army  and  the 
fate  of  East  Prussia  depended  on  it. 

It  would  have  been  particularly  useful  if  we  could 
have  strengthened  this  front.  A  strong  attack  from 
Mlawa  against  the  Narew  front  between  Roshan  and 
Pultusk  would  have  been  the  most  effective  support 
for  the  operations  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula.  But 
we  had  to  limit  our  aims,  for  the  success  of  the  flank 
attack  on  the  left  bank  had  to  be  assured.  Otherwise 
our  resources  would  merely  have  been  dissipated.  It 
was  as  much  as  we  could  do  if  we  managed  to  strengthen 
Zastrow's  Corps  sufficiently  for  it  to  constitute  a  cer- 
tain threat  to  North  Poland,  and  lead  the  enemy  to 
believe,  if  only  for  a  short  time,  that  an  offensive  here 
was  really  intended.  Strong  Russian  forces  were  con- 
centrated north  of  Novo  Georgievsk.  It  was  important 
for  the  battle  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula  that  they 
should  be  held  there. 

The  Westemhagen  Brigade  and,  later,  a  portion  of 
the  new  main  reserve  from  Thorn,  were  available  for 
the  forward  movement  up  the  right  bank  of  the  Vis- 
tula. We  had  thought  of  sending  them  up  toward 
Plock,  so  as  to  convey  a  false  impression  in  conjunction 
with  Zastrow's  Corps.  Once  in  Plock,  it  was  possible 
to  bring  them  over  and  use  them  in  the  battle  on  the 
left  side  of  the  Vistula. 

The  headquarters  of  the  Ninth  Army  went  to 
Hohensalza. 

Those  units  of  the  Eighth  Army  intended  for  Thorn, 
the  ist  and  the  25  th  Reserve  Corps,  were  to  be  put 
imder  the  command  of  the  Ninth  Army. 

The  20th  Army  Corps  and  the  3d  Guard  Division, 
which  had  come  up  from  Upper  Silesia,  were  detrained 
south  of  Hohensalza,  and  the  17  th  Army  Corps  near 
Gnesen. 


I20  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Von  Richthofen's  Cavalry  Corps,  with  the  6th  and  9th 
Cavahy  Divisions,  which  had  come  from  the  West, 
were  concentrated  at  the  same  place 

The  nth  Army  Corps  was  marched  on  German 
territory  through  Ostrowo  to  the  neighborhood  of 
Wreschen. 

General  von  Frommers  Cavalry  Corps  had  skirmishes 
with  Russian  cavalry  between  the  rivers  Prosna  and 
Warta,  east  of  Kalisz,  and  formed  a  screen  behind 
which  the  Posen  Corps  took  up  its  positions. 

The  Landsturm,  which  joined  the  Breslau  Corps 
later,  held  the  Hne,  a  very  thin  one,  almost  up  to  about 
Wielun.  From  there  to  half-way  to  the  Czestochova- 
Cracow  line  was  General  von  Woyrsch,  with  the  35th 
Reserve  Division,  Count  von  Bredow's  Landwehr 
Division,  the  Landwehr  Corps,  and  the  Guard  Reserve 
Corps,  minus  the  3d  Guard  Division.  At  this  point 
they  joined  hands  with  the  Austrian  First  Army,  whose 
front  extended  to  the  Vistula.  South  of  the  river  to 
the  Carpathians  stretched  the  rest  of  the  allied  army, 
once  more  closely  concentrated,  and  scronger  forces 
were  posted  in  the  mountains  for  the  protection  of 
Hungary. 

From  this  survey  it  will  be  seen  that  the  actual 
blow  against  the  enemy's  flank  could  be  carried  out 
with  but  five  and  a  half  corps.  Our  forces  for  dealing 
with  the  enemy  front  from  the  point  at  which  the 
Warta  flows  into  German  territory  southward  to  the 
region  of  Czestochova  were  quite  inadequate.  General 
von  Woyrsch  was  told  to  act  in  conjunction  with  the 
Austrian  Army.  Whether  the  Austrians  could  take  the 
offensive  was  still  uncertain.  Opinions  on  that  point 
were  Dnce  more  very  pessimistic. 

To  the  question  whether  the  Austrian  First  Army 
would  be  able  to  resist  the  impending  hostile  attack 
we  received  the  answer  that  it  would  certainly  be  in 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN   POLAND  121 

a  position  to  do  so  for  twenty-four  hours.  The  at- 
tack never  took  place.  It  was  again  greatly  to  General 
von  Conrad's  credit  that  he  raised  the  morale  of  the 
army  and  revived  the  spirit  of  the  offensive.  But  he 
would  never  have  done  it  without  German  support. 

We  had  intended  to  bring  a  considerable  part  of 
Von  Woyrsch's  army  up  north  to  add  weight  to  the 
flank  attack  and  strengthen  our  line.  But  General 
von  Conrad  offered  strong  objection  to  this  idea,  and 
so  only  the  3d  Guard  Division  was  brought  to  Hohen- 
salza  to  support  the  shock  troops  of  the  Ninth  Army. 

General  von  Conrad  railed  General  von  Boehm- 
ErmoUi  with  four  infantry  and  two  or  three  cavalry 
divisions  round  from  the  Carpathians,  through  Upper 
Silesia,  to  the  north  side  of  Czestochova. 

In  order  to  meet  the  wishes  of  General  von  Conrad, 
General  von  Woyrsch  and  his  troops  were  placed  under 
the  Austrian  High  Command. 

After  the  arrival  of  the  Austrian  troops,  the  Breslau 
Corps,  still  in  process  of  formation,  could  be  concen- 
trated a  little  more.  Of  course  these  measures  resulted 
in  a  certain  stiffening  of  the  front  from  the  middle  of 
November,  but  we  were  still  too  weak  to  dehver  a 
heavy  blow. 

It  was  claimed  later  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Army  had  defended  Upper  Silesia.  In  reality  it  was 
defending  its  own  homes,  also  north  of  Czestochova. 

It  was  natural  that  in  this  situation  our  eyes  should 
again  turn  to  the  West.  I  asked  myself  whether  there 
was  any  chance  of  obtaining  a  success  at  Ypres,  or 
whether  it  would  not  be  better  once  and  for  all  to 
restrict  operations  on  the  Western  front  to  a  defensive, 
and  carry  out  the  contemplated  operations  against 
Russia  with  all  our  available  forces.  General  von  Con- 
rad had  suggested  this  in  November. 

This  point  of  view  seemed  to  me  to  be  the  right  one. 


122  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

and  I  asked  our  High  Command  for  reinforcements 
from  the  West.  In  addition  to  the  two  cavalry  divi- 
sions, the  despatch  of  further  forces  was  contemplated ; 
but  these  arrived  too  late  and  at  odd  times.  The 
operation  on  the  flank  could  attain  a  military  decision 
only  if  carried  out  as  a  surprise — that  is,  with  speed, 
great  concentration  of  force,  and  in  conjunction  with 
a  strong  frontal  attack.  We  dared  not  delay  the  be- 
ginning of  operations  in  the  East,  even  if  we  had  seen 
our  way  absolutely  clear  as  regards  reinforcements  on 
November  lo. 

The  troops  which  came  from  the  Western  front  had 
suffered  so  heavily  in  the  fighting  there  that  they  were 
really  no  more  fit  for  battle  than  the  Eastern  troops. 
The  complete  contrast  between  the  conditions  in  the 
Polish  theater  of  war  and  those  in  the  West  must, 
necessarily,  have  affected  them  adversely  at  first. 

On  the  question  whether,  in  view  of  the  reinforce- 
ments sent  to  us  from  the  West,  something  else  could 
or  should  have  been  done,  I  cannot  express  an  opinion 
without  knowledge  of  other  factors.  For  that  reason 
I  am  unwilling  to  offer  any  criticism.  I  have  always 
held  the  view  (even  when  I  was  a  lecturer  at  the 
Kriegsakademie)  that  any  criticism  not  founded  on 
actual  knowledge  only  reflects  on  the  critics. 

Shortly  after  the  arrival  of  Von  Richthofen's  Cavalry 
Corps,  which  turned  up  just  in  time  for  the  advance, 
Von  Hollen's  Cavalry  Corps  and  the  2d  and  4th  Cav- 
alry Divisions  appeared.  They  were  attached  to  Zas- 
trow's  Corps. 

Later,  but  only  after  the  forward  movement  had 
begun,  the  following  units  were  assigned  to  us:  the 
3d  Reserve  Corps,  under  General  von  Beseler,  with  the 
5th  and  6th  Reserve  Divisions;  the  13th  Army  Corps, 
under  General  von  Fabeck,  with  the  26th  Infantry 
Division   and   25th  Reserve   Division;    the   2d  Army 


THE   CAMPAIGN   IN   POLAND  123 

Corps,  under  General  von  Linsingen,  with  the  3d  and 
4th  Infantry  Divisions,  and  the  24th  Reserve  Corps, 
under  General  von  Gerok,  with  the  47th  and  48th 
Reserve  Divisions.  These  were  posted  according  to 
the  requirements  of  the  situation. 

The  means  at  our  disposal  at  the  beginning  of  opera- 
tions on  November  10  were  imperfect,  but  in  spite  of 
that,  an  attempt  had  to  be  made  to  deal  the  Russians 
such  a  blow  as  would  not  only  bring  their  armies  in 
the  bend  of  the  Vistula  to  a  standstill  once  and  for  all, 
and  so  put  an  end  to  their  offensive,  but  crush  them 
decisively. 

This  would  be  accomplished,  if  we  were  able  to  force 
them  back  from  Warsaw.  If  we  were  too  weak  to  do 
this,  we  must  content  ourselves  with  the  lesser  result, 
and  even  that  would  be  of  great  importance. 


XI 

In  November  fighting  developed  as  anticipated. 
The  Russian  armies  everywhere  started  upon  the  exe- 
cution of  the  great  tasks  set  them  by  the  Grand  Duke. 

The  Eighth  Army  found  itself  attacked.  Even 
though  it  had  been  depleted  of  the  ist  and  25th  Re- 
serve Corps,  it  made  an  attempt  to  hold  the  east 
frontier  of  East  Prussia  against  the  overwhelming 
Russian  assaults,  but  it  was  not  able  to  do  so  per- 
manently. Toward  the  middle  of  November  we  with- 
drew it  to  the  Masiuian  Lakes-river  Angerapp  position. 

Thus  the  eastern  part  of  East  Prussia  was  once  more 
exposed  to  a  Russian  invasion.  A  period  of  great 
suffering  was  in  store  for  it,  but,  although  this  was  to 
be  foreseen,  the  reduction  of  the  Eighth  Army  was  a 
necessary  evil.  The  Russians  followed  close  upon 
our  heels  and  also  attacked  us  in  our  new  positions. 
In  spite  of  all  this  we  decided  to  bring  the  ist  Infantry 


124  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Division  of  the  Ninth  Army  up  to  join  in  the  fighting, 
west  of  the  Vistula.  We  staked  much  in  order  to  attain 
our  objective  at  this  most  important  point. 

Zastrow's  Corps  was  assailed  in  its  positions  between 
Mlawa  and  Prasnysz  and  found  itself  forced  to  retire 
to  the  Soldau-Neidenburg  line.  Here  the  advance  of 
the  enemy  was  checked  after  heavy  fighting.  The 
whole  situation  east  of  the  Vistula  seemed  gravely 
imperiled,  and  West  Prussia,  in  particular,  was  im- 
mediately threatened,  but  Zastrow's  Corps  did  its 
duty.  We  Hved  through  many  an  anxious  hour  in 
Posen,  but  the  arrival,  in  the  middle  of  November,  of 
Von  Hollen's  Cavalry  Corps  on  both  wings  improved 
the  situation. 

Von  Westemhagen's  Landsturm  Brigade  reached 
Plock,  and,  later  on,  was  brought  over  to  the  left  bank 
of  the  Vistula. 

In  the  mean  time  the  deployment  of  the  Ninth 
Army  had  been  carried  out  and  completed  according 
to  plan.  The  railways  had  met  the  demands  made 
upon  them.  As  early  as  the  evening  of  November  lo, 
the  army  stood  in  readiness  for  the  forward  movement : 

The  2Sth  and  ist  Reserve  Corps  south  of  Thorn. 
Direction  of  advance,  Wlozlawek-Lowicz. 

Von  Richthofen's  Cavalry  Corps,  20th  Army  Corps, 
and  3d  Guard  Division,  south  of  Hohensalza,  with 
orders  to  march  on  Kutno. 

17th  Army  Corps  southeast  of  Gnesen,  march- 
direction  Lentschytza. 

nth  Army  Corps  east  of  Wreschen,  march-direction 
Kolo-Dobie. 

Von  Frommel's  Cavalry  Corps  between  Unieiov  and 
Sieradz,  march-direction  Lodz. 

Posen  Corps  on  the  Kalisz-Sieradz  line,  march- 
direction  Lask. 

From  the  Landstuinn  of  the  Breslau  Corps  little  was 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN  POLAND  125 

to  be  expected,  and  the  same  applied  to  the  attached 
Austrian  Cavalry  Division.  Other  forces  were  at  the 
time  not  yet  in  position.  An  offensive  farther  south 
was  not  yet  to  be  thought  of.  The  idea  of  such  a 
movement  by  General  von  Woyrsch  alone,  who  had 
already  felt  strong  Russian  pressure,  could  not  be  con- 
sidered for  a  moment. 

In  the  bend  of  the  Vistula,  Wlozlawek  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  Russians,  otherwise  the  position  as  far 
as  the  river  Warta  was  somewhat  obscure.  Here  was 
the  First  Russian  Army,  part  of  which  still  extended  to 
the  right  bank  of  the  Vistula.  It  was  composed  of 
from  ten  to  fourteen  divisions.  We  might  certainly 
rely  on  there  being  from  eight  to  ten  divisions  between 
the  Vistula  and  the  Warta.  Immediately  north  of 
the  Warta,  strong  Russian  cavalry  forces  were  pushing 
toward  the  frontier.  The  bulk  of  the  Russian  Army 
was  in  line  from  the  Warta,  north  of  Sicradz,  through 
Novo  Radomsk  to  the  region  northeast  of  Cracow, 
Other  portions  had  arrived  in  Galicia  on  the  river 
Dunajec  and  were  pushing  far  into  the  Carpathians. 

The  hostile  advance  movements  had  come  to  a  stand- 
still, for  the  destruction  of  the  railways  had  produced 
the  intended  effect.  But  there  were  now  signs  that  a 
resumption  of  their  forward  movement  was  to  be 
expected. 

General  von  Mackensen  began  operations  without 
delay  on  November  11.  We  could  only  agree  w4th 
him.  The  Russians  were  taken  completely  by  sur- 
prise, but  even  in  the  early  days  of  our  advance  there 
was  very  heavy  fighting,  extremely  expensive  to  both 
sides,  near  Wlozlawek,  Kutno.  and  Dombe.  The  enemy 
was  beaten  everywhere. 

While  the  main  body  of  the  Ninth  Army  pushed 
forward  unceasingly  on  the  Lodz-Koliuschki  Station 
line,  General  von  Morgen  covered  its  flank  north  of 


126  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

Lowicz  with  the  ist  Reserve  Corps.  He  was  sorely- 
pressed.  At  first  he  had  to  rely  for  protection  on  his 
own  vigorous  attacks,  and  then  he  had  to  meet  an 
attack  from  a  Russian  corps  which  had  crossed  from 
Novo  Georgievsk  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula. 
Thanks  to  the  subsidiary  operation  near  Mlawa,  this 
movement  proceeded  but  slowly. 

The  center  of  the  Ninth  Army,  Von  Richthofen's 
Cavalry  Corps,  the  3d  Guard  Division,  and  the  25th 
Reserve  Corps,  finally  broke  the  resistance  offered  them. 
The  army  crossed  the  Lowicz-Lodz  line,  and  pushed 
far  to  the  south  by  Brsheshiny,  its  attention  fixed  on 
the  south  and  west,  and  strove  for  a  great  success. 
An  order  from  the  Ninth  Army,  of  which  I  also  knew, 
to  fortify  a  position  near  Skierniwice  did  not  reach 
the  other  army.  Army  Headquarters  was  not  far 
enough  forward. 

The  20th,  17th,  and  9th  Army  Corps,  which  had 
closed  up  considerably,  met  a  strong  hostile  force  north 
of  Lodz  on  the  17th,  and  grappled  with  it.  Von 
Frommel's  Cavalry  Corps  and  the  Posen  Corps  ad- 
vanced but  slowly  on  the  east  bank  of  the  Warta. 

An  intercepted  wireless  revealed  to  us  that  the  Rus- 
sians thought  of  retreating  from  Lodz.  Our  satisfac- 
tion was  great.  But  the  strong  will  of  the  Grand 
Duke  held  his  forces  where  they  were,  as  we  learned 
from  a  further  wireless,  and  our  disappointment  was 
keen. 

The  Russian  troops  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Vistula, 
with  the  exception  of  certain  units  which  were  to  re- 
main near  Mlawa,  were  ordered  to  cross  the  Vistula. 
It  was  a  good  thing  that  this  operation  was  effected 
somewhat  slowly;  otherwise  General  von  Morgen's 
position  would  have  been  made  still  more  difficult. 

The  defeated  Russian  forces,  retreating  through 
Skierniewice  to  Warsaw,  were  concentrated  due  west 


THE  CAMPAIGN   IN  POLAND  127 

of  the  fortress,  from  which  they  were  to  resume  their 
advance. 

The  Russian  right  wing  concentrated  round  Lodz. 
Reinforcements  from  the  front  of  the  Second  and  Fifth 
Russian  Armies,  which  were  not  yet  involved,  pushed 
north  on  Koliuschki  and  west  of  Lodz,  Here  they  took 
the  Eleventh  Army  by  surprise  and  pressed  it  sorely. 

The  reinforced  25th  Reserve  Corps,  under  its  trusts- 
leader,  General  von  Schaffer-Boyadel,  Chief  of  Staff 
Colonel  von  Massow,  had  pushed  forward  far  through 
Brsheshiny  by  the  2 2d.  Portions  of  Von  Richthofen's 
Cavalry  Corps  had  neared  Petrikau  and  Tomaschow. 
The  infantry  divisions  southeast  of  Lodz  swung  round 
west;  great  things  were  expected.  Then  the  situation 
changed. 

The  25th  Reserve  Corps  lost  touch  with  the  20th 
Army  Corps.  The  enemy  near  Lodz  was  not  thrown 
back,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  pressed  back  the  20th 
Army  Corps  and  pushed  his  way  in  between  the  inner 
wings  of  the  two  corps.  The  Russian  forces  that  had 
been  rallied  west  of  Warsaw  pushed  forward  without 
opposition  from  Skierniewice  to  Brshesliiny.  The  25th 
Reserve  Corps  and  the  units  with  it  were  cut  off,  being 
attacked  from  the  south  by  the  portions  of  the  Fifth 
Russian  Army  which  was  marcliing  on  Koliuschki 
Station. 

The  details  of  the  various  engagements  which  now 
developed  with  the  3d  Guard  Division,  under  General 
Litzmann,  the  25th  Reserve  Corps,  and  Von  Richtho- 
fen's Cavalry  Corps,  have  been  wonderfully  described 
by  Captain  von  Wulffen  in  a  brochure.  I  can,  there- 
fore, refer  to  it.  From  enemy  wireless  messages  we 
learned  in  Posen,  far  from,  the  battle-field,  how  hope- 
fully the  Russians  regarded  the  situation,  how  they 
planned  the  various  battles,  how  they  already  exulted 
at   the  thought  of  capturing  various  German   corps. 


128  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

They  were  preparing  trains  in  readiness  for  the  trans- 
port of  the  prisoners.  I  cannot  describe  what  I  then 
felt.  What  was  at  stake?  Not  only  the  triumph  of 
the  enemy  and  the  capture  of  so  many  brave  men,  but 
nothing  less  than  a  lost  campaign.  After  this  defeat,  the 
Ninth  Army  would  have  had  to  be  withdrawn.  What 
would  then  have  been  the  position  at  the  end  of  19 14? 

The  Brsheshiny  episode  closed  with  a  brilliant  feat 
of  arms.  The  surrounded  German  troops  broke  through 
northward  on  the  night  of  November  24.  They  took 
with  them  10,000  prisoners  and  many  captured  guns. 

The  units  that  broke  through  were  posted  between 
the  20th  Army  Corps  and  the  ist  Reserve  Corps.  In 
this  way  our  front  was  made  much  more  dense,  and 
when  the  Russians  assaulted  it  in  force  it  was  in  vain. 
The  great  aim  of  our  operations  (the  destruction  of  the 
Russians  in  the  bend  of  the  Vistula)  had  not  been 
attained,  as  we  had  not  proved  strong  enough  for  that 
purpose. 

In  the  mean  time.  General  von  Conrad  had  given 
orders  that  the  army  under  Boehm  -  Ermolli,  Von 
Woyrsch's  force,  and  the  Austrian  armies  south  of 
Cracow  should  advance  on  November  1 7 .  This  action 
resulted  in  some  local  successes,  but  soon  died  down 
and  ceased  to  leave  any  strategical  interest.  From 
now  on  to  the  end  of  November  the  Russians  pressed 
the  Ninth  Army  severely  and  attacked  farther  south 
also,  but  without  much  success.  At  the  end  of 
November  and  beginning  of  December,  when  the  ist 
Division  from  the  Eighth  Army  and  the  reinforce- 
ments from  the  West  had  at  last  arrived,  I  had  an 
opportunity  of  resuming  (temporarily)  my  original  plan 
of  operations.  At  the  same  time,  it  was  a  question 
how  the  enemy  attacks  could  be  held  up,  especially 
those  against  the  ist  Reserve  Corps,  while  these  troops 
were  being  got  into  position. 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN   POLAND  129 

Zastrow's  Corps  succeeded  in  taking  Ciechanov  and 
Prasnysz.  The  Russians  had  sent  some  troops  from 
here  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula,  but  the  cavalry 
divisions  made  no  progress,  on  account  of  bad  weather. 
Also  the  horses  were  not  shod  for  the  winter  campaign. 
The  enemy  soon  made  a  counter-attack,  and  Zastrow's 
Corps  had  again  to  withdraw  to  Mlawa.  In  the  bend 
of  the  Vistula  there  were  again  a  series  of  sanguinary 
conflicts.  The  3d  Reserve  Corps  and  the  13th  Army 
Corps  were  placed  under  the  headquarters  of  the  Ninth 
Army,  and  posted  on  its  left  wing.  In  view  of  the 
serious  position  of  the  ist  Reserve  Corps,  this  was  done 
immediately  after  each  unit  arrived,  but  no  united 
action  resulted.  Perhaps  I  would  have  been  wiser  to 
propose  the  formation  of  a  special  army  detachment, 
which  could  have  been  placed  imder  the  direct  orders 
of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East.  In  this  way 
we  should  have  gained  more  direct  influence  on  the 
operations. 

The  )eft  wing  of  the  Ninth  Army  had  now  been  so 
strengthened  that  there  was  no  longer  cause  for  anxiety. 
It  could  slowly  work  its  way  toward  the  enemy's  posi- 
tions on  the  Bzura.  But  this  movement  was  now 
merely  in  the  nature  of  a  piirely  frontal  attack,  and  not 
an  enveloping  movement  on  bold  lines.  At  the  same 
time,  it  was  possible  for  us  to  attack  on  the  whole  front 
down  to  Von  Woyrsch's  detachment,  inclusive.  The  2d 
Army  Corps  had  been  sent  to  positions  east  of  Sieradz, 
and  the  48th  Reserve  Division  to  reinforce  that  part 
of  the  front  held  by  the  Breslau  Corps.  At  the  begin- 
ning of  December,  the  attack  made  by  the  2d  Army 
Corps  was  crowned  with  success  and  was  pushed  for- 
ward in  the  direction  of  Lodz.  What  would  we  not 
have  given  for  this  success  a  fortnight  earlier! 

The  Russians  evacuated  Lodz  on  December  6  and 
retired  behind  the  river  Miashga.     Farther  south,  also, 


I30  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY  * 

we  now  gained  more  ground  owing  to  the  enemy  hav- 
ing weakened  that  part  of  his  line  in  the  latter  half  of 
November  in  order  to  hold  Lodz. 

On  December  1 5  Lowicz  was  taken  by  our  northern 
wing,  and  from  our  central  front  further  local  progress 
was  recorded. 

South  of  Cracow,  the  situation  had  become  more 
acute.  The  Austro-Hungarian  General  Staff  had 
urgently  asked  for  a  German  Division  to  reinforce  the 
Austrian  front.  Reluctantly  we  sent  the  47th  Reserve 
Division.  From  a  purely  theoretical  point  of  view 
this  appeared  to  be  a  mistake — and  events  proved  that 
to  be  true.  The  division  only  just  arrived  in  time  to 
save  the  day.  General  von  Conrad  intended  envelop- 
ing the  Russian  southern  wing  from  the  Carpathians. 
In  order  to  make  this  plan  possible,  he  had  considerably 
thinned  his  front.  In  the  eventful  battle  for  Limanova 
and  Sapanov,  from  December  3-14,  he  succeeded  in 
beating  the  Russians  west  of  the  river  Dunajec.  It 
was  a  triumph  for  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army  after 
the  many  reverses  it  had  suffered  since  the  beginning 
of  the  war. 

Under  the  pressure  of  our  progress  in  Poland  and 
Galicia,  the  Russians  fell  back  behind  the  Bzura-Rawka 
sector,  the  upper  Pilica,  the  Nida,  and  the  Dunajec. 

The  enveloping  forces  of  General  Boroevic  from  the 
Carpathians  soon  came  upon  a  very  superior  enemy, 
which  attacked  them  without  hesitation.  The  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops,  which  were  trying  to  envelop  the 
enemy,  were  forced  back  into  the  Carpathians.  Here 
a  state  of  affairs  was  developing  which  was  destined  to 
exercise  influence  of  the  utmost  importance  upon  the 
plans  for  191 5. 

In  the  bend  of  the  Vistula  some  local  fighting  oc- 
curred, especially  on  the  front  of  the  Ninth  Army, 
which  ought  not  to  have  taken  place.     We  were  still 


THE  CAMPAIGN   IN   POLAND  131 

inexperienced  in  trench  warfare.  There  was  too  much 
bickering.  I  should  have  pursued  a  bolder  policy  from 
the  start.  The  danger  was  that  the  gain  would  not 
be  commensurate  with  the  loss.  It  was  the  duty  of 
leadership  to  guard  against  this. 

On  the  northern  bank  of  the  Vistula,  the  Russians 
took  possession  of  Plock  and  penetrated  as  high  up  as 
Wlozlawek.  We  were  able  to  hold  the  heights  along 
the  left  bank  of  the  Vistula,  east  of  the  town,  from 
which  we  controlled  the  railway  line.  Here,  however, 
the  flank  of  the  Ninth  Army  from  the  mouth  of  the 
Bzura  and  Wlozlawek  was  too  long,  and  needed  con- 
stant watching.  As  it  happened,  the  Vistula  did  not 
freeze,  and  so  no  danger  arose  from  the  extended  flank. 

No  change  occurred  in  the  situation  on  the  southern 
frontiers  of  our  country,  east  of  the  Vistula.  The 
Eighth  Army  was  able,  on  the  whole,  to  hold  its  lines, 
though  fighting  was  constant  and  severe.  A  break- 
through by  the  Russians  in  a  section  of  the  line  between 
the  Masurian  Lakes  proved  merely  of  local  importance. 

On  all  fronts  there  was  diligent  work  on  the  improve- 
ment of  our  position. 

During  the  operations  we  had  great  trouble  in  getting 
the  railway  lines,  which  we  had  ourselves  previously 
completely  destroyed,  into  working  order  again.  We 
worked  now  with  might  and  main  to  restore  them,  but 
considerable  time  elapsed  before  the  railway  communi- 
cations were  really  in  order.  The  troops,  who  were 
everywhere  exhausted,  suffered  much  on  account  of 
this.  It  was  particularly  regretable  that  we  were  not 
able  to  get  their  Christmas  parcels  delivered  in  time. 
This  gave  considerable  w^ork  to  the  railways,  for  at 
that  time  these  marks  of  affection  flowed  in  very  freely. 
Leave,  too,  could  not  be  granted  to  the  extent  we 
desired. 

The   measures   for   the    government   of    the    Poles 


132  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

in  the  occupied  territory  took  up  a  great  deal  of  time. 
They  are  now  of  no  interest.  The  country  had  no 
reason  to  complain ;  even  the  situation  compelled  us 
to  remove  valuable  war  raw  material. 

We  negotiated  with  Austria-Hungary  on  the  ques- 
tions of  the  new  boundaries  of  our  respective  military 
jurisdictions.  Naturally  the  agreements  made  by  me 
in  September,  under  other  conditions,  now  needed  alter- 
ation. Unfortunately  General  Headquarters  and  Ber- 
lin now  interfered  in  the  negotiations,  probably  at  the 
instigation  of  Austria-Hungary.  This  did  not  help 
matters,  as  the  authorities  in  question  were  not  ac- 
quainted with  the  actual  facts.  But  this  also  is  now 
of  no  account.  In  the  course  of  my  duties  I  was 
obliged  to  occupy  myself  with  a  number  of  military- 
political  questions  which  brought  me  more  annoyance 
than  satisfaction. 

A  shadow  fell  on  the  proud  satisfaction  with  which 
we  contemplated  the  development  of  events  on  the 
Eastern  front.  The  Austrian  Army  had  fought  with- 
out final  success  in  Serbia.  At  the  end  of  December 
it  had  penetrated  far  into  that  country.  Belgrade  had 
been  carried  on  December  2.  Joy  reigned  in  Austria- 
Hungary.  Yet  as  early  as  the  days  of  the  capture  of 
Lodz  and  the  battle  of  Limanova  the  Austrian  troops 
were  retiring  from  Serbia,  defeated.  They  were  no 
longer  a  vigorous  fighting  instrument.  At  first  they 
had  underestimated  their  opponents,  now  they  went 
to  the  other  extreme  and  overestimated  them.  The 
enemy's  numbers  alone  terrified  them.  That  super- 
stition, bound  up  with  a  certain  feeling  of  impotence 
in  the  face  of  the  adversary,  the  once  brave  army  has 
never  overcome. 

We  of  the  staff  lived  a  harmonious  Hfe  in  the  castle 
at  Posen.  Common  cares  and  common  glory  united 
us.     It  became  the  custom  for  us  to  sit  together  awhile 


THE  CAMPAIGN  IN   POLAND  133 

after  dinner  at  night.  We  used  to  sit  at  a  round  table 
on  which  stood  a  pahn,  the  gift  of  Her  Majesty,  our 
Kaiserin,  a  true  German  woman  upon  whom  I  always 
look  with  the  greatest  admiration. 

This  short  little  hour  was  a  relaxation  for  me  in  the 
midst  of  the  almost  crushing  work  of  those  four  months 
of  war. 

A  great  battle  had  been  fought  and  won.  Now  new 
affairs  claimed  our  attention.  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  had  been  saved  from  the  Russian  danger. 
All  the  Grand  Duke's  plans  were  shattered.  His  attack 
on  the  East  Prussian  frontier,  his  advance  on  the  west 
bank  of  the  Vistula,  and,  \\ath  this,  all  the  Entente's 
hope  of  a  victorious  finish  of  the  war  in  the  year  19 14, 
had  fallen  to  the  ground.  The  surrender  of  the  eastern 
portion  of  East  Prussia  and  of  a  large  part  of  Galicia, 
hard  as  it  was,  was  of  no  consequence  compared  to 
these  results. 

The  second  part  of  the  campaign  in  Poland  was,  too, 
an  achievement.  There  is  Httle  in  military  history  that 
can  compare  •with  it. 

Our  troops,  which  had  been  constantly  fighting  or 
on  the  move  since  the  beginning  of  August,  had  dis- 
tinguished themselves  beyond  all  praise.  Once  more 
they  had  been  victorious  against  an  enemy  with  nearly 
twice  their  numbers.  It  was  only  with  such  leaders 
and  such  men  that  it  proved  actually  possible  for  us  to 
translate  bold  plans  into  action  against  such  superior 
forces. 

Honor  and  peroetual  remembrance  to  the  German 
Army  of  1914! 


THE  WINTER   CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA, 
FEBRUARY— MARCH   191 5 

Chief  of  Staff,  Southern  Army — The  Plan  of  Operations — The  Cam- 
paign— The  Result  of  the  Campaign — The  Russian  Counter- 
offensives — East  Prussia  Finally  Liberated. 

(Maps  VII  and  VIII) 
I 

THE  1 914  campaign  had  not  brought  a  decision, 
and  I  could  not  see  how  one  was  to  be  reached  in 
1 91 5.  At  the  end  of  the  year  four  new  army  corps 
were  formed  which  were  to  be  ready  in  February. 
The  experience  with  the  new  formations  of  the  autumn 
1914  had  taught  us  our  lesson.  These  corps  were 
stronger  than  the  earlier  formations  in  that  each  com- 
pany had  a  percentage  of  war-hardened  and  particu- 
larly able  officers,  non-com's  and  men.  The  higher 
positions  also  were  well  filled.  Naturally  I  wished  the 
four  corps  to  be  under  the  eastern  command,  in  order 
further  to  maintain  our  pressure  on  the  Russians  and 
break  down  their  resistance  as  far  as  our  strength  made 
that  possible.  We  were  planning  a  new  hammer-blow 
in  West  Prussia.  Such  a  blow  would  also  have  been 
of  strategical  value  in  the  Carpathians  if  the  Hungarian 
railways  had  been  better  developed  in  days  of  peace. 

By  the  end  of  the  year  the  Austro-Hungarian  General 
Staff  was  already  afraid  that  Przemysl  would  fall  in 
the  spring,  and  anticipated  an  invasion  of  Hungary  by 
strong  hostile  forces. 

The  Russians  had  in  the  mean  time  continued  their 
attacks  on  General  Boroevic's  army,  and  won  the  crest 


THE  WINTER   CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    135 

of  the  Carpathians.  General  von  Conrad  now  wanted, 
to  undertake  a  coiinter-attack  himself  on  a  large  scale, 
and  relieve  Przemysl  at  the  same  time. 

I  considered  the  reinforcement  of  the  Austrian  Army 
in  the  Carpathians  necessary,  in  view  of  its  internal 
conditions;  all  the  more  so,  if  the  Russian  Army  could 
not  be  attacked  vigorously  at  some  other  point. 
Whether  it  would  be  possible  to  do  this  in  East  Prussia 
was  still  questionable;  it  was  not  yet  known  whether 
those  four  new  corps  were  to  be  placed  at  our  disposal. 

I  was  accordingly  obliged  to  support  the  suggestion 
that  German  forces  should  be  sent  to  Hungary,  even 
though  they  were  taken  from  the  forces  at  the  disposal 
of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East.  The  Ninth 
Army  in  Poland  was  packed  very  tight.  Positions 
were  being  prepared.  The  war  in  the  West  had  taught 
us  that  on  the  defensive,  in  a  war  of  positions,  consider- 
ably longer  fronts  could  be  allowed  than  had  up  to 
now  been  thought  possible.  A  number  of  divisions 
could  be  withdrawn  from  the  Ninth  Army  for  use  else- 
where. The  idea  of  continuing  the  frontal  attacks 
here  or  south  of  the  river  Pilica,  which  had  been  sug- 
gested from  one  quarter,  I  rejected. 

The  following  units  were  released  for  the  Hungarian 
front:  the  Headquarters  Staff  of  the  2d  Army  Corps, 
the  ist  Infantry  Division,  48th  Reserve  Division,  as 
well  as  a  special  brigade  of  three  regiments,  out  of  which 
a  guard  division  was  formed  later,  and  the  5th  Cavalry 
Division.  At  the  same  time,  still  further  reserves  were 
withdrawn  for  disposal  by  the  Commander-in-chief 
in  the  East,  If  it  were  possible  to  carry  out  the  offen- 
sive proposed  by  General  von  Conrad,  with  the  help 
of  the  reinforcements  in  view,  it  would  be  better  than 
mere  defense. 

General  von  Conrad,  on  his  side,  decided  "to  reduce 
the  number  of  troops  on  the  Serbian  front,  as  far  as 


136  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

conditions  would  allow,  and  send  all  available  forces 
to  the  Carpathians.  He  proposed  to  deliver  the  main 
attack  on  Przemysl  with  the  bulk  of  his  forces  between 
the  Uszok  and  Diikla  Passes.  East  of  that  point  the 
German  troops,  reinforced  by  Austrian  formations,  and 
styled  the  German  Southern  Army,  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  von  Linsingen,  a  particularly  far- 
seeing  and  zealous  leader,  were  to  follow  the  advance 
of  the  main  forces  on  Przemysl  as  right -flank  echelon. 

The  German  Southern  Army  was  too  weak  to  make 
an  encircling  movement  possible,  as  that  would  neces- 
sarily have  involved  an  extension  far  out  to  the  Buko- 
vina.  Moreover,  the  railway  system  was  not  sufficient 
to  carry  out  such  a  plan. 

While  these  operations  were  being  discussed  I  was 
surprised  by  a  telegram  from  our  General  Headquarters, 
stating  that  I  had  been  made  Chief  of  Staff  of  the 
Southern  Army. 

General  Field-Marshal  von  Hindenburg  did  not  want 
to  part  with  me.  He  wrote  fully  to  His  Majesty  the 
Kaiser,  asking  to  be  allowed  to  retain  me,  and  in  the 
position  I  had  hitherto  held. 

Meanwhile,  as  once  before  at  Insterburg,  I  said 
good-by  to  the  members  of  the  staff,  and  entered  on 
my  new  duties,  convinced  that  I  would  shortly  return. 

On  the  journey  through  the  Carpathians  I  had  an 
interview  in  Breslau  with  Generals  von  Conrad  and 
von  Falkenhayn,  when  the  details  of  the  deployment 
and  the  operations  were  settled.  In  particular,  the 
equipment  of  the  troops  was  discussed.  General  von 
Conrad  considered  that  mountain  equipment  was  not 
necessary.  But  when,  later,  I  arrived  in  the  region 
assigned  for  our  deployment  I  was  thoroughly  con- 
vinced of  the  absolute  necessity  of  such  an  equipment, 
and  lost  not  a  moment  in  securing  some. 

We  were  warmly  welcomed  by  the  population   of 


THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN   IN  MASURIA    137 

Hungary,  as  we  were  later  when  we  freed  Transylvania. 
But,  once  we  had  done  our  duty,  their  gratitude  soon 
waned.  All  sorts  of  things  occurred  that  made  life 
uncomfortable  for  our  troops.  The  Magyars  are  a 
strong  and  masterful  people,  but  they  lacked  under- 
standing of  the  common  interests  of  Austria-Hungary 
and  the  just  wishes  and  needs  of  the  numerous  nation- 
alities living  in  Hungary.  Hungary  was  the  stronger 
half  of  the  Dual  Monarchy,  and  misused  her  position 
to  further  a  disastrous  foreign  policy  on  the  part  of 
the  Empire  against  Serbia  and  Rumania.  Unfortu- 
nately, we  made  no  protest. 

The  headquarters  of  the  staff  of  the  Southern  Army 
was  at  Munkacs.  General  von  Linsingen  and  I  trav- 
eled from  there  through  the  concentration  area,  and 
settled  the  question  of  its  relations  to  the  neighboring 
commands  and  the  Austrian  troops,  who  were  already 
in  position  in  the  mountains  and  were  to  link  up  with 
the  Southern  Army. 

The  troops  were  insufficiently  provided  for,  not  only 
as  regards  the  preparation  of  positions,  but  also  shelter. 
Much  had  to  be  made  good. 

On  a  walk  through  the  wooded  hills  I  once  came  across 
a  sentry.  He  gave  me  a  message  in  some,  I  do  not 
know  what,  foreign  language.  Even  the  Austrian 
officers  who  accompanied  me  could  not  understand 
him.  From  this  incident  I  gained  some  idea  of  the 
difficulties  with  which  this  army  had  to  contend. 
These  difficulties  were  aggravated  by  the  fact  that 
nationalities  were  much  mixed  in  the  regiments  in 
order  to  make  them  more  reliable.  Czech  and  Ru- 
manian regiments  had  gone  over  to  the  enemy.  Men 
of  these  nationalities  were  now  divided  among  many 
regiments. 

But  these  measures  did  no  good.  They  lowered  the 
inherent  value  of   the  brave  Hungarian,  and  particu- 


138  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

larly  good  German  regiments,  and  aggravated  the 
language  difficulty  to  an  extraordinary  degree. 

Once  more,  as  at  the  time  of  my  journey  to  Neu 
Sandec,  in  September  19 14,  I  gained  the  impression 
of  the  complete  lack  of  development  of  all  the  races 
which  did  not  belong  to  the  ruling  nationalities.  One 
of  my  journeys  led  through  the  village  of  Huzules.  I 
shall  never  forget  the  poor  housing  conditions  of  this 
unhappy  people.  How  different  were  things  in  Ger- 
many, thanks  to  the  wise  measures  of  her  rulers, 
and  how  high  Kultur  and  progress  stood  among  us  as 
compared  with  Austria-Hungary!  When  I  saw  those 
huts  in  Huzules  I  realized  that  this  nation  could  not 
know  what  it  was  fighting  for. 

Austria-Hungary  had  been  very  negligent.  As  an 
allied  Power  we  should  have  known  how  to  prevent  it. 
Had  the  Dual  Monarchy  and  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Army  accomplished  even  half  of  what  could  properly 
have  been  expected  of  them,  German  troops  need  not 
have  been  brought  in  such  masses  to  reinforce  their 
fronts.  In  the  long  run  we  should  have  had  more 
troops  at  our  disposal  for  the  Western  front. 

I  admit  that  Austria-Hungary  complained  that  we 
had  failed  in  France  in  the  autumn  of  19 14,  and  that 
she  had  been  exposed  single-handed  to  Russia's  over- 
whelming numbers. 

In  any  case  it  was  fatal  for  us  that  we  were  allied  with 
decaying  states  like  Austria-Hungary  and  Turkey.  A 
Jew  in  Radom  once  said  to  one  of  my  officers  that  he 
could  not  understand  why  so  strong  and  vital  a  body  as 
Germany  should  ally  itself  with  a  corpse.     He  was  right. 

But  Germany  was  not  to  obtain  any  vigorous  battle 
allies.  We  even  neglected  to  infuse  any  new  life  into 
our  perishing  allies.  I  got  to  know  the  condition  of 
affairs  in  Austria- Hungary  only  in  the  course  of  the  war. 
I  had  never  had  any  opportunity  previously.     I  was 


THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    139 

utterly  amazed.  Our  responsible  authorities  had  real- 
ized that  the  Dual  Monarchy  had  become  the  "Sick 
Man  of  Europe,"  but  failed  to  draw  the  correct  con- 
clusions from  it.  We  should  have  kept  faith  with 
her  and  led  her,  instead  of  binding  ourselves  to  her 
and  seconding  her  strong  but  one-sided  policy. 

My  stay  in  Munkacs  was  not  of  long  duration.  At 
the  end  of  January  I  was  again  in  Posen  in  my  old 
position.  I  had  had  an  exciting  time,  and  found  that 
I  had  missed  nothing  of  importance. 


II 

Meanwhile,  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East 
had  been  advised  by  General  Headquarters  that  during 
the  first  half  of  February  three  new  corps  and  the 
2ist  Army  Corps  could  be  placed  at  his  disposal  for  the 
Eastern  theater  of  war.  General  Headquarters  had 
considered  that  the  replacement  of  the  21st  Corps 
by  a  new  corps  was  necessary,  in  view  of  the  fact  that 
its  reserves  consisted  of  men  from  Alsace-Lorraine. 
The  untrustworthiness  shown  by  some  of  the  troops 
from  the  Reichsland  on  the  West  front  increased 
as  the  war  went  on.  They  were,  therefore,  generally 
sent  to  the  East.  Of  course  this  meant  that  many 
loyal  Alsace-Lorraine  subjects  had  to  suffer,  but  it 
was  not  possible  to  do  justice  to  each  individual.  For 
the  19 1 8  offensive  in  France  all  the  younger  classes 
were  withdrawn  from  the  army  in  the  East.  This 
applied  also  to  the  corresponding  classes  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  troops,  and  gave  rise  to  complaints  from  some 
of  the  men.  On  the  Eastern  front  the  Alsace-Lor- 
raine troops  fought  excellently,  and  the  21st  Corps  even 
with  distinction. 

It  had  been  arranged  with  General  Headquarters 
that  as  soon  as  the  four  corps  were  detrained  they 


I40  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

should  be  concentrated  for  a  blow  at  the  Russian 
forces  facing  the  Eighth  Army.  The  experience  of 
Tannenberg  and  the  battle  of  the  Masurian  Lakes  had 
shown  us  that  a  great  and  rapid  success  in  battle  was 
to  be  obtained  only  when  the  enemy  was  attacked 
on  two  sides.  We  now  had  the  possibility  of  carrying 
out  two  enveloping  movements,  one  from  the  Tilsit- 
Wladislawow-Kalvaria  direction,  with  a  strong  group 
of  three  corps  (which  were  to  be  assembled  between  the 
Niemen  and  the  road  from  Insterburg  to  Gumbinnen), 
and  another  with  the  40th  Reserve  Corps,  to  which  the 
2d  Infantry  Division  and  the  4th  Cavalry  Division 
were  attached,  between  Lake  Spirding  and  the  frontier 
from  the  direction  of  Bialla-Raigrod-Augustovo  and 
the  south.  Simultaneously,  the  enemy  was  to  be  pinned 
down  by  a  frontal  attack. 

Both  our  opponent's  wings  were  weak.  We  could 
hope  to  gain  a  lot  of  ground  before  the  enemy  main 
forces  could  get  away  from  our  frontal  attack.  Both 
our  thrusting  wings  were  to  surround  the  enemy — the 
earlier  the  better. 

If  we  succeeded  in  annihilating  the  enemy  it  might 
be  possible,  while  guarding  our  flank  against  any 
move  from  the  Kovno-Grodno  direction,  to  attack  the 
Osowiec-Grodno  line,  and  take  the  Bobra  crossing  near 
Osowiec  from  the  rear.  This  presupposed  that  the  long 
flank  stretching  through  Wlozlawek,  Mlawa,  and 
Johannisburg  to  Osowiec  held  firm. 

The  result  would  be  even  more  favorable  for  us  if, 
simultaneously  with  the  offensive  on  the  eastern 
frontier  of  East  Prussia,  a  move  could  be  made  from 
the  Wlozlawek- Johannisburg  line,  and  we  could  gain 
ground  toward  the  Narew,  and  attack  Osowiec.  I 
tried  to  realize  this  plan,  because  in  this  case  we  would 
forestall  the  Russians  all  along  the  line.  It  remained 
to  be  seen  whether,  later  on,  we  should  be  able  to  take 


THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    141 

the  Russian  main  forces  west  of  the  Vistula  in  the 
rear. 

A  leader  must  weigh  up  all  such  possibilities,  other- 
wise he  would  live  from  hand  to  mouth,  and  thus 
endanger  the  conduct  of  the  campaign  and  the  safety 
of  the  troops.  Grim  reality  takes  care  that  plans  do 
not  go  beyond  what  troops  can  accomplish  in  the  way 
of  overcoming  the  enemy's  resistance. 

The  measures  which  I  took  as  a  result  of  this  course 
of  reasoning  completely  upset  the  enemy's  calculations, 
which  had  become  known.  The  Entente  hoped  to  win 
the  war  in  191 5  through  Russia.  While  the  Grand 
Duke  intended  an  offensive  in  full  force  in  the  Carpa- 
thians, strong  Russian  forces  were,  according  to  the  so- 
called  "gigantic  plan,"  to  be  sent  forward  between  the 
Niemen  and  the  Gumbinnen-Insterburg  road  against 
the  weak  north  wing  of  the  Eighth  Army,  crush  it  in, 
envelop  the  army,  and  throw  it  back  to  the  Vistula. 
Other  troops,  especially  masses  of  cavalry,  were  to 
break  through  our  weak  forces  between  Mlawa  and 
the  Vistula,  and  invade  West  Prussia.  The  stretch  of 
Prussian  territory  east  of  the  Vistula  was  to  be  over- 
run, and  the  German  troops  which  occupied  it  were  to 
be  annihilated. 

In  January  a  reinforcement  of  the  enemy's  front 
opposite  the  left  wing  of  the  Eighth  Army  was  per- 
ceptible. It  is  very  probable  that  the  advance  of  the 
Russians  toward  the  Wlozlawek-Mlawa  line  east  of  the 
Vistula  in  December  1Q14  had  been  made  out  with  this 
intention.  The  completion  of  the  one  operation  was 
here,  as  in  the  Carpathians,  the  introduction  to  another. 

The  execution  of  the  "gigantic  plan"  was  still  only 
in  its  first  stages;  but  the  Russians  had  already  fixed 
their  eyes  firmly  on  the  country  east  of  the  Vistula.  As 
early  as  the  beginning  of  January  they  had  taken  away 
troops  from  their  front  west  of  the  Vistula  in  order  to 


i42  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

use  them  in  the  north.  If  we  forestalled  their  plans 
by  our  own,  we  should  certainly  have  to  reckon  with 
strong  counter-attacks  across  both  the  Niemen  and 
the  Narew.  These  counter-attacks  were  actually 
made,  and  indeed  with  such  force  and  continuity  that 
we  had  a  very  hard  time  of  it.  The  Grand  Duke  was 
a  really  great  soldier  and  strategist. 

Flank  protection  on  the  Kovno-Olita  side,  on  the 
one  hand,  and  the  Osowiec-Lomza  side  on  the  other, 
was  to  be  secured  mainly  by  those  units  of  the  Eighth 
Army  which  would  become  available  owing  to  the 
shortening  of  the  front.  This  would  result  from  the 
enveloping  movements  to  be  carried  out  by  both  wings 
in  the  direction  of  Grodno. 

At  the  beginning  of  February,  while  the  four  corps 
were  being  deployed,  the  20th  Army  Corps  of  the  Ninth 
Army  was  sent  to  the  neighborhood  southeast  of  Ortels- 
burg  to  reinforce  the  southern  front.  It  was  ready  to 
move  on  Lomza  and  Myschinjetz  also.  Next,  the  ist 
Reserve  Corps  and  the  6th  Cavalry  Division  were  sent 
to  Willenberg,  the  3d  Infantry  Division  to  Neidenburg, 
and  the  ist  Guard  Reserve  Division  from  General  von 
Woyrsch's  Army  Detachment  to  the  neighborhood  of 
Soldau.  The  deployment  of  these  troops  would  be 
complete  by  about  February  20.  They  had  been 
moved  very  late  intentionally.  We  feared  that  the 
withdrawal  of  troops  on  such  a  large  scale  from  occu- 
pied Poland  could  not  be  kept  secret,  and  might  dis- 
close our  plan  for  an  offensive  in  East  Prussia.  I 
attached  the  utmost  importance  to  secrecy  for  the 
success  of  our  operations.  Later  on  some  more  divi- 
sions were  withdrawn  from  the  front  west  of  the  Vistula, 
a  move  which  was  made  possible  by  the  fact  that  the 
enemy,  too,  was  weakening  his  front  there.  These 
troop  movements  were  a  compHcated  game  that  re- 
quired our  closest  attention. 


THE  WINTER   CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    143 

Now  that  aU  this  is  past,  a  natural  question  suggests 
itself.  Was  it  wise  to  send  German  troops  to  the  Car- 
pathians? Undoubtedly  they  were  badly  missed  in 
our  winter  campaign  east  of  the  Vistula,  where  their 
rightful  place  was.  But  they  were  needed  still  more 
in  the  Carpathians,  owing  to  the  immediate  condition 
of  the  Austrian  Army,  which  required  stiffening.  I 
should,  however,  have  found  it  considerably  more 
difficult  to  recommend  the  sending  of  reinforcements 
had  I  at  the  time  realized  that  we  would  be  given  the 
four  army  corps. 

I  am  unable  to  judge  whether  or  not  our  General 
Headquarters  was  at  this  juncture  in  a  position  to 
release  more  troops  from  the  West  for  the  East,  as  it 
actually  did  in  April.  Naturally  every  addition  to 
our  forces  in  the  East  would  have  been  welcome.  But 
the  great  decision  to  stake  everything  against  Russia 
was  not  taken  until  a  much  later  date. 


in 

In  the  mean  time  local  fighting  had  continued  in  the 
Polish  salient  of  the  Vistula.  It  was  doubtful  how  far 
this  engaged  the  attention  of  the  Russians.  On  the 
whole,  one  cannot  expect  any  great  advantage  from 
such  diversions  as  long  as  the  enemy's  troops  are  to  be 
relied  upon  and  remain  steadfast.  They  become  of  im- 
portance only  when  the  command  feels  it  is  losing  its 
grip  of  affairs  as  the  result  of  unfavorable  events.  As 
soon,  however,  as  demonstrations  develop  into  tactical 
actions  which  may  produce  fairly  important  local  suc- 
cesses, matters  assume  quite  a  different  aspect. 

In  order  to  make  the  Russians  believe  that  our 
offensive  was  to  continue,  the  Ninth  Army  was  to 
attack  in  full  force  in  the  neighborhood  of  BaHmow  at 
the  end  of  January.     For  this  purpose  our  General 


144  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

Headquarters  placed  eighteen  thousand  rounds  of  gas- 
shells  at  our  disposal.  It  is  characteristic  of  our  ideas 
at  that  time  that  this  amount  of  ammunition  was  con- 
sidered something  quite  exceptional.  In  the  East  we 
were  never  short  of  ammunition.  We  always  had  as 
much  as  was  possible  for  the  supply  services  to  bring 
up  on  the  bad  roads  during  open  warfare,  and  in  trench 
warfare  no  great  dumps  were  made  in  those  days.  In 
the  West,  however,  conditions  were  different — am- 
munition was  very  short  there  indeed.  None  of  the 
warring  nations  had  estimated  correctly  either  the 
effects  of  concentrated  artillery  fire  or  the  consumption 
of  ammunition. 

When  I  was  Director  of  the  Operations  Department 
before  the  war  I  continually  pointed  out  the  necessity 
of  increasing  our  ammunition  supplies  in  peace  to  such 
an  output  that  it  would  last  until  deliveries  were  forth- 
coming under  war  contracts.  I  was  unsuccessful  in 
getting  even  anywhere  near  the  required  amount;  but 
even  if  my  proposals  had  been  adopted,  there  would 
have  been  a  shortage,  because  the  rate  of  consumption 
was  too  enormous.  But  we  should,  at  any  rate,  have 
been  able  to  overcome  the  crisis  sooner,  and  perhaps 
got  well  ahead  with  our  output  instead  of  always  re- 
maining behind  the  demand.  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bauer 
had,  as  early  as  the  autumn  of  19 14,  done  his  best  to 
speed  up  supplies. 

The  Ninth  Army's  attack  near  Bolimow  took  place 
on  January  31.  The  weather  was  too  cold  for  a  gas 
attack,  though  that  as  yet  we  did  not  realize.  Other 
things,  too,  did  not  turn  out  as  we  could  have  wished. 
We  took  a  few  thousand  prisoners,  but  otherwise,  from 
a  tactical  point  of  view,  our  success  was  small.  All 
the  same,  our  attack  made  a  great  impression  upon  the 
Russians  and  strategically  our  hopes  were  realized. 

The  development  of  the  four  corps  detailed  to  make 


THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    145 

the  attack  started  at  the  beginning  of  February  and 
went  off  smoothly.  On  February  6  it  was  completed. 
We  moved  our  headquarters  to  Insterburg.  We  did 
not  find  it  easy  to  say  good-by  to  Posen,  where 
we  had  passed  through  great  and  eventful  times.  But 
Insterburg  called  up  pleasant  memories  of  the  events 
of  September  19 14. 

For  these  operations  the  Tenth  Army  Headquarters, 
General  von  Eichhom,  with  Colonel  Hell  as  his  Chief 
of  Staff,  was  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  Commander- 
in-chief  in  the  East.  There  would  have  been  too 
many  units  for  the  Eighth  Army  Headquarters  to 
manage  alone.  I  was  very  pleased  with  this  new 
arrangement,  for  it  is  easier  to  operate  with  two  army 
staffs  than  with  one.  I  had  learned  this  from  my 
campaign  in  Poland. 

The  Tenth  Army  was  placed  north  of  the  Eighth, 
and  the  boundary  of  their  respective  areas  ran  approxi- 
mately through  Darkehmen.  The  enveloping  group 
of  the  Tenth  Army — the  21st  Army  Corps,  39th  Army 
Corps,  38th  Reserve  Corps  (from  right  to  left) — had 
taken  up  positions  between  Ragnit  and  the  big  forests 
northeast  of  Insterburg,  and  were  covered  by  the 
ist  Cavalry  Division  and  the  5th  Guard  Infantry 
Brigade  as  well  as  by  the  main  reserve,  now  the  Konigs- 
berg  Landwehr  Division,  on  the  great  Insterburg  road. 
Then  followed,  on  a  Une  to  Lake  Spirding,  the  3d  Re- 
serve Division,  3d  Landwehr  Division,  with  a  heavy 
leaven  of  Landsturm,  and  the  5th  Infantry  Brigade. 

The  attacking  group  of  the  Eighth  Army  under 
General  von  Litzmann  was  placed  as  follows:  the 
2d  Infantry  Division  east  of  Johannisburg,  the  40th 
Reser\'e  Corps  south  of  it,  as  far  as  the  frontier,  and 
following  it,  the  4th  Cavalry  Division.  Landsturm 
formations  lined  the  frontier.  The  20th  Army  Corps 
was  completing  its  detraining  behind  the  right  wing 


146  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

of  the  Eighth  Army,  near  Ortelsburg.  This  corps 
had  come  from  the  Ninth  Army,  and  was  to  move  for- 
ward behind  General  von  Litzmann's  attacking  wing,  to 
Lomza,  and  then  feel  its  way  past  Myschinjetz  toward 
the  river  Narew.  The  withdrawal  of  the  other  troops 
and  their  transfer  to  the  Mlawa  direction  was  in  full 
swing.  General  von  Gallwitz  was  to  take  over  the 
command  between  the  Vistula  and  the  Orshitz  and 
push  south  as  soon  as  he  had  concentrated  his  forces. 
It  remained  to  be  seen  how  far  the  German  troops 
who  were  advancing  into  north  Poland  would  be  able 
to  get.  An  offensive  here  would  be  the  best  way  of 
helping  the  operation  by  the  Tenth  and  Eighth  Armies 
and  forestalling  any  counter-attacks  by  the  enemy. 

The  "winter  battle"  was  inaugurated  on  February 
7,  on  which  day  General  von  Litzmann  initiated  opera- 
tions. The  rest  of  the  Eighth  Army  and  the  Tenth 
Army  were  not  to  advance  and  open  their  attack  before 
February  8.  Only  the  barest  outlines  of  the  operations 
could  be  given  by  orders ;  the  rest  had  to  be  left  to  the 
judgment  of  the  army  commands.  But  the  same 
tactical  views  were  shared  by  all,  so  success  was 
assured  everywhere.  Even  during  the  battle  itself  the 
Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  had  but  few  disposi- 
tions to  make.  I  had  to  be  thinking  of  the  next  move 
and  the  covering  of  the  flanks. 

I  did  not  find  it  easy  to  start  the  army  off  on  its  task. 
The  winter  was  cold.  An  exceptionally  fierce  snow- 
storm had  been  raging  since  February  4  or  5,  roads 
and  railways  were  buried,  and  it  was  difficult  to  get 
ahead  off  the  beaten  track.  Snow-drifts,  as  high  as  a 
man,  were  succeeded  by  bare  places  covered  with  thin 
ice.  However,  no  alteration  was  made  in  the  original 
scheme.  The  Russians  had  even  greater  difficulties 
to  contend  with,  because  their  supply -trains  had  been 
sent  on  ahead. 


THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    147 

Our  troops  were  equipped  for  a  winter  campaign, 
and  the  transports  had  been  put  on  runners,  though 
these  proved  later  to  be  impracticable,  for  they  could 
not  be  used  on  roads  which  were  covered  with  snow 
only  in  places. 

The  feats  performed  by  man  and  horse  during  the 
following  days  are  beyond  description,  and  forever 
redound  to  their  honor.  The  heads  of  the  marching 
columns  worked  their  way  laboriously  through  the 
snow-drifts.  Wagons  got  stuck  in  the  snow.  The 
columns  stopped  and  got  longer  and  longer.  The  in- 
fantry edged  its  way  past  the  wagons  and  guns,  and  tried 
to  catch  up  with  those  in  front.  Ten  to  twelve  horses 
were  harnessed  to  guns  and  ammunition-wagons.  So 
the  roads  were  gradually  covered  with  long  marching 
columns,  infantry  pushing  ahead,  interspersed  with 
only  a  few  guns  and  still  fewer  ammunition -wagons. 
For  the  night  or  when  fighting  was  taking  place  the 
columns  closed  up  a  little.  After  a  few  days  the 
weather  changed.  The  roads  became  impassable. 
Great  pools  of  water  covered  the  frozen  ground  off  the 
roads  and  the  surface  of  the  marshes.  It  was  lucky 
that  by  our  wide  encircling  movement  we  captured 
provisions  from  the  enemy's  provision  columns,  for 
otherwise  we  would  have  had  to  break  off  the  whole 
operation  through  failure  of  suppl3^ 

The  commands  and  the  subordinate  staffs  had  to 
face  extraordinary  difficulties.  It  was  a  long  time 
before  battle-worthy  units  could  be  brought  up  when 
an  engagement  with  the  enemy  took  place.  Orders 
could  not  be  transmitted,  wires  were  broken  down  by 
the  storm,  messages  did  not  arrive.  And  yet  the  most 
wonderful  things  were  accomplished. 

The  operation,  like  most  operations,  did  not  pass 
without  friction,  which  prejudiced  the  strategical  unity. 

Genera]  Litzmann's  troops  made  good  progress  on 


148  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

the  7th.  They  got  as  far  as  Johannisburg  and  farther 
south  crossed  the  Pissa.  On  the  8  th  they  took  Johannis- 
burg, and  during  the  following  days,  their  flank  secured 
against  any  enemy  movement  from  Osowiec,  they 
pressed  forward  to  Raigrod,  where  they  met  with  strong 
opposition.  An  enemy  attack  from  the  direction  of 
Osowiec  was  met  and  repulsed.  At  the  same  time  the 
center  of  the  Eighth  Army,  following  close  on  the  heels 
of  the  enemy,  who  was  giving  way  along  the  whole 
front,  was  approaching  Lyck. 

Both  leaders  and  troops  spared  no  effort  to  accelerate 
the  advance,  but  progress  was  too  slow  for  the  strategic 
combination  as  a  whole.  Lyck,  which  was  splendidly 
defended  by  the  3d  Siberian  Corps,  fell  only  on  the 
morning  of  the  14th.  This  corps  escaped  annihilation 
and  withdrew  via  Augustovo  behind  the  marshes  of 
the  upper  Bobr. 

After  the  fall  of  Lyck  progress  was  rapid.  By  the 
night  of  the  1 6th  General  von  Litzmann  was  in  Augustovo 
after  fiirther  heavy  fighting.  I  now  endeavored  to 
push  forward  the  right  wing  of  the  Eighth  Army  from 
Raigrod  due  east  via  Taino  (south  of  Augustovo)  to 
Schtabin,  KJrasnybor,  and  the  Bobr,  so  as  to  come  in 
on  the  flank  of  the  3d  Siberian  Corps  once  more.  But 
the  Eighth  Army  did  not  consider  this  to  be  practicable, 
owing  to  the  condition  of  the  roads. 

Very  early  in  the  operations,  while  our  columns  were 
still  marching  on  Augustovo,  the  3d  Reserve  Division, 
the  5th  Infantry  Brigade,  and  the  nth  Landwehr 
Division  had  gradually  been  withdrawn  from  this 
battle-front  and  pushed  forward  for  the  protection  of 
the  armies  against  attacks  from  the  Osowiec-Lomza 
line.  Osowiec  was  to  be  invested  and  stormed.  It 
was  now  certain  that  strong  forces  were  gathering  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Lomza,  and  the  portion  of  the  20th 
Army  Corps  stationed  there  was  no  longer  sufficient. 


THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    149 

In  the  mean  time  the  enveloping  movement  of  the 
Tenth  Army  had  been  completed.  By  the  night  of 
the  loth,  after  extraordinary  forced  marches  and  in- 
credible efforts,  the  center  of  this  army,  moving  on  the 
Tilsit-Kalvaria  line,  had  reached  the  Insterburg- 
Kovno  road  near  Wirballen,  and  when  Lyck  fell  on  the 
14th  the  infantry  columns  were  already  due  north  of 
the  great  Augustovo  forest  near  Suwalki-Seiny. 

The  retreating  Russian  Army  was  attacked  vigor- 
ously in  the  flank  and  forced  southward.  It  was 
apparently  taken  by  surprise  again,  just  as  at  the  be- 
ginning of  our  offensive  from  Upper  Silesia  and  Hohen- 
salza.  In  this  connection  our  intelligence  service  did 
good  work  by  spreading  false  rumors  and  preventing 
the  enemy  from  obtaining  information.  The  Russians 
and  the  Entente  did  not  succeed  in  getting  news  of 
these  movements.  It  is  indeed  extremely  difficult  to 
obtain  accurate  information  about  the  enemy,  especially 
in  time  for  it  to  be  of  any  use.  If  it  were  otherwise, 
conducting  a  campaign  with  inferior  numbers  would 
not  be  such  an  extraordinarily  difficult  task.  We  were 
favored  by  luck  at  Tannenberg. 

Some  parts  of  the  Russian  Army  which  had  retired 
toward  Ko/no  thus  stood  on  our  flank,  and  attacked 
us  incessantly,  with  a  view  to  holding  up  our  advance. 
It  was  in  vain.  They  were  thrown  back  on  the  Kovno- 
Olita  line  by  the  troops  protecting  the  flank  of  the 
Tenth  Army. 

On  the  evening  of  the  14th  it  seemed  as  though  it 
would  be  possible  to  complete  the  envelopment  of  the 
enemy  due  east  of  Augustovo.  General  von  Eichhom 
diverted  his  left  wing  in  this  direction.  On  the  15th 
and  1 6th  the  advance-guard  of  the  21st  Army  Corps 
advanced  on  the  Seiny-Augustovo  chauss4e,  far  into 
the  forest,  but  here  it  was  overrun  by  Russian  columns 
pouring  back  eastward,  and  part  was  taken  prisoner. 


ISO  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Up  to  February  i8  forces  of  the  Tenth  Army  pushed 
on  boldly  along  the  northern  edge  of  the  forest  to  the  ' 
vicinity  of  Grodno.  Here  they  took  up  a  position 
facing  west,  with  their  rear  close  to  the  fortifications. 
This  bold  and  venturesome  movement  cut  off  the 
enemy's  retreat.  Other  German  troops  penetrated  the 
forest  from  the  north,  and  after  the  capture  of  Augus- 
tovo  reached  the  Grodno-Lipsk  chauss^e  and  the  Bobr 
below  Krasnybor,  fighting  all  the  way.  At  Lipsk  the 
ring  was  closed. 

The  position  of  our  troops  before  Grodno  was  ex- 
ceedingly hazardous.  On  the  20th  and  21st  violent 
attacks  were  made  from  the  fortress  where  the  Russian 
reinforcements  had  assembled.  The  Russians  made 
repeated  attacks  from  the  Augustovo  forest,  into 
which  they  had  poured  in  their  retreat.  The  German 
troops  stood  firm,  though  suffering  heavy  losses. 

It  was  a  brilliant  piece  of  work  for  the  21st  Army 
Corps,  and  its  leader,  Gen.  Fritz  von  Below,  who  after- 
ward made  good  as  Commander-in-chief  in  the  West, 
had  reason  to  be  proud  of  his  troops  and  his  own  force- 
fulness.  The  staff  of  the  Tenth  Army  could  claim  a 
share  of  the  glory  with  good  conscience. 

A  few  days  later  the  masses  of  Russian  troops  surg- 
ing in  the  Augustovo  forest,  and  defending  themselves, 
desperately  surrendered.     The  battle  was  at  an  end. 

IV 

The  tactical  results  of  the  winter  campaign  in 
Masuria  were  important:  110,000  prisoners  and  many 
hundred  guns.  The  Russian  Tenth  Army  had  been 
annihilated,  and  Russia's  strength  was  once  more  per- 
ceptibly reduced. 

The  original  plan  of  operations  had  comprised  an 
attack  on  Osowiec  with  the  help  of  the  heaviest  possible 


THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    151 

direct  fire.  Of  that  part  of  the  attacking  armies  which 
had  reached  the  upper  Bobr  south  of  Augustovo,  dur- 
ing the  fighting  in  the  forest,  the  38th  and  40th  Reserve 
Corps,  the  2d  Infantry  Division,  and  the  4th  Cavalry 
Division  were  to  have  crossed  the  river.  Before  they 
could  do  so,  however,  they  had  become  partly  involved 
in  that  tremendous  fight  in  the  forest  which  preceded 
the  destruction  of  the  Tenth  Russian  Army. 

I  had  awaited  the  end  of  this  fighting  with  increasing 
suspense.  The  section  of  the  Eighth  Army  which  had 
been  employed  here — the  von  Litzmann  group — joined 
the  Tenth  Army.  The  Eighth  Army  received  instructions 
to  effect  the  attack  on  Osowiec  from  Grajewo  and  take 
over  the  defense  of  East  Prussia  against  Russian  attacks 
from  that  point  to  the  Orshitz. 

Our  troops  did  not  succeed  in  getting  through  the 
marshes  of  the  upper  Bobr  in  spite  of  repeated  and 
obstinate  attempts.  We  wanted  frost,  but  heavy  rain 
continued  to  fall  without  ceasing.  It  was  hardly  pos- 
sible to  remain  in  the  forest  and  marsh  district.  The 
upper  Bobr  could  be  crossed  only  by  the  existing  cause- 
ways. The  bridges  had  been  destroyed.  The  3d  Sibe- 
rian Corps  which  had  escaped  at  Lyck  offered  a  brave 
resistance,  and  the  desperate  stand  of  the  Russians  in 
the  Augustovo  forest  had  given  them  time  to  strengthen 
the  defenses  of  the  Grodno-Osowiec  section. 

Our  troops  were  worn  out  by  the  bad  weather  and 
the  strain  of  the  operations.  They  reported  that  the 
Russians  were  stationed  south  of  the  channel  in  con- 
crete positions.  That  seemed  quite  possible,  although 
we  were  very  skeptical.  Subsequently,  in  the  year 
1 91 6,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hoffmann  inspected  the  Rus- 
sian positions,  but  saw  no  concrete  works.  The  wearier 
attacking  troops  are  the  stronger  does  the  position  to 
be  attacked  appear  to  them,  and  they  give  the  enemy 
credit  for  strength  he  does  not  possess.     This  is  a  very 


152  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

human  trait.  It  did  not  have  any  influence  on  the 
decisions  we  came  to,  for  the  young  contingents  were 
iindoubtedly  exhausted,  and  this  necessitated  fresh 
measures. 

Meanwhile  the  attack  on  Osowiec  had  not  made  any 
headway,  either.  In  spite  of  our  powerful  artillery  it 
defied  frontal  attack,  as  the  commanding  heights  on 
the  southern  bank  of  the  Bobr  could  not  be  reached 
at  all  points. 

Under  these  circumstances  I  could  not  conceal  from 
myself  that  this  great  victory  had  been  deprived  of  its 
full  strategical  results.  Army  Headquarters  was  called 
upon  to  make  grave  and  difficult  decisions. 

In  the  first  place,  the  order  was  given  to  discontinue 
the  attacks  on  the  Bobr  and  Osowiec. 

The  Tenth  Army  could  not  remain  where  it  was. 
Very  strong  forces  were  needed  to  protect  our  flanks 
on  the  east,  the  Olita-Kovno  direction,  but  they  were 
not  available.  Communication  with  the  rear,  and  the 
conditions  under  which  the  army  was  living,  had 
become  too  difficult,  owing  to  the  inclemency  of  the 
weather.  They  could  not  be  borne  for  long.  The 
broad-gage  railway  built  by  the  Russians  from  Marg- 
grabowa  via  Ratschki  to  Suwalki  could  do  little  to 
ameliorate  this  state  of  affairs.  The  roads  and  tracks 
were  too  bad,  the  weather  too  unfavorable,  and  the 
horses  too  exhausted.  Our  transport  could  hardly  get 
on  at  all  on  the  highroads  with  their  thin  surface  of 
worn  stones.  Besides,  we  had  very  Uttle  available. 
The  army  had  to  return  to  conditions  under  which  it 
could  live  and  recuperate.  All  this  made  it  urgently 
necessary  that  the  Tenth  Army  should  face  about  and 
withdraw. 

At  the  very  beginning  of  the  operations  orders  had 
been  given  for  the  construction  of  rear  positions  east 
of  Augustovo-Suwalki,  reaching  as  far  as  the  Niemen. 


THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    153 

The  work  was  immediately  put  in  hand  by  labor 
companies  as  soon  as  we  had  conquered  this  district. 
These  positions — although  only  in  an  early  stage — 
now  offered  a  certain  amount  of  support.  The  Tenth 
Army  received  orders  for  its  right  wing  to  wheel  and 
retire  to  the  prepared  line.  It  was  left  to  that  army 
itself  to  carry  out  the  details  of  the  movement  and  also 
decide  whether  the  left  wing  should  withdraw  the  same 
distance  or  only  as  far  as  the  Kalvaria-Pilwischki  line. 
It  was  to  be  presumed  that  the  enemy  would  press 
closely  after  them. 

At  the  same  time  the  Tenth  Army  had  received  in- 
structions to  release  forces  which  were  urgently  re- 
quired farther  west.  The  great  Russian  counter-attacks 
had  begun  against  our  long  flank  on  the  southern  fron- 
tier of  West  and  East  Prussia.  Further,  the  Russians 
were  keeping  us  busy  to  the  north  of  the  Niemen.  The 
battle  raged  all  roimd  German  territory  west  of  the  Vis- 
tula. 

Quiet  reigned  in  the  Polish  bend  of  the  Vistula. 

The  Austrian  Army's  offensive  for  the  relief  of 
Przemysl  had  been  unsuccessful.  The  Russians  very 
soon  made  counter-attacks.  Przemysl  would  have  to 
be  left  to  its  fate.  On  the  whole  Eastern  front  we  were 
now  faced  by  the  prospect  of  heavy  Russian  attacks. 


After  the  Augustovo  forest  had  been  cleared  and  the 
wounded  removed,  at  the  beginning  of  March,  General 
von  Eichhorn,  in  accordance  with  instructions,  with- 
drew his  right  to  the  defensive  line,  and  his  left  north 
of  the  Augustovo  forest  as  far  as  Seiny  and  south 
of  Kalvaria.  He  proposed  to  fall  on  the  pursuing 
Russians  again  and  defeat  them  by  enveloping  their 
right  wing. 


154  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

The  idea  was  a  good  one  and  in  accordance  with  the 
resolute  spirit  prevailing  at  Army  Headquarters.  The 
days  from  March  9-1 1  witnessed  a  fresh  success,  for 
the  newly  formed  Tenth  Russian  Army  suffered  defeat. 
But  the  troops  needed  rest  so  much  and  the  weather 
was  so  bad  that  the  army  command  had  reluctantly 
to  decide  to  give  up  any  idea  of  further  attacks  and 
have  recourse  to  position  warfare,  especially  as  more 
troops  had  to  be  transferred  to  the  Eighth  Army  and 
Von  Gallwitz's  detachment.  The  left  wing  remained  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Kalvaria-Mariampol-Pilwischki. 
About  the  middle  of  March  the  Russians  hurled  them- 
selves against  these  positions,  but  a  period  of  quiet 
gradually  set  in. 

The  Russian  attacks  on  the  southern  front  became 
more  and  more  determined  and  the  fighting  more  and 
more  violent.  During  General  von  Litzmann's  advance 
from  Johannisburg  through  Bialla  in  the  early  days 
of  the  winter  battle,  the  20th  Army  Corps  and  the 
41st  Infantry  Division,  with  some  Landsturm,  had 
pushed  forward  on  the  Johannisburg-Kolno  road  tow- 
ard Lomza  so  as  to  cut  this  fortress  off  from  the 
north.  The  37th  Infantry  Division  was  pressing  for- 
ward via  Myschinjetz.  The  41st  Infantry  Division 
encountered  the  enemy  in  front  of  the  fortifications 
of  Lomza,  and  was  just  strong  enough  to  isolate  the 
sector  between  the  Pissa  and  the  Scszuszin-Stawiski- 
Lomza  road. 

The  3d  Reserve  Division  and  the  5th  Infantry  Bri- 
gade came  up  only  by  degrees.  They  were  to  cover 
the  long  sector  between  Stawiski  and  the  Bobr,  while 
the  nth  Landwehr  Division  began  the  attack  on 
Osowiec.  The  arrival  of  the  3d  Reserve  Division  and 
the  5th  Infantry  Brigade  coincided  with  an  attack  from 
Lomza  by  the  Russian  Guard  and  the  5th  Army  Corps. 
From  February  21   heavy  fighting  developed  to  the 


THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    155 

north  of  the  fortress.  The  German  troops  fought 
heroically,  but  the  crisis  was  grave. 

One  morning  the  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Eighth  Army 
reported  to  me  that  the  line  of  the  3d  Reserve  Division 
had  been  pierced.  However,  it  managed  to  recover 
and  hold  fast,  as  the  Russians  relaxed  their  efforts. 
For  a  long  time  their  situation  and,  of  course,  that  of 
the  force  besieging  Osowiec  were  very  critical.  It  was 
not  until  the  arrival  of  the  ist  Landwehr  Division  before 
Lomza  early  in  March  that  our  front  was  so  strongly 
held  that  I  was  able  to  regard  all  danger  east  of  the 
Pissa  as  past. 

The  steadfastness  of  the  troops,  and  especially  the 
3d  Reserve  Division,  had  resulted  in  a  brilliant  defen- 
sive victory.  General  von  Scholtz  took  over  command 
of  this  sector,  and  his  sphere  of  command  was  sub- 
sequently extended  as  far  as  the  Schkwa.  General 
von  Scholtz  had  already  held  commands  at  the  battle 
of  Tannenberg  and  in  Poland  w4th  great  distinction. 
He  was  considerably  senior  in  the  service  to  the  com- 
mander of  the  Eighth  Army,  Gen.  Otto  von  Below, 
but  the  General  readily  took  service  under  his  younger 
comrade. 

Between  the  Pissa  and  the  Orshitz  General  von 
Staabs,  with  his  37th  Infantry  Division  and  the 
Landsturm  stationed  there,  had  gained  ground  in  the 
direction  of  the  Narew,  Before  long  the  Russians  were 
considerably  reinforced  here.  They  attacked  inces- 
santly from  Novograd  and,  especially  with  the  4th  Si- 
berian Corps,  from  Ostrolenka.  The  fighting  became 
increasingly  severe,  and  more  and  more  of  the  troops 
who  had  taken  part  in  the  winter  battle  had  to  be 
transferred  to  this  point.  By  degrees  there  arrived 
from  the  Tenth  Army  the  2d  Infantry  Division,  the 
75th  Reserve  Division,  the  loth  Landwehr  Division, 
and  the  4th  Cavalry  Division.     But  in  the  end  even 


iS6  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

these  were  not  enough.  The  76th  Reserve  Division 
from  the  Tenth  Army  was  sent  there  also  after  being 
transferred  for  a  time  to  the  west  of  the  Orshitz, 
in  General  von  Gallwitz's  area. 

Owing  to  the  character  of  the  country,  with  its  great 
stretches  of  marsh  intersected  by  patches  of  forest  and 
narrow  defiles  covered  with  scraggy  pines,  the  fighting 
here  was  broken  up  into  local  actions.  It  placed  heavy 
responsibility  on  the  subordinate  commands  and  of- 
ficers of  lower  rank.  Man  fought  with  man.  Though 
these  local  crises  seemed  interminable,  and  the  fighting 
dragged  on  into  April,  we  were  still  over  the  frontier 
when  it  came  to  an  end. 

After  the  middle  of  February  fighting  was  in  full 
swing  west  of  the  Orshitz  also.  General  von  Gallwitz, 
an  enterprising  and  resourceful  soldier,  and  a  man  with 
a  variety  of  interests  in  every  sphere  of  life,  was  one 
of  the  best  leaders  in  our  army.  He  strengthened  the 
weak  front  to  the  west  of  Mlawa,  and  in  the  middle  of 
February  pushed  forward  here  up  the  Vistula  as  far  as 
Plock.  Here  once  more  we  forestalled  the  Russian 
plans  and  made  a  thrust  into  their  area  of  concentration. 

Meanwhile  the  German  reinforcements  had  taken 
up  their  positions  on  the  Neidenburg-Willenberg  front, 
the  left  wing  of  Von  Gallwitz's  detachment.  The  situa- 
tion seemed  to  promise .  that  a  fresh  attack  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Prasnysz  would  dislodge  the  enemy  troops  fac- 
ing the  17th  Reserve  Corps.  A  general  advance  of  Von 
Gallwitz's  detachment  to  the  line  of  the  Narew  would 
then  be  possible.  At  that  time  this  seemed  important 
strategically.  The  attack  against  Osowiec  and  the 
Upper  Bobr  was  still  in  progress.  Every  local  success 
achieved  by  General  von  Gallwitz  improved  the  general 
position  and  our  prospects  for  further  engagements. 
We  were  in  a  state  of  great  tension. 

General  von  Gallwitz  attacked  on  February  22,  in 


THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    157 

the  direction  of  Prasnysz,  with  portions  of  the  17th 
Reserve  Corps,  the  ist  Reserve  Corps,  and  the  3d  In- 
fantry Division.  General  von  Morgen  stormed  this 
very  strongly  fortified  town  on  the  24th.  The  situa- 
tion was  everywhere  favorable  when  it  was  reported 
that  strong  Russian  forces  were  advancing  between  the 
Ciechanov-Mlawa  road  and  the  Orshitz,  and  had 
already  outflanked  General  von  Morgen.  Recon- 
noitering  by  means  of  aeroplanes  was  not  possible  in 
those  days,  and  we  were  very  poorly  equipped  as  re- 
gards flying  squadrons.  Our  cavalry  patrols  could  not 
get  through,  and  finally  infantry  outposts  were  in 
contact  everywhere.  On  February  27,  in  face  of  the 
attack  by  the  Siberian  Corps,  Prasnysz  had  to  be 
abandoned  with  ver}*  heavy  losses  on  our  side.  Gen- 
eral von  Morgen  retreated  toward  the  Janow-Chorshele 
line,  at  the  frontier.  The  Russians  did  not  press  on  so 
hard  to  the  north,  but  their  attacks  toward  Mlawa  were 
extremely  vigorous. 

The  local  commanders  proposed  to  hold  the  frontier 
position  in  course  of  construction  to  the  south  of 
Neidenburg-Willenberg,  but  I  made  the  ist  Reserve 
Corps  stand  farther  south.  Here,  also,  the  fighting 
became  very  violent. 

Up  to  March  7  the  Russians  attacked  incessantly 
between  Mlawa  and  Chorshele,  and  suffered  very 
heavy  losses,  but  in  vain. 

At  this  time  there  was  fighting  on  the  whole  of  the 
eastern  and  southern  front  of  East  and  West  Prussia. 
The  Tenth  Army  had  completed  its  withdrawal, 
wheeled,  and  was  now  beginning  its  counter-attack 
north  of  the  Augustovo  forest.  Near  Lomza  the 
crisis  was  at  an  end,  but  no  conclusion  had  yet  been 
reached  between  the  Pissa  and  Mlawa.  Every  day  I 
had  to  make  innumerable  tactical  and  other  decisions. 
The  commanders  on  the  southern  front  were  appealing 


158  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

continuously  for  reinforcements,  but  the  Tenth  Army 
still  thought  it  could  bring  off  a  success,  even  if  only  a 
local  one,  and  was  therefore  reluctant  to  part  with 
troops. 

In  the  mean  time  further  reinforcements  from  the 
Tenth  Army  had  reached  General  von  Gallwitz  and  the 
right  wing  of  the  Eighth  Army.  We  were  now  strong 
enough  to  make  a  counter-attack  on  both  sides  of  the 
Orshitz  against  the  enemy,  who  had  been  weakened 
during  the  last  few  days  by  heavy  losses. 

Our  advance  took  place  from  March  8-12  and  ceased 
north  of  Prasnysz.  The  Russians  replied  with  heavy 
counter-attacks.  On  March  18  they  taught  our  troops 
near  Jednoroshetz  that  swamps  are  no  sure  protection 
against  the  enemy.  Our  soldiers  connected  the  idea 
of  swamps  with  the  idea  of  being  swallowed  up,  but 
the  Russians,  as  children  of  Nature,  knew  better. 
The  swamps  in  the  region  of  the  fighting  were  frozen 
only  in  places.  In  others  they  were  not  deep,  and 
covered  a  firm,  non-porous  bed,  so  it  was  possible  to 
wade  through  them. 

At  the  end  of  March  the  fighting  to  the  west  of  the 
Orshitz  died  down.  Here  it  was  possible  to  withdraw 
the  76th  Reserve  Division  and  transfer  it  to  the  east 
of  the  river.  We  were  also  able  to  release  the  6th 
Cavalry  Division  west  of  the  Orshitz.  It  was  urgently 
needed  north  of  the  Pregel. 

Von  Gallwitz 's  detachment  had  achieved  great  suc- 
cesses, and  this  officer  also  was  justified  in  being  proud 
of  his  troops.  They  had  defended  themselves  against 
an  enormous  numerical  superiority  and  even  forced  the 
enemy  back. 

From  the  end  of  March  and  beginning  of  April 
onward  the  troops  on  the  whole  of  the  southern  front 
could  at  last  enjoy  the  rest  they  longed  for. 

The  engagements  from  Lomza  to  Mlawa  are  not  so 


THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    159 

well  known.  In  the  East,  Germany  thought  only  of 
big  successes.  It  was  no  longer  possible  to  achieve 
these  by  such  obvious  means.  The  Grand  Duke's 
great  counter-move  against  the  victory  of  the  winter, 
the  attack  on  the  Narew  against  our  weak  flank,  and 
also  part  of  the  Entente's  plan  of  campaign  for  the 
year  191 5,  had  all  been  frustrated.  The  troops,  both 
collectively  and  individually,  had  fought  in  a  manner 
worthy  of  the  great  achievements  of  the  past.  Old 
and  new  formations  had  vied  with  one  another  in  battle. 
There  was  more  staying  power  in  the  old  formations. 
The  Landwehr  and  Landsturm  forces  had  done  valuable 
work.  The  command  was  fully  competent  for  its  task 
and  the  campaign  of  the  past  winter  had  been  a  splen- 
did military  achievement. 

VI 

Apart  from  the  big  decisive  actions,  engagements 
had  been  taking  place  north  of  the  Pregel  since  the 
middle  of  February.  On  both  sides  they  were  only 
conducted  by  Landsturm  and  Landwehr  troops,  and 
had  no  strategic  importance,  but  they  kept  us  occupied 
and  always  on  the  alert. 

At  the  beginning  of  February  the  Russians  were  still 
on  Prussian  territory  northeast  of  Tilsit,  and  we  were 
justified  in  our  desire  to  wrest  this  last  small  corner  of 
German  soil  from  the  power  of  the  enemy.  The  task 
was  intrusted  to  the  Governor  of  Konigsberg,  General 
von  Pappritz,  with  the  Landsturm  forces  stationed 
there,  reinforced  by  some  artillery.  Taiiroggen  was 
seized  on  February  18. 

The  name  Tauroggen  is  bound  up  with  great  histori- 
cal memories,  and  it  was  a  misfortune  for  the  two 
states,  now  at  war,  that  they  forsook  that  road  of 
Russo-German  friendship  which  Tauroggen  symbolizes. 


i6o  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

The  peace  which  reigned  once  more  north  of  the 
Pregel  was  rudely  broken  on  March  17  by  an  inroad 
near  Memel  and  Tauroggen  of  a  Russian  force  com- 
posed of  home-defense  and  frontier-guard  formations. 
They  took  us  by  surprise  while  we  were  still  devoting 
all  our  attention  to  events  elsewhere. 

It  is  true  that  there  had  been  rumors  of  the  concen- 
tration of  enemy  forces  on  the  Russian  side  of  the  fron- 
tier near  Memel.  But  there  had  been  so  many  rumors, 
and  hitherto  nothing  had  come  of  them.  Moreover, 
there  was  no  reason  whatever  to  expect  a  Russian 
attempt  in  that  neighborhood. 

The  Russian  horde  advanced  on  Memel,  which  the 
Lands  turm  forces  abandoned.  We  heard  of  this 
through  a  telephone  girl,  who  rang  us  up  and  gave  us 
this  news  when  the  Russians  were  actually  in  the 
post-office. 

I  endeavored  to  obtain  the  Iron  Cross  of  the  Second 
Class  for  this  young  girl,  Fraulein  Erica  Rostel.  This 
was  not  possible,  but  she  afterward  received  a  gold 
watch  from  the  state. 

The  Russians  took  Tauroggen  at  the  same  time,  and 
pushed  on  in  the  direction  of  Tilsit.  The  actions  on 
the  other  fronts  had  used  up  the  reserves.  The  com- 
mand of  the  2d  Army  Corps  had  now  to  send  an  Ersatz 
battalion  to  replace  them  from  Stettin,  a  proof  of  how 
freely  we  had  spent  ourselves,  and  how  severely  our 
strength  had  been  taxed  by  the  engagements  which  had 
taken  place  since  the  beginning  of  February. 

On  March  21  Memel  was  freed,  and  on  the  2 2d  three 
thousand  people  who  had  been  carried  off  were  recov- 
ered from  the  enemy.  The  Russians  had  wrought  in- 
credible havoc.  Tauroggen  fell  on  March  29.  The 
6th  Cavalry  Division  was  transferred  to  that  district 
and  from  that  time  guarded  it  from  the  Lithuanian  side 
of  the  frontier. 


THE  WINTER  CAMPAIGN  IN  MASURIA    i6i 

East  Prussia  was  once  more  free,  and  henceforth  was 
spared  any  further  enemy  invasion.  It  was  now  pos- 
sible to  begin  the  work  of  reconstruction. 

Since  the  middle  of  February  our  headquarters  had 
been  at  Lotzen,  These  were  hard  days  for  me  until 
the  beginning  of  April.  I  had  to  abandon  the  hopes 
I  had  entertained  of  making  immediate  strategical  use 
of  the  advantages  gained  by  the  winter  battle.  Tac- 
tically this  battle  had  been  successful,  and  that  filled 
me  with  satisfaction.  It  was  comforting  to  know  that 
the  Grand  Duke's  heavy  attacks  had  been  shattered 
and  that  we  stood  everywhere  on  hostile  soil.  But  we 
had  taken  but  one  step  toward  the  final  decision  against 
Russia,  and  it  was  with  that  goal  that  my  innermost 
thoughts  and  feelings  were  most  concerned.  The  fear- 
ful waste  of  Russian  strength  in  East  and  West  Prussia 
ought,  later  on,  to  help  the  operations  in  GpJicia,  The 
Russian  losses  had  been  extraordinarily  heavy  in  com- 
parison with  ours.  Even  Russia's  enormous  resources 
in  man -power  could  not  stand  such  a  drain  indefinitely. 

Each  of  the  successive  tactical  situations  had  made 
the  fullest  demands  on  my  mental  and  spiritual  ener- 
gies. It  is  simply  impossible  to  put  it  all  on  paper — the 
proud  hopes,  the  despondency,  the  disappointments, 
the  heart-searchings  before  a  decision,  the  annoyance 
caused  by  one  thing  and  another.  I  cannot  describe 
the  differences  which  had  so  often  to  be  overcome,  nor 
can  I  portray  how  deeply  I  felt  for  the  troops  who  had 
to  bear  the  privations  of  a  winter  campaign  in  such 
inclement  weather. 

Later  on  I  had  happier  times  at  Lotzen, 

Our  quarters  and  the  office  were  small,  but  I  liked 
them.  I  look  back  with  pleasure  on  that  time  in  the 
friendly  little  East  Prussian  town. 

While  the  fighting  was  still  going  on  one  of  our  most 
important  tasks  was  the  construction  of  rear  positions. 


i62  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Along  the  whole  of  the  eastern  frontier  of  Prussia  there 
arose  a  barbed- wire  zone  as  the  first  permanent  element 
of  the  new  positions.  Numerous  special  battalions 
composed  of  poorly  trained  men  unfit  for  labor  or 
service  in  the  field  were  sent  there  at  my  request. 
They  often  had  to  work  under  enemy  fire,  and  did  so 
devotedly.  The  word  "digger"  is  a  title  of  honor. 
These  units  were  subsequently  transferred  from  the 
Eastern  to  the  Western  front. 

About  this  time  General  Headquarters  ordered  the 
number  of  regiments  to  a  division  in  the  West  to  be 
reduced  from  four  to  three,  so  that  a  division  now  had 
nine  battalions  instead  of  twelve.  We  did  the  same 
on  our  front.  In  this  way  a  larger  number  of  strate- 
gical units  was  formed.  Operations  were  thus  facili- 
tated, and  no  doubt  this  was  a  great  advantage.  But 
a  division  of  nine  battalions  is  too  weak,  tactically, 
while  the  staff  and  administrative  services  are  too  large. 
After  the  war  I  should  most  certainly  have  advocated 
the  re-establishment  of  the  larger  divisions. 

It  remains  to  be  seen  what  will  now  happen  to  our 
proud  and  splendid  army,  which,  assisted  by  allies  of 
not  very  high  military  value,  has  kept  its  head  above 
water  for  the  last  four  years,  defied  the  world,  and  pre- 
served its  homeland  almost  intact  from  the  horrors  of 
war.  Shall  such  an  army  vanish  completely?  Will 
Germany  commit  suicide  once  more?  I  cannot  and 
shall  never  believe  it.  The  seventy  to  eighty  millions 
of  Germans  will  some  day  come  together  and  think 
things  over.  When  they  remember  the  overwhelm- 
ing military  achievements  of  this  war,  they  will  not 
forget  what  a  really  united  army  can  do. 


THE   SUMMER    CAMPAIGN   AGAINST 
RUSSIA,    1915 

Scheme  for  a  Decisive  Battle  in  the  East — The  Thrust  Toward  Lith- 
uania and  Courland — The  Break-through  in  Galicia — The  Offensive 
Over  the  Narew — The  Battles  East  of  the  Vistida — The  Occupa- 
tion of  Novo  Georgievsk — The  Advance  into  Eastern  Poland — 
The  Passage  of  the  Niemen — The  Attack  of  the  Niemen  Army 
— The  Conclusion  of  the  Summer  Campaign. 

(Map  IX) 
I 

THE  offensive  undertaken  by  General  von  Conrad 
in  January  had  been  unsuccessful.  At  the  start 
ground  was  gained  along  the  whole  of  the  Carpathian 
ridge,  but  after  that  matters  came  to  a  standstill. 
The  Russians  made  their  counter-attack  and  pressed 
the  Austrian  Army  hard.  Only  the  plucky  German 
Southern  Army  under  General  von  Linsingen  continued 
to  make  progress.  Without  these  German  troops  the 
position  could  not  have  been  maintained.  The  diffi- 
culties of  this  theater  of  war  in  the  winter  were 
enormous.  They  subjected  the  troops,  who  worked 
wonders,  to  a  terrible  strain.  The  losses  due  to 
frostbite  were  very  great. 

Przemysl  was  not  relieved  and  fell  on  March  ig. 

While  the  attacks  against  German  territory  east 
of  the  Vistula  abated  early  in  April,  the  Grand  Duke 
continued  his  offensive  against  the  Austrian  Army 
with  the  express  purpose  of  descending  on  Hungary 
from  the  Carpathians  and  putting  Austria-Hungary 
out  of  the  war. 


i64  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

In  April  the  Headquarters  Staff  at  Teschen  consid- 
ered the  miHtary  situation  of  the  Dual  Monarchy  to 
be  extremely  grave.  Italy's  attitude  had  become  in- 
creasingly doubtful.  She  had  refused  all  Austria- 
Hungary's  extensive  concessions,  the  necessity  for 
which  I  myself  had  urged  on  General  von  Conrad,  and 
was  fairly  caught  in  the  net  spread  by  the  Entente. 
In  spite  of  its  superiority  in  numbers,  the  latter 
needed  additional  forces  to  master  us.  It  became 
more  and  more  certain  that  we  had  to  reckon  on  Italy 
entering  the  war  on  the  side  of  our  enemies.  Austria- 
Hungary  realized  that  she  had  to  reinforce  her  troops 
on  the  Italian  frontier  considerably.  The  Serbian  Army 
also  seemed  to  require  watching  again. 

The  more  the  Austrian  Army  was  obliged  to  weaken 
itself  in  Hungary  and  Galicia,  in  favor  of  other  fronts, 
the  more  severely  would  it  feel  a  Russian  attack. 
Feeling  at  Teschen  became  ever  more  despondent. 
The  Austrian  liaison  officer,  acting  on  instructions 
from  General  von  Conrad,  described  the  situation  to 
us  as  one  of  the  utmost  gravity.  Judging  by  my 
knowledge  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army,  this  was 
certainly  true.  We  forwarded  these  serious  reports 
and  our  interpretation  of  them  to  General  Headquarters. 

About  the  middle  of  April  the  situation  in  the  Car- 
pathians became  still  more  critical.  General  Boroevic's 
army  was  thrown  back  over  the  ridge,  while  farther  east 
the  German  Southern  Army  stood  firm.  The  moment 
had  arrived  when  help  was  absolutely  necessary.  We 
despatched  the  25th  Reserve  Division,  which  was  with 
the  Ninth  Army  awaiting  the  order,  by  rail.  They 
arrived  just  in  time  to  avert  the  worst  disaster. 

We  reported  the  measures  we  had  taken  to  General 
Headquarters,  who  fully  concurred  in  our  view  of  the 
situation.  The  Beskiden  Corps  was  raised  under 
General   von   der  Marwitz,   who  had  hitherto  com- 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     165 

manded  our  38th  Reserve  Corps.  The  Commander- 
in-chief  in  the  East  also  gave  up  the  4th  Division 
and  a  newly  formed  division  to  reinforce  the  Car- 
pathian front.  But,  in  spite  of  all  this,  the  situation 
there  continued  to  be  grave.  We  had  to  send  reinforce- 
ments to  the  Serbian  front  at  the  same  time.  These 
reinforcements  afterward  joined  General  von  Linsingen 
during  his  attack  in  May. 

The  German  General  Staff  now  resolved  to  try  to 
obtain  a  decision  against  Russia.  The  plan  was  an 
ambitious  one,  and  the  very  idea  of  weakening  our 
forces  in  the  West  in  spite  of  the  critical  situation  there 
was  a  proof  of  the  General  Staff's  readiness  to  accept 
responsibility. 

Since  the  engagements  roimd  Ypres  in  November 
the  fighting  on  the  whole  of  the  Western  front  had 
developed  into  trench  warfare.  The  cessation  of  the 
advance  in  France,  the  bending  back  of  the  right 
wing  in  September,  and  the  poor  results  of  the  fighting 
in  Flanders  had  caused  great  depression  in  the  army 
in  the  West,  and  this  had  been  deepened  by  the  lack  of 
ammunition.  In  Januaiy  an  attack  near  Soissons  by 
the  3d  Army  Corps,  under  its  admirable  and  distin- 
guished commander.  General  von  Lochow,  had  had  a 
most  encouraging  effect,  and  an  attack  by  the  Saxons 
near  Craonne  immediately  afterward  led  to  splendid 
results.  In  February  and  March,  after  a  great  struggle, 
we  had  at  last  succeeded  in  shattering  a  determined 
French  effort  to  break  through  in  Champagne. 

The  future  hopes  of  the  Entente  were,  for  the  mo- 
ment, based  on  Russia  alone.  In  England  Kitchener's 
army  was  in  course  of  formation.  This  was  a  great 
creation  of  a  distinguished  organizer.  Of  the  thirty- 
two  divisions  the  first  twelve  could  be  ready  by  May. 
The  Entente's  war  industry  was  extending.  The 
United  States  had  been  added  to  the  number  of  the 


i66  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Entente's  contractors.  Although  at  first  we  were  able 
to  hinder  the  export  of  war  materials  from  America 
through  economic  measures,  this  could  not  have  a 
lasting  effect.  In  our  great  struggle  this  action  on 
the  part  of  the  United  States  could  be  interpreted  by 
us  only  as  evidence  of  favoritism  toward  our  enemies. 
Her  behavior  roused  feelings  of  the  greatest  bitterness 
in  us. 

It  was  to  be  expected  that  the  German  offensive 
against  Russia  would,  for  her  relief,  give  rise  to  enemy 
attacks  on  the  Western  front.  The  critical  engage- 
ments in  May  near  La  Bassee  and  Arras,  which  gave 
us  so  much  anxiety,  illustrate  the  responsibility  as- 
sumed by  General  Headquarters,  when  it  risked  a 
decisive  battle  in  the  East. 

General  von  Mackensen,  with  the  newly  formed 
Eleventh  Army,  which  consisted  principally  of  troops 
from  the  Western  front,  received  instructions  early  in 
May  to  attack  and  crush  in  the  flank  of  the  Russian 
armies,  which  were  pursuing  their  offensive  in  the 
Carpathians  with  supreme  contempt  of  death.  He  was 
a  distinguished  man,  of  great  accomplishments,  and  a 
brilliant  soldier  whose  deeds  will  live  in  history  for  all 
time.  Colonel  von  Seeckt,  formerly  General  von 
Lochow's  Chief  of  Staff,  was  appointed  his  Chief  of 
Staff.  Thanks  to  his  keen  intellect  and  clear  judgment, 
this  officer  became  one  of  the  most  prominent  figures 
in  the  war. 

Field-Marshal  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria  took  com- 
mand of  the  Ninth  Army,  and  well  deserved  this,  the 
highest  military  rank.  He  readily  put  himself  under 
Field-Marshal  von  Hindenburg,  who  was  inconsider- 
ably junior  to  him  in  the  service. 

The  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  received  in- 
structions to  demonstrate  on  his  front  in  order  to  pin 
down  the  enemy  forces  there. 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     167 

II 

The  Ninth  Army  had  been  enjoying  a  spell  of  rest. 
Early  in  March  it  thought  it  could  bring  off  some  suc- 
cess north  of  the  Pilica  and  made  an  attack  there,  in 
spite  of  great  difficulties.  But  it  was  soon  forced  to 
desist. 

In  accordance  with  the  instructions  of  General  Head- 
quarters the  Ninth  Army  was  now  to  attack  at  Skier- 
niewice.  We  had  received  a  supply  of  gas  and  antici- 
pated great  tactical  results  from  its  use,  as  the  Russians 
were  not  yet  fully  protected  against  gas.  We  also  had 
reason  to  expect  local  successes  from  an  attack  by  the 
Tenth  Army,  east  of  Suwalki,  and  instructions  were 
issued  accordingly. 

The  gas  attack  by  the  Ninth  Army,  which  took  place 
on  May  2,  was  not  a  success.  The  wind  was  favorable, 
but  the  troops  had  not  been  properly  instructed.  The 
gas  was  emitted  as  intended,  but  the  troops  imagined 
that  the  enemy  ought  not  to  be  able  to  move  at  all. 
As  the  latter  were  still  firing  in  places  and  our  own 
artillery  did  not  co-operate  as  it  should  have  done,  the 
infantry  did  not  attack.  It  assumed  that  the  gas  had 
had  no  effect.  The  Ninth  Army  was  unlucky  with  gas. 
When  it  repeated  the  gas  attack  at  the  same  place 
later,  but  not  in  connection  with  these  operations,  the 
wind  veered  round.  We  suffered  severe  losses  by  gas- 
sing. The  troops  were  not  fond  of  gas;  the  installa- 
tion took  too  long  and  both  officers  and  men  disliked 
waiting  with  full  gas-containers  in  the  trenches  for  the 
wind. 

The  attack  by  the  Tenth  Army  at  Suwalki  was  a 
tactical  success. 

I  do  not  know  whether  these  attacks  really  helped 
the  operations  as  a  whole,  but  tactically  they  were  cor- 
rect and  on  that  groimd  they  seemed  to  be  justified. 


i68  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

More  effective  support  of  General  von  Mackensen's 
operations  would  be  forthcoming  when  we  ourselves 
were  able  to  initiate  an  extensive  movement  against 
the  enemy.  This  was  impossible  on  the  fronts  occupied 
by  the  Ninth  Army.  Von  Gallwitz's  Army  Detachment, 
and  the  Eighth  and  Tenth  Armies,  and  was  practicable 
only  north  of  the  Niemen  in  Lithuania  and  Courland. 
At  the  end  of  March  and  beginning  of  April  we  had 
received  from  the  Western  front  the  3d  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion and  the  Bavarian  Cavalry  Division,  and  these  had 
been  sent  to  Gumbinnen,  as  the  left  wing  of  the  Tenth 
Army  was  still  very  weak.  These  two  divisions  and 
the  6th  Cavalry  Division,  which  was  already  stationed 
north  of  the  Pregel,  were  to  advance  into  Lithuania 
and  Courland  at  the  end  of  April,  supported  by  the  6th, 
36th,  and  78th  Reserve  Divisions.  The  cavalry  divi- 
sions had  been  very  carefully  equipped  for  these  opera- 
tions. General  von  Lauenstein  was  placed  in  command 
here. 

On  April  27  our  march  into  Lithuania  and  Courland 
began. 

General  von  Lauenstein  initiated  the  movement 
planned  by  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  by 
marching  in  three  columns  on  Shavli: 

With  the  right  column — Bavarian  and  3d  Cavalry 
Division  and  36th  Reserve  Division — through  Jurborg, 

With  the  center  column — 78th  Reserve  Division — 
to  the  great  Tauroggen  road. 

With  the  left  column — 6th  Cavalry  Division  and  6th 
Reserve  Division — ^from  the  neighborhood  of  Memel. 

On  the  evening  of  the  27th  the  3d  Cavalry  Division 
already  stood  southeast  of  the  Tatu-oggen-ELielmy  road 
not  far  from  Skaudvily,  while  the  Bavarian  Cavalry 
Division  had  got  to  Rossieny.  The  6th  Cavalry  Divi- 
sion had  some  hard  fighting  east  of  the  frontier  and  had 
not  made  much  progress  by  the  27  th. 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     169 

The  enemy,  whose  raain  force  had  remained  north- 
east of  Tauroggen  since  the  end  of  March,  withdrew 
to  Kielmy  and  escaped,  as  the  3d  Cavah-y  Division 
did  not  attack.  On  April  28  the  Bavarian  and  the  3d 
Cavalry  Division  were  near  Kielmy  and  to  the  east 
the  6th  was  near  Womy.  In  two  days  seventy-five 
kilometers  had  been  covered.  On  the  29th  the  cavalry 
divisions  were  approaching  Shavli  and  Kurschani.  On 
the  30th  Shavli,  which  the  Russians  had  set  on  fire, 
was  occupied.  The  6th  and  3d  Cavalry  Divisions  con- 
tinued the  movement  in  the  direction  of  Mitau,  at 
which  the  6th  arrived  on  May  3.  Here  they  could 
no  longer  break  the  enemy's  defense  and  for  the  time 
they  remained  southwest  of  Mitau.  Later  on  they 
withdrew  behind  the  Windau,  along  the  Mitau-Mos- 
cheiki  Railway.  The  3d  Cavalry  Division  halted  shortly 
after  this  and  the  Bavarian  Cavalry  Division  came  up 
with  them.  The  two  divisions  then  moved  south- 
east from  Shavli  via  Beissagola  on  Keidany.  Here, 
however,  the  enemy's  defense  was  stronger.  They, 
therefore,  yielded  slowly  before  his  pressure  and  re- 
tired behind  the  Dubissa  in  the  direction  of  Kielmy. 

The  infantry  divisions  had  also  carried  out  some 
extraordinary  forced  marches.  The  36th  Reserve  Divi- 
sion was  pushed  forward  to  the  lower  Dubissa  to  act 
as  cover  against  attacks  from  Kovno,  while  the  78th 
and  6th  Reserve  Divisions  had  united  near  Shavli. 

The  object  of  this  daring  enterprise  had  been  at- 
tained.   The  Russians  were  visibly  being  reinforced. 

There  now  followed  on  an  extended  front  on  the 
Dubissa,  from  the  mouth  of  the  river  up  to  Kielmy, 
round  Shavli  and  to  the  northwest,  a  series  of  critical 
engagements  which  dragged  on  through  May  and  June 
and  proved  most  exhausting  for  both  leaders  and  men. 
On  our  side  they  were  carried  out,  both  defensively 
and   offensively,    with   a  great   numerical  inferiority, 


lyo  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

and  in  order  to  hold  what  we  had  gained  and  pin  down 
the  enemy  further,  we  were  obHged  to  bring  up  the 
8th  Cavalry  Division  of  the  Ninth  Army,  the  ist 
Reserve  Division  and  2d  Cavalry  Division  from  Von 
Gallwitz's  Army  Detachment,  and  the  weak  Beckmann 
Division  of  the  Tenth  Army  to  the  north  of  Niemen. 
The  forces  were  thus  increased  to  such  an  extent  that 
it  became  necessary  to  combine  them  under  one  army 
command  with  its  numerous  administrative  services; 
corps  commanders  no  longer  sufficed.  Gen.  Otto 
von  Below  was  appointed  to  this  command  and  the 
army  was  given  the  name  of  the  "Niemen"  Army. 
General  von  Scholtz  was  given  the  command  of  the 
Eighth  Army  in  his  place. 

We  held  the  Dubissa  line  by  hard  fighting.  Shavli 
could  not  be  held  permanently  and  it  was  possible  to 
bring  back  only  a  part  of  the  plentiful  leather  supplies 
which  were  of  such  great  importance  to  us. 

As  early  as  May  we  had  to  abandon  the  town  to 
the  enemy,  and  remained  due  south  of  it.  Our  cavalry 
stood  on  the  banks  of  the  Windau  from  Kurschani 
downward  as  far  as  Hasenpoth;  every  now  and  then 
their  line  was  broken  by  the  enemy,  but  in  spite  of 
that  they  held  the  line  of  the  river. 

On  the  evening  of  May  7  the  3d  Cavalry  Brigade 
took  Libau.  We  were  well  aware  that  the  Russian 
forces  there  were  of  very  little  value,  but  we  did  not 
know  of  the  condition  of  the  fortifications.  Libau 
had  been  abandoned  as  a  military  port  before  the  war. 
The  extensive  military  harbor  works  were  evidence  of 
the  ambition  of  imperial  Russia,  bent  as  she  was  on 
extending  her  power.  The  town  contained  some  im- 
portant industrial  establishments,  including  one  of 
the  largest  barbed-wire  factories  in  Russia.  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Hoffmann  suggested  that  a  surprise  attack 
should  be  made  and  I  agreed  to  this.    Our  troops  were 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     171 

not  very  numerous.  The  3d  Cavalry  Brigade  under 
Colonel  von  der  Schulenberg,  two  or  three  battalions 
and  a  few  batteries  belonging  to  the  reserve  divisions 
already  on  the  spot,  were  to  approach  the  town  from 
the  easu,  while  a  Landsturm  battalion  approached  it 
from  the  south  along  the  coast  and  torpedo-boats 
attacked  from  the  sea.  The  fortress  was  not  seriously 
defended.  The  fortifications  were  blown  up  by  the 
garrison,  and  the  coast  guns  turned  out  to  be  dummies. 
The  weak  garrison  of  1,500  men  surrendered  when  our 
troops  forced  their  way  in  from  the  south  and  east. 
The  taking  of  Libau  was  not  a  martial  achievement 
worthy  of  a  permanent  place  in  history,  but  it  was  a 
happy  little  enterprise  which  all  who  took  part  in  it 
recall  with  pleasure.  Its  most  valuable  feature  was 
that  it  was  carried  out  without  any  loss.  It  was  always 
my  endeavor  to  achieve  success  at  the  least  possible 
cost.  Troops  may  take  pride  in  bearing  heavy  losses 
and  succeeding  in  spite  of  them.  The  commander 
must  have  a  different  point  of  view. 

Ill 

In  the  early  hours  of  May  2  General  von  Macken- 
sen,  in  a  well-prepared  attack  brilliantly  carried  out 
by  the  troops,  broke  through  the  Russian  front  on  the 
middle  Dunajec.  During  the  next  few  days  the  second 
and  third  Russian  lines  were  taken.  After  this  the 
Russians  withdrew  from  Hungary  northward  over  the 
ridge  of  the  Carpathians.  Hungary  was  freed  from 
the  enemy  and  the  Austrian  Army  greatly  relieved. 

It  was  high  time,  for  at  this  time  Italy  entered  the 
war. 

Her  army  numbered  over  600,000  men  besides  the 
numerous  formations  in  second  line  which  were  not 
intended  to  take  part  in   the  fighting  immediately. 


172  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

This  was  an  enormous  accession  of  strength  to  the 
Entente.  By  September  the  total  strength  of  the 
ItaHan  front-Hne  troops  had  already  increased  to 
900,000  men. 

General  von  Mackensen  pressed  forward  unceasingly 
in  the  direction  of  Jaroslav  on  the  San  and  stormed  the 
bridge-head  on  May  15.  The  neighboring  Austrian 
armies  linked  up  on  either  side  of  the  advancing  German 
troops  and  the  German  Southern  Army  also  attacked 
and  gained  ground  to  the  north  beyond  Stryj.  At  the 
beginning  of  June  Przemysl  was  again  wrested  from  the 
Russians. 

North  of  the  upper  Vistula  the  Russians  abandoned 
the  Nida  and  withdrew  toward  the  Vistula.  General 
von  Woyrsch  was  able,  in  mid-May,  to  advance  as  far 
as  Kielce  while  keeping  his  left  wing  in  position. 

The  Russian  armies  between  the  Carpathians  and  the 
PiHca  had  thus  been  obliged  to  abandon  their  positions 
and  lost  heavily  in  so  doing.  But,  speaking  generally, 
the  allies  were  able  to  follow  up  with  only  frontal 
attacks,  although  they  made  desperate  endeavors  to 
effect  local  encircling  movements,  and  more  particu- 
larly to  fall  on  the  western  flank  of  the  Russian  Car- 
pathian Army.  An  attempt  at  an  enveloping  move- 
ment made  by  the  right  wing  of  the  Austrian  Army 
in  the  Bukovina  was  frustrated;  it  was  not  strong 
enough,  and  ended  in  a  withdrawal  before  enemy 
pressure. 

The  difficulty  of  keeping  up  communications  with 
the  rear  stopped  the  advance  on  the  San  for  a  time. 
These  difficulties  were  overcome  early  in  June,  and  the 
attack  was  resumed.  The  heaviest  fighting  always  fell 
to  the  German  troops.  On  June  22  Lemberg  was  re- 
covered, and  soon  afterward  Rava  Ruska  was  stormed 
and  the  Russians  were  forced  to  retreat  still  farther 
toward  the  Bug.     They  were  simultaneously  continu- 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     173 

ing  their  retreat  down  the  Vistula  in  the  direction  of 
LubUn-I  vangorod . 

At  Lotzen  we  had,  of  course,  watched  the  progress 
of  events  in  GaHcia  with  the  greatest  anxiety,  and 
never  ceased  to  make  plans,  aiming  at  more  active 
support  of  the  operations  against  Russia.  At  the 
moment  our  forces  were  seriously  reduced.  But  the 
Russian  forces  on  our  front,  especially  in  front  of  the 
Ninth  Army,  had  weakened.  The  enemy  had  also 
withdrawn  troops  for  GaUcia  from  the  southern  frontier 
of  West  and  East  Prussia.  They  had  moved  troops 
from  the  front  facing  the  Tenth  Army  to  Lithuania, 
when  we  invaded  that  province.  The  enemy  front, 
therefore,  was  thinner  all  along  our  line.  We  had  also 
withdrawn  a  good  many  troops  by  degrees  and  sur- 
rendered them  for  the  operations  in  the  southeast. 

We  should  be  able  to  do  so  more  as  time  went  on, 
but  with  such  an  enormously  long  front  there  had  to 
be  a  limit  to  the  process.  Our  positions  had,  at  any 
rate,  to  be  manned  sufficiently  to  permit  of  the  reUef 
of  each  individual  soldier.  It  was  not  until  June, 
when  General  Headquarters  assigned  some  newly 
formed  Landsturm  regiments  to  us,  that  we  were  able 
to  think  of  preparing  divisions  for  our  own  offensive 
operations. 

The  withdrawal  of  the  Russian  front  in  Galicia, 
however  painful  it  was  for  them,  did  not  result  in  any 
decisive  military  victory.  They  withdrew,  fighting  all 
the  way,  just  as  far  as  we  could  venture  to  advance, 
having  regard  for  our  communications.  They  were 
not  yet  fighting  on  their  own  soil,  and  until  that 
stage  had  been  reached  they  could  afford  to  abandon 
large  areas.  Moreover,  in  these  frontal  engagements 
our  losses  were  not  inconsiderable.  It  remained  to  be 
seen  whether  other  plans  would  not  hold  out  better 
prospects.     We  could  add  nine  or  ten  divisions  to  Von 


174  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

Gallwitz's  Detachment,  which  had  now  developed  into 
the  Twelfth  Army,  for  a  concentrated  offensive  in  the 
direction  of  the  lower  Narew,  but  we  had  no  great 
hopes  of  this.  It  was  to  be  assumed  with  certainty  that 
Russians,  at  the  best,  would  offer  resistance,  and  then 
withdraw  as  they  had  done  in  Galicia. 

In  theory  the  operations  which  we  had  contemplated 
after  the  winter  campaign  seemed  more  promising;  that 
is,  to  press  forward  along  the  Osowiec-Grodno  line, 
and  perhaps  also  past  Lomza.  Such  a  movement  might 
have  had  decisive  results.  It  was  by  far  the  shortest 
way  to  the  rear  of  the  Russian  forces  which  were 
retreating  from  East  Galicia  between  the  Vistula  and 
the  Bug.  We  reconnoitered  the  swamps  on  either  side 
of  Osowiec  in  the  hope  of  finding  some  way  across, 
but,  as  we  had  foreseen,  the  results  were  unsatisfactory. 
The  condition  of  the  ground  put  all  thought  of  crossing 
there  out  of  the  question.  We  had  to  reckon  on  strong 
resistance  on  the  Osowiec-Grodno  line,  a  very  strong 
tactical  position  in  itself  and  presumably  strongly  held. 
We  could  not  expect  to  overcome  this  resistance  and  the 
other  difficulties  which  lay  before  us.  It  was  with  the 
deepest  regret  that  I  felt  myself  unable  to  agree  to  such 
an  offensive,  even  at  the  suggestion  of  General  Head- 
quarters. 

Every  operation  farther  to  the  north  increased  the 
distance  from  the  decisive  point  southeast  of  Grodno. 
This  disadvantage  would  have  to  be  counteracted  by 
speed,  especially  if  the  rate  of  the  enemy  retreat  was 
accelerated.  In  that  case  the  enemy  flank  was  more 
and  more  likely  to  be  found  in  the  direction  of  Vilna- 
Minsk.  A  big  German  advance  between  Grodno- 
Kovno  would  not  be  sufficiently  effective  in  itself.  We 
should  find  ourselves  in  a  cul-de-sac.  It  seemed  more 
advisable,  in  the  first  instance,  to  take  Kovno  by  a 
direct  attack  of  the  Tenth  Army  from  the  west,  and  a 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     175 

simultaneous  enveloping  movement  by  the  Niemen 
Army  from  the  north.  Once  this  fortress  had  fallen, 
the  comer -stone  of  the  Russian  defense  on  the  Niemen, 
the  road  to  Vilna  and  to  the  rear  of  the  Russian  forces 
would  be  open.  They  would  then  have  to  retreat  with 
all  possible  speed.  If  the  Niemen  Army  and  the 
Tenth  Army  could  receive  even  small  reinforcements 
at  the  right  moment  and  be  supplied  with  sufficient 
transportation,  it  was  to  be  hoped  that  they  could  fall  on 
the  northern  flank  of  the  retreating  host,  via  Vilna,  with 
such  force  that  the  summer  campaign  of  191 5  would 
end  in  a  decisive  defeat  of  the  Russian  armies.  The 
harder  we  pressed  our  advance  from  East  Galicia  into 
the  area  east  of  the  Bug  the  more  likely  were  we  to 
achieve  this  success. 

In  pursuance  of  this  idea  the  Niemen  Army  was  re- 
inforced by  the  41st  Infantry  Division,  76th  Reserve 
Division,  and  the  4th  Cavalry  Division  of  the  Eighth 
Army. 

The  attack  on  Kovno  was  facilitated  by  the  fact 
that,  in  mid-May,  after  a  Russian  advance  on  Schaki 
from  the  woods  to  the  west  of  Kovno  had  been  repulsed, 
our  line  in  these  woods  had  been  so  far  advanced  that 
it  was  possible  to  bring  our  heaviest  artillery  into 
position.  The  Russian  advance  took  us  by  surprise, 
and  made  considerable  progress  at  first  toward  the 
frontier.  It  was  impossible  to  tell  whether  it  was  the 
forerunner  of  a  heavier  move  against  the  weak  north 
wing  of  the  Tenth  Army.  The  Headquarters  Staff  of 
this  army  quickly  concentrated  near  Wilkowischki 
several  divisions  under  General  Beckmann,  who  very 
soon  drove  back  the  enemy.  We  experienced  a  certain 
amount  of  relief  when  the  situation  became  easier  at 
that  point.  General  Beckmann  subsequently  crossed 
the  Niemen,  where  he  was  placed  in  command  of  the 
army  of  that  name. 


176  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

The  preparations  for  the  operations  against  Kovno 
were  just  about  to  be  begun  when  His  Majesty  com- 
manded the  Field-Marshal  and  me  to  go  to  Posen 
for  July  I .  Here,  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff,  and  after  having  heard  the  Field- 
Marshal's  proposals,  the  Kaiser  decided  that  the  Polish 
offensive  should  be  continued,  and,  in  particular,  that 
the  Twelfth  Army  should  break  through  the  enemy 
line  facing  it,  and  push  on  to  the  Narew,  while  the 
Ninth  Army  and  General  von  Woyrsch  should  ad- 
vance toward  the  Vistula.  The  allied  armies  were 
also  to  continue  the  advance  between  the  Bug  and 
the  Vistula. 

Our  General  Staff  believed  that  in  these  operations 
part  of  the  Russian  forces  still  in  the  bend  of  the  Vistula 
could  be  annihilated.  I  had  to  keep  my  views  to  myself 
and  hope  that  the  movement  I  wanted  made  would 
be  carried  out  when  General  von  Gallwitz  had  reached 
the  Narew  and  found  that  he  also  could  make  progress 
only  by  means  of  frontal  attacks.  I  thought  that  even 
then  there  would  still  be  time  to  put  it  into  execution. 
The  advance  of  our  line  in  Lithuania  and  Courland 
by  the  troops  already  there  might  serve  as  a  favorable 
introduction  to  the  operation.  But  we  had  to  abandon 
any  idea  of  getting  the  reinforcements  hitherto  ear- 
marked for  Courland,  and  taking  Kovno. 

IV 

In  accordance  with  the  instructions  from  General 
Headquarters,  preparations  for  the  crossing  of  the 
Narew  were  now  begun  on  an  extensive  scale.  Not 
only  the  Twelfth  Army,  but  the  right  wing  of  the 
Eighth  Army  also  were  got  into  position,  so  that  the 
Twelfth  Army  should  advance  between  the  Vistula 
and  the  Schkwa  with  Pultusk-Roshan  as  their  objective, 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     177 

and  the  Eighth  Army  should  reach  the  river  between 
the  Schkwa  and  the  mouth  of  the  Pissa. 

General  von  Gallwitz  decided  to  make  his  opening 
move  on  either  side  of  Prasnysz.  For  this  attack  he 
had  at  his  disposal:  ist  Army  Corps,  with  the  2d  and 
37th  Infantry  Divisions;  13th  Army  Corps,  with  the 
3d  and  26th  Infantry  Divisions  and  4th  Guard  Divi- 
sion; 17th  Army  Corps,  with  the  35th  and  36th  In- 
fantry Divisions  and  the  ist  Guard  Reserve  Di\4sion; 
nth  Army  Corps,  with  the  38th  Infantry  Division 
and  Von  Wernitz's  Division ;  1 7th  Reserve  Corps,  with 
Von  Breugel's  Dixdsion,  the  14th  Landwehr  Division, 
and  Dickhuth's  Corps. 

General  von  Scholtz  attacked  with  the  75th  Reserve 
Division  and  the  loth  Landwehr  Division. 

In  preparation  for  the  attack  we  had  concentrated, 
especially  in  the  area  of  the  Twelfth  Army,  what  was 
then  for  the  Eastern  front  a  very  large  amount  of 
heavy  artillery. 

Both  armies  began  the  attack  on  July  13.  Thanks 
to  the  careful  organization  by  the  Army  Headquarters 
Staff  and  the  excellent  spirit  of  the  troops,  it  was 
entirely  successful. 

General  von  Gallwitz 's  divisions  gained  ground,  got 
right  into  the  enemy's  system  of  defenses,  and  con- 
tinued to  press  forward.  On  the  15th,  after  heavy- 
fighting,  a  strong  rear-guard  position  was  stormed,  and 
by  the  17th  the  Narew  had  been  reached,  while  the 
right  wing  had  arrived  northwest  of  Novo  Georgievsk. 
The  Field-Marshal  and  I  were  present  with  the  Twelfth 
Army  at  the  battle  on  the  13  th  and  14th ;  we  were  most 
favorably  impressed  by  both  leaders  and  troops. 
The  Twelfth  Army,  like  the  Eleventh  Army  in  West 
Galicia,  had  gained  a  great  deal  of  ground  in  the  first 
attack. 

On  the  Narew,  as  had  been  the  case  on  the  San,  a 


178  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

pause  in  the  operations  now  ensued.  Pultusk  and 
Roshan  were  stormed  on  July  23.  Ostrolenka  was 
taken  on  August  4,  and  thus  the  crossing  of  the  Narew 
on  a  wide  front  was  made.  Other  forces  moved 
against  Sieroc  and  Segershe,  so  that  as  soon  as  these 
works  were  taken  Novo  Georgievsk  could  be  cut  off 
from  the  northeast. 

The  Eighth  Army,  in  line  with  the  Twelfth,  had 
reached  the  Narew  between  the  Schkwa  and  the  Pissa, 
but  had  managed  to  place  only  a  weak  force  on  the 
southern  bank  of  the  river  near  the  confluence  of  the 
Schkwa. 

The  Russians  offered  stubborn  resistance  everywhere 
and  suffered  very  heavy  losses. 

The  Ninth  Army  and  General  von  Woyrsch's  de- 
tachment had  also  gone  forward  in  the  Polish  bend  of 
the  Vistula.  Von  Woyrsch's  detachment  had  beaten  the 
Russians  on  the  Ilshanka  and  near  Radom,  occupied 
Radom  on  July  19,  and  forced  the  Russians  to  retreat 
behind  the  Vistula.  As  a  consequence  of  this,  on 
July  21  the  Russians  north  of  the  Pilica  also  retreated 
behind  the  Vistula  and  the  outer  defenses  of  Warsaw. 
The  Ninth  Army,  which  was  still  weak,  now  advanced 
to  attack  this  position.  Its  further  mission  was  to  cut 
off  Novo  Georgievsk  from  the  south. 

Between  the  upper  Bug  and  the  Vistula  the  allied 
armies  gained  further  ground  to  the  north  in  successive 
frontal  attacks. 

Far  from  the  great  battle-field  in  Poland,  the  Niemen 
Army  had  also  started  an  offensive  in  the  middle  of 
July,  and  made  great  progress  eastward. 

I  was  now  quite  convinced  that  the  time  had  come 
to  initiate  the  movement  I  had  recommended,  a  move- 
ment on  the  lower  Niemen  against  Kovno,  followed 
by  an  attack  in  full  force  in  the  rear  of  the  Rus- 
sian armies.     The  troops  could  be  taken  from  Von 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     179 

Woyrsch's  detachment  and  the  Ninth,  Twelfth,  and 
Eighth  Armies.  We  had  delays  quite  long  enough 
already.  The  taking  of  Kovno  would  take  time,  and 
the  Russian  retreat  in  Galicia  was  already  far  ad- 
vanced. But  it  seemed  still  possible  to  achieve  great 
things,  at  any  rate  something  bigger  than  could  be 
effected  by  the  operations  then  in  progress.  These 
could  end  in  nothing  more  than  a  pure  frontal  west- 
east  retirement  of  the  enemy. 

General  Headquarters  stuck  to  its  point  of  view, 
and  still  preferred  the  movement  over  the  Vistula 
and  Narew.  We  were  not  allowed  to  weaken  the 
armies  engaged  in  that  operation  for  the  benefit  of  the 
Tenth  and  Niemen  Armies.  A  new  division  from  the 
West  was  assigned  to  both  the  Twelfth  and  the  Eighth 
Armies  by  General  Headquarters.  Whether  our  Gen- 
eral Staff,  for  reasons  connected  with  the  general 
military  situation,  no  longer  wished  to  embark  upon 
such  an  extensive  and  far-reaching  plan  as  that  we  had 
suggested,  it  is  impossible  for  me  to  say. 

The  Ninth,  Twelfth,  and  Eighth  Armies  continued 
to  advance  on  the  same  lines  as  before  and  in  the 
strength  settled  upon  by  General  Headquarters.  Prep- 
arations for  the  attack  of  Novo  Georgievsk  were  begun. 
At  the  same  time  we  decided  to  take  Kovno  and  the 
Niemen  Army  continue  its  attacks  if  all  went  well. 


As  I  had  expected,  the  operations  of  the  allied  armies 
in  Poland  to  the  east  of  the  Vistula  meant  purely 
frontal  pressure  on  the  enemy  and  incessant  fighting. 
Repeated  efforts  to  envelop  the  Russians  ended  in 
failure.  The  Russian  armies  were  certainly  kept  on 
the  move,  but  they  escaped.  They  frequently  made 
fierce  counter-attacks  with  strong  forces,  and  again  and 


i8o  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

again  took  advantage  of  the  many  marshy  areas  in 
the  neighborhood  of  rivers  and  streams  to  rally  and 
offer  prolonged  resistance.  Owing  to  the  continuous 
movement  for  many  weeks  on  bad  roads  and,  generally 
speaking,  in  bad  weather,  the  strain  on  our  troops  was 
tremendous.  Clothing  and  boots  were  in  rags  and 
tatters.  Supply  was  difficult.  It  was  almost  impossible 
to  find  billets,  as  the  Russians  systematically  destroyed 
or  burned  stores  and  villages.  They  drove  the  cattle 
before  them  and  left  them  to  die  on  the  highroad. 
The  people  whom  they  carried  off  with  them  were 
driven  into  the  swamps  at  the  sides  of  the  road  if  they 
blocked  the  way.  Many  scenes  in  the  Russian  cam- 
paign have  been  indelibly  printed  on  my  memory. 

The  supply  and  transport  conditions  became  more 
unfavorable  from  day  to  day,  especially  with  the 
Twelfth  Army,  which  was  getting  farther  and  farther 
away  from  its  rail-head.  Communications  with  the 
rear  were  improved  for  the  Eighth  Army  after  the 
capture  of  Lomza-Osowiec.  It  was  then  possible,  but 
still  very  difficult,  to  send  supplies  from  that  side. 
What  vehicles  we  had  were  principally  employed  in 
bringing  up  ammunition.  In  attack  our  exhausted  in- 
fantry required  more  support  from  the  artillery  the 
farther  east  it  got.  As  the  distances  increased,  the 
difficulty  in  bringing  up  ammunition  increased  propor- 
tionately. Thus  the  movement  slowed  down  and  lost 
its  sting. 

After  the  conclusion  of  peace  with  Russia,  a  high 
Russian  officer  told  me  he  had  never  been  able  to 
understand  why  we  had  not  pushed  on  with  greater 
vigor,  since  if  we  had  the  Russian  Army  would  have 
gone  to  pieces.  Officers  and  men  did  everything  in 
their  power  to  bring  about  that  result,  but  when  per- 
fect discipline,  the  greatest  enthusiasm,  and  the  most 
strenuous  efforts  on  the  part  of  every  individual  can- 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     i8i 

not  stave  off  the  stage  of  exhaustion,  the  will  of  the 
commander  is  equally  powerless. 

We  built  a  branch  line  from  Willenberg  via  Chorshele 
to  Ostrolenka,  and  repaired  the  other  lines  as  quickly 
as  possible,  but  the  lines  of  communication  became 
longer  and  longer;  they  far  exceeded  the  one  hundred 
and  twenty  kilometers  which  we  had  regarded  as  the 
extreme  limit.  The  Entente  was  better  off  during  its 
big  attacks  in  the  summer  of  191 8.  It  had  numerous 
railway  connections  running  direct  from  behind  its 
front  line,  and  was  able  to  bring  up  its  enormous  supply 
of  munitions  continuously,  and  thus  support  its  infantry 
effectively.  Motor  transport  enabled  the  infantry  to 
recuperate  in  good,  well-furnished  billets,  and  return 
to  the  line  again  and  again  with  renewed  vigor. 

Operations  continued  in  accordance  with  the  plans 
of  the  General  Staff.  At  the  end  of  July  Cholm  and 
Lublin  fell  into  our  hands.  Farther  east  we  were  not 
making  much  progress,  and  thus  gave  the  Russians 
time  to  withdraw  troops  from  the  salient  we  were  mak- 
ing in  their  line,  and  send  them  south  to  form  a  new 
front. 

General  von  Woyrsch  took  the  western  bridge-head 
of  Ivangorod,  and  on  July  28  crossed  the  Vistula  to 
the  north  of  this  poiat  under  the  enemy's  nose,  and 
was  heavily  attacked.  I  thought  this  crossing  very 
hazardous.  Tactically  it  succeeded,  but  it  did  not  alter 
the  general  strategic  situation. 

The  Russians  facing  the  Ninth  Army  withdrew  from 
the  outer  defenses  of  Warsaw,  and  early  in  August 
from  Warsaw  itself. 

On  August  5  the  Ninth  Army  occupied  the  capital  of 
Poland.  This  army  was  taken  out  of  oxir  command 
and  placed  imder  the  direct  orders  of  General  Head- 
quarters. Field-Marshal  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria  was, 
at  the  same  time,  put  in  command  of  Von  Woyrsch's 


i82  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

detachment.  No  doubt  General  Headquarters  had 
its  own  good  reasons  for  thus  reorganizing  the  com- 
mands, but  it  did  not  simplify  matters  for  me,  especially 
as  the  lines  of  communication  of  the  Ninth  Army  re- 
mained under  our  control.  The  movements  of  the  Ninth 
and  Twelfth  Armies  were  very  closely  related.  General 
Headquarters  was  far  too  busy  for  me  to  venture  to 
trouble  it  with  such  details. 

The  capture  of  Warsaw  gave  us  special  satisfaction. 
We  had  fought  so  hard  for  it  in  the  autumn  of  19 14. 
In  that  campaign  were  laid  the  foundations  of  the 
present  successes,  of  which  the  occupation  of  Warsaw 
was  the  sign  and  symbol. 

During  the  following  days  Field-Marshal  Prince 
Leopold  of  Bavaria's  army  group  crossed  the  Vistula 
between  Ivangorod  and  Warsaw  on  a  wide  front.  Once 
again  General  Headquarters  attempted  to  effect  an 
enveloping  movement  by  directing  this  detachment 
straight  on  Brest-Litovsk,  while  strong  Russian  forces 
were  still  north  of  Lublin.  But  in  vain;  the  Russians 
got  away.  WTiile  Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen  was 
struggling  toward  Brest-Litovsk,  Prince  Leopold's 
group  was  advanced  to  the  Bug  below  the  fortress. 

After  the  crossing  of  the  Narew  by  the  Twelfth  Army 
at  the  end  of  July,  General  von  Gallwitz  had  cast  his 
eyes  due  south  toward  the  Bug.  As  I  had  feared  and 
General  von  Gallwitz  had  also  thought  possible,  these 
hopes  were  not  fulfilled.  Somewhere  about  the  loth, 
the  Twelfth  Army  received  instructions  to  march  east, 
with  the  right  wing  moving  up  the  Bug.  In  this  way 
it  came  into  close  touch  with  the  Eighth  Army,  which, 
after  the  fall  of  Ostrolenka  on  August  5,  had  gained 
more  ground  on  the  southern  bank  of  the  Narew,  and 
was  now  advancing  with  Lomza  as  its  objective. 

In  the  mean  time  Sieroc  and  Segershe  had  fallen, 
also  Dombe;  Novo  Georgievsk  had  been  cut  off  from 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     183 

all  sides.  The  capture  of  this  fortress  was  intrusted 
by  the  Field-Marshal  to  General  von  Beseler.  The 
troops  of  the  Ninth  and  Twelfth  Armies  investing 
Novo  Georgievsk  were  placed  under  his  command. 
He  also  received  a  considerable  number  of  the  heaviest 
Austro-Hungarian  howitzers. 

The  plans  for  the  capture  of  Novo  Georgievsk,  the 
direction  of  the  Eighth  and  Tenth  Armies,  the  attack 
on  Kovno,  and  the  situation  in  Lithuania  and  Courland 
made  further  great  demands  on  myself  and  my  staff. 
Although  we  had  not  the  same  free  hand  in  conducting 
the  operations  of  the  summer  campaign  of  191 5  as  in 
previous  campaigns,  but  followed  the  plans  laid  down 
by  instructions  of  General  Headquarters,  there  still 
remained  an  enormous  amount  of  work  for  me  to  do, 
and  the  necessity  of  forming  and  executing  a  number 
of  decisions,  both  great  and  small.  Added  to  this  there 
were  differences  of  opinion  with  General  von  Falken- 
hayn,  such  as  are  only  too  likely  to  occur  between 
men  of  independent  views,  but  which  made  it  more 
than  ever  incumbent  upon  me  to  carry  out  most  punc- 
tiliously the  plans  of  General  Headquarters,  which  were 
opposed  to  mine,  rather  than  my  own  or  those  that 
coincided  with  mine. 

VI 

The  capture  of  Novo  Georgievsk  did  not  directly 
affect  the  progress  of  the  operations.  It  was  an  in- 
dependent operation,  taking  place  in  the  rear  of  the 
armies  pushing  on  eastward.  General  von  Beseler, 
the  conqueror  of  Antwerp,  and  Colonel  von  Sauber- 
zweig,  his  extremely  energetic  Chief  of  Staff,  guaranteed 
that  there  should  be  no  question  of  a  so-called  siege 
with  all  its  attendant  complications.  A  mere  invest- 
ment of  Novo  Georgievsk  would  be  enough  to  bring 
about  its  fall.     The  garrison  of  eighty  thousand  could 


1 84  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

not  hold  out  for  long.  It  is  astonishing  that  the  Grand 
Duke  should  have  let  it  come  to  this,  whereas,  later  on, 
Brest-Litovsk  and  Grodno  were  evacuated.  He  ought 
to  have  told  himself  that  it  was  impossible  to  hold  the 
fortress,  and  that  the  condition  of  the  fortifications 
was  not  good  enough  to  withstand  heavy  high-angle 
fire. 

General  von  Beseler  decided  to  attack  the  north- 
eastern forts.  The  Mlawa-Ciechanov-Nasielsk  Railway, 
which  had  been  restored  some  time  previously,  indi- 
cated the  direction  from  this  side.  The  main  object 
was  to  make  the  distance  to  be  traveled  by  road  as 
short  as  possible  for  the  artillery  and  ammunition  sup- 
plies being  sent  up  by  rail,  so  as  to  avoid  the  waste  of 
time  involved  in  making  field  and  light  railways.  The 
strength  of  the  front  was  of  no  importance,  for  a  plenti- 
ful supply  of  heavy  shells  put  the  attack  on  equal  terms. 
The  artillery  was  brought  up  as  soon  as  the  railway 
had  been  completed  as  far  as  Nasielsk. 

On  August  9  the  investment  was  completed,  and 
soon  afterward  the  artillery  and  ammunition  supplies 
were  established  in  position.  By  the  middle  of  August 
the  batteries  were  able  to  open  fire.  Its  effect  did  not 
appear  satisfactory.  The  voices  of  those  wise  after 
the  event  were  now  raised  to  say  that  nothing  could  be 
done  with  the  curtailed-attack  method;  what  had  been 
right  in  one  case  was  wrong  in  the  other.  This  vacilla- 
tion was  soon  overcome.  Under  continuous  fire  the 
northeastern  works  were  stormed  and  taken.  Then 
followed  the  attack  along  the  whole  front  to  the  north 
of  the  Vistula.  Our  troops,  which  were  mainly  com- 
posed of  Landsturm  and  Landwehr  forces,  behaved 
extremely  well,  and  Novo  Georgievsk  fell  on  August  19. 

Soon  afterward  His  Majesty  the  Kaiser  inspected 
the  fortress  and  thanked  the  troops.  The  Field-Marshal 
and  I  were  commanded  to  be  present.    I  was  thus  able 


SUMMER   CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     185 

to  see  for  myself  the  devastating  effects  of  the  heavy- 
artillery  fire  and  the  poor  construction  of  the  works. 

The  troops  released  by  this  event  were  sent  to  the 
Tenth  Army,  with  the  concurrence  of  General  Head- 
quarters, and  this  force  thus  received  the  reinforce- 
ments it  required,  unfortunately  very  late  in  the  day. 
The  heaviest  batteries  were  to  be  sent  against  Grodno. 
Kovno  had  already  fallen. 

By  the  end  of  August  the  Russian  General  Govern- 
ment of  Poland  had  fallen  completely  into  the  hands 
of  the  allies.  As  before,  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary 
shared  the  administration.  The  frontier  on  the  west 
of  the  Vistula  was  formed  by  the  Pilica,  and  on  the 
east  it  more  or  less  followed  the  lower  Wieprz.  We 
formed  a  German  General  Government  of  Warsaw 
under  General  von  Beseler,  and  the  Austrian  estab- 
lishment, a  Military  Government  of  Lublin.  The 
partition  was  injurious  to  the  common  interest  of 
the  allies;  many  imperatively  necessary  measures  were 
wrecked  on  it. 

The  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  had  had  the 
administration  of  occupied  Poland  in  his  hands  since 
the  autumn  of  19 14.  He  now  made  way  for  General 
von  Beseler,  and  had  more  than  enough  administra- 
tive cares  in  the  northeast  instead. 

Novo  Georgievsk  will  possibly  prove  the  last  ring 
fortress  to  be  taken  after  investment.  Not  that  I 
believe  in  disarmament.  The  world  will  very  soon 
learn  its  lesson  in  regard  to  that  delusion.  However 
much  it  may  be  regretted,  mankind  will  never  come 
to  that.  But  the  day  of  the  ring  fortress  is  past.  It 
cannot  stand  against  modem  artillery  and  its  scale  of 
munitionment,  and  must  give  place  to  something  else. 
Land  fortifications  will  soon  be  necessary,  but  they 
will  assume  the  character  of  long  fortified  lines  on  the 
frontier. 


i86  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

VII 

When,  on  August  lo,  the  Twelfth  Army  received  in- 
structions to  march  with  the  right  wing  up  the  Bug, 
on  the  west,  it  was  in  the  rear  of  the  Eighth  Army, 
which  was  advancing  on  either  side  of  the  Narew  against 
Lomza.  I  endeavored  to  maintain  this  echelon  as  the 
advance  progressed,  in  order  to  make  use  of  the  possi- 
bilities of  mutual  co-operation  on  the  flanks.  But  by 
degrees  the  two  armies  came  up  level  with  their  inner 
wings  on  the  Ostrolenka-Lapy  Railway.  South  of  the 
Bug  Field-Marshal  Prince  Leopold's  army  group  had 
moved  forward  to  correspond. 

The  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  had  to  see  to 
the  tactical  details  for  the  advance,  which  were  unim- 
portant, having  regard  to  the  campaign  as  a  whole. 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Hoffmann  and  I  had  frequent  inter- 
course with  the  armies.  The  two  chiefs  of  staff.  Colonel 
Marquard  and  Major  Count  Schwerin,  were  excellent 
soldiers,  who  gave  effective  support  to  their  Com- 
mander-in-chief. 

On  August  9  Lomza  was  taken  from  the  southwest. 
For  some  time  past  we  had  had  a  squadron  of  bombing 
aeroplanes  at  our  disposal  in  East  Prussia.  The  forts 
in  which  an  enemy  corps  or  army  staff  had  its  quarters 
were  often  bombed.  Splendid  results  had  been  reported ; 
but  when  I  was  able  to  have  the  damage  inspected  it 
was  impossible  to  verify  it.  In  the  interest  of  the  troops 
I  was  glad  of  this,  as  they  were  able  to  use  the  forts 
as  billets.  It  was  only  later  that  our  bombs  became 
effective,  when  the  airmen  took  more  interest  in  bomb- 
ing work. 

As  the  advance  progressed  it  became  evident  that 
Mackensen's  and  Prince  Leopold's  army  groups  were 
pushing  north,  and  thus  forcing  the  Twelfth  and  Eighth 
Armies  to  the  left.     On  August  i8  Field-Marshal  von 


SUMMER   CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     187 

Mackensen  had  arrived  before  Brest-Litovsk ,  Prince 
Leopold  of  Bavaria  was  approaching  the  Bialowieser 
forest,  and  the  Twelfth  Army,  Bialystok,  the  former 
seat  of  the  excellent  Prussian  administration  of  New 
East  Prussia  at  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  and  the  be- 
ginning of  the  nineteenth  centuries.  The  Eighth  Army 
pressed  forward  toward  Grodno  in  the  narrow  space 
between  Bialystok  and  the  Narew,  so  as  to  capture 
Osowiec  from  the  south.  This  fortress  was  invested  on 
August  22.  We  had  intended  taking  it  from  the  east 
and  north,  yet  we  took  it  from  the  south.    Such  is  war. 

In  the  latter  days  of  August  both  armies  continued 
the  advance  in  a  more  northeasterly  direction  beyond 
the  Bialystok-Osowiec  line,  the  Twelfth  Army  marching 
north  of  Wolkowysk,  and  the  Eighth  Army  on  Grodno. 
Both  these  armies,  therefore,  were  gradually  losing 
touch,  tactically,  with  the  two  Southern  army  groups, 
which  after  the  investment  of  Brest-Litovsk  on  August 
25-26  marched  on  toward  Pinsk  and  Baranovici.  By 
degrees  they  came  within  the  sphere  of  the  operations 
which  were  in  preparation  farther  north. 

At  the  beginning  of  September,  the  Eighth  and 
Twelfth  Armies  reached  the  region  of  Grodno,  south- 
east thereof.  In  a  fortnight's  time  or  so  they  were  to 
be  at  Lida,  north  of  the  Niemen.  About  eight  weeks 
would  then  have  elapsed  since  the  offensive  started. 
During  this  operation  the  Twelfth  Army  had  had  to 
make  a  wide  detour  to  the  south.  How  much  better 
would  it  have  been  if,  instead  of  this  movement,  an 
attack  on  the  Lomza-Grodno  line  had  been  possible! 
That  could  not  be  done.  But  an  operation  to  the  north 
of  Grodno,  combined  with  the  taking  of  Kovno,  would 
have  reached  this  point  much  more  quickly  and  easily, 
and  have  been  far  more  effective  if  it  had  been  carried 
out  in  full  strength,  even  as  late  as  the  first  fortnight 
in  August. 


1 88  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

For  a  time  it  looked  as  though  General  Headquarters 
wished  to  suspend  the  advance  in  the  East.  It 
transferred  large  portions  of  Field-Marshal  von  Mack- 
ensen's  army,  and  later  of  the  Twelfth  and  Eighth 
Armies,  too,  to  West  and  South  Hungary.  But  it 
allowed  the  operations  which  had  been  begun  after 
the  taking  of  Kovno  and  our  advance  in  Lithuania  and 
Courland  to  take  their  course. 


VIII 

The  storming  of  Kovno  was  an  intrepid  stroke.  In 
order  to  accomplish  it  troops  had  to  be  withdrawn 
from  the  center  and  right  wing  of  the  Tenth  Army, 
which  already  held  a  very  long  front.  Only  thus  were 
we  able  to  concentrate  a  comparatively  strong  force 
for  the  attack  west  of  Kovno.  The  Commander-in- 
chief  in  the  East  and  General  von  Eichhorn  made  them- 
selves responsible  for  this  strain  on  the  rest  of  their 
front.  The  general  had  often  complained  to  me  that 
the  Tenth  Army  had  remained  inactive  so  long,  and 
he  now  set  about  his  new  task  with  zest.  He  and  his 
Chief  of  Staff,  Colonel  Hell,  were  men  of  great  self- 
confidence  and  daring.  General  von  Eichhorn  was  an 
officer  of  brilliant  intellectual  qualities,  and  had  trained 
his  troops  in  an  exemplary  manner. 

The  reinforced  40th  Army  Corps,  under  General  von 
Litzmann,  was  to  carry  out  the  attack. 

The  General  was  extremely  impetuous  and  his  influ- 
ence on  the  men  was  very  great.  He  had  laid  the 
foundations  of  his  military  fame  in  the  course  of  the 
break  through  at  Brsheshiny  on  November  22-25, 1914- 
He  once  wrote  against  the  Guard  Officers'  Corps,  but 
he  recognized  on  this  occasion  what  a  power  this 
Officers*  Corps  stood  for.  I  myself  am  proud  of  having 
been  an  infantryman  of  the  line,  and  in  the  8th  Regi- 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     189 

ment  of  the  Leib-Grenadiers  I  learned  to  know  a  unit 
whose  Officers'  Corps  had  a  special  tradition  handed 
down,  as  in  the  Guards  Officers'  Corps.  Such  traditions 
are  quite  justifiable,  but  they  should  not  lead  to  favor- 
itism and  vanity;  when  that  occurs  they  arouse  re- 
sentment and  should  be  discarded. 

The  attack  on  Kovno  was  rendered  more  difficult 
by  the  lack  of  the  heaviest  howitzers.  Such  as  had 
been  supplied  by  General  Headquarters  at  the  end  of 
July  had  to  be  used  at  Novo  Georgievsk.  All  we  got 
was  a  few  additional  batteries,  which  could  be  brought 
into  position  by  light  railways  and  the  range  of  which 
was  only  short.  But  we  allowed  no  difficulties  to  deter 
us  and  we  built  the  railways.  A  broad  survey  of  the 
position  made  it  clear  that  the  attack  could  be  made 
only  between  the  Wirballen-Kovno  Railway  and  the 
Niemen.  The  right  wing  of  the  attacking  troops  was 
always  very  seriously  threatened,  and  the  menace  in- 
creased the  more  ground  we  gained.  At  any  moment  the 
Russians  might  rake  its  flank  very  effectively  with 
their  artillery.  The  left  wing  was  covered  to  the  north 
by  a  Landsturm  brigade,  which  during  the  offensive 
of  the  Niemen  Army  had  been  pushed  forward  across 
the  Dubissa  as  far  as  the  northwest  w^orks  of  Kovno. 

By  the  beginning  of  August  the  railways  were  ready. 
There  was  now  a  lack  of  ammunition  for  the  heavy 
field-howitzers.  I  gave  up  my  reserve,  for  the  Director 
of  Field  Ordnance  in  the  East,  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Rostock,  always  had  something  in  hand.  So  at  last, 
on  August  8,  after  much  trouble,  ever>'thing  was  ready 
and  the  attack  could  begin.  No  fortress  has  ever 
been  attacked  with  such  scanty  material,  but  the  troops 
entrusted  with  the  work  were  inspired  by  the  gallant 
spirit  of  their  commander. 

At  this  time,  as  I  mentioned  before,  the  Russians 
were  still  close  to  the  Vistula  opposite  Warsaw. 


I90  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

On  August  6  the  infantry  in  the  assembly  positions 
had  got  up  close,  in  order  to  obtain  better  artillery  ob- 
servation. On  the  8th  the  bombardment  began.  Dur- 
ing the  next  few  days  a  number  of  strong  positions  had 
to  be  stormed.  The  vigor  of  the  attack  appeared  to  be 
waning,  but  General  von  Litzmann  continued  to  work 
his  way  along  the  line  of  forts  until  the  15th.  Luckily 
the  Russians  proved  to  be  incapable  of  withstanding 
the  fire  of  the  heavy  artillery.  A  fresh  attack,  by  a 
company  which  had  joined  the  other  troops,  succeeded 
on  the  1 6th  in  breaking  through  the  western  line  of 
forts.  On  the  17th  General  von  Litzmann  crossed  the 
Niemen  and  took  the  town  and  the  eastern  forts.  The 
booty  was  not  so  great  as  at  the  taking  of  Novo 
Georgievsk,  for  it  was  not  a  case  of  storming  a  fortress 
which  had  been  previously  invested.  The  garrison  had 
a  way  out  in  the  rear,  and  was  in  touch  with  the  Rus- 
sian forces  on  the  Eastern  front.  I  have  never  been  able 
to  find  out  why  that  army  did  not  help  them,  or  whether 
the  speedy  fall  of  the  works  took  it  by  surprise. 

All  the  bridges,  including  the  very  important  rail- 
way bridge,  and  also  the  tunnel  on  the  east  bank,  had 
been  destroyed,  the  latter,  fortunately,  not  completely. 
It  was  soon  restored.  We  were  thus  to  a  certain 
extent  able  to  open  a  line  of  communications  east  of  the 
Niemen  in  the  direction  of  Vilna,  even  before  the  rail- 
way bridge  was  ready.  It  was  a  vital  matter  for  the 
troops  that  it  should  be  put  in  working  order  again 
if  the  operations  were  to  progress  as  we  hoped. 

The  town  of  Kovno  was  saved,  with  the  exception 
of  the  factories;  these  had  been  burned  down  and  the 
population  had  fled.  I  had  an  opportunity  of  seeing 
how  difficult  it  was  for  the  troops  to  find  billets  without 
the  co-operation  of  the  inhabitants. 

Immediately  after  the  taking  of  Kovno,  General  von 
Eichhom  sent  General  von  Litzmann  and  his  advance- 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     191 

guard  on  toward  the  Vilna  Railway,  and  himself  took  the 
troops  next  in  line  across  the  Niemen.  At  the  same 
time  he  directed  the  rest  of  the  Tenth  Army,  the 
2ist  Army  Corps,  under  General  von  Hutier,  to 
push  on  with  OUta  as  their  main  objective,  and 
lighter  forces  to  advance  through  Augustovo  forest 
toward  Grodno.  These  forces  co-operated  very  closely 
with  the  advancing  Eighth  Army,  with  which  they 
were  almost  level. 

General  von  Eichhom  intended  to  force  the  crossing 
of  the  Niemen  along  the  whole  line,  an  operation  which 
fitted  into  the  framework  of  our  plans.  It  was  en- 
tirely in  accordance  with  our  views.  If,  on  the  one 
hand,  much  remained  to  be  done,  especially  where  the 
armies  were  close  together,  on  the  other,  in  other 
directions  the  armies  did  much  by  independent  deci- 
sions to  facilitate  the  direction  of  the  whole.  Their 
sole  duty  was  to  report  in  good  time  their  view  of  the 
situation  and  what  they  wished  to  do.  The  junction 
of  two  armies  is  always  a  point  where  friction  is  in- 
evitable. On  the  Eastern  front,  especially  in  trench 
warfare,  this  was  not  so  obvious  as  it  was  subsequently 
on  the  Western  front.  The  boundary  lines  there  some- 
times developed  into  high  walls,  which  one  could  look 
only  along,  but  not  over.  One  of  the  most  important 
duties  of  the  Higher  Command  was  to  level  this  wall  and 
insure  that  the  points  of  junction  did  not  become  weak 
points  tactically. 

The  center  and  right  wing  of  the  Tenth  Army  ad- 
vanced, but  with  heavy  fighting.  Under  pressure  of 
events  at  Kovno  the  Russians  had  completely  destroyed 
the  railways  and  bridges  over  the  Niemen,  abandoned 
the  left  bank,  and  wi  thdrawn  in  the  direction  of  Orany. 
By  August  26  the  21st  Army  Corps  had  taken  Olita. 
By  the  end  of  August  the  Tenth  Army  had  crossed  the 
Niemen  and  was  slowly  advancing  toward  the  Grodno- 


192  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Vilna  Railway.  Before  it  reachedt  he  railway  it  met 
with  very  strong  resistance,  which  was  too  much  for  it 
at  first.  The  Russians  began  to  bring  up  reinforce- 
ments from  eastern  to  northern  Poland. 

The  tactical  results  of  the  advance  of  the  Tenth 
Army  across  the  Niemen  in  the  direction  of  Grodno 
were  small,  owing  to  the  vast  region  of  forest  to  the 
northeast  of  that  fortress.  But  the  Russians  had  be- 
come nervous.  They  abandoned  Grodno  with  amaz- 
ing speed  when  the  right  wing  of  the  Tenth  Army,  and 
more  particularly  the  Eighth  Army,  began  their  attack. 
On  September  i  General  von  Scholtz,  with  the  7Sth 
Reserve  Division,  took  the  southwest  forts  of  the  town, 
and  the  town  itself  was  occupied  on  the  2d,  after 
violent  street  fighting.  But  on  the  Kotra  and  its 
northern  tributary  from  Lake  Osjery,  not  far  east  of 
Grodno,  he  came  up  against  strong  enemy  resistance. 

The  siege  artillery  was  no  longer  needed  and  was 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  General  Headquarters, 

General  von  Gallwitz  reached  the  Svislosz,  fighting 
all  the  way.  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria's  army  group 
had  traversed  the  Bialowieser  forest,  which,  by  the 
way,  was  not  an  impassable  swamp,  but  well  provided 
with  roads.  Farther  south  the  troops  were  still  ad- 
vancing on  Pinsk. 

IX 

up  to  that  time  the  engagements  of  the  Niemen 
Army  during  the  months  of  July  and  August  had  been 
directly  connected  with  the  main  operations  only  in 
so  far  as  they  had  drawn  enemy  forces  in  their  direc- 
tion. There  was,  of  course,  a  tactical  co-operation  on 
the  Niemen  between  the  inner  wings  of  the  Tenth  and 
the  Niemen  Army.  With  the  attack  on  Kovno  this 
co-operation  became  closer,  and  at  the  taking  of  the 
fortress  led  to  their  fighting  on  the  same  field  of  battle; 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     193 

it  then  relaxed  again.  From  now  onward  the  connec- 
tion of  these  armies  was  to  take  a  prominent  part  in 
the  operations. 

Gen.  Otto  von  Below  was  fighting  in  a  distinct  and 
separate  area,  and  his  actions  therefore  were  more 
independent  than  those  of  the  other  commanders, 
who  were  fighting  on  narrow  sectors.  We  were  able  to 
confine  ourselves  to  giving  general  instructions  for  the 
conduct  of  the  campaign. 

Since  the  middle  of  July  the  Niemen  Army  had  held 
the  line  of  the  Dubissa  to  southwest  of  Shavli,  and 
of  the  Wenta  and  Windau  from  Hasenpot  down  to  the 
coast.  At  the  beginning  of  the  operations  General 
von  Below  was  ordered  to  make  an  enveloping  attack 
on  the  strong  enemy  forces  near  Shavli,  and,  after  se- 
curing his  left  against  attack  from  the  direction  of 
Riga,  to  push  east,  north  of  the  Niemen.  These 
operations  were  in  particularly  good  hands.  General 
von  Below,  who  had  already  been  regarded  in  peace- 
time as  an  imusually  efficient  and  self-reliant  officer, 
had  led  his  troops  with  great  prudence  and  foresight 
during  the  battle  of  Tannenberg,  and  distinguished 
himself  in  the  battle  of  the  Masurian  Lakes  by  the 
effective  disposition  of  his  forces.  Field-Marshal  von 
Hindenburg  held  his  manly  and  upright  character  in 
high  esteem,  and  in  November  suggested  to  His  Majesty 
that  he  should  tak:e  over  the  command  of  the  Eighth 
Army,  although  he  was  among  the  most  junior  generals 
in  the  service  to  hold  such  a  command.  General  von 
Below  had  fully  justified  the  confidence  placed  in 
him  by  his  Commander-in-chief.  His  Chief  of  Staff, 
General  von  Boclonann,  had  long  been  on  the  General 
Staff,  and  during  the  war  had  proved  himself  to  be  a 
good  leader  of  troops  and  to  have  the  makings  of  a  good 
chief  of  staff.  The  two  men  worked  together  in  com- 
plete harmony.     At  headquarters  at  Lotzen  we  could 


194  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

feel  confident  that,  with  the  forces  at  its  disposal, 
it  would  exploit  to  the  full  the  possibilities  of  the 
operations  north  of  the  Niemen. 

The  communications  of  the  Niemen  Army  were  a 
difficult  problem.  The  standard-gage  railway  ceased 
at  Laugzargen,  northeast  of  Tilsit,  and  Memel.  The 
Niemen,  although  navigable,  could  be  used  only  to 
bring  up  troops  and  supplies  for  the  right  wing  of  the 
army,  and  the  traffic  control  was  so  poor  that  it  could 
not  be  relied  upon.  An  attempt  to  tow  the  troops,  so 
urgently  required  to  reinforce  the  right  wing,  in  barges 
up  the  river  proved  a  failure.  The  string  of  barges 
ran  aground  on  sand-banks  on  the  Russian  side  of 
the  river. 

Libau  could  be  used  only  with  the  greatest  caution 
as  a  base  of  supplies.  At  that  time  the  Russian  fleet 
and  English  submarines  dominated  the  eastern  part 
of  the  Baltic.  Nevertheless,  with  the  material  we  had 
found  there,  we  managed  to  maintain  an  inadequate 
service  on  the  railway  running  east  from  Libau.  We 
very  soon  began  to  build  a  light  railway  between 
Laugzargen-Tauroggen-Kielmy,  but  it  made  slow 
progress,  owing  to  the  shortage  of  labor.  When  our 
plans  for  a  large  operation  began  to  mature  we  had 
to  develop  a  more  complete  network  of  railways. 
The  shortest  connection  with  the  Russian  railways 
ran  from  Memel  to  Prekuln,  east  of  Libau.  The  con- 
struction of  this  stretch  of  line  was  begun,  but  had  to  be 
stopped  again  when  the  High  Command  had  to  give 
up  labor  companies  for  the  building  of  the  Willenberg- 
Ostrolenka  Railway.  By  the  beginning  of  July  the 
railway  to  Prekuln  was  completed ;  it  was  of  inestimable 
value,  although  its  working  still  left  much  to  be  de- 
sired. The  Libau-Moscheiki  Railway  was  now  patched 
up.  Subsequently  we  also  established  a  connection  via 
Koshedary,  east  of  Kovno,  with  the  network  of  rail- 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     195 

ways  in  Lithuania.  At  last  we  began  the  construction 
of  the  Tauroggen  -  Radzivihshki  main  line  (southeast 
of  Shavli).  The  wooden  bridge  over  the  Dubissa  is 
said  to  have  been  a  work  ot  art. 

About  the  middle  of  July,  after  the  arrival  of  the 
reinforcements  which  had  been  despatched  in  Jime,  the 
grouping  of  the  Niemen  Army  was  completed.  Army 
Headquarters  was  bitterly  disappointed  because,  ow- 
ing to  the  attack  on  the  Narew,  it  did  not  receive 
the  quota  of  troops  it  had  hoped  for.  It  adhered 
to  its  original  plan  of  operation  notwithstanding. 
The  line  of  the  Dubissa  as  far  as  Kielmy  was 
not  very  strongly  held.  The  ist  Reserve  Corps  was 
concentrated  for  attack  between  Kielmy  and  Shavli. 
The  line  of  the  Windau  was  also  lightly  held  to  the 
point  where  it  joined  a  strong  sector  north  of  the 
Libau  Railway.  Here  there  were  two  or  three  infantry 
and  as  many  cavalry  divisions. 

On  July  14,  when,  in  North  Poland,  Prasnysz  had 
just  fallen,  and  farther  south  the  Russians  were  still 
west  of  the  Vistula  and  south  of  Lublin-Cholm,  General 
von  Below  crossed  the  Windau  with  the  intention  of 
enveloping  the  strong  Russian  forces  near  Shavli  by 
an  advance  from  the  north  in  the  direction  of  Mitau, 
and  pressing  forward  from  the  southeast  with  the 
ist  Reserve  Corps.  The  weak  center  was  to  hold 
its  ground.  The  right  wing  of  the  army  on  the  Dubissa 
was  to  stand  by  for  the  time  being,  and  to  join  in  the 
operations  only  after  some  progress  had  been  made. 

Apparently  the  Russians  had  not  expected  an  attack, 
nor  had  they  discovered  this  extension  of  the  line  to 
the  north.  In  the  direction  of  0km j any  they  attacked 
the  6th  Reserve  Division,  advancing  in  the  center, 
and  forced  it  to  withdraw  to  the  west.  But  their 
right  flank  was  threatened  to  such  an  extent  that  they 
were  unable  to  follow  up  this  success. 


196  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

By  the  17  th  the  infantry  divisions  on  the  left  wing 
had  beaten  the  Russians  at  Autz,  but,  owing  to  what 
had  occurred  to  the  6th  Reserve  Division,  they  had  to 
be  brought  back  south.  In  consequence  of  this  the 
enveloping  movement  was  not  effective.  In  the  course 
of  continuous  fighting,  which  lasted  until  July  23,  these 
operations,  which  became  known  as  the  "Battle  of 
Shavli,"  ended  with  the  retreat  of  the  Fifth  Russian 
Army  beyond  Shavli  toward  Ponieviesh.  Portions  of 
it  got  away,  as  the  German  cavalry  in  their  rear  was 
short  of  artillery.  Ponieviesh  was  occupied  by  us  on 
July  29.  On  the  left  wing  the  cavalry  reached  out  to  the 
Bay  of  Riga  and  joined  up  with  the  infantry  advancing 
on  Mitau,  which  was  taken  on  August  i.  Farther 
south  the  Dubissa  was  crossed,  and  by  July  29  the 
Kovno-Ponieviesh  line  had  been  occupied. 

Communication  had  now  to  be  established  once  more 
and  the  troops  supplied  with  ammunition.  Supply 
columns  had  been  sent  in  great  numbers  to  the  Twelfth 
and  Eighth  Armies,  and  the  Niemen  Army  was  corre- 
spondingly short.  Their  further  advance  now  began 
to  slow  down.  On  the  day  on  which  Kovno  was  taken 
the  troops  were  on  the  banks  of  the  Svienta  and  the 
Shara.  Here  there  was  a  long  halt,  while  the  left 
wing  pushed  forward  toward  the  Dvina.  To  the  south 
of  Riga  the  Russians  were  holding  an  important  bridge- 
head, which  was  to  be  a  thorn  in  our  flesh  for  a  long 
time  to  come.  On  the  other  hand,  early  in  September 
the  Dvina  was  reached  between  Uxkiill  and  Friedrich- 
stadt,  and  the  enemy  thrown  back  to  the  opposite 
bank. 

Meanwhile  the  Russians  had  been  reinforced.  The 
weak  forces  of  the  Niemen  Army  were  distributed  over 
a  very  wide  area,  so  that,  for  the  time  being,  they  were 
unable  to  advance  farther  without  reinforcement. 
They  were  in  touch  with  the  left  wing  of  the  Tenth 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA    197 

Army,  as  the  latter,  after  the  taking  of  Kovno,  again 
encountered  strong  enemy  forces  half-way  to  Vilna. 

An  attempt  by  the  fleet  in  the  Bay  of  Riga,  on 
August  8,  had  no  influence  on  the  operations  on  land. 

The  rapid  advance  of  the  Niemen  Army  showed  that 
still  more  could  be  done  if  the  forces  had  been  stronger 
and  better  equipped,  especially  in  regard  to  supply 
columns. 


In  the  second  half  of  August  the  idea  of  continuing 
operations  east  of  the  Niemen  had  assumed  more  defi- 
nite shape.  The  attack  on  the  flank  of  the  retreating 
army  from  Poland  could  be  carried  out,  if  at  all,  only 
in  the  direction  of  Kovno-Vilna-Minsk.  This  attack 
was  to  be  carried  out  by  the  Tenth  Army,  while  the 
Eighth  and  Twelfth  Armies  and  the  Southern  Army 
groups  were  to  keep  up  the  pressure  on  the  enemy. 

The  operations  of  the  Tenth  Army  required  that  its 
flank  should  be  protected  on  the  north  from  attack 
from  the  railway  from  Riga  to  Dvinsk,  which  is  a 
junction  for  several  lines  from  the  northeast  and  east, 
and  also  from  any  movement  from  the  Polotzk-Molo- 
detchno  and  Orscha-Borissov-Minsk  lines.  The  Nie- 
men Army  was  to  continue  its  advance  with  Dvinsk  as 
the  objective,  while  a  strong  contingent  of  cavalry 
advanced  tow^ard  the  two  railway  lines  mentioned 
above. 

According  to  this  plan,  the  Russian  front  facing  the 
Tenth  and  Niemen  Armies,  which,  although  unbroken, 
was  weak  to  the  northeast  of  Kovno,  would  be  pierced 
— that  is,  it  would  be  forced  back  through  Vilna  to 
Dvinsk,  while  the  cavalry  divisions  advanced  on 
Polotzk-Minsk. 

The  question  remained  whether  the  operations 
would  still  be  profitable  now  that  the  Russians  had 


198  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

retreated  so  far  to  the  east.  There  was  no  doubt  that 
every  day's  delay  made  the  prospects  less  promising, 
I  considered  whether  we  should  not  content  ourselves 
with  a  thrust  through  Olita-Orany  on  Lida.  I  rejected 
this  idea,  because  all  similar  endeavors  during  the 
preceding  summer  campaign  to  accomplish  an  out- 
flanking movement  had  been  unsuccessful.  Accord- 
ingly, 1  still  pinned  my  faith  to  the  bigger  scheme, 
because  its  success  would  bring  a  more  substantial 
reward.  In  this  case  also  we  were  compelled  to  take 
a  leap  in  the  dark.  It  was  clear  that  the  Tenth  Army 
needed  reinforcements,  and  the  troops  which  had  been 
investing  Novo  Georgievsk  were  employed  for  this 
purpose. 

The  Eighth  and  Twelfth  Armies  had,  in  the  course 
of  the  operations,  become  so  concentrated  that  it  was 
possible  to  withdraw  divisions,  in  addition  to  those 
already  earmarked  for  the  West.  They  were  con- 
veyed to  Kovno,  and  thence  they  were  assigned  to  the 
left  wing  of  the  Tenth  or  the  right  wing  of  the  Eighth 
Army. 

Meanwhile  the  Tenth  Army  had  been  heavily  at- 
tacked from  Vilna.  The  enemy  had  brought  reinforce- 
ments from  Poland  to  the  north.  In  the  hope  of 
turning  the  enemy's  flank,  the  Tenth  Army,  like  the 
troops  it  confronted,  had  been  reinforced  on  the  north 
in  the  direction  of  Vilkomir.  The  fighting  was  par- 
ticularly heavy  on  the  northern  bank  of  the  Vilia. 

We  passed  once  more  through  a  period  of  great 
anxiety.  I  would  have  gladly  expedited  the  early 
stages  of  the  operations,  but  the  capacity  of  the  Wir- 
ballen-Kovno  Railway  was  limited,  owing  to  its  un- 
finished condition.  Everything  took  an  endless  time, 
and  in  addition  to  this  the  roads  were  bad  and  the 
troops  were  no  longer  fresh. 

At  last,  on  September  9,  the  advance  began.     The 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA     199 

Niemen  Army  made  good  progress  toward  Dvinsk- 
Jakobstadt.  Near  Uzjany  their  right  wing  advanced 
along  the  Kovno-Dvinsk  road  and  very  soon  drove 
the  enemy  back  beyond  Novo  Alexandrovsk.  The 
enemy  made  a  stand  at  both  bridge-heads  and  the 
fighting  here  was  long  and  severe. 

The  left  wing  of  the  Tenth  Army,  south  of  Vilkomir, 
made  good  progress  on  the  first  two  days  toward  the 
Vilia  above  Vilna.  Farther  on,  however,  they  were 
able  to  force  the  Russians  back  across  this  river  only 
by  degrees. 

Between  the  inner  wings  of  the  two  armies,  from 
Dvinsk  to  the  ViHa,  the  cavalry  divisions  had  more 
room  to  maneuver.  In  the  first  place,  they  had  to  fight 
their  way  through  the  lake  country  between  Vilkomir 
and  Sventziany,  which  was  taken  on  the  13th.  From 
here  the  divisions  were  diverted  toward  Smorgon, 
Molodetchno,  and  the  Molodetchno-Polotzk  railway, 
half-way  between  the  two  places.  It  was  now  possible 
to  bring  up  the  cavalry  divisions  of  the  Eighth  Army. 
The  Vilna-Molodetchno-Polotzk  railway  near  Smorgon 
and  Vileika  and  east  of  Glubokoie  had  been  reached 
by  the  14th,  and  the  Russian  right  wing  on  the  Vilia, 
northeast  of  Vilna,  seriously  threatened.  The  Orscha- 
Minsk  Railway  was  also  cut  in  the  neighborhood  of 
Borissov.  Here,  as  had  so  often  occurred  in  the  east, 
the  cavalry  found  a  new  field  for  its  activities.  The 
German  cavalry  has  everywhere  given  proof  of  its 
brilliant  dash  and  courage. 

The  Tenth  made  repeated  efforts  to  transfer  troops 
from  its  front  to  the  left  wing.  For  this  purpose 
it  made  a  detour  up  the  ViHa  to  Smorgon,  and 
south  of  the  Vishniev  to  Vileika.  The  movements  were 
difficult  to  carry  out,  and  took  up  a  great  deal  of  time; 
they  imposed  a  tremendous  strain  on  the  troops,  for 
the  roads  and  weather  were  bad  and  hindered  progress. 


20O  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

The  infantry  divisions  were  not  able  to  relieve  the 
cavalry  divisions  quickly  enough  in  their  foremost  posi- 
tions. With  their  weak  artillery  they  were  unable  per- 
manently to  hold  Smorgon.  The  latter  place  was  re- 
captured on  the  19th  by  forces  from  Vilna  after  a 
plucky  resistance  on  the  part  of  the  ist  Cavalry 
Division. 

The  Russians  had  realized  the  danger  which  threat- 
ened them,  and  had  brought  up  reinforcements  by 
rail  to  the  region  east  of  Dvinsk;  these  reinforcements 
very  soon  made  their  appearance  to  the  south  of  that 
town.  The  railway  via  Polotzk  to  Molodetchno  was 
not  used.  From  Lida  and  Slonim,  on  the  other  hand, 
they  were  able  to  wheel  and  effect  a  wholesale  with- 
drawal in  the  direction  of  Molodetchno  with  their  in- 
fantry, and  toward  Dokschitzy  with  their  cavalry. 
The  great  retreat  along  the  Russian  front  from  Poland 
into  West  Russia  had,  unfortunately,  progressed  so  far 
that  their  troops  which  had  been  brought  up  north 
were  able  to  reach  the  Vilia  in  time.  The  German 
enveloping  movement  came  to  a  standstill  here.  Its 
strength  was  insufficient  to  overcome  the  enemy  re- 
sistance. The  Russians,  for  their  part,  crossed  the 
Vilia  north  of  Molodetchno  for  a  counter-attack,  but 
were  also  unable  to  make  progress.  In  the  mean  time 
the  German  frontal  attack  had  made  but  slow  progress. 
The  Russians  were  not  able  to  hold  Vilna  against  this 
pressure,  and  retired  slowly,  fighting  along  the  whole 
front.  The  German  front  at  Busswce  had  still  enough 
force  in  it  to  reach  the  region  west  of  Smorgon,  the 
western  Beresina  and  the  neighborhood  of  Baranovici 
and  Pinsk. 

During  the  gradual  advance  from  Vilna  on  Smorgon 
I  saw  clearly  that  the  operations  would  have  to  be 
broken  off.  A  continuation  of  the  movement  was  out 
of  the  question.     In  the  long  run  it  was  impossible  to 


SUMMER  CAMPAIGN  AGAINST  RUSSIA    201 

keep  the  left  wing  of  the  Tenth  Army  so  far  forward 
in  face  of  the  hostile  cavalry,  which  was  pressing  in 
increasing  strength  upon  all  sides  to  oppose  our  attempt 
to  break  through.  We  had  to  prepare  our  winter 
quarters  and  found  good  positions  on  the  Vishniev- 
Narotch  and  Drysviaty  Lakes  line. 

While  fresh  reinforcements  joined  the  Niemen  Army 
near  Lake  Drysviaty  the  north  wing  of  the  Tenth 
Army  wheeled  back  into  the  positions  mentioned  above. 
The  Tenth  Army  intended  to  check  the  advancing 
enemy,  as  had  been  done  in  a  similar  movement  near 
Grodno,  but  it  delayed  overlong,  and  in  the  end  was 
severely  handled  east  of  Lake  Narotch. 

The  Russian  flood  surged  against  our  new  front, 
but  the  tempest  gradually  died  down.  Meanwhile  the 
Austrian  Army  had  attempted  to  execute  an  envelop- 
ing movement  by  breaking  through  northeast  of  Lutsk, 
but  had  been  repulsed  by  a  counter-attack.  Near 
Dvinsk  the  fighting  continued  for  a  long  time.  The 
Niemen  Army  still  hoped  to  take  the  bridge-head. 
But  the  communications  were  so  bad  that  an  offensive 
was  out  of  the  question,  and  therefore,  at  my  desire, 
the  operation  was  stopped. 

Quiet  reigned  along  the  front  as  far  as  the  Car- 
pathians. 

The  summer  campaign  against  Russia  was  at  an 
end.  The  Russians  had  been  defeated  and  their 
front  forced  back.  The  operations  round  Kovno  had 
not  met  with  any  great  success,  as  they  started  too 
late.  That  was  the  principal  reason.  The  enemy  had 
been  able  to  thwart  the  enveloping  movement  with 
which  he  was  threatened  on  the  Vilia.  If  he  had  been 
a  few  days'  march  farther  west  he  would  not  have  been 
in  a  position  to  do  so. 

Throughout  the  whole  war  we  never  succeeded, 
either  on  the  Eastern  or  Western  front,  in  exploiting  a 


202  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

big  strategical  break-through  to  the  full.  The  one 
between  Vilna  and  Dvinsk  was  nearest  to  succeeding. 
It  showed  that  a  strategical  break-through  yields  its 
full  reward  only  when  it  is  followed  up  by  a  tactical 
envelopment.  It  was  left  for  the  Bulgarian  Army  in 
September  191 8  to  show  to  the  world  the  momentous 
consequences  of  such  an  operation.  These  conse- 
quences, however,  were  possible  only  because  of  the 
utter  collapse  of  that  army. 

The  great  anxiety  of  those  September  days  had  once 
again  resulted  only  in  a  tactical  success.  We  had  had 
an  unusually  critical  situation  to  contend  with.  The 
action  fought  by  the  ist  Cavalry  Division  near  Smorgon 
on  the  enemy's  line  of  retreat  was  immensely  tragic. 
Just  before  the  arrival  of  the  infantry  it  was  forced 
to  retire  with  heavy  losses.  The  situation  on  the  south 
wing  of  the  Niemen  Army  also  continued  to  be  pre- 
carious, and  the  rearward  movement  of  the  Tenth 
Army  extremely  dangerous.  All  this,  however,  was 
nothing  to  the  nerve-racking  suspense;  could  the 
infantry  get  forward  fast  enough  on  the  bad  roads  to 
complete  the  envelopment  which  had  been  so  skilfully 
begun  by  the  cavalry  division?  Such  suspense  can  be 
understood  only  by  those  who  have  actually  experi- 
enced it. 

We  had  brought  the  final  overthrow  of  Russia  one 
step  nearer.  The  Grand  Duke,  with  his  strong  per- 
sonality, resigned,  and  the  Tsar  placed  himself  at  the 
head  of  the  army. 

Our  troops  and  their  leaders  had  done  their  duty 
everywhere  and  the  German  soldier  was  justly  con- 
vinced of  his  unquestionable  superiority  over  the  Rus- 
sian.    Numbers  no  longer  had  any  terrors  for  him. 


THE   HEADQUARTERS   OF   THE  COM- 
MANDER-IN-CHIEF ON  THE   EASTERN 
FRONT  IN   KOVNO,  OCTOBER  1915   TO 
JULY    1916 

The  Period  of  Inactivity — The  General  Situation  in  Autumn  191 5 — 
Historical  Memories — Consolidating  the  Front — The  Country  and 
the  People — Duties  of  the  Administration — The  Area  to  Be  Ad- 
ministered— The  Organization  of  the  Administrative  System — 
The  Battles  and  the  Crisis  in  the  East — Plans  for  the  Campaign 
of  1916 — Fighting  at  Lake  Narotch — Operations  Around  the  Lake 
— Russian  Offensives — Conferences  at  General  Headquarters. 

(Maps  X  and  XII) 

I 

AFTER  the  cessation  of  the  fighting  to  the  north  of 
Arras  in  May,  quiet  reigned  everywhere  on  the 
Western  front  throughout  the  summer  of  191 5.  At 
the  end  of  September  the  Entente  started  a  powerful 
offensive  near  Loos  and  in  Champagne.  The  troops 
which  had  been  transferred  from  the  East  arrived  just 
in  time  to  support  the  defenders  of  the  Western  front, 
who  were  holding  out  so  gallantly,  and  avert  a  serious 
defeat. 

The  Italians  had  attacked  repeatedly,  but  without 
success.  The  Austrian  Army  fought  well  against  Italy ; 
she  was  their  hereditary  foe,  whereas  the  war  against 
Russia  aroused  no  national  prejudices. 

The  German  and  Austrian  General  StafTs  had  de- 
cided upon  the  conquest  of  Serbia.  Bulgaria,  a  natural 
enemy  of  Serbia,  and  hemmed  in  by  Macedonia,  de- 
clared herself  cpenly  on  our  side.  The  taking  of  War- 
saw had  madf;  a  particularly  strong  impression  on  her. 


204  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

The  Bulgarian  contribution  of  twelve  strong  infantry 
divisions  at  once  equalized  the  forces  in  the  Balkans. 
Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen  crossed  the  Danube  at 
the  beginning  of  October.  By  the  beginning  of  De- 
cember the  Serbian  campaign  had  brought  us  close  to 
the  Greek  frontier.  Consideration  for  Greece,  the 
fatigue  of  the  troops,  and  the  state  of  our  communica- 
tions, perhaps  also  other  political  and  military  circum- 
stances, unknown  to  me,  prevented  us  from  completing 
our  operations  with  an  attack  on  Salonica,  where  the 
first  Entente  troops  were  arriving  to  join  in  the  fighting. 
The  capture  of  Salonica  would  have  considerably  re- 
lieved our  position  in  the  Balkan  Peninsula.  It  is 
clear  to  me,  in  the  light  of  subsequent  experience,  that 
by  such  an  operation  we  should  not  have  gained  even 
one  Bulgarian  for  the  Western  front.  The  English, 
French,  and  Serbians,  who  afterward  occupied  the 
Macedonian  front,  would  probably  have  fought  against 
us  in  France.  This  consideration  continued  to  weigh 
with  us.  The  attack  on  Salonica  was  always  a  side- 
show, and  must  be  regarded  as  such. 

The  Austrian  troops  pushed  forward  through  Monte- 
negro as  far  as  the  Vojusa  in  Albania,  where  the  fight- 
ing lasted  until  February.  The  troops  covering  the 
flank  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army  had  advanced 
from  the  Danube  far  into  Albania,  even  to  the  Greek 
frontier.  The  protection  of  this  front  was  entrusted 
to  Bulgarian  troops,  not  only  in  their  own  interest,  but 
also  in  that  of  Austria-Hungary  and  ourselves. 

Most  of  the  German  troops  returned  by  degrees  to 
the  Danube.  Austria-Hungary  a.  so  had  fresh  troops 
at  her  disposal.  The  Serbian  Army  was  severely  de- 
feated, though  remnants  of  it  escaped  in  the  direction 
of  Valona,  and,  owing  to  the  high-handed  action  of 
France  and  England  at  Corfu,  became  once  more  a 
factor  in  the  struggle  to  be  feared  by  the  Bulgarian 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     205 


soldier.     They  were  transferred  subsequently  to  Salon- 
ica,  where  they  fought  very  creditably. 

The  Entente  found  itself  forced  to  release  drafts  for 
Macedonia  from  other  theaters  of  war.     It  also  had  to 


Patinka 


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abandon  the  idea  of  continuing  the  Gallipoli  operations, 
which,  thanks  to  the  efficiency  of  German  leadership 
and  the  Mediterranean  division,  had  cost  the  Entente 
very  dearly.  The  position  of  the  Expeditionary  Force 
had    now    become    imtenable.     Communication    with 


2o6  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Turkey  was  established  by  the  defeat  of  Serbia  and  the 
aUiance  with  Bulgaria.  We  were  no  longer  obliged  to 
smuggle  our  war  material  through  Rumania;  it  was 
possible  to  give  Turkey  direct  assistance.  The  railway 
running  to  Constantinople  was  opened  on  January  i6. 
On  January  8  and  9  the  Entente  troops  evacuated  the 
Gallipoli  Peninsula. 

The  blockade  of  the  Straits  was  assured.  If  the 
enemy  fleets,  by  occupying  the  Straits,  had  commanded 
the  Black  Sea,  Russia  could  have  been  supplied  with 
the  war  materials  of  which  she  stood  in  such  need.  The 
fighting  in  the  East  would  then  have  assumed  a  much 
more  serious  character.  The  Entente  would  have  had 
access  to  the  rich  corn  supplies  of  South  Russia  and 
Rumania  and  would  have  persuaded  this  kingdom  to 
yield  to  its  wishes  even  sooner  than  she  actually  did. 
Russia's  communications  with  the  outside  world  for 
the  transport  of  war  materials  were,  at  that  time,  via 
the  trans-Siberian  railways,  along  the  Murman  coast,  to 
which  the  railway  from  Petrograd  was  still  in  course  of 
construction,  but  not  yet  completed,  and,  in  summer, 
by  the  White  Sea.  The  traffic  through  Finland  with 
Sweden  was  important,  but  the  latter  would  not  permit 
the  transport  of  war  material.  Sweden  interpreted  the 
duties  of  a  neutral  state  correctly.  These  details  clearly 
show  the  importance  of  the  Straits,  and  therefore  of 
Turkey,  for  the  Eastern  front  and  our  whole  military 
position. 

Military  operations  in  Asia  Minor  were  a  difficult 
matter.  Turkey  was  entirely  dependent  on  communi- 
cations by  road,  whereas  modern  warfare  requires  com- 
munications either  by  rail  or  sea.  The  railway  to  the 
Caucasus  had  only  just  been  begun  between  Angora 
and  Sivas.  The  Bagdad  Railway,  broken  by  the  moun- 
tain chains  of  Taurus  and  Amanus,  had  not  nearly 
reached  the  Tigris.     Tunnels  were  in  course  of  con- 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     207 

struction.  The  railway  to  Syria  joined  the  Bagdad 
Railway  at  Aleppo — that  is,  beyond  the  intervening 
mountain  barrier.  South  of  Damascus  it  gave  place 
to  the  narrow-gage  Hedjaz  Railway,  with  a  branch 
line  which  traversed  Palestine  and  came  to  an  end  at 
Beersheba,  south  of  Jersualem. 

The  state  of  the  railways,  which  were  bad  enough 
in  themselves,  was  made  still  worse  by  the  condi- 
tions under  which  they  were  worked,  for,  as  regards 
both  personnel  and  materials,  things  could  not  have 
been  worse.  The  railways  served  very  little  purpose, 
and  did  not  in  any  way  meet  the  necessities  of  the 
situation. 

Endeavors  were  made,  with  some  success,  to  use  the 
Euphrates  and  the  Tigris,  but  this  made  little  differ- 
ence to  the  general  situation. 

German  motor  transport  helped  to  improve  matters. 

Owing  to  the  difficulties  of  communication,  a  cam- 
paign in  Asia  Minor,  Syria,  and  Mesopotamia  was 
doomed  to  failure  so  long  as  transport  conditions  were 
not  improved. 

The  military  efficiency  of  the  Turks  in  their  frontier 
provinces  was  still  further  limited  by  the  fact  that  the 
Kurds  and  Armenians  on  the  Caucasus  frontier,  and 
the  Arab  tribes  in  Mesopotamia  and  Syria  as  far  as 
Aden,  were  hostile  to  them.  The  Turks  have  always 
pursued  an  unhappy  policy  in  regard  to  native  popu- 
lations. They  have  gone  on  the  principle  of  taking 
everything  and  giving  nothing.  Now  they  had  to 
reckon  with  these  peoples  as  their  enemies.  By  their 
unpardonable  treatment  of  the  Armenians  the  Turks 
deprived  themselves  even  of  labor,  which  they  needed 
urgently,  both  for  the  building  of  railways  and  for 
agriculture. 

The  Turkish  efforts  to  summon  Tripoli  and  Benghasi 
to  a   holy  war  were    only  partially   successful.     Our 


2o8  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

U-boats  brought  them  arms,  and  to  a  certain  extent 
maintained  communication  between  those  districts  and 
Turkey. 

An  expedition  against  the  Suez  Canal  in  January- 
February  1 91 5  was  defeated.  It  could  have  been 
successful  only  if,  at  the  same  time,  the  Senussi  had 
invaded  Egypt  from  the  west  and  the  Egyptians  them- 
selves had  risen.  But  these  were  Utopian  ideas;  Eng- 
lish sovereignty  is  firmly  established  in  those  provinces 
which  are  in  her  power. 

At  the  mouth  of  the  Euphrates  and  Tigris,  England, 
with  her  maritime  communications,  advanced  step  by 
step  toward  Bagdad.  It  had  been  impossible  for  the 
Turks  to  prevent  this.  In  December  191 5  fighting 
again  took  place  round  Kut-el-Amara  below  Bagdad, 
to  which  the  English  Expeditionary  Force  was,  by  this 
time,  alarmingly  close. 

The  Turkish  Army  on  the  Caucasus  frontier  had  been 
defeated  in  the  winter  of  19 14-15.  It  had  been  mark- 
ing time  since  then.  Nevertheless,  it  had  suffered  a 
high  rate  of  wastage,  chiefly  owing  to  typhus  and  frost- 
bite. 

The  events  in  the  Sinai  Peninsula  and  Mesopotamia 
did  not  directly  affect  the  Eastern  front.  The  Suez 
expedition  was  followed  with  great  interest  and  much 
hopefulness.  The  difficulties  of  communication, 'to  which 
I  have  referred  above,  were  not  fully  realized  by  me 
at  that  time.  In  particular  I  was  under  the  impression 
that  the  Bagdad  Railway  was  better  and  farther  ad- 
vanced than  was  actually  the  fact.  Whether  more 
could  have  been  done  here  it  is  impossible  for  me  to 
say. 

The  fighting  on  the  Caucasian  front  did  not  bring  us 
the  relief  we  had  hoped  for  as  regards  Russia. 

Owing  to  the  occupation  of  vast  regions  in  the  East, 
the  opening  of  the  Balkan  Peninsula  and  our  through 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     209 

communications  with  Turkey,  our  army  administration 
had  been  greatly  facilitated.  Rumania  had  become 
much  more  accommodating  as  regards  the  delivery  of 
suppUes,  as  she  was  unable  to  dispose  of  her  materials 
elsewhere.  The  year  191 5  ended  with  a  distinct  ad- 
vantage to  us.  We  had  strengthened  our  position  for 
the  coming  year,  but  we  did  not  by  a  long  way  get 
everything  we  could  or  ought  to  have  expected  from 
the  home  country. 

Our  enemies  continued  to  increase  their  armaments. 

In  England  Kitchener's  army  was  developing.  The 
greater  part  of  it  had,  by  this  time,  arrived  on  the 
Western  front.  The  English  front  had  extended  south- 
ward and  released  French  troops.  Further  divisions 
were  being  formed  in  England.  Conscription  had  taken 
the  place  of  voluntary  recruiting.  The  English  Con- 
scription bill  was  passed  in  Parliament  in  January 
1 91 6.  Thus  England,  the  last  European  Power  to  do 
so,  accepted  the  standpoint  of  the  universal  obligation 
of  every  able-bodied  man  to  serve  the  State  under  arms, 
when  required  to  do  so  by  the  necessities  of  war  and 
the  duties  of  citizenship.  England  did  not  extend  the 
law  to  Ireland — a  characteristic  touch. 

The  French  Army  had  kept  up  its  original  strength. 
The  Serbian  Army  was  being  reorganized.  Russia,  to 
make  good  her  losses,  had  made  great  inroads  on  her 
vast  man-power. 

The  transformation  of  the  peace-time  industries  of 
France,  England,  Japan,  and  America  had  made  de- 
cided progress. 

The  year  191 6  was  to  witness  some  terrific  fighting. 

In  this  great  drama  of  historical  events  operations 
on  the  Eastern  front,  which  since  November  19 14  had 
been  an  important  and  frequently  the  decisive  theater, 
receded  into  the  background.  The  work  we  now  had 
to  do  was  of  a  less  active  kind. 


/ 


310  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

II 

At  the  close  of  the  great  operations  the  circumstances 
under  which  the  Eastern  armies  were  living  were  make- 
shift and  unsatisfactory  in  every  respect;  further,  con- 
ditions in  the  territory  we  had  occupied  in  the  course 
of  events  had  to  be  improved. 

In  order  to  get  a  better  grasp  of  affairs  and  be  in 
closer  touch  with  the  troops,  we  went  to  Kovno  at  the 
end  of  October. 

The  Field-Marshal,  the  officers  of  the  General  Staff, 
and  I  were  quartered  in  two  villas  belonging  to  Herr 
Tillmann,  a  German  whose  family  name  was  in  good 
repute  among  the  Germans  in  Russia.  He  himself  had 
been  in  Germany  from  the  beginning  of  the  war.  The 
Field-Marshal,  Colonel  Hoffmann,  and  myself  lived 
together  in  one  of  the  villas.  Here  also  was  the  staff 
mess.  I  spent  many  hours  in  this  house  and  it  is  in- 
delibly engraved  on  my  memory. 

The  offices  of  the  General  Staff  were  in  the  barracks. 
The  fifty-pfennig  portraits  of  the  Tsar,  the  Tsarina,  and 
the  Tsarevitch  were  typical  of  the  Russian  culture  of 
that  time.  The  rooms  were  large  and  suitable  for  our 
purpose  and  could  be  well  heated  for  the  coming 
winter. 

Kovno  is  a  typical  Russian  town,  with  low,  mean, 
wooden  houses  and  comparatively  wide  streets.  From 
the  hills  which  closely  encircle  the  town  there  is  an 
interesting  view  of  the  town  and  the  confluence  of  the 
Niemen  and  the  Vilia.  On  the  farther  bank  of  the 
Niemen  there  stands  the  tower  of  an  old  German  castle 
of  the  Teutonic  Knights,  a  symbol  of  German  civiliza- 
tion in  the  East,  and  not  far  from  it  there  is  a  memorial 
of  French  schemes  for  the  conquest  of  the  world — that 
hill  upon  which  Napoleon  stood  in  1812  as  he  watched 
the  great  army  crossing  the  river. 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     211 

My  mind  was  flooded  with  overwhelming  historical 
memories ;  I  determined  to  resume  in  the  occupied  ter- 
ritory that  work  of  civilization  at  which  the  Germans 
had  labored  in  those  lands  for  many  centuries.  The 
population,  made  up  as  it  is  of  such  a  mixture  of  races, 
would  never  accomplish  anything  of  its  own  accord, 
and,  left  to  itself,  would  succumb  to  Polish  domination. 

I  was  proud  to  think  that,  over  a  hundred  years  ago, 
after  a  period  of  great  weakness  and  tribulation  in  Ger- 
many, we  had  thrown  off  the  foreign  yoke.  Now  that 
same  Germany,  first  beaten  by  Napoleon  because  she 
was  decadent  and  subsequently  united  by  the  efforts 
of  a  few  great  men,  stood  victorious  in  this  World  War 
against  enemies  who  far  outnumbered  her  and  added 
fresh  glories  to  her  record.  I  had  faith  in  final  victory. 
Nothing  else  was  possible.  The  German  people  had 
been  through  too  much  already  to  expose  themselves 
again  to  such  a  terrible  fate.  The  men  who  were  lead- 
ing Germany  only  needed  to  develop  her  latent  powers 
to  add  fuel  to  the  holy  fire  burning — as  I  then  thought 
— in  every  German  heart. 

A  happy  future  of  assured  prosperity  seemed  to  be 
opening  out  for  the  Fatherland. 

Our  work,  of  course,  was  not  interrupted  for  a  single 
day  by  the  migration  from  Lotzen  to  Kovno.  The 
necessary  telephone  connections  were  quickly  made  in 
the  office,  and  the  bare  necessities  in  the  way  of  furni- 
ture were  improved  upon.  That  this  additional  fur- 
niture was  taken  from  other  houses  which  had  been 
deserted  by  the  inhabitants  could  not  be  helped.  It 
was  done  in  as  orderly  a  manner  as  possible,  but  a 
certain  amount  of  confusion  was  inevitable.  These 
are  the  regretable  conditions  imposed  by  the  exigen- 
cies of  war.  The  belligerent  or  individual  soldiers  are 
not  to  be  blamed  for  this.  Circumstances  are  too 
strong  for  them.     To  the  individual  civilian  who  suffers 


212  LUDENDORFF'S  OW^  STORY 

it  is  a  matter  of  indifference  hoiv  he  loses  his  property. 
He  understands  nothing  of  the  necessities  of  war,  and 
therefore  is  ready  enough  to  talk  about  the  enemy's 
barbaric  methods  of  warfare. 

We  found  plenty  of  furniture  at  Kovno,  but  later, 
when  we  got  to  Brest-Litovsk,  we  were  confronted  by 
empty  barracks.  We  therefore  had  fiuniture  sent  on 
to  us  from  Kovno  and  requisitioned  some  from  other 
places  as  well.  War  is  a  rough  trade  and  there  was  no 
help  for  it. 

In  this  town  I  usually  attended  the  evangelical  ser- 
vices which  Pastor  Wessel  held  in  the  former  Orthodox 
church,  a  magnificent  building,  typical  of  the  Russian 
despotic  rule  in  that  country.  There  I  heard  for  the 
first  time  on  foreign  soil  the  beautiful  old  melody  sung 
as  a  hymn : 

I  have  given  myself 

With  heart  and  with  hand. 
To  thee,  land  of  love  and  life, 
My  German  Fatherland.^ 

I  was  deeply  moved.  This  hymn  oughu  to  be  sung 
every  Sunday  in  all  the  churches,  and  shoiild  be  en- 
graved on  the  hearts  of  all  Germans. 


Ill 

The  work  before  us  was  to  consolidate  our  front  and 
endeavor  to  improve  the  condition  of  the  armies.  On 
our  right  wing  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria's  army 
group  was  occupying  the  sector  south  of  the  Niemen 
as  far  as  south  of  Pinsk.  This  army  group  and  High 
Command  in  the  East  itself  were  under  the  General 
Headquarters.     To  the  south  these  troops  linked  up 

>  Ich  hab'  mich  ergeben 

Mit  Herz  und  mit  Hand, 
Dii   Land  voll  Lieh'  und  Leben, 
Mein  dcutsches  Vaterland. 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     213 

with  the  front  line  of  the  Austrian  Army  (with  its 
General  Headquarters  at  Teschen),  which  had  Lin- 
singen's  army  group  on  its  left  wing  and  its  right  close 
to  the  Rumanian  frontier. 

In  the  Eastern  theater  the  line  of  the  Twelfth  and 
Eighth  Armies  had  been  so  shortened  that  there  was 
room  for  only  one  of  them.  The  Twelfth  remained 
where  it  was;  it  extended  from  the  Niemen  to  beyond 
the  Lida-Molodetchno  Railway.  General  von  Gallwitz 
had  given  up  the  command  and  taken  over  the  com- 
mand of  an  army  against  Serbia.  His  place  with  the 
Twelfth  Army  had  been  taken  by  General  von  Fabeck, 
who  had  come  from  the  Western  front. 

The  Tenth  Army  extended  to  the  north  as  far  as  the 
Disna.  Farther  north  again,  the  Scholtz  army  group 
had  been  formed  under  the  general  of  that  name,  who 
had  commanded  the  Eighth  Army.  The  left  wing  of 
the  Tenth  Army  was  on  the  banks  of  the  Dvina,  about 
half-way  between  Dvinsk  and  Jakobstadt. 

The  northern  part  of  the  front  and  the  coast  defenses 
were  under  General  von  Below.  The  Niemen  Army, 
no  longer  entitled  to  that  name,  became  the  Eighth 
Army.  Such  a  change  of  name  is  not  so  simple  as  it 
looks  on  paper.  A  variety  of  measures  have  to  be 
taken  to  avoid  present  and  future  possibility  of  con- 
fusion. 

The  Navy  had  taken  up  quarters  in  the  naval  port  of 
Libau.  The  sphere  of  its  command  there  had  to  be 
specially  determined. 

Certain  subordinate  formations  had  to  be  fitted  into 
this  scheme  for  holding  the  front.  A  number  of  rear- 
rangements on  a  large  scale  were  necessary.  Where  the 
main  offensives  had  taken  place  there  was  a  congestion 
of  troops.  At  other  points  the  line  was  too  thin.  A 
proper  balance  had  to  be  struck.  Cavalry  divisions 
had  to  be  relieved  by  infantry  divisions.     It  was  a 


214  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

long  time  before  these  movements  were  completed  and 
the  troops  arrived  at  positions  where  they  could  be  left 
for  the  time  being.  But  there  could  not  be  any  ques- 
tion as  yet  of  real  rest.  The  line  had  to  be  consolidated, 
and  meanwhile  other  troops  had  to  hold  long  stretches 
of  front.  Both  these  tasks  taxed  the  strength  of  the 
men.  The  positions  to  be  strengthened  were  generally 
those  where  the  fighting  had  been  fiercest.  Points 
which  it  was  impossible  to  hold  were  to  be  abandoned, 
but  both  commanders  and  troops  resigned  themselves 
to  this  course  with  great  reluctance. 

Between  Vishniev  and  the  Disna,  the  line  to  which 
the  left  wing  of  the  Tenth  Army  had  withdrawn,  it  was 
easier  to  select  positions. 

The  construction  of  trenches  and  billets,  and  indeed 
conditions  at  the  front  as  a  whole,  suffered  from  the 
bad  railway  connections.  The  Russians  had  every- 
where completely  destroyed  the  railways.  The  bridges 
over  the  Niemen  and  other  large  rivers  had  all  been 
blown  up,  the  railway  stations  burned,  the  water  sup- 
ply destroyed,  and  the  telegraph  wires  broken  down. 
The  railways  had  been  torn  up  in  places,  and  the 
sleepers  and  rails  removed.  The  military  railway 
authorities,  with  their  labor  and  engineer  companies, 
and  the  telegraphists  for  the  extremely  important  work 
of  re-establishing  the  telegraph,  had  a  colossal  work 
before  them.  The  Director  of  Railways  in  the  East 
knew  his  job. 

The  completion  of  the  railway  bridge  near  Kovno 
was  of  the  greatest  importance.  It  was  possible  to 
use  it  by  the  end  of  September,  and  for  a  long  time  it 
was  the  only  channel  for  supplies  to  the  Tenth  and 
Twelfth  Armies  and  the  right  wing  of  Scholtz's  army 
group.  At  that  time  I  was  satisfied  if  I  could  count 
on  two  trains  a  day  to  Lida  for  the  Twelfth  Army,  but, 
as  it  turned  out,  it  was  not  so  simple  to  obtain  the  trains 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     215 

themselves,  which  were  required  by  the  army.  Com- 
munication with  our  own  railways  was  very  bad.  On 
one  occasion  the  Twelfth  Army  had  urgently  requested 
a  train-load  of  fodder  and  received  a  train-load  of 
seltzer-water!  That  is  a  trifle  during  a  great  war, 
but  the  well-being  of  man  and  horse  is  dependent  on 
a  series  of  trifles,  and  so  the  latter  assume  a  great  and 
disproportionate  importance. 

The  northern  network  of  railways  joined  the  Memel 
line  at  Prekuln.  The  Russian  railways  in  Lithuania 
and  Courland  had  a  surprisingly  small  capacity,  even 
in  peace-time.  This  would  not  have  been  the  case  if 
Russia  had  really  needed  the  ports  of  Windau  and 
Libau  for  her  domestic  and  commercial  existence.  The 
Prekuln-Memel  line,  moreover,  was  behind  the  times. 
It  was  a  long  time  before  any  sort  of  regular  service  of 
three  or  four  trains  could  be  established  on  the  line 
from  Ponieviesh  to  Dvinsk. 

On  the  long  stretches  from  Vilna  to  Smorgon  and 
Vilna  to  Dvina  conditions  were  not  so  difficult,  but 
even  here  the  provisional  water-tanks  froze  in  winter 
and  there  were  all  sorts  of  obstacles,  surmountable  and 
insurmountable. 

The  branch  line  Ponieviesh-Uzjany-Sventziany  had 
hardly  been  damaged,  but  it  was  quite  inadequate. 

It  was  long  after  Christmas  before  traffic  was  made 
safe  and  comparatively  regular  on  all  the  lines,  so  that 
at  last  the  longed-for  leave  trains  could  be  put  on. 

And  then  a  peculiarly  critical  situation  arose.  After 
a  spell  of  intense  cold  the  ice  on  the  Niemen  and 
Windau  began  to  break  up.  The  masses  of  ice  swept 
away  the  bridge  across  the  Windau  at  Moscheiki.  The 
sole  means  of  communication  with  Germany  by  rail 
was  thus  cut  off.  The  floating  ice  dashed  against  the 
railway  bridge  at  Kovno  and  displaced  the  rails,  but 
the  bridge  stood  firm.     Once  more  we  passed  through 


2i6  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

a  period  of  great  anxiety ,  although  for  a  different  reason. 
If  this  bridge  had  also  been  destroyed  the  armies  would 
have  been  in  a  critical  position. 

By  degrees  the  other  bridges  across  the  Niemen  were 
completed.  The  extension  of  the  railways  progressed, 
traffic  became  regular,  and  conditions  on  the  Eastern 
front  were  regulated  more  satisfactorily.  The  new 
lines,  the  Tauroggen-Radzivilishki  and  Shavli-Mitau 
sections,  were  completed  in  May  and  August  1916,  the 
line  from  Sventziany  toward  Lake  Narotch  not  until 
later. 

The  two  former  railways  have  opened  up  the  country 
and  facilitated  the  work  of  civilization.  To  this  ex- 
tent these  districts  are  in  oiu"  debt. 

Behind  the  front  there  arose  a  system  of  light  rail- 
ways, connecting  up  with  this  network  of  lines,  for  the 
direct  supply  of  the  troops. 

The  roads  in  the  districts  occupied  by  the  troops 
continued  to  be  of  great  importance.  The  great  main 
roads  from  Grodno  to  Lida,  Kovno  to  Dvinsk,  and 
Tauroggen  to  Mitau  were  put  into  excellent  repair. 
The  other  roads  were  repaired  as  far  as  possible.  At 
the  season  when  the  snow  was  melting  they  were 
transformed  in  places  into  a  slough  in  which  horses 
were  drowned  if  they  happened  to  fall. 

As  the  work  on  the  railways  and  roads  progressed  the 
consolidation  of  the  front  also  went  forward.  The 
troops  cut  wood  for  themselves,  and  some  of  the  barbed 
wire  was  manufactured  on  the  spot.  The  proximity 
of  war  underground  made  the  construction  of  the 
trenches  peculiarly  difficult.  The  geologists  rendered 
good  service  to  the  troops  in  this  connection. 

Behind  the  front  arose  workshops  for  the  repair  of 
all  kinds  of  war  material.  The  numerous  captiured 
Russian  machine  guns  were  altered  to  suit  German 
ammunition  in  a  specially  erected  factory. 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     217 

Of  course  I  did  not  deal  with  these  matters  in  detail, 
and  confined  myself  to  stimulating  and  organizing 
activities. 

I  was  particularly  concerned  about  the  welfare  of 
the  men  and  the  horses. 

The  quarters  were,  in  themselves,  not  so  bad.  The 
war  had  passed  comparatively  rapidly  over  the  region 
which  we  finally  occupied,  and  therefore  had  not  been 
very  destructive.  Nor  had  the  Russians  burned  down 
everything,  as  they  did  farther  south  in  Poland.  All 
the  same,  there  remained  a  great  deal  of  work  to  be  done 
in  the  constructions  of  billets  for  the  troops,  especially 
close  behind  the  line.  The  dugouts,  which  took  a  long 
time  to  build,  were  made  as  habitable  as  possible  by 
the  troops.  But  only  those  who  have  been  through 
it  can  know  with  how  little  officers  and  men  had  to  be 
satisfied  and  were  satisfied. 

Huts  for  men  and  horses  had  to  be  built  farther 
behind  the  line.  The  troops  became  great  experts  at 
this  work.  Their  artistic  sense  was  displayed  in  deco- 
rative embellishments  of  birchwood. 

Generally  speaking,  the  provisioning  of  the  troops 
proceeded  pretty  regularly.  Rations  were  sometimes 
short  with  some  of  the  troops,  especially  potatoes.  There 
was  not  enough  fodder  for  the  horses.  There  was  no 
oats,  and  green  fodder  was  too  scarce  to  be  supplied 
in  sufficient  quantities.  Many  horses  died  of  debiUty. 
In  the  end  we  had  to  add  sawdust  to  their  food. 

It  needed  special  care  to  prevent  the  supplies  which 
had  been  brought  up  at  such  pains  from  going  bad  at 
the  railway  stations.  Of  course  there  were  no  sheds  or 
tents  there.  I  had  to  see  to  this  also.  Good-will  was 
universal,  but  the  difficulties  accumulated  until  they 
took  the  heart  out  of  even  the  lowest  ranks.  In  deal- 
ing with  the  Christmas  parcels  there  were  similar 
difficiilties  to  be  overcome. 


2i8  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

The  health  of  men  and  horses  had  my  special  atten- 
tion. I  went  into  both  these  subjects  in  detail  with  the 
officers  responsible  for  them,  Surgeon-General  von 
Kern  and  Chief  Veterinary-Surgeon  Grammlich. 

It  had  been  difficult  to  look  after  the  wounded  during 
the  advance,  but  conditions  had  now  become  somewhat 
easier.  There  still  remained,  however,  a  great  deal  to 
be  done  by  the  responsible  authorities.  The  few  hos- 
pitals which  we  found  in  the  occupied  territory  were 
hardly  worth  considering.  I  urged  that  as  many 
wounded  as  possible  should  be  sent  home,  but  I  had  to 
be  Very  patient.  Later  on  cases  of  slight  illness  or 
wounds  were  not  sent  home,  but  retained  in  the  occupied 
territory,  where,  during  convalescence,  they  were  given 
light  duty.  We  were  spared  the  epidemics  to  which 
armies  are  liable;  only  spotted  fever  occurred  from 
time  to  time  for  a  short  period.  As  regards  measures 
against  vermin,  very  thorough  precautions  had  been 
taken  at  the  frontier  to  prevent  the  troops  from  going 
home  infected.  Thanks  to  the  energy  of  Surgeon- 
General  von  Kern  and  the  conscientiousness  of  the  army 
doctors,  the  whole  medical  service  was  in  perfect  order. 
Herr  von  Kern  is  a  philosopher,  and  this  would  appear 
to  show  that  philosophers  can  also  be  men  of  action. 

The  horses  suffered  from  glanders  and  mange.  We 
mastered  the  glanders  by  means  of  blood-tests,  but  not 
the  mange,  and  this  did  extensive  mischief.  Many 
remedies  were  tried,  but  an  effective  one  was  not 
discovered  until  the  war  was  almost  at  an  end.  Veteri- 
nary hospitals  were  erected  in  large  numbers,  and  the 
officers  of  this  service  had  plenty  to  do.  Their  devo- 
tion was  rewarded  by  great  successes. 

The  supplies  and  accommodation  for  the  horses  were 
not  always  all  they  should  have  been.  I  often  repre- 
sented to  the  Army  Headquarters  Staff  that  it  should 
devote  more  care  and  attention  to  the  horses. 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     219 

The  replacement  of  clothing,  the  provision  of  winter 
clothing  and  woolen  wear,  and  the  delivery  of  pit- 
props  for  the  trenches  were  beset  with  many  difficulties ; 
I  had  to  bring  all  my  energies  to  bear. 

Leave  was  begun  as  soon  as  possible.  It  was  granted 
more  and  more  freely  as  the  situation  on  the  railways 
improved. 

I  went  into  the  question  of  the  speedy  delivery  of 
letters  and  newspapers.  I  was  most  anxious  that  the 
men  should  be  as  closely  in  touch  with  home  as  possible, 
and  I  was  able  to  help  in  that  direction.  At  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war  the  military  postal  authorities  were 
faced  with  an  insoluble  problem.  They  had  not  suf- 
ficient motor-lorries.  But  under  the  Military  Post- 
master Domizlaff  they  soon  got  to  work  and  were  able 
to  meet  the  heavy  demands  on  their  resources. 

Behind  the  front  and  in  the  large  towns  soldiers*  and 
officers'  clubs  were  established.  There  could  not  be  too 
many  of  these,  so  far  as  I  was  concerned.  The  soldiers' 
clubs  in  the  East  met  a  deeply  felt  need;  this  was 
shown  by  the  numbers  who  frequented  them.  The 
people  at  home  gave  me  real  assistance,  and  the  women 
who  came  out  to  the  soldiers'  clubs  did  good  work. 

I  was  particularly  gratified  when,  through  the  agency 
of  Pastor  Hoppe,  friends  of  the  Field-Marshal  and 
myself  offered  to  equip  certain  field  libraries  for  the 
use  of  the  troops.  Looking  after  the  intellectual  needs 
of  the  troops  was  a  labor  of  love  to  us,  and  we  eagerly 
accepted  this  offer.  Pastor  Hoppe  took  the  matter  in 
hand  and  carried  it  through  energetically.  On  my 
birthday  in  191 7  he  handed  me  a  considerable  sum  for 
the  same  purpose  with  these  heartfelt  words,  "The 
spirit  creates  weapons  and  brings  victory."^  I  hope 
these  field  libraries  were  useful  to  the  troops.  They 
could  not,  of  course,  entirely  satisfy  their  demands  for 

^  "  Der  Geist  schaflft  Waff  en  and  Sieg." 


220  LUDENDORFF'S  OWT^  STORY 

books;  military  bookshops  were  set  up  in  great  num- 
bers. These  were  handed  over  to  the  management  of 
Messrs.  Stilke,  who  were  to  co-operate  with  other  firms. 
They  served  the  troops  well.  The  military  bookshops 
also  stocked  newspapers  of  every  political  complexion. 

The  armies  produced  their  own  local  newspapers.  I 
arranged  for  them  to  have  a  good  news  service. 

The  getting  up  of  concerts,  theaters,  and  moving- 
picture  shows  were  in  the  hands  of  the  army  authorities, 
and  we  encouraged  these  undertakings. 

In  view  of  the  enormous  demands  that  the  High 
Command  in  the  East  had  been  obliged  to  make  on  the 
troops  it  was  a  real  pleasure  to  do  everything  I  could 
for  them,  and  my  colleagues  helped  me  most  effec- 
tively in  this  work. 

The  military  efiBciency  of  the  troops  was  not  neg- 
lected. Training  was  promoted  as  far  as  possible, 
although  schools  could  not  be  established  on  the  same 
scale  as  they  were  in  the  West. 

The  Niemen  fortresses,  Grodno  and  Kovno,  as  also 
Libau,  were  strengthened,  and  the  former  frontier  lines 
maintained  in  a  state  of  readiness.  They  formed  re- 
serve positions.  The  labor  available  did  not  allow  of 
any  further  measures.  My  ordinary  duties  in  looking 
after  the  various  armies  were  very  considerably  in- 
creased by  the  demands  made  by  the  military  and  home 
authorities  in  the  occupied  territories — not  to  speak  of 
my  duty  to  take  care  of  the  local  population.  I  cheer- 
fully imdertook  all  these  new  duties  and  firmly  re- 
solved to  make  a  good  job  of  them. 

IV 

The  coiintry  was  in  a  devastated  condition  owing  to 
the  war,  and  only  where  we  had  been  in  occupation  for 
some  time  was  there  any  approach  to  order.    Some  of 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     221 

the  inhabitants  had  deliberately  left  in  the  van  of  the 
retreating  Russians;  others  had  been  taken  with  them. 
Numbers  of  these  had  hidden  themselves  in  the  depths 
of  the  forests  and  now  returned  home.  Many  proper- 
ties, however,  remained  unoccupied.  The  harvest  had 
not  been  reaped  and  it  was  impossible  to  imagine  how 
cultivation  was  to  be  continued.  There  was  no  con- 
trol. The  Russian  government  officials,  judges,  ad- 
ministrative authorities,  and  nearly  all  secret-intelli- 
gence agents  had  left  the  country.  There  were  neither 
gendarmerie  nor  police,  and  the  priests  alone  possessed 
a  remnant  of  authority.  This  denuded  country  had 
to  Hve  somehow.  At  the  very  outset  of  our  occupa- 
tion of  Vilna,  Kovno,  and  Grodno  serious  difficulties 
arose  in  connection  with  the  feeding  of  the  population, 
and  these  difficulties  threatened  to  increase  and  spread 
to  other  towns.  There  was  also  a  shortage  of  wood 
for  fuel. 

The  population,  apart  from  the  German  portion,  held 
aloof  from  us.  The  German  districts,  especially  the 
Baits,  had  welcomed  our  troops.  The  Letts  were 
opportunists,  and  awaited  events.  The  Lithuanians 
believed  the  hour  of  deliverance  was  at  hand,  and  when 
the  good  times  they  anticipated  did  not  materialize, 
owing  to  the  cruel  exigencies  of  war,  they  became  sus- 
picious once  more,  and  turned  against  us.  The  Poles 
were  hostile,  as  they  feared,  quite  justifiably,  a  pro- 
Lithuanian  policy  on  our  part.  The  White  Ruthenians 
were  of  no  accoimt,  as  the  Poles  had  robbed  them  of 
their  nationality  and  given  nothing  in  return.  In  the 
autumn  of  191 5  I  thought  I  would  like  to  obtain  some 
idea  of  the  distribution  of  this  race.  At  first  they  were, 
literally,  not  to  be  found.  Subsequently  we  discovered 
they  were  a  widely  scattered  people,  apparently  of 
Polish  origin,  but  with  such  a  low  standard  of  civiliza- 
tion that  much  time  would  be  required  before  we  could 


22£  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

do  anything  for  them.  The  Jew  did  not  know  what 
attitude  to  adopt,  but  he  gave  us  no  trouble,  and  we 
were  at  least  able  to  converse  with  him,  which  was 
hardly  ever  possible  with  the  Poles,  Lithuanians,  and 
Letts.  The  language  difficulties  weighed  heavily  against 
us  and  cannot  be  overestimated.  Owing  to  the  dearth 
of  German  works  of  reference  on  the  subject,  we  knew 
very  little  about  the  country  or  the  people,  and  found 
ourselves  in  a  strange  world. 

In  a  region  as  large  as  East  and  West  Prussia, 
Pomerania,  and  Posen  together  we  were  faced  with  an 
appalling  task.  We  had  to  construct  and  organize 
everything  afresh.  The  first  thing  to  be  done  was  to 
secure  peace  and  order  behind  the  army  and  put  an 
end  to  espionage.  The  land  must  be  made  self-sup- 
porting, and  further  supply  the  army  and  our  people 
at  home.  It  had  also  to  contribute  to  the  equipment 
of  troops  and  our  requirements  in  war  material.  Our 
economic  conditions,  due  to  the  enemy  blockade,  made 
this  course  an  imperative  duty. 

Agriculture  had  to  be  taken  in  hand  as  soon  as 
possible.  The  time  for  the  solution  of  political  prob- 
lems was  not  yet  at  hand.  These  matters  were  handed 
over  to  the  inspectors  of  the  lines  of  communication, 
who  were  primarily  concerned  with  the  administration 
of  occupied  territories. 

These  officers  were  given  the  duty  of  maintaining 
order  in  the  country.  The  lines-of-communication 
troops  were  at  their  disposal  for  this  purpose,  and  in 
the  work  of  counter-espionage  the  field  police  rendered 
assistance. 

The  inspectors  of  the  lines  of  communication  were 
given  special  organizations  for  the  administration  of 
the  district.  These  were  under  a  chief  administrator, 
who  was  given  special  duties  and  was  responsible  to  his 
particular  inspector  of  communications. 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     223 

The  commandants  on  the  lines  of  communication 
and  the  administrative  bodies  were  subordinate  to  the 
authority  of  the  inspectors.  Causes  of  friction,  of 
course,  there  were,  and  therefore,  among  Germans, 
friction  was  bound  to  arise.  However,  thanks  to  our 
excellent  inspectors,  all  these  difficulties  were  eventually 
overcome.  Generals  von  Harbou,  Madlung,  and  Frei- 
herr  von  Seckendorff  proved  themselves  efficient  dis- 
trict administrators. 

In  the  area  under  the  control  of  the  Commander-in- 
chief  in  the  East  administrative  and  economic  ques- 
tions were  studied  and  dealt  with  by  a  special  depart- 
ment. There  was  no  scope  for  a  General  Government, 
quite  apart  from  the  fact  that  it  would  have  been 
a  useless  piece  of  machinery.  The  armies  required 
their  own  lines  of  communication  area.  The  Quarter- 
master-General was  busy  in  the  West,  and  unable  to 
give  sufficient  attention  to  affairs  in  the  East.  The 
latter  had  to  take  matters  into  his  own  hands.  The 
inspectors  were  responsible  for  the  execution  of  any 
order  issued  by  him,  apart  from  their  own  particular 
duties. 

Owing  to  the  absence  of  any  native  administrative 
or  legal  machinery,  our  administration  had  a  character 
of  its  own,  which  enabled  it  to  withstand  the  storms  of 
the  revolution  in  November  191 8. 


I  can  give  only  a  brief  description  of  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  High  Command  in  the  East,  but  I  do  it 
gladly,  for  I  owe  as  many  thanks  to  my  assistants  in 
this  field  of  labor  as  I  do  to  those  who  helped  me  on 
the  military  side.  What  we  accomplished  together 
until  my  departure  in  191 6  was  admirable  in  every 
respect  and  worthy  of  the  German  character.     It  bene- 


2^4  LUDEXDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

fited  the  army  and  Germany  as  well  as  the  local  inhabi- 
tants and  the  country. 

I  required  many  colleagues  in  this  responsible  under- 
taking. They  were  not  all  appointed  at  once,  but  only 
as  occasion  and  necessity  demanded.  By  the  side  of 
my  military  staff  there  gradually  arose  an  extensive 
administrative  staff  imder  General  von  Eisenhart- 
Rothe,  a  man  of  wide  experience  in  economic  problems. 
He  ser\ed  the  cause  and  myself  with  infectious  and 
self-sacrificing  energy".  As  Intendant-General  he  was 
of  the  utmost  assistance  to  me  later  on. 

At  the  end  of  October  the  first  thing  to  be  done  was 
to  introduce  our  administration  into  the  newly  occupied 
portions  of  the  lines-of -communication  area,  as  had 
already  been  done  in  the  western  portions.  A  belt  of 
territory  along  the  front  remained  the  operations  zone, 
under  the  direct  control  of  the  army  commands.  The 
various  lines-of -communication  areas  had  adopted  dif- 
ferent methods,  but  centralization  was  imperative,  as 
otherwise  it  would  be  very  difficult  to  supervise  the 
administrative  machinery.  This  had  to  be  done  with 
tact  and  caution,  or  we  should  do  more  harm  than 
good- 

The  magnitude  of  the  task,  and  the  wide  region  to 
be  administered,  a  large  personnel  was  necessan,-,  in 
spite  of  all  efforts  to  be  as  economical  as  possible. 
Although  I  hold  the  %-iew  that  it  is  not  numbers  that 
matter,  but  individual  quality,  this  principle  is  neces- 
sarily subject  to  limitations.  I  could  not  carr\^  on  the 
work  without  a  certain  staff,  and  no  organization  could 
have  done  with  less  than  mine.  Ever}*body  did  his 
best.     I  could  not  have  dispensed  with  one  of  them. 

I  was  careful  that  the  military  character  of  our 
administration  in  the  area  under  the  control  of 
the  inspectors  of  lines  of  communication  "should  be 
maintained,  and,  above  all,  that  those  should  be  se- 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     225 

lected  who  were  no  longer  fit  for  service  at  the  front. 
But  I  also  used  civilians.  My  chief  preoccupation 
was  to  obtain  men  with  technical  training,  for  I  am 
not  one  of  those  who  believe  that  the  majority  of  men 
are  capable  of  holding  any  post.  I  have  often  ob- 
served how  a  little  technical  knowledge  helps  to  make 
the  work  easier  for  everybody.  For  purely  adminis- 
trative posts  I  was  compelled  to  take  men  without  pre- 
vious experience.  A  resolute  will,  general  experience, 
and  sound  common  sense  had  to  make  up  for  what 
was  lacking.  For  agriculture,  forestry,  law,  finance, 
ecclesiastical,  and  educational  affairs,  experts  were  ab- 
solutely necessary.  The  extraordinary  demands  on 
the  man-power  of  the  nation,  for  military  duties, 
made  it  at  first  difficult  to  obtain  the  necessary  men. 
Later  on,  when  the  administration  of  the  Commander- 
in-chief  in  the  East  attained  a  certain  reputation,  it 
was  an  easier  matter.  We  used  to  make  searching  in- 
quiries about  all  candidates  at  the  employment  bureaus 
at  home.  The  subordinate  posts  were  filled  by  the 
various  administrations,  and  lines-of-communication 
inspectorates  in  the  same  way.  I  insisted  upon  having 
reliable  men  on  this  foreign  soil.  Natives  were  em- 
ployed only  in  Courland,  and  then  sparingly. 

Everybody  co-operated  zealously  with  me  in  this 
strenuous  undertaking.  We  were  controlling  a  coun- 
try the  conditions  of  which  were  absolutely  luiknown 
to  us,  which  had  been  devastated  by  war,  and  in 
which  all  political  and  economic  bonds  had  been 
severed.  We  were  among  a  foreign  population,  con- 
sisting of  many  different  rival  races,  a  population  that 
did  not  speak  our  tongue  and  was  secretly  hostile.  All 
of  us  were  animated  by  the  spirit  of  faithful  devotion  to 
duty,  the  heritage  of  many  centuries  of  Prussian 
discipline  and  tradition. 

As  I  became  better  acquainted  with  the  country  I 


226  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

realized  that  some  measures  could  not  be  carried 
through,  but  would  have  to  be  modified.  Here  and 
there,  of  course,  things  might  have  been  gone  better  ^^ 
and  more  might  have  been  achieved.  But  my  duty 
was  to  act  promptly  and  decisively  in  these  unfamiliar 
conditions.  In  particular,  any  omission  in  matters 
economical  was  more  serious  than  a  mistake  which 
could  be  rectified  later.  Only  after  we  had  got  to 
work  on  the  problem  was  I  able  to  see  my  way  clearly. 
I  should  have  been  more  cautious  had  I  been  dealing 
with  a  political  problem,  but  I  was  not  concerned  with 
that  yet. 

VI 

The  territory  administered  by  the  Commander-in- 
chief  in  the  East  stretched  southward  to  parts  of  the 
lines-of -communication  area  of  the  army  group  under 
Field-Marshal  Prince  Leopold.  These  had  formerly 
been  the  areas  through  which  the  Twelfth  Army  ad- 
vanced and  subsequently  had  its  Hnes  of  communica- 
tion. The  forest  of  Bialowieser  thus  came  under  the 
administration  of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East. 
Its  ramifications  linked  with  the  whole  lines-of -com- 
munication system,  and  the  two  developed  side  by  side. 
Up  to  the  end  of  191 5  and  191 6  the  following  adminis- 
trative districts  had  been  created :  Courland,  Lithuania, 
Suwalki,  Vilna,  Grodno,  and  Bialystok.  The  boun- 
daries were  afterward  altered.  At  first  Vilna  and 
Suwalki  were  jointly  administered  from  Vilna.  At  my 
desire,  on  my  departure  in  July  19 16,  the  districts  of 
Vilna  and  Lithuania  were  combined  under  the  ad- 
ministration of  Lithuania.  In  the  first  instance  Grodno 
was  joined  to  Bialystok.  In  the  autumn  of  191 7  all 
these  districts  were  incorporated  in  Lithuania. 

The  chief  administrators  of  Courland  and  Lithuania 
have  attracted  much  public  attention. 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     227 

Major  von  Gossler  governed  Courland  in  an  un- 
obtrusive and  impartial  manner.  He  was  a  member  of 
the  Reichstag,  a  landowner,  and  an  ex-Landrat. 
Since  1905  the  Baits  had  been  very  bitter  against  the 
Letts.  He  understood  not  only  how  to  make  the  former 
more  conciliatory,  but  also  how  to  win  the  sympathy 
of  the  latter  and  gain  their  active  co-operation.  In 
Courland  they  still  speak  with  gratitude  and  apprecia- 
tion of  his  just  and  far-seeing  administration. 

Lieutenant-Colonel  Prince  von  Isenburg,  in  Lith- 
uania, was  more  impulsive,  perhaps  too  much  so.  He 
was  an  energetic  man  who  managed  his  family  estates 
admirably.  My  attention  was  first  drawn  to  him  in 
occupied  Poland,  where  he  had  taken  a  useful  part  in 
the  administration.  The  Lieutenant-Colonel  later  fell 
a  victim  to  politics. 

So  long  as  I  remained  in  Kovno  politics  played  no 
part  in  the  administration.  Prince  von  Isenburg  had 
fuU  opportunity  for  interesting  himself  in  the  affairs 
of  the  other  districts  and  enHsting  the  sympathies 
of  the  population  and  clergy  of  the  small  district  then 
nuder  his  cntrol. 

I  am  sorry  I  cannot  give  the  names  of  various  other 
deserving  administrators.  The  personality  of  the  Lines 
of  Communication  Inspector,  Gen.  Freiherr  von  Secken- 
dorff,  made  itself  felt,  particularly  in  the  Bialystok 
district.  He  gave  his  administration  a  character  of  its 
own.  Nowhere  else  did  the  lines-of-communication 
commandants  and  the  heads  of  districts  work  so  well 
together  and  with  so  little  friction  from  the  start. 

The  chief  administrators  and  Hnes-of-communica- 
tion  inspectors  were  in  all  respects  responsible  to  the 
Commander  -in-chief  in  the  East  for  the  administration 
of  the  country.  They  had  a  body  of  officials  under 
them  corresponding  to  the  economic  section  of  my  staff. 

The  administrative  districts  were  divided  into  circles, 


228  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

often  as  large  as  a  line-of-communication  area  in  the 
West.  The  onus  of  the  administrative  work,  as  regards 
its  economic  and  agricultural  aspects,  lay  on  the  presi- 
dent and  head  of  the  circle.  He  had  nothing  to  do  with 
the  law,  which  had  equal  authority  with  his  own. 
The  heads  of  the  circles  ranked  with  town  majors  of  the 
larger  towns. 

Subordinated  to  the  district  commandants  were  the 
mayors  of  the  small  towns  and  the  area  presidents  in 
the  country,  and  under  the  latter  were  the  village 
presidents.  Attached  to  the  district  commandantis 
were  specialist  agricultural  officers,  whose  duty  was  to 
supervise  cultivation  and  estate  management,  and  to 
take  steps  for  increasing  production  and  utihzing  the 
harvest.  Other  officials  assisted  the  commandants  in 
producing  all  kinds  of  raw  material  required  for  war 
purposes. 

The  uniform  system  of  administration  outlined  above 
was  only  gradually  introduced  in  accordance  with  an 
administrative  decree  of  June  7,  1916. 

These  districts  had  a  body  of  gendarmerie  for  their 
police  force.  In  the  provinces  they  were  formed  into 
detachments,  and  in  the  district  under  the  Commander- 
in-chief  in  the  East  they  were  formed  into  a  corps.  I 
deeply  regretted  the  lack  of  German  police  forces. 
Germany  could  not  spare  sufficient  gendarmes,  and  I 
was  therefore  compelled  to  commandeer  older  men  from 
the  front.  They  received  special  instructions  to  fit 
them  in  some  measure  for  their  duties.  Col.  Rochus 
Schmidt,  a  particularly  careful  officer,  and  I  would 
gladly  have  found  some  better  arrangement,  but  the 
whole  thing  "  was  a  makeshift.  Unfortunately  in- 
dividual gendarmes  may  have  added  to  the  discontent 
which  showed  itself  later.  How  could  they  be  expected 
to  give  satisfaction  and  accomplish  anything  in  a 
strange  land  and  among  a  hostile  population,  and  with 


1:^000000 


»IG.   6.      JURISDICTION   OF    THE   COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF   IN   THE  EAST 


230  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

insufficient  knowledge  of  the  language?  This  one 
question  will  illustrate  the  difficulties  which  Germans 
in  a  foreign  land  had  to  encounter.  Dishonesty  and 
profiteering  are  absolutely  inexcusable.  The  loyalty 
of  the  gendarmes  brought  them  into  conflict  with  the 
numerous  armed  bands,  and  many  of  them  lost  their 
lives.     This  must  never  be  forgotten. 

The  government  of  the  country  included  the  ad- 
ministration of  justice,  which  was  so  arranged  as  to 
fit  in  with  the  district  organization.  In  each  district 
there  was  a  district  court  for  the  local  population;  we 
had  to  create  them,  as  there  were  none.  The  provincial 
courts  were  set  up  as  a  kind  of  higher  court,  perhaps 
unnecessarily. 

The  High  Court  in  Kovno,  under  President  Kratzen- 
berg,  was  the  final  court  of  appeal.  As  chief  of  the 
Department  of  Justice  he  had  to  take  considerable  part 
in  its  administrative  business. 

The  functions  of  the  lines-of -communication  tribunals 
were  in  no  way  restricted  by  these  district  courts.  The 
courts  worked  well,  both  together  and  independently. 

The  forestry  service  in  the  various  provinces  was  out- 
side the  district  organization.  Inspectorates  were 
created  according  to  the  forest  areas,  of  which  that  at 
Bialovics  became  the  best  known. 


VII 

Vitality  had  to  be  infused  into  this  administrative 
system,  if  it  was  to  accomplish  useful  work.  It  could 
not  become  bureaucratic,  but  must  adapt  itself  to  the 
needs  of  the  situation.  "Precedent,"  that  grave- 
digger  of  independent  judgment,  could  not  apply  here, 
thank  God! 

I  had  the  services  of  Captains  von  Brockhusen  and 
Preiherr  von  Gayl,  of  the  Reserve,  in  the  whole  business 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     231 

of  building  up  the  administrative  machine.  Prior  to 
the  war  the  former  had  been  a  Landrat,  and  the  latter 
director  of  the  East  Prussian  Land  Company  at 
Konigsberg.  We  produced  a  sound  organization,  well 
fitted  to  cope  with  the  heavy  demands  made  upon  it. 

We  gave  special  attention  to  the  health  of  the  popu- 
lation. We  triumphed  over  spotted  fever,  which  was 
rampant  in  many  places.  It  involved  heavy  sacrifices 
in  doctors. 

To  pacify  the  population  and  give  material  relief  to 
the  country  we  made  a  beginning  with  the  redemption 
of  requisition  notes  issued  by  the  troops  during  opera- 
tions. It  was  a  difficult  and  complicated  matter  to 
carry  through.  From  now  on  we  paid  for  everything 
in  cash.  I  wanted  in  that  way  to  help  the  country 
and  increase  its  productivity — in  my  view  a  very  im- 
portant matter. 

It  was  necessary  for  us  to  obtain  control  of  the 
products  of  the  soil,  and  to  insure  the  proper  manage- 
ment of  agriculture  and  full  utilization  of  the  soil. 
This  was  all  the  more  difficult  because  the  population 
was  so  small.  For  example,  the  district  of  Bauske 
numbered  only  four  inhabitants  to  the  square  kilometer. 

In  our  anxiety  to  help  the  home  country,  and  indeed 
under  pressure,  we  attempted  too  much  in  the  way  of 
cultivation.  We  interested  German  companies  in  the 
business  in  the  hope  of  their  being  able,  with  the 
means  at  their  disposal,  to  improve  the  cultivation  of 
the  thinly  populated  regions. 

We  took  big  estates  under  our  own  management. 
Motor-plows  and  agricultural  machinery  of  all  kinds 
were  supplied.  Seed  was  distributed.  Army  horses 
helped  in  the  plowing.  The  main  thing,  however,  was 
to  stimulate  the  interest  of  the  local  population  by 
paying  ready  money  and  fixing  fair  prices. 

The  prices  we  allowed  were  lower  than  those  adopted 


232  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

by  the  General  Government  of  Warsaw,  but  they  were 
quite  adequate.  We  took  into  consideration  the  al- 
ready enormous  expenditure  of  the  Treasury.  Prince 
Max's  Government  raised  the  prices  immediately — I 
do  not  know  why;   at  any  rate,  he  got  no  thanks  for  it. 

The  soil  was,  generally  speaking,  unproductive,  and 
disappointed  our  hopes.  It  is  not  drained,  and  culti- 
vation can  be  attempted  only  late  in  the  season.  The 
varieties  of  seed  were  not  selected  with  sufficient  care. 
Artificial  manure  was  unknown.  The  yield  of  hay  and 
clover,  rape-seed  and  flax,  was  alone  satisfactory. 

The  transport  of  stores  to  the  railway  and  other 
collecting  stations  was  a  particularly  arduous  business. 
The  roads  were  bad,  and  it  took  days  to  get  the  produce 
of  the  land  to  these  places  in  small  carts  drawn  by  one 
or  two  horses.  We  paid  premiums,  but  the  peculiar 
difficulties  of  this  theater  of  war  could  only  be  reduced, 
not  eliminated.     A  good  deal  was  never  delivered  at  all. 

Arrangements  were  immediately  made  for  the  instal- 
lation of  a  potato-drying  plant,  and  we  took  steps  to 
organize  the  production  of  fodder  from  wood  and  straw. 

It  was  doubly  necessary  to  exploit  to  the  full  the  re- 
sources of  the  occupied  territory,  as  the  demands  on 
the  home  cattle  stocks  were  so  great.  Cattle  had,  of 
course,  suffered  severely,  owing  to  the  war.  A  census 
had  to  be  taken.  It  was  a  difficult  business.  Many 
were  hidden  in  the  cellars  or  driven  into  the  forests, 
but  we  were  gradually  successfiil  in  our  stock-taking, 
although  there  was  no  register.  But  by  degrees  we 
got  a  regular  trade  going. 

We  paid  much  attention  to  the  cultivation  of  vege- 
tables and  fruit.  Jam  and  marmalade  factories  were 
established.  Mushrooms  in  large  quantities  were  col- 
lected and  dried. 

The  fishing  rights  of  the  numerous  large  lakes  were 
leased.     At  Libau  deep-sea  fishing  was  organized. 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     233 

Everything  that  could  be  used  for  food  was  de- 
veloped to  the  fullest  extent. 

The  condition  of  the  town  population  was  desperate, 
and  in  the  winter  of  191 5-16  we  were  compelled  to 
draw  on  our  military  stores  for  the  alleviation  of  dis- 
tress. Later,  the  conditions  improved  considerably. 
The  army  received  its  share,  and  I  also  helped  the 
home  country.  I  remember  that  when  in  June  or 
July  19 1 6  Herr  von  Batocki  asked  me  to  assist  Berlin, 
I  was  in  a  position  to  do  so. 

In  order  to  help  the  coimtry  we  permitted  the  ac- 
tivities of  the  existing  foreign  maintenance  committees 
of  the  various  nationalities  inhabiting  the  occupied 
territory,  on  condition  that  their  support  should  not 
be  confined  to  inhabitants  of  their  own  nationality, 
but  that  they  should  also  consider  others.  The  Jewish 
committee,  which  had  the  largest  means  at  its  dis- 
posal (derived  from  America),  showed  itself  broad- 
minded,  and  did  useful  work.  Its  activities  testified  to 
the  extraordinary  imity  of  this  people  and  won  recog- 
nition. The  first  Jewish  national  kitchen  established 
in  Kovno  bore  my  name.  The  army  Rabbi  Rosenack 
made  the  suggestion  to  me. 

Men  of  proved  ability  gave  me  their  assistance  in  all 
agricultural  and  food  problems.  Among  these  names 
the  most  prominent  are  those  of  the  well-known  mem- 
ber of  the  Prussian  Upper  Chamber,  Major  Count 
Yorck  of  Wartenburg,  Geh.  Reg.  Rat  Captain  von 
Rumker,  and  later  Hojkammerrat  Major  Heckel. 

The  conscription  of  horses  naturally  lay  in  the  hands 
of  the  military.  In  this  matter  the  district  com- 
mandants performed  the  same  duties  as  the  Prussian 
Landrat.  The  occupied  territory  had  to  supply  a 
large  number,  if  we  wished  to  avoid  making  yet  heavier 
demands  on  the  home  country.  The  Lithuanian  horse 
is  small  and  strong;    it  possesses  great  powers  of  en- 


234  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

durance,  and  its  wants  are  few.     It  is,  therefore,  a  very- 
useful  animal  for  military  purposes. 

The  country  was  bound  to  suffer  severely  as  the  re- 
sult of  the  continuous  heavy  demands  made  upon  it 
and  the  constant  levies  of  horses  and  cattle.  The  local 
administrative  authorities  often  drew  my  attention  to 
this  fact,  but  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  insist  on 
these  deliveries.  The  area  governed  by  us  was  no 
more  severely  taxed  than  any  other.  The  home  coun- 
try also  suffered  from  the  measures  we  were  forced  to 
adopt. 

A  great  deal  of  the  discontent  that  was  apparent  later 
was  traceable  to  these  inevitable  military  requisitions. 
Severities  that  occurred  from  time  to  time  may  have 
increased  this  ill  feeling ;  they  certainly  did  harm.  The 
poHtical  democratic  agitators  made  it  their  business  to 
add  fuel  to  the  flames. 

It  would  have  been  an  absurdity  to  spare  the  area  ad- 
ministered by  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  from 
humanitarian  reasons  at  the  cost  of  our  own  country. 

Owing  to  the  intensive  cultivation  in  Germany,  any 
action  prejudicial  to  the  agricultural  industry  must  be 
far  more  harmful  than  decreased  productivity  in  the 
area  of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East. 

The  provision  of  raw  material  was  an  important 
undertaking,  for  which  we  also  paid  cash.  The  Jew 
was,  in  this  instance,  indispensable  as  middleman.  We 
supplied  the  home  War  Department  with  skins  and 
hides,  copper  and  brass,  rags  and  scrap  iron,  and  further 
relieved  it  by  taking  over  and  managing  the  factories 
in  Libau,  Kovno,  and  Bialystok.  A  very  extensive 
trade  department  was  gradually  established,  under  the 
control  of  Geheimrat  Major  Eilsberger,  a  man  of  fore- 
sight and  energy,  who  later  became  Ministerial  Director 
in  the  Imperial  Treasury. 

Great  importance  was  attached  to  the  manufacture  of 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     235 

barbed  wire.  This  and  the  management  of  other  fac- 
tories was  efficiently  undertaken  by  Captain  Markau, 
who  in  peace  had  been  with  the  General  Electric  Com- 
pany, and  during  the  war  with  the  Chief  of  the  Field 
Telegraphs  on  the  Eastern  front.  So  everything  was 
put  to  the  fullest  possible  use. 

Among  other  things  a  large  railway  workshop  was 
established  at  Libau  by  the  military  railway  directorate. 

With  the  provision  of  raw  materials  there  was  a  slight 
improvement  in  trade,  which  was  necessarily  hampered 
by  the  restrictions  on  personal  intercourse,  which  for  mili- 
tary reasons  we  were  compelled  to  impose  on  the  country. 

The  rich  forests  particularly  invited  exploitation,  but 
indiscriminate  felling  was  prohibited.  The  consump- 
tion of  wood  for  field  works  and  railway  sleepers  was 
enormous.  Sawmills  arose  one  after  the  other,  and 
as  we  gradually  provided  for  all  the  needs  of  our  army, 
we  were  also  able  to  deliver  wood  to  the  West  and  to 
Serbia.  Suitable  timber  was  sent  to  Germany,  and  also 
given  to  the  inhabitants  for  the  rebuilding  of  their  homes. 

At  Alt-Autz,  in  Courland,  the  chief  of  the  Aviation 
Services  erected  a  workshop  for  sheds  and  barracks. 

Sleepers  were  constructed  in  considerable  numbers. 

It  was  extremely  difficult  to  have  the  stocks  of  wood 
necessary  for  heating  purposes  always  in  readiness, 
especially  in  the  winter  of  191 5-16,  as  we  lacked  all 
idea  of  the  quantities  required. 

Cellulose  wood  for  the  manufacture  of  powder  and 
paper  was  sent  to  Germany  in  considerable  quantities. 
We  soon  allowed  unrestricted  trade  in  this  particular 
kind  of  wood,  as  we  and  Germany  profited  by  it.  I 
was  glad  to  be  able  to  help  the  supply  of  paper  to  the 
German  newspapers. 

Raft  transport  on  the  Niemen  and  other  navigable 
rivers  was  undertaken  and  magnificently  organized  by 
Forstrat  Schutte. 


236  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

We  turned  our  attention  to  the  production  of  resin, 
and,  acting  under  the  advice  of  Oberforster  Kienitz, 
introduced  this  industry  into  those  districts.  It  is  a 
tedious  but  nevertheless  profitable  process.  It  was  in- 
tended to  demonstrate  it  in  Germany  at  a  later  date. 
A  factory  for  preparing  the  resin  was  established  at 
Kovno.  From  the  wood  we  also  extracted  various 
chemicals,  and  from  the  residue  made  charcoal.  For- 
strat  Kirchner  and  many  other  officials  have  left  a 
monument  of  their  energy  and  foresight.  The  work 
done  by  Forstrat  Major  Escherich,  both  as  an  organizer 
of  agriculture  and  administrative  official  in  his  district 
of  the  Bialovieser  forest,  has  been  the  admiration  of 
many  German  visitors. 

The  agricultural  possibilities  of  the  land  were  very 
thoroughly  developed  in  every  direction,  but  we  spared 
the  country  and  local  population  as  much  as  we  could. 
Consideration  for  the  rate  of  exchange  made  it  impos- 
sible always  to  pay  in  German  money.  In  agreement 
with  the  Imperial  Bank  and  the  authorities  in  Berlin, 
the  Army-Intendant  Geheimrat  Kessel  and  Captain 
Konigs  issued  special  local  coinage  of  the  Commander- 
in-chief  in  the  East,  which  was  soon  gladly  accepted. 
We  also  opened  German  banks  in  order  to  revitalize 
economic  conditions. 

It  was  no  simple  matter  to  finance  the  whole  admin- 
istration. Geh.  Ober-Finanzrat  Captain  Tiesler,  who 
distinguished  himself  by  his  peculiarly  clear  insight 
and  creative  gifts,  undertook  this  duty  with  great  skill. 

FORESTRY 

He  had  to  draw  up  an  exact  budget  for  the  entire  ad- 
ministration and  at  the  same  time  find  sources  of  revenue. 

As  I  have  said  before,  the  numbers  employed  were 
kept  down  as  much  as  possible.     There  was  an  ab- 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     237 

solute  scramble  among  the  various  departments  of 
my  administration  for  places  and  extra  pay  for  the 
subordinates. 

The  commandants  on  the  lines  of  communication 
were  always  coming  to  me  with  fresh  demands.  I 
had  to  smooth  things  over,  and  so  gained  some  idea  of 
the  trials  and  anxieties  of  our  national  financial 
administration. 

As  soon  as  we  had  successfully  drawn  up  our  first 
budget  we  forwarded  it  to  the  War  Ministry  in  Berlin  and 
to  the  Quartermaster-General.  After  careful  scrutiny 
and  violent  disagreement  it  was  at  last  approved. 

Our  revenue  was  derived  from  customs,  monopoHes. 
taxes,  and  national  industries. 

The  technical  details  of  the  whole  system  of  taxation 
had  to  be  arranged  on  the  simplest  possible  lines.  It 
would  have  been  impossible  to  introduce  a  more  com- 
plicated and  therefore  more  equitable  system  in  the 
first  place,  because  we  lacked  a  trained  staff.  Besides, 
nothing  had  been  left  of  the  Russian  system,  and  in 
any  case  the  population  was  ignorant  of  these  matters. 
The  bulk  of  our  revenue  was  derived  from  customs, 
indirect  taxation,  and  monopolies,  in  view  of  the 
Russian  practice. 

Import  duties  were  collected  at  the  frontiers  bj 
Prussian  financial  officials,  against  an  indemnity  co  the 
Prussian  Treasury. 

Private  parcels  intended  for  the  army  were,  of  course, 
duty  free.  Only  the  few  consignments  intended  for 
the  population  were  affected,  and  the  revenue  derived 
from  this  source  was  small. 

We  levied  a  small  export  duty  only  on  cellulose  wood. 
It  did  not  bring  in  much. 

The  taxes  yielded  more.  Captain  Tiesler  established 
a  monopoly  of  the  sale  of  cigarettes,  the  financial 
technicalities  of  which  seem  to  me  worthy  of  imita- 


238  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

tion.  Monopolies  of  spirits,  salt,  matches,  and  con- 
fectionery were  introduced  on  the  same  lines. 

We  introduced  a  rough  system  of  graded  taxation 
per  head.  We  could  not  have  any  better  basis  for  a 
system  of  personal  assessment. 

As  regards  taxation  on  property,  we  introduced  a 
tax  on  land  and  profits  and  inhabited  house  duty. 

The  people  on  the  whole  were  satisfied  with  the 
taxation,  which  did  not  burden  them  heavily.  The 
total  taxes  per  head,  including  the  local  rates,  did  not 
exceed  19.50  marks^  annually,  as  against  32.75  marks 
before  the  war.  They  could  not,  however,  get  used 
to  the  dog  license.  Owing  to  hydrophobia,  dogs  had 
become  a  danger  to  the  country,  and  counter  measures 
had  to  be  taken.  The  tax,  however,  was  abolished 
when  its  purpose  in  that  respect  had  been  accomplished. 

At  first  the  Government  undertakings  yielded  very 
little  profit.  This  was  due  partly  to  the  heavy  initial 
expenses  and  the  high  cost  of  liquidation,  and  partly  to 
the  economic  isolation  of  Germany,  which  made  it 
necessary  to  concentrate  on  increase  of  production 
rather  than  financial  profit. 

I  have  indicated  only  the  principal  items  of  taxation. 
Further  sources  of  revenue  were  gradually  developed. 
The  results  were  favorable,  for  the  receipts  sufficed 
for  the  administration  of  the  country  without  assistance 
from  the  Imperial  Treasury.  A  system  had  been  es- 
tablished which,  though  based  on  broad  principles,_had 
required  the  most  careful  elaboration  in  detail. 


VIII 

The  legal  system  was  in  accordance  with  the  Hague 
Convention.     This  required  in  matters  of  private  litiga- 

*  Before  the  war  a  mark  was  equal  to  24J4  cents,  United  States  gold 
oney. 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     239 

tion  that  the  local  population  should  have  the  benefit 
of  its  own  laws.  Our  first  business,  however,  was  to 
find  out  what  the  law  really  was.  This  was  no  easy 
matter,  owing  to  the  confusion  in  the  Russian  system, 
a  confusion  which  had  existed  in  this  region  even  before 
the  war. 

When  we  found  out  what  the  law  was  it  had  to  be 
translated  into  German  to  enable  the  German  judges 
to  give  judgment  accordingly.  I  firmly  believe  that 
only  the  Germans  would  take  so  much  trouble  in  a 
conquered  country.  In  spite  of  that,  enemy  propa- 
ganda announced  us  as  Huns  to  the  world  at  large  so 
successfully  that  we  were  helpless  against  it. 

President  Kratzenberg  did  excellent  work  in  his 
quiet,  clear-headed  way.  The  German  judge  admin- 
istered foreign  laws  to  the  poor,  vermin-infested  vil- 
lages of  Lithuania  in  the  same  spirit  of  justice  and  im- 
partiality that  he  would  have  shown  in  BerHn.  Who 
can  emulate  this? 

Major  Altman,  Inspector  of  Schools  in  the  Prussian 
Ministry  of  Education,  drew  up  a  scheme  for  the 
guidance  of  schools,  to  the  further  benefit  of  the 
population.  It  was  conceived  in  a  lofty  spirit,  and 
respected  the  rights  of  each  denomination  and  race. 
Here,  as  elsewhere,  anything  of  a  provocative  nature 
was  studiously  excluded.  There  was  a  dearth  of 
teachers  for  the  schools,  so  we  supplied  numbers  of  the 
teaching  profession  from  the  Landsturm.  Later  on, 
the  complaint  was  made  that  they  spoke  only  German 
to  the  children,  who,  after  all,  attended  voluntarily. 
The  teachers  unfortunately  knew  no  other  language, 
and  we  had  very  few  Lithuanian  or  Polish-speaking 
teachers  at  our  disposal. 

We  turned  our  attention  to  the  question  of  school- 
books,  for  various  Polish  school-books  had  shown  me 
what  education  can  do  to  intensify  national  feeling. 


240  ludi:ndorff's  own  story 

Dantzic,  Gnescn,  Pof:cn,  and  Vilna  were  Polish  towns. 
This  fact  imiJTCss^/A  me  as  dec^^ly  as  the  systematic 
manner  in  which  France  had  educated  her  youth  in  the 
idf:^  of  revanche  ma/le  a  deep  imjjression  ufx>»n  me.  ITie 
Poles  and  the  French  have  by  the<x;  means  kc-^A  alive 
a  str«'/rj^{  national  feeling,  which  stands  them  in  good 
stead  nov/.  We  have  not  jjursuefl  such  an  educational 
XX>licy,  and  suffere^l  from  the  faf:t  that  the  strong 
national  idea  has  not  been  instilled  into  our  youth. 
Such  a  feeling  is  necc^ssary  if  a  country  is  to  survive 
crir^es  such  as  we  have  live*"!  through  since  1914,  and 
now  more  than  ever.  Thh  view  is  rejected  by  all  who 
think  that  the  ideal  of  human  l^rotherhood  comes  first. 
'ITiat  is  natural  enough  from  their  jjoint  of  view.  The 
logic  of  facts,  howevc-r,  is  against  thc-m  until  all  nations 
adopt  the  same  jxjint  (jf  view.  We  now  stand  in  sore 
n^icd  of  such  a  rXv'mg  r)iii\(m',x]  icj-}\r\y^. 

No  reconstructions  wctc  mipfy^d  on  any  one  in  the 
■pTOj^\c:it  of  his  religion.  We  went  so  far  in  our  desire 
l()V  tok^ation  as  to  give  the  Jew:;  v/hcaten  flour  for 
unleavened  hmaxl. 

Tha  Evangelical  clergy  in  Courland  were  on  our 
side,  and  we  wctc  s<'>on  <yn  satisfactory  icrmv,  v/ith 
the  Catholic  jwiesthood  of  Lithuania.  'J'he  Polish 
Catholics,  howcvcT,  were  hostile  to  us.  To  a  certain 
extent  the  attitude  of  the  pec^jle  toward  ur;  was  re- 
flected in  that  of  the  Church,  but  the  Lithuanian  clcTgy 
wc^e  on  the  whole  better  dlsx^osed  to  us  than  the 
dem ocTJu;y  in  Vilna,  who  f/jon  lost  all  status  through 
their  muddle-hea/led  ambitions. 

The  J^>li;;h  clergy  were  the  x)illar  of  Polish  national 
X>ropaganda.  They  had  pr (•/.:< trvcd  that  character  evf^ 
under  the  Russian  knout,  'i'hey  were  at  war  with  the 
Lithuanians  and  harj  alrearjy  overthrown  the  White 
Kuthenians.  That  the  I<uf;;;ians  should  have  a]lr;wed 
Buch  a  state  of  affairs  is  incomprehensible.     The  White 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     241 

Ruthenes  had  to  conduct  their  reHgious  service  in 
Polish,  not  in  their  own  tongue.  And  this  with  Rus- 
sian approval.  The  assistance  of  the  clergy  was  in- 
voked to  oppress  the  White  Ruthenians,  the  same  as 
their  brothers  in  East  Galicia. 

The  Poles  soon  put  forward  claims  in  educational 
matters,  and  were  anxious  to  have  their  own  university 
in  Vilna,  but  I  refused  permission. 

As  long  as  I  controlled  the  administration  we  main- 
tained a  neutral  attitude  toward  the  various  races. 
The  Poles  regarded  us  as  anti-Polish  because  we  gave 
the  Lithuanians  equal  rights  with  them.  I  knew  we 
should  make  no  friends  by  pursuing  a  neutral  poHcy. 

I  had  purposely  held  aloof  from  racial  politics,  as  I 
knew  it  would  be  impossible  to  deal  with  this  question 
until  the  Polish  situation  had  been  cleared  up.  As  the 
Imperial  Government  did  not  commit  itself  to  any 
definite  policy,  my  reserve  was  justified.  In  view  of 
the  general  condition  of  the  country,  any  political 
intervention  would  have  been  mistimed 


LAW 

I  could,  therefore,  not  make  up  my  mind  to  ask  the 
Imperial  Chancellor  to  draw  up  any  definite  political 
program,  and  merely  kept  him  informed  as  to  my  views. 

Every  race  had  its  own  newspaper,  which  was,  of 
course,  subject  to  censorship.  As  a  German  paper,  the 
Kovnoer  Zeitung  took  precedence.  For  the  press  and 
the  censorship.  Captain  Berkkau  acted  as  my  adviser. 
He  combined  great  energy  and  a  detailed  knowledge  of 
press  technicalities  with  an  independent  and  mature 
political  judgment,  and  so  was  of  great  use  to  me.  He 
had  previously  worked  with  the  publishing-house  of 
Ulstein,  while  the  editor  of  the  Kovnoer  Zeitung,  Lieu- 
tenant Osman,  had  been  on  the  staff  of  the  Deutschg 


242  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Tageszeitung.  With  his  strong  national  bias,  he  was 
just  what  I  wanted. 

I  gave  all  newspapers  clear  instructions  to  discuss 
events  in  Germany  in  a  spirit  acceptable  to  the  Imperial 
Government.  I  could  not,  of  course,  permit  any  polit- 
ical activity  on  the  part  of  the  people,  who  were  also 
forbidden  to  hold  meetings. 

Despite  the  necessary  limitation  of  intercourse  among 
the  population,  I  permitted  a  certain  amount  of  corre- 
spondence. I  established  a  local  post,  with  the  aid  of 
the  Imperial  Post-Office.  Imperial  postage  stamps 
were  used,  surcharged  for  the  territory  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-chief in  the  East. 

Lastly,  we  allowed  freer  intercourse  between  the 
Lithuanians  and  Jews  and  their  compatriots  in  the 
United  States. 

We  observed  with  satisfaction  that  the  country  was 
gradually  settling  down  and  that  life  was  once  more 
falling  into  an  orderly  routine.  The  German  love  of 
order  and  knowledge  of  hygiene  carried  the  day.  The 
peasant  earned  more  than  he  had  done  under  the  Rus- 
sians.    In  the  towns  business  was  revived. 

The  population  was  governed  with  a  calm  and  steady 
hand.  I  objected  to  the  compulsory  military  salute  in- 
troduced by  one  army.  I  believe  that  to-day  the  peo- 
ple will  acknowledge  that  we  acted  with  justice  and 
consideration. 

IX 

Industrial  reconstruction  in  the  occupied  area  was 
undertaken  by  the  troops.  In  particular,  many  saw- 
mills were  erected,  there  being  not  only  a  big  demand 
for  planks,  but  also  wood  shavings  for  the  mattresses  of 
officers  and  men,  and  bedding  for  the  horses. 

The  monotony  of  trench  warfare  was  greatly  relieved 
for  the  men  by  their  industrial  employment.     I  sym- 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     245 

pathized  with  this  feeling,  and  was  glad  to  find  a  fresh 
field  in  which  to  serve  the  Fatherland.  A  very  stimu- 
lating piece  of  work  had  fallen  to  me,  and  it  absorbed 
my  whole  attention.  I  came  to  know  splendid  men 
and  had  to  interest  myself  in  many  activities  quite 
new  to  me.  It  was  a  great  satisfaction  to  me  to  know 
that  the  authorities  placed  full  confidence  in  me.  My 
will  permeated  every  branch  of  the  administrative  ser- 
vices, and  kept  alive  their  zeal  for  work.  We  felt  that 
we  were  working  for  Germany's  future,  even  in  a  strange 
land.  We  especially  hoped  to  open  a  field  for  German 
colonization  in  Courland.  I  prohibited  the  sale  of  land 
in  order  to  lay  the  foundation  of  a  sound  land  and 
colonial  policy,  and  also  to  prevent  its  exploitation. 
At  that  time  I  had  in  mind  plans  similar  to  those  which 
the  navy  had  carried  out  with  great  success  at  Kiao-chau. 

What  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  accom- 
plished in  the  short  time  before  the  beginning  of  August 
1916,  when  I  left,  was  a  work  for  civilization. 

The  beautiful  gift  later  presented  co  me  in  Pless  by 
the  administrative  officials  will  always  remind  me  of 
the  time  when  it  was  granted  me,  in  the  midst  of  war, 
to  do  constructive  work. 

This  work  was  not  wasted,  for  it  certainly  helped  the 
home  country,  the  army,  and  the  land  itself  during  the 
war,  but  whether  seeds  have  remained  in  the  soil  which 
may  later  spring  up  and  bear  fruit  is  a  question  de- 
pendent on  our  hard  fate  and  one  that  only  the  future 
can  answer. 


THE   CAMPAIGN    AND    CRISIS    IN   THE    EAST 

While  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  was 
quietly  working  for  the  welfare  of  the  army  and  the 
occupied  territory,  the  war  continued  on  its  course. 


144  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

In  November  and  December  191 5  our  successes 
against  Serbia  and  Montenegro  had  brought  on  the 
fourth  Isonzo  battle;  and  about  Christmas  the  Russian 
offensive  on  the  southern  portion  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  front.  This  attack  lasted  into  January  of  191 6. 
Both  concluded  in  a  successful  resistance  on  the  part 
of  oiu"  allies. 

The  two  general  staffs  had  now  to  make  their  plans 
for  the  campaign  of  191 6.  Both  were  to  attempt  an 
offensive  to  bring  about  a  decision.  The  German  com- 
mand was  to  attack  at  Verdun,  while  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  command  was  to  invade  Italy  from  the  Tyrol. 

This  necessitated  the  transfer  of  troops  and  material 
to  the  Eastern  front,  to  meet  the  Russian  offensive, 
which  could  be  reckoned  on  as  a  certainty. 

From  a  strategical  point  of  view  Verdun  as  the  point 
of  attack  was  well  chosen.  This  fortress  had  always 
served  as  a  particularly  dangerous  sally-port,  which 
very  seriously  threatened  our  rear  communications,  as 
the  autumn  of  191 8  disastrously  proved.  Had  we  only 
been  able  to  reach  the  defenses  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Meuse,  we  should  have  achieved  complete  success. 
Our  strategic  position  on  the  Western  front,  as  well  as 
the  tactical  situation  of  our  troops  in  the  St.-Mihiel 
salient,  would  have  been  materially  improved.  The 
attack  began  on  February  21  and  had  a  great  success, 
especially  during  the  early  days,  owing  to  the  sterling 
qualities  of  our  men.  The  advantage,  however,  was 
insufficiently  exploited,  and  our  advance  soon  came  to 
a  standstill.  At  the  beginning  of  March  the  world 
was  still  under  the  impression  that  the  Germans  had 
won  a  victory  at  Verdun, 

The  Tyrol  offensive  against  Italy  by  the  Austrian 
troops  was  to  begin  only  at  the  end  of  April  or  early  in 
May.  Owing  to  the  bad  railway  commimications, 
preparation  had  to  be  made  very  early. 


HEADQUARTERS  ON   EASTERN  FRONT     245 

To  make  the  offensive  against  Verdun  possible,  heavy 
artillery  had  to  be  transferred  from  the  German  Eastern 
front  to  the  West.  The  High  Command  had  with- 
drawn more  divisions  from  Serbia,  and  in  order  to  rein- 
force the  Italian  front  the  Eastern  front  had  been 
greatly  weakened  by  the  Austrian  General  Staff.  Both 
offensives  suffered  from  the  fact  that  inadequate  re- 
serves prevented  the  first  successes  from  being  followed 
up.  At  Verdun,  perhaps,  as  the  offensive  was  limited, 
from  a  tactical  point  of  view,  we  might  have  obtained 
a  moderately  favorable  conclusion  at  not  too  high  a 
cost. 

But  in  Italy  it  was  a  question  of  an  operation  on  the 
grand  scale,  which  in  its  nature  demanded  for  success 
much  more  man-power  than  we  had  at  our  disposal. 
Yielding  to  this  demand  led  to  a  very  serious  weaken- 
ing of  the  Eastern  front,  where  the  position  was  already 
critical  on  account  of  the  great  numerical  superiority 
of  the  Russians,  even  if  a  decisive  victory  were  won  in 
Italy.  In  any  case,  we  were  under  the  impression  that 
the  successful  repulse  of  the  Russian  winter  offensive  had 
made  Austria-Hungary  safe. 

I  am  unable  to  say  whether  the  two  general  staffs 
could  have  embarked  on  different  operations  alto- 
gether, or  have  undertaken  a  joint  offensive  against 
Italy.  In  any  case,  the  result  of  the  war  was  not  to 
be  decided  on  the  Itahan  front.  It  could  be  fought 
out  only  in  the  West,  in  France.  And  we  should  be 
strong  enough  for  a  decision  on  that  front  only  when 
the  Russians  had  been  defeated. 

My  thoughts  turned  to  Rumania.  She  was  the 
feather  in  the  scales.  We  had  to  know  what  her  atti- 
tude was.  Had  Rumania,  even  under  pressure,  joined 
forces  with  us,  the  Russian  Army  would  have  been 
outflanked.  This  offered  great  possibilities.  If,  under 
pressure  from  us,  Rumania  turned  to  the  Entente,  we 


246  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

should,  at  any  rate,  have  known  how  matters  stood. 
We  could  act  without  delay  with  the  troops  on  the  spot 
at  the  time. 

The  Quadruple  Alliance  was  on  the  defensive  in  the 
Balkans  and  Asia  Minor.  Only  south  of  Bagdad  Field- 
Marshal  von  der  Goltz  was  preparing  to  attack  the 
English  at  Kut-el-Amara. 

As  a  result  of  the  evacuation  of  Gallipoli  by  the 
Entente,  the  position  of  Turkey  was  considerably 
improved. 

I  do  not  know  what  the  Entente  had  in  view  for  191 6 
before  the  French  Army  was  compelled  to  concentrate 
on  Verdun.  It  appeared,  and  indeed  it  was  only  to 
be  expected,  that  the  French  were  contemplating  great 
offensives  on  all  fronts. 

The  Russian  advance  into  Armenia,  which  in  the 
spring  of  1916  led  to  the  capture  of  Trebizond  and 
Erzerum,  was  of  no  strategic  value,  and  the  Russians 
had  no  need  to  make  any  special  effort.  They  held  a 
more  favorable  position  and  had  great  numerical 
superiority  over  the  Tiu-ks. 

The  English  operations  in  Persia,  Mesopotamia,  and 
the  Peninsula  of  Sinai  were,  on  the  same  principle,  not 
directed  to  the  destruction  of  the  Turkish  Army,  but 
aimed  at  territorial  acquisitions  for  the  British  World 
Empire. 

XI 

The  German  offensive  at  Verdun  in  March  led  to  the 
fifth  Isonzo  battle.  This  Italian  attack,  therefore, 
took  place  long  before  the  contemplated  Austro-Htm- 
garian  offensive.     It  was  once  more  unsuccessful. 

The  Russian  Army  also  came  on  the  scene.  The 
Russian  movement  in  the  second  half  of  March  against 
our  Eastern  front  was  much  more  than  an  attempt  of 
a  relief  offensive.     It  was  to  be  a  decisive  battle  and 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     247 

had  been  undertaken  in  this  spirit.  Captured  army 
orders  were  found,  speaking  of  driving  the  enemy  back 
beyond  the  frontiers  of  the  Empire. 

Since  the  beginning  of  March  rumors  had  been  cur- 
rent of  a  proposed  offensive  against  Vilna.  A  concen- 
tration of  troops  had  been  observed  east  of  Smorgon. 
The  Smorgon- Vilna  region  seemed  to  be  indicated. 
Reports  of  a  coming  offensive  also  reached  us  from 
Dvinsk  and  Jakobstadt.  Counter  measures  were  taken. 
We  gathered  that  it  was  not  exactly  imminent,  and  I 
decided  to  go  for  two  days  to  Berlin  on  family  matters, 
and  attend  the  wedding  of  Captain  Prince  Joachim  of 
Prussia,  who  had  been  a  valuable  member  of  our  staff 
since  autumn  19 14.  I  was  in  BerHn  on  March  11  and 
12,  when  I  received  news  which  seemed  to  indicate  that 
the  attack  was  to  begin  shortly.  So  I  was  relieved  to 
find  myself  back  at  Kovno. 

The  Russian  bombardment  began  on  the  i6th,  not 
in  the  Smorgon  region,  however,  as  I  expected,  but  on 
the  narrow  front  between  Lakes  Narotch  and  Vish- 
niev,  on  both  sides  of  the  Sventziany-Postavy  Railway, 
and  southwest  of  Dvinsk.  The  artillery  duel  was  of 
unprecedented  intensity  for  the  Eastern  front.  It  was 
resumed  on  the  17th.  On  the  i8th  the  infantry  attacks 
began,  and  continued  with  intervals  imtil  the  end  of 
March. 

The  Russian  aim  was  to  cut  off  our  north  wing  in  the 
direction  of  Kovno  and  compel  it  to  retreat  by  attacks 
at  other  points.  In  the  second  stage,  it  was  to  be 
thrown  back  against  the  coast  north  of  the  Niemen. 
This  plan  was  conceived  on  a  grand  scale. 

The  first  move  in  this  enveloping  process  was  to 
break  our  front  in  the  direction  of  Sventziany  by  the 
two  attacks  from  the  Vishniev-Narotch  sector  and  at 
Postavy.  The  front  was  wide  and  well  chosen.  Oiu* 
reserves  would  have  been  insufficient  to  close  up  the 


248  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

gap.  Besides  this,  it  was  very  difficult  to  rush  them 
up  to  the  Hne,  owing  to  the  bad  railway  connection  with 
Lake  Narotch.  The  railway  was  in  process  of  con- 
struction. If  the  gap  were  once  forced,  the  rest  would 
follow.    The  way  to  Kovno  would  lie  open. 

The  attacks  on  the  northern  portion  of  our  front 
were  made  from  the  south  of  Lake  Drysviaty,  near 
Vidzy,  and  chiefly  from  the  bridge-heads  at  Dvinsk 
and  Jakobstadt. 

From  March  18-21  the  situation  of  the  Tenth  Army 
was  critical  and  the  numerical  superiority  of  the  Rus- 
sians overwhelming.  On  the  21st  they  won  a  success 
on  the  narrow  lake  sector  which  affected  us  gravely, 
and  even  the  attack  west  of  Postavy  was  stemmed  only 
with  difficulty. 

The  ground  had  become  soft,  and  in  that  marshy 
country  water  collected  in  ponds ;  the  roads  were  liter- 
ally bottomless.  The  reserves  which  we  drew  from  the 
Tenth  Army  could  make  only  slow  progress  from  the 
Vilna-Dvinsk  Railway  by  wading  through  the  swamps. 
Every  one  was  strung  up  to  the  highest  pitch  of  anxiety, 
wondering  what  would  happen  next. 

But  the  Russians,  whose  offensive  had  led  them  into 
even  heavier  ground  we  had  in  and  behind  our  posi- 
tions, were  exhausted,  and  when  the  Russian  olEfensive 
gain  reached  its  highest  pitch  on  March  26  we  had 
practically  overcome  the  crisis. 

The  position  of  Von  Scholtz's  army  group  of  the  Eighth 
Army  was  no  less  difficult.  Although  holding  a  long 
front,  the  "  Leibhusaren "  Brigade  was  compelled  to 
defend  itself  at  Vidzy  against  the  massed  attacks  of 
the  enemy.  It  achieved  wonders.  Farther  north  at 
Dvinsk  the  enemy  made  particularly  determined  at- 
tacks. Divisions  of  the  oldest  classes  fought  with  the 
same  spirit  of  sacrifice  as  the  younger  comrades  at 
their  side. 


HEADQUARTERS  ON   EASTERN  FRONT     249 

The  front  was  particularly  thin  at  Jakobstadt,  but 
the  West  Prussian  regiments  there  did  their  duty. 


\r\sVoie- 
"Sec 


^we 


FIG.   7.      BATTLES   AT  LAKE    NAROTCH,  MARCH    I9I6 


The  attacks  of  the  enemy  collapsed.     The  Russian 
offensive  was  petering  out  by  the  end  of  March.     As 


250  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

had  been  truly  said,  without  exaggeration,  it  had  been 
choked  in  "swamp  and  blood."  The  losses  suffered 
by  the  Russians  had  been  extraordinarily  heavy. 

Our  thin  lines,  manned  by  well-trained  and  brave 
troops,  with  their  proper  quota  of  officers,  had  tri- 
umphed over  the  massed  attacks  of  the  badly  trained 
Russian  Army.  The  efforts  of  our  troops  had  been 
very  strenuous,  owing  to  the  swampy  ground  and  wet 
and  cold  weather. 

The  front  of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East 
had  survived  its  first  great  defensive  action. 

One  would  expect  such  a  defensive  battle  to  be  less 
strain  on  the  Higher  Command  than  an  offensive,  but 
in  reaHty  it  is  much  more  nerve-racking.  The  com- 
mander must  content  himself  with  providing  reserves 
at  the  right  time,  but  for  this  to  be  possible  the  re- 
serves must  be  available.  That  is  a  difficult  matter 
when  the  command  is  forced  to  live  from  hand  to 
mouth,  as  we  had  to.  Further,  it  is  not  easy  to  make 
up  one's  mind  to  transfer  reserves  before  the  direction 
of  the  attack  is  known  with  certainty,  and  yet  it  has 
to  be  done,  or  they  will  arrive  too  late.  Nor  is  it  easy 
to  expect  the  subordinate  commands  to  give  up  their 
reserves  when  they  themselves  anticipate  attack.  But 
the  cordial  relations  which  existed  between  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Hoffmann  and  myself  and  the  various  army 
commanders  enabled  us  to  settle  these  serious  problems 
without  friction,  to  the  general  benefit  of  the  army. 
At  the  beginning  of  April  things  quieted  down. 

On  April  28,  in  a  vigorous  operation,  carefully  pre- 
pared by  powerful  artillery,  the  Tenth  Army  recapt- 
ured the  lost  ground  between  Lake  Narotch  and  Lake 
Vishniev.  It  was  the  first  engagement  on  the  Eastern 
front  in  which  we  employed  the  artillery  methods  which 
had  now  become  customary  in  the  West.  The  result 
was  good. 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     251 

We  reckoned  on  a  continuation  of  the  great  Russian 
offensive.  The  armies  were  organized  accordingly  and 
reserves  held  in  readiness  By  order  of  General  Head- 
quarters certain  German  divisions  with  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Army  were  sent  to  us.  Later  in  May  fresh 
attacks  from  the  Riga  bridge-head  and  the  region  of 
Smorgon  seemed  imminent.  We  took  measures  ac- 
cordingly, and  even  contemplated  an  offensive  of  our 
own.  But  with  the  inadequate  forces  at  our  disposal, 
this  offensive  coiild  be  only  a  local  one  at  Riga,  with  the 
object  of  removing  that  very  inconvenient  bridge-head. 

At  the  end  of  May  His  Majesty  visited  us.  The 
Kaiser  went  over  the  whole  of  the  area  controlled  by 
the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East.  The  Field- 
Marshal  and  I  accompanied  him.  We  also  went  to 
Mitau.  I  shall  never  forget  how  German  everything 
seemed  there.  Every  one  who  went  for  the  first  time  to 
these  Baltic  provinces  had  the  same  feeling,  that  here 
was  a  piece  of  their  own  native  soil. 

At  the  beginning  of  June  we  celebrated  the  victory 
of  our  fleet  in  the  Skager  Rack  battle,  another  of  those 
great  achievements  in  the  war  which  influenced  the 
attitude  of  the  neutral  states.  But  our  rejoicings  were 
dampened  by  our  losses,  which  turned  out  to  be  heavier 
than  at  first  reported. 

XII 

I  had  followed  the  doings  of  our  navy  with  great 
interest.  In  peace-time  we  had  set  great  store  by  it. 
Now,  as  a  fighting-weapon  side  by  side  with  the  army, 
it  had  to  fight  for  victory  to  save  us  from  strangulation 
by  England.  It  was  to  be  expected  that  in  accordance 
with  England's  historical  traditions  her  share  in  the 
war  would  take  the  form  of  a  ruthless  fight  against  the 
entire  population  of  the  Central  Powers,  regardless 
alike  of  international  law  or  the  laws  of  humanity.     It 


252  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

was  clear  from  the  start  that  our  warships  could  not 
keep  the  seas  open.  The  Mediterranean  division  went 
to  Constantinople. 

After  the  successful  Japanese  attack  on  Kiao-chau, 
whose  garrison  put  up  a  brave  fight,  our  cruiser  squad- 
ron in  East  Asia  and  the  southern  Pacific  was  left 
without  any  support  and  compelled  to  return  to  the 
home  harbors.  The  battle  of  Coronel  on  November  i, 
and  that  of  the  Falkland  Islands  on  December  3,  1914, 
mark  the  victory,  distress,  and  extinction  of  our  cruiser 
squadron.  These  battles  fill  every  German  heart  with 
pride  and  sorrow. 

Our  cruisers  and  auxiliary  cruisers  had  sown  enemy 
waters  with  mines,  and  from  time  to  time  even  made 
the  high  seas  dangerous  to  the  enemy.  They  brought 
fresh  laurels  to  German  valor,  but  were  unable  to  ac- 
complish anything  decisive.  All  the  same,  their  deeds 
were  not  in  vain,  for  they  will  ever  be  a  source  of  pride 
to  the  Germans. 

The  Mediterranean  division  in  the  Bosphorus  was, 
on  the  whole,  doomed  to  inactivity  after  the  Entente 
had  given  up  the  attack  on  Constantinople.  The 
enemy  had  a  great  superiority  in  the  Black  and  Mediter- 
ranean Seas.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Navy  was  not 
very  enterprising.  After  Italy's  declaration  of  war  it 
made  only  a  few  unimportant  raids  along  the  east 
coast  of  that  country.  In  the  Baltic  the  fighting 
strength  on  each  side  was  such  as  to  enable  us  to 
maintain  our  merchant  service.  This  was  of  para- 
mount importance  to  us,  on  account  of  the  importation 
of  iron  ore  from  Sweden. 

The  navy  fulfilled  a  part  of  its  duties  in  maintaining 
the  freedom  of  the  Baltic.  This  enabled  the  Com- 
mander-in-chief in  the  East  to  establish  communica- 
tion between  Libau  and  the  German  harbors  in  the 
Baltic,  which  was  of  the  utmost  importance  for  the 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     253 

supply  of  our  troops  in  Courland.  The  West  Baltic 
remained  a  maneuvering  ground  for  our  fleet. 

The  bulk  of  our  fleet  was  in  the  North  Sea  pro- 
tected by  oiir  bases  at  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe,  Heligo- 
land, and  Wilhelmshaven.  We  ought  to  have  sought 
a  decisive  battle  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  This, 
indeed,  was  the  desire  of  Grand  Admiral  von  Tirpitz, 
though  he  did  not  sufficiently  insist  upon  it.  Only 
by  this  means  could  we  hope  to  defeat  the  enemy  plans, 
of  which  we  had  no  clear  idea.  After  the  English 
naval  maneuvers  of  1910-11  there  were  signs  that 
England  contemplated  an  extensive  blockade.  It  was 
in  defiance  of  international  law,  and  could  be  carried 
out  only  provided  that  neutrals,  particularly  the  United 
States,  tolerated  it. 

England  avoided  battle,  although  tradition,  her 
strength,  and  the  war  situation  should  have  urged  her 
to  it.  Had  England  won  such  a  battle  it  would 
have  made  our  iron  imports  from  Sweden  an  im- 
possibility, and  the  submarine  warfare  could  never 
have  assumed  proportions  so  dangerous  to  herself. 
Great  Britain  preserved  her  fleet  for  political  reasons. 
She  realized  that  a  battle  with  the  German  fleet  might 
cost  her  not  only  her  place  in  the  world,  but  also  her 
prestige  among  her  allies  and  even  at  home.  The 
other  reasons  put  forward,  such  as  the  dearth  of  docks 
on  the  east  coast,  to  enable  her  to  effect  swift  repairs 
after  battle,  are  not  convincing.  It  is  not  to  the  credit 
of  England's  proud  navy  that  she  refrained  from  giving 
battle. 

The  naval  action  in  the  Heligoland  Bight  on  August 
28,  1914,  was  of  no  strategical  importance.  Our 
cruisers  were  attracted  by  the  love  of  adventure. 
Our  fleet  was  more  enterprising  than  that  of  the 
enemy.  We  bombarded  the  English  coast,  that  had 
not  been  attacked  for  centuries.     The  battle  on  the 


254  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

Dogger  Bank  on  January  24  was  the  result  of  such  an 
attack. 

Our  naval  policy  of  compelling  the  English  to  give 
battle  as  near  our  coasts  as  possible  was  pursued  more 
definitely  when  Admiral  Scheer  assumed  command  of 
the  fleet.  On  May  31,  191 6,  he  successfully  achieved 
his  end.  He  was  not  afraid,  although  far  from  all  our 
naval  bases. 

I  Owing  to  the  caution  of  the  hostile  fleet  our  naval 
fortresses  did  not  appear  to  be  threatened  and  we  were 
able  to  withdraw  their  garrisons. 

They  went  to  form  the  Marine  Corps,  which  was 
employed  on  the  Flanders  coast  after  the  taking  of 
Antwerp.  Certain  marine  divisions  also  fought  with 
distinction  in  the  land  campaigns. 

Meanwhile  the  submarine  warfare  on  enemy  ships 
within  a  certain  zone  round  England  began  on  Feb- 
ruary 4,  191 5.  At  the  time  this  was  against  the  advice 
of  Admiral  von  Tirpitz,  who  considered  such  a  plan 
premature.  We  had  a  very  small  number  of  sub- 
marines; I  do  not  know  why.  In  any  case,  what  the 
U-boats  accomplished  was  realized  only  during  the  war 
as  the  successes  won  by  the  crews  increased  and  they 
gained  in  experience.  The  submarine  campaign  pro- 
claimed on  February  4  did  not  materialize,  as  for 
political  reasons  it  was  directed  exclusively  against 
enemy  merchant-ships.  Further  restrictions  soon  fol- 
lowed that  entirely  crippled  it. 

After  the  sinking  of  the  Lusitania  it  fell  into  abeyance 
for  the  time,  but  was  revived  for  a  short  time  between 
November  191 5  and  February  19 16.  After  the  sinking 
of  the  Sussex  on  March  24,  191 6,  Germany  declared 
her  intention  of  prosecuting  the  campaign  only  accord- 
ing to  the  rules  of  the  Prize  Court.  The  U-boat  war- 
fare was  thereupon  suspended. 

In  their  fear  of  submarine  warfare  our  enemies  did  not 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     255 

hesitate  to  call  the  U-boat  a-Veapon  the  use  of  which 
was  contrary  to  international  law  and  humane  prin- 
ciples. This  was  a  surprising  doctrine  in  view  of  the 
perpetual  violation  of  international  law  by  the  En- 
tente. New  weapons  of  war  create  new  international 
precedents.  The  United  States  acknowledged  this  in 
her  note  to  Engji^ij^  of  March  5,  191 5. 

Admiral  Sif' Percy  Scott,  a  man  whose  opinion  car- 
ried weight,,  took  up  the  same  attitude  in  the  Times 
of  July  16,  19 14.     He  wrote: 

"Such  a  decree — a  blockade  by  means  of  mines  and 
submarines — would  in  my  opinion  be  quite  regular; 
and  if  English  and  neutral  vessels  were  to  ignore  the 
decree  and  attempt  to  break  through  the  blockade 
one  could  not  say  that  they  were  following  the  peaceful 
pursuits  of  which  Lord  Sydenham  speaks;  were  they 
to  be  destroyed  in  the  attempt,  we  could  not  designate 
it  as  a  relapse  into  savagery  or  piracy  in  its  worst  form." 

We  were  within  our  rights,  as  far  as  the  submarine 
war  was  concerned,  in  adopting  such  measures  as  we 
considered  necessary  to  serve  our  purpose  in  the  war, 
so  long  as  they  were  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of 
humanity  and  showed  due  regard  for  neutrals. 

We  found  the  right  solution,  and  no  criticism  can 
make  any  difference,  as  the  future  will  prove. 

At  the  very  beginning  of  the  war,  England,  in  total 
disregard  of  international  law,  started  the  War  of 
Starvation  against  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 
This  strangling  hunger-blockade  was  intended  so  to 
debilitate  the  body  as  to  prepare  the  mind  for  the 
poison  of  propaganda.  England  had  another  aim:  to 
make  war  against  the  children  still  unborn,  so  that  a 
physically  inferior  race  might  arise  in  Germany.  A 
more  gruesome  method  cannot  be  imagined.  England 
acted  with  inexorable  consistency,  as  so  often  before 
in  her  cruel  history.     Step  by  step,  and  of  set  purpose, 


'■i56  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

the  English  Government,  by  Orders  in  Council  of  Au- 
gust 20,  and  October  29,  19 14,  and  other  economic  and 
military  decrees,  suppressed  all  direct  traffic  to  the 
German  harbors,  all  imports  through  neutral  coun- 
tries., and  even  the  import  of  the  products  of  neutral 
countries  into  Germany. 

The  trump  card  was  the  proclamation  of  the  North 
Sea  as  a  "war  zone"  on  November  2,  19 14.  The 
northern  approaches  to  the  North  Sea  were  thereby 
completely  cut  off,  and  the  neutral  trading-vessels  were 
compelled  to  go  through  the  Channel,  close  to  the  Eng- 
lish coast,  and  could  then  proceed  only  in  one  direction, 
right  across  the  North  Sea.  And  yet  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war  England  had  declared  that  she  would  in 
principle  accept  the  convention  of  the  Declaration  of 
London  as  her  standard  of  action.  Her  attitude  in 
the  years  before  the  war  was  also  quite  different. 

With  the  declaration  of  a  "war  zone"  she  had  allowed 
it  to  be  understood  that  she  would  no  longer  consider 
herself  bound  by  the  regulations  of  cruiser  warfare  as 
laid  down  by  the  Prize  Courts,  and  also  that  she  con- 
sidered herself  justified  in  the  adoption  of  violent  meas- 
lures  against  traffic  in  the  "war  zone."  Germany  was 
therefore  blockaded,  although  there  was  no  lawful 
blockade.  The  only  reason  why  a  true  blockade  was 
ineffective,  according  to  the  rules  of  naval  warfare,  was 
that  England  was  powerless  to  hinder  traffic  in  the 
Baltic. 

The  German  declaration  of  a  "war  zone"  on  Febru- 
ary 4,  191 5,  only  a  similar  measure  to  the  English  prece- 
dent, gave  England  an  excuse  for  fiu-ther  severity  in 
the  economic  war  against  the  Central  Powers.  In  the 
famous  Order  in  Council  of  March  11,  191 5,  she  de- 
clared her  intention  of  seizing  all  ships  entering  or  leav- 
ing Germany.  All  goods  intended  for  Germany,  or 
exported  from  there,  as  well  as  all  goods  in  German 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     257 

ownership,  or  of  German  origin,  even  if  the  property 
of  neutrals,  could  henceforward  be  taken  from  neutral 
ships. 

This  was  another  unexampled  instance  of  putting 
might  before  right.  England  justified  herself  by  de- 
claring this  procedure  to  be  an  act  of  reprisal  against 
the  submarine  warfare  commenced  in  February  191 5. 
This  defense  fell  to  the  ground  when  Germany,  after 
the  Sussex  case,  formally  renoimced  submarine  war- 
fare. Had  England  acted  in  accordance  with  her 
declarations,  she  would  have  raised  the  so-called  block- 
ade, now  that  the  reason  for  retaUation  had  lapsed. 
But  she  never  thought  of  such  a  thing.  The  blockade 
went  on  as  before. 

By  Order  in  Council  of  June  7,  191 6,  England  finally 
abandoned  the  Declaration  of  London.  In  this  way 
those  principles  which,  despite  repeated  assurances,  no 
one  had  attempted  to  maintain,  were  formally  de- 
nounced. The  violation  of  international  law  was  to 
be  made  legal  and  valid. 

We  in  the  East  also  felt  the  effects  of  England's  con- 
tinued violation  of  the  international  law.  In  the  long 
run  it  was  bound  to  help  the  cause  of  the  Entente,  as 
the  United  States,  both  before  and  after  her  entry  into 
the  war,  had  given  her  sanction,  and  the  neutrals  of 
Europe  were  in  England's  power. 

XIII 

The  German  attack  at  Verdun  led  to  no  decisive 
result.  By  May  it  bore  the  stamp  of  the  first  great 
battle  of  attrition,  in  which  the  struggle  for  victory 
meant  feeding  a  stationary  fighting-line  with  a  con- 
tinuous mass  of  men  and  materials.  The  other  parts 
of  the  Western  front  were  inactive. 

On  May  15  the  Austro-Hungarian  offensive  against 


258  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Italy  had  at  length  begun  and  at  first  was  brilliantly 
successful,  and  brought  our  allies  to  the  Asiago-Arsiero 
line.  But  by  the  end  of  the  month  it  was  clear  that 
the  operation  had  lost  its  impetus.  All  was  quiet  on 
the  Macedonian  and  Turkish  fronts,  except  for  the 
fighting  in  Mesopotamia.  Kut-el-Amara  was  taken 
toward  the  end  of  April,  but  Field-Marshal  von  der 
Goltz,  who  had  prepared  the  way  for  this  victory,  did 
not  live  to  see  it.  He  died  of  spotted  fever  shortly 
before  the  attack 

In  the  East  there  were  signs  that  local  attacks  on  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Army  were  probable,  although  the 
bulk  of  the  Russian  Army  remained  on  the  German 
front  in  readiness  to  attack  us  there. 

The  Entente  was  planning  a  powerful  assault  on  its 
most  formidable  enemy — the  German  Army.  In  the 
West  there  was  to  be  the  offensive  on  the  Somme.  In 
the  East  the  Russians  were  to  start  an  offensive,  with 
Baranovici,  Smorgon,  and  Riga  as  its  critical  points. 

Their  operations  on  the  Austro-Hungarian  front  in 
the  beginning  of  June,  in  the  region  of  Lutsk,  Tarnopol, 
and  on  the  Dniester,  were  more  in  the  nature  of  a 
demonstration. 

At  first  much  larger  reserves  were  concentrated 
behind  the  selected  sectors  of  the  German  front  than 
in  the  Lutsk  and  Bukovina  sectors. 

Russia's  amazing  victories  over  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian troops  induced  her  to  abandon  her  proposed 
offensive  against  the  front  of  the  Commander-in-chief 
in  the  East,  except  for  the  move  in  the  direction  of 
Baranovici,  and  concentrate  all  her  efforts  against 
Austria-Hungary.  The  more  the  German  front  proved 
itself  inviolable  the  more  eagerly  did  the  Russians 
turn  from  it  to  hurl  themselves  against  their  weaker 
foe,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army  between  the  Pripet 
and  the  Carpathians. 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     259' 

The  front  of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East 
was  therefore  denuded  as  occasion  required,  in  order  to 
bolster  up  the  fronts  farther  south.  A  very  intimate 
connection  sprang  up  between  the  tactical  operations 
of  the  army  group  under  Field-Marshal  Prince  Leo- 
pold of  Bavaria  and  that  of  the  Commander-in-chief 
in  the  East,  as,  indeed,  between  the  whole  German  and 
Austro-Hungarian  fronts. 

The  previous  arrangements  between  the  two  general 
staffs  had  been  good  enough  for  periods  of  inactivity, 
but  never  contemplated  such  a  situation  as  developed 
out  of  the  Russian  offensive.  It  was  now  imperative 
to  act  quickly.  Reference  to  the  two  General  Head- 
quarters in  Charleville  or  Pless  and  Teschen  might 
mean  a  loss  of  time  that  could  never  be  recovered. 
Even  in  the  great  March  offensive  our  liaison  system 
had  been  found  inconvenient.  We  were  able  to  avoid 
friction  only  because  we  always  worked  so  well  with 
the  army  group  of  Field-Marshal  Prince  Leopold  of 
Bavaria  and  Von  Woyrsch's  group  under  his  com- 
mand. From  that  time  the  question  of  a  single  com- 
mand had  not  been  lost  sight  of.  First,  the  proposal 
to  put  Prince  Leopold's  group  under  the  command  of 
the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  was  frequently 
discussed.  But  a  wholesale  change — such  as  war  is 
constantly  calling  for — was  what  was  required,  and  that 
meant  that  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  would 
have  to  take  over  the  command  of  the  whole  Eastern 
front  from  the  Gulf  of  Riga  to  the  Carpathians. 

But  bitter  experience  was  needed  before  this  change 
was  effected.  Irrelevant  matters  that  had  nothing  to 
do  with  the  issue  aggravated  the  problem.  In  the  first 
place,  the  Austrian  General  Staff,  for  reasons  of  so- 
called  prestige,  found  it  difficult  to  contemplate  any 
limitation  of  its  tactical  authority  over  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops.     In  its  interpretation  of  its  powers 


26o  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

it  jealously  maintaitied  the  Austrian  point  of  view,  of 
not  letting  Germany's  military  predominance  become 
apparent.  Germany,  on  the  other  hand,  considered 
military  necessities  and  nothing  else. 

On  June  4  the  Russian  offensive  against  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  front  east  of  Lutsk,  at  Tamopol,  and  im- 
mediately north  of  the  Dniester  began. 

Their  attacks  were  carried  out,  though  the  Russians 
had  no  decisive  superiority  in  numbers.  In  the  neigh- 
borhood of  Tamopol  they  were  completely  repulsed 
by  the  army  of  General  Cotmt  von  Bothmer,  who  had 
taken  over  the  command  of  the  German  Southern 
Army  in  succession  to  General  von  Linsingen,  but  they 
broke  through  in  the  two  other  places  and  won  a  com- 
plete victory.  At  both  points  they  penetrated  deep 
into  the  Austro-Hungarian  positions.  Things  were  all 
the  more  critical  because  the  Austrian s  had  shown 
such  small  powers  of  resistance  that  at  one  blow  the 
whole  Eastern  front  was  in  dire  jeopardy.  Although 
we  were  anticipating  an  attack  on  our  front,  we  imme- 
diately started  divisions  on  the  southward  march. 
Field-Marshal  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria's  army 
group  also  responded  to  the  requirements  of  the  situa- 
tion. Our  General  Headquarters  made  heavy  demands 
upon  both  groups  and  also  withdrew  divisions  from  the 
West.  The  battle  of  the  Somme  had  not  yet  begun. 
Austria  gradually  broke  off  the  Italian  offensive,  and 
sent  troops  to  the  Eastern  front. 

The  Italian  Army  now  started  a  counter-offensive  in 
the  Tyrol.  The  face  of  the  war  had  changed  com- 
pletely. Not  much  later  the  opening  of  the  Somme 
battle  and  Rumania's  declaration  of  war  was  to  make 
our  position  still  more  unfavorable. 

General  Headquarters  seems  to  have  had  some  hope 
of  neutralizing  the  piercing  of  our  lines  by  the  enemy 
at  Lutsk  by  a  counter-attack  (an  operation  similar  to 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     261 

our  successful  counter-attack  in  November  and  De- 
cember 191 7  at  Cambrai)  and  at  the  same  time  hold- 
ing up  the  advance  of  the  troops  that  had  broken 
through  so  far  on  the  Dniester. 

Thanks  to  the  failure  of  the  Austrian  defense,  the 
Russian  offensive  at  Lutsk  made  rapid  progress,  and, 
following  the  railway  to  Kowel,  soon  reached  the 
Stochod.  The  first  German  reinforceemnts  became  in- 
volved in  the  retreat.  A  new  German  front  was  grad- 
ually created  on  the  Stochod  on  both  sides  of  the  rail- 
way. It  was  in  touch  with  the  Austrian  troops,  who 
were  still  holding  the  Styr.  The  Russians  had  not  fol- 
lowed up  very  smartly  in  a  westerly  direction,  although 
a  great  victory  was  beckoning  them.  They  had  too 
few  reserves  at  hand  to  make  full  use  of  their  oppor- 
tunity. 

At  Saturtzky  and  Kisielin,  some  way  west  of  the 
Stochod,  the  beaten  Austrian  Army  was  able  to  collect 
its  remnants.  It  was  obvious  that  the  wing  of  the 
Austrian  Army  which  had  escaped  at  Lutsk  would  have 
to  swing  back  quickly  to  avoid  being  rolled  up.  Here 
again  Brussiloff  was  not  strong  enough  for  a  really 
energetic  pursuit.  The  arrival  of  further  reserves 
strengthened  the  front  on  both  sides  of  the  Kowel- 
Lutsk  Railway.  They  came  up  with  the  Fourth  Army 
farther  south,  and  somewhere  near  Gorochow  formed 
a  strong  counter-offensive  group  behind  the  Austrian 
wing  retreating  to  the  southwest.  Our  critical  situa- 
tion did  not  allow  of  our  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  all 
our  reserves  in  order  to  attack  all  together,  although 
Von  Linsingen's  group  always  wished  to  do  so. 

The  counter-attacks  of  the  German  troops  during 
the  latter  half  of  June  and  early  part  of  July  obtained 
only  local  successes.  The  Russian  offensive  on  the 
Dniester  had  broken  through  the  Austrian  divisions 
under  General  von  Pflanzer-Baltin  in  the  Okna  (east 


262  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

of  Zaleszsyki) — Sniatin  direction,  and  south  of  the  river 
soon  gained  a  lot  of  ground.  Czernowitz  fell.  By  the 
end  of  June  the  Russians  had  reached  a  line  from  Tlu- 
macz  on  the  Dniester,  to  Kolomea  and  Kimpolung, 
and  were  pushing  on  toward  the  Carpathian  passes. 

The  Austrian  front  south  of  the  Dniester,  originally 
a  very  short  one  between  the  river  and  the  Rumanian 
frontier,  had  now  become  very  much  longer,  and  this 
long  new  line  was,  of  course,  now  correspondingly  thin. 

Owing  to  the  extraordinarily  bad  railway  communi- 
cations reserves  could  only  be  brought  up  with  the 
greatest  difficulty.  German  troops  from  the  front  of 
the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East,  as  well  as  the 
Western  front,  were  conveyed  to  the  Carpathians  and 
the  Dniester.  Even  all  the  fresh  divisions  that  were 
thrown  in  were  hardly  sufficient  to  hold  the  front.  In 
these  circumstances  counter-attacks  were  inadvisable. 
They  were  attempted  by  our  troops  all  the  same,  but 
remained  without  result.  A  pure  defense  from  the 
start  would  have  been  our  proper  course,  as  the  Rus- 
sians were  also  contending  against  extraordinary  diffi- 
culties of  supply  and  were  not  very  strong.  This  fact 
helped  the  Austrian  Army  more  than  its  own  defense. 
Owing  to  the  complete  failure  of  our  allies  south  of  the 
Dniester,  General  von  Bothmer  saw  himself  compelled 
at  the  beginning  of  July  to  withdraw  his  right  wing 
from  Buczacz  as  far  as  the  mouth  of  the  Koropiec. 
Thanks  to  the  excellent  influence  of  our  army  on  the 
Austrian  troops  with  it,  all  the  Russian  attacks  had 
been  beaten  off. 

While  the  Russian  onslaught  on  the  Austrian  Army 
was  gaining  its  first  successes,  and  when  the  greater 
part  of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East's  and 
Field-Marshal  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria's  reserves 
had  proceeded  to  the  relief  of  our  allies'  front,  a  violent 
Russian  attack  was  delivered  against  Von  Woyrsch's 


> 3000000 


EXPLANATION 


Battle  line  of  the 
confederated  armies 
at  the  beginning  of 
the  Russian  attack, 
June  4.  1916. 
(Battle  line  before  the 
counter-attack  of  the 
confederated  armies. 


^ine  of  the  confed- 
erated armies  at  the 
close  of  battles,  1916 
'Direction  of  Russian 
attack. 

'Counter  attack  of 
confederated  armies. 


FIG.  8.      RUSSIAN   ATTACK,    I916 


264  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

army  group  on  June  13.  It  collapsed  completely  after 
extraordinarily  severe  fighting.  The  army  group  and 
General  von  Woyrsch  were  compelled  to  throw  in  all 
their  reserves. 

At  that  time  we  were  anticipating  an  attack  at 
Smorgon  or,  as  now  seemed  more  probable,  on  the  old 
battle-fields  of  March,  and  at  Riga.  At  these  points 
the  Russians  were  still  in  very  great  strength.  In 
spite  of  this  we  denuded  our  front  to  the  utmost  to 
help  the  armies  in  the  south.  We  even  had  battalions 
to  serve  as  reserves  for  our  long  lines.  I  formed  these 
battalions  from  men  at  recruit  depots,  although  I 
realized  that  if  the  Russians  had  a  really  great  success 
at  any  point  these  units  would  be  but  a  drop  of  water 
on  a  hot  stone.  We  were  absolutely  confident  that 
our  troops  would  hold  their  positions,  however  thin 
their  hnes  were.  Our  anxiety  increased  with  the 
progress  of  events. 

In  the  first  place,  the  Russian  forces  on  our  front 
had  not  been  noticeably  reduced.  They  had  to  decide 
whether  they  would  really  attack  us  or  follow  up 
and  consolidate  their  successes  in  the  south.  Of  course 
they  realized  that  we  and  Austria-Hungary  would  send 
reinforcements.  They  meant  to  obtain  a  decision  on 
the  Austrian  front,  but  had  such  large  reserves  at  then- 
disposal  that  they  could  attack  us  in  force  as  well, 
and  thereby  prevent  us  from. sending  fm-ther  help  to 
the  south.  While  the  Germans  and  Austrians  were 
concentrating  round  the  Lutsk  salient,  on  the  Dniester 
and  in  the  Carpathians,  and  in  the  second  half  of  June 
making  local  attacks  nearly  everywhere,  the  Russians 
rushed  up  reserves  to  the  points  where  they  had 
broken  through  and  brought  the  German  local  efforts 
to  a  standstill  by  counter-attacks. 

In  the  middle  of  July,  after  severe  fighting,  in  which 
the  Austrian  troops  had  again  shown  only  slight  re- 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     265 

sisting  power,  they  prevented  the  Germans  from  devd- 
oping  their  initial  successes  in  the  Lutsk  saHent.  They 
pushed  forward  southwest  to  the  Styr.  General  von 
Boehm-Ermolli  foimd  himself  compelled  to  withdraw 
his  left  wing  and  center  to  the  frontier  of  GaHcia.  But 
in  the  Lutsk  salient  the  Russian  offensive  was  held  up. 

The  enemy  gained  still  more  ground  south  of  the 
Dniester  in  the  direction  of  the  Carpathians. 

While  all  this  was  taking  place  at  the  two  main  points 
of  attack,  the  Russians  embarked  on  a  violent  onslaught 
on  the  front  of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East, 
between  Lakes  Narotch  and  Vishniev  and  at  Smorgon, 
on  the  army  group  of  Field-Marshal  Prince  Leopold  of 
Bavaria,  northeast  and  south  of  Baranovici,  and  on 
Von  Linsingen's  army  group  in  the  bend  of  the  Styr. 
General  von  Bothmer  was  also  engaged. 

In  July  a  terrible  struggle  was  raging  on  the  Eastern 
front,  while  in  the  West  England  and  France  were 
gaining  their  first  successes  on  the  Somme.  We  man- 
aged to  hold  out  against  the  attacks  and  beat  them 
off  in  battles  lasting  many  days. 

The  line  of  Von  Woyrsch's  group  was  successfully 
forced  at  the  point  where  it  was  held  by  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops.  To  fill  the  gap  we  threw  in  all 
our  carefully  hoarded  reserves.  They  held  their  ground, 
and  from  July  8  onward  the  battle  here  died  down. 

The  Russian  offensive  at  the  bend  of  the  Styr,  north 
of  Lutsk,  was  completely  successful.  The  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops  let  their  lines  be  broken  through  in 
several  places.  The  German  units  that  had  been  sent 
to  help  were  once  more  in  a  critical  position,  and  on 
July  7  General  von  Linsingen  was  compelled  to  with- 
draw his  left  wing  behind  the  Stochod.  The  right  wing 
of  Field-Marshal  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria's  army 
group  and  part  of  Gronau's  group,  south  of  the  Pripet, 
had  to  retire  also. 


266  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

This  was  one  of  the  greatest  crises  on  the  Eastern 
front.  We  had  little  hope  that  the  Austro-Hungarian 
troops  would  be  able  to  hold  the  line  of  the  Stochod. 
which  was  unfortified. 

We  took  the  risk  of  denuding  our  lines  still  further, 
and  Field-Marshal  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria  followed 
our  example.  Although  the  Russian  attack  might  be- 
gin again  at  any  moment,  we  extended  our  line  and 
released  single  regiments  in  order  to  support  the  left 
wing  of  Von  Linsingen's  army  group,  northeast  and  east 
of  Kowel.  If  this  wing  were  to  retreat  still  farther 
it  was  impossible  to  imagine  when  it  would  end.  Those 
were  terribly  anxious  days.  We  gave  up  everything 
we  had,  knowing  full  well  that  if  the  enemy  were  to 
attack  us  no  one  could  help  us. 

And  that  is  just  what  happened. 

On  July  1 6  the  Russians,  in  enormous  force,  poured 
out  from  the  Riga  bridge-head  west  of  the  Dvina  and 
gained  ground  at  once. 

We  went  through  a  terrible  time  until  the  crisis  here 
was  overcome,  thanks  to  the  valor  of  the  troops  and  the 
careful  handling  of  affairs  by  the  Headquarters  Staff 
of  the  Eighth  Army,  which  was  compelled  to  use  single 
battalions  and  batteries  as  reserves. 

These  battles  were  not  yet  over  at  the  end  of  July, 
when  there  were  sure  indications  that  the  attacks  at 
Baranovici  and  along  the  whole  course  of  the  Stochod 
would  be  resumed.  We  awaited  these  with  a  sinking 
heart,  for  our  troops  were  exhausted  by  constant 
fighting  and  had  long  fronts  to  defend.  The  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops  had  lost  all  confidence  in  themselves 
and  needed  German  support  everywhere. 

We  could  see  everything  that  was  going  on  as  far 
as  the  Stochod,  but  farther  south  we  were  less  in  the 
picture.  We  knew  only  that  General  von  Boehm- 
ErmoUi  was  also  now  expecting  an  attack  at  Brody, 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     267 

that  the  Russians  were  continuing  their  offensive 
between  the  Dniester  and  the  Carpathians  in  full 
strength,  and  that  they  were  gaining  ground  toward 
the  crest  of  the  ridge. 

General  Count  von  Bothmer  had  stood  like  a  rock  in 
the  maelstrom  of  continuous  attacks,  and  in  all  essen- 
tials remained  master  of  the  situation. 

It  was  clear  that  the  Russians  were  gathering  strength 
for  another  mighty  blow,  while  we  were  still  bleeding 
from  many  wounds  on  the  Somme,  and  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops  were  being  hard  pressed  on  the 
Italian  front.  Storms  were  threatening,  and  our  nerves 
were  strung  to  the  highest  pitch. 


XIV 


We  had  maintained  the  closest  touch  with  General 
Headquarters  during  the  difficult  and  anxious  days  we 
had  passed  through  in  Kovno  since  the  beginning  of 
June.  We  had  repeatedly  pointed  out  the  necessity 
of  unity  of  command  on  the  Eastern  front.  Of  course, 
if  necessary,  we  could  have  continued  as  before,  but 
it  had  become  evident  that  reserves  could  be  moved 
about  with  less  friction  if  the  command  of  the  whole 
Eastern  front  was  under  one  control.  Before  the  end 
of  June  the  Field-Marshal  and  I  were  summoned  to 
Pless  to  give  our  views  concerning  the  position  in  the 
East.  It  could  be  described  only  as  very  grave.  Of 
course  we  came  back  to  the  question  of  the  single  com- 
mand, and  in  this  connection  we  emphasized  the  neces- 
sity of  extending  the  process  of  introducing  German 
units  into  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army.  Also,  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops  could  be  used  on  the  quieter  parts 
of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East's  front.  We 
urged  very  strongly  that  the  Austro-Hungarian  troops, 


268  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

especially  the  infantry,  should  be  trained  on  really 
modern  lines. 

The  journey  to  Pless  was  fruitless  as  regards  any 
settlement  of  the  command  question,  for  the  opposition 
was  still  too  great.  But  General  Headquarters  decided 
to  form  three  divisions  for  the  Austro-Hungarian  front 
from  troops  taken  from  the  Western  and  Eastern 
fronts.  These  were  to  be  ready  for  use  in  Poland  about 
the  beginning  of  August.  The  desired  interchange  of 
German  and  Austro-Hungarian  troops  was  begun, 
and  we  received  a  battle-worn  Austro-Hungarian  in- 
fantry division,  which  set  free  the  ten  Landwehr 
divisions  of  the  Tenth  Army.  This  was  immediately 
handed  over  to  General  von  Linsingen,  In  the  critical 
battle-situation  a  second  Austro-Hungarian  division, 
which  had  been  placed  at  our  disposal,  could  not  now 
be  withdrawn. 

The  Austro-Hungarian  Army  had  arranged  its 
reserves  in  such  a  way  that  at  given  intervals  each 
infantry  regiment  had  a  so-called  "march  battalion," 
composed  of  reservists,  assigned  to  it.  These  battalions 
were  often  attached  to  the  regiments  as  fighting  bat- 
talions. Regiments  that  had  not  suffered  at  all  some- 
times contained  five  or  six  battalions  instead  of  three; 
whereas  the  strengths  of  others  were  often  very  low. 
What  was  wanted  was  an  even  distribution,  and  this 
was  uncommonly  difficult  on  account  of  the  many 
nationalities  among  the  Austro-Hungarian  troops. 
National  distinctions  among  the  men  were  also  main- 
tained. 

What  was  still  more  grave  was  the  very  inadequate 
training  of  the  march  battalions.  They  served  only 
to  swell  our  losses  in  prisoners.  We  had  to  take  a  hand 
in  the  training  of  these  march  battalions,  and  we  did. 
We  thereby  discovered  much  good  and  useful  material 
in   the  ranks,   but   the  officers,   who  were  then   still 


HEADQUARTERS  ON  EASTERN  FRONT     269 

under  the  control  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  command, 
were  of  poor  quality  and  not  trained  to  that  strict 
sense  of  duty  which  distinguishes  our  German  officers. 

On  July  27  we  were  again  summoned  to  Pless.  The 
news  of  the  fall  of  Brody,  which  reached  us  that  day, 
induced  the  Austro-Hungarian  General  Staff  to  modify 
its  attitude  to  a  certain  extent.  It  agreed  to  let  Field- 
Marshal  von  Hindenburg  take  over  command  of  the 
whole  front  as  far  as  south  of  Brody.  The  armies  of 
General  Count  von  Bothmer  and  General  von  Pflanzer- 
Baltin  formed  already  one  army  group  under  the  Arch- 
duke Charles,  with  General  von  Seeckt  as  Chief  of 
Staff.  We  were  still  under  the  German  General  Head- 
quarters. The  Archduke  Charles's  group  was  under 
the  Austro-Hungarian  General  Headquarters  as  before. 
The  Austrians  could  not  make  up  their  minds  to  go 
the  whole  way,  but  still  the  new  arrangement  offered 
such  considerable  advantages  that  I  regarded  it  as  a 
great  step  in  the  right  direction. 

We  then  returned  to  Kovno,  where  I  said  farewell 
to  the  place  in  which  I  had  spent  a  happy  period  of 
quiet  work,  and  latterly  lived  through  such  critical 
hours.  I  left  many  loyal  colleagues  behind  me  in  the 
administrative  services.  The  military  staff  remained 
unchanged. 

I  had  first  proposed  to  visit  the  Army  Headquarters 
of  the  former  Austrian  front,  in  order  to  form  my  own 
opinion  of  the  situation.  The  position  of  our  new 
headquarters  had  not  yet  been  settled.  There  was  no 
question  of  remaining  in  Kovno — it  lay  too  far  north. 
For  the  present  we  decided  to  use  our  special  train. 
General  von  Eichhom,  while  retaining  his  command 
of  the  Tenth  Army,  took  over  the  command  of  Von 
Scholtz's  army  group  and  the  Eighth  Army.  The 
Twelfth  Army  was  assigned  to  the  command  of  Field- 
Marshal  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria. 


UNITY    OF    COMMAND    ON    THE 
EASTERN  FRONT,  AUGUST  1916 

Visits  to  Our  Colleagues — Renewed  Russian  Oflfensives 
(See   Fig.    8,   page   263.) 


ON  August  3  or  4  we  were  in  Kowel,  the  headquarters 
of  General  von  Linsingen.  His  Chief  of  Staff 
was  Colonel  Hell,  hitherto  Chief  of  Staff  on  the  Tenth 
Army.  He  had  taken  over  his  new  duties  in  July, 
and  was  the  right  man  in  the  right  place  to  deal  with 
this  extraordinarily  difficult  situation. 

The  Eastern  front  had  passed  through  another  criti- 
cal period.  The  terrific  Russian  offensive  had  burst 
on  us,  and  the  end  of  the  fighting  could  not  be  foreseen. 
We  were  heavily  engaged,  and  there  was  slight  hope  of 
relief.  There  were  too  many  troops  of  the  oldest 
classes  on  the  Eastern  front,  and  we  did  not  like  to 
place  such  men  in  the  hottest  corners. 

While  the  attacks  at  Riga  were  dying  down,  the  Rus- 
sians resumed  their  offensive  on  July  23,  north  of 
Baranovici,  where  they  imagined  they  were  facing 
Austro-Hungarian  troops  and  had  some  success.  But 
this  had  since  been  limited  by  a  German  counter- 
attack. 

The  Russian  attack,  carried  out  with  great  violence 
on  the  25th  and  27th,  remained  without  result. 

The  actions  on  the  front  of  Von  Linsingen's  army 


UNITY  OF  COMMAND  271 

group  had  been  continued  into  the  second  half  of  July. 
They  never  actually  came  to  an  end.  The  strain  on 
this  group  was  severe.     The  front  was  not  firm. 

On  July  28  the  big  Russian  offensive  on  the  Stochod 
had  begun,  and  continued  with  unprecedented  violence 
until  the  evening  of  August  i.  The  Russians  had 
assembled  enormously  superior  numbers,  and  con- 
tinuously fed  their  line  regardless  of  losses.  At  several 
points  there  had  been  very  critical  moments.  German 
Landwehr  had  to  drive  the  enemy  out  of  those  parts  of 
the  Austro-Hungarian  lines  which  he  had  penetrated. 
Even  the  German  troops  were  forced  to  give  ground,  as 
their  front  was  thin  and  their  losses  heavy.  But  finally 
we  threw  everything  into  the  scale  and  the  front  held. 

The  fighting  had  extended  northward  and  involved 
Gronau's  army  group,  which,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
its  strength  was  inadequate  for  so  extended  a  front, 
put  up  a  strong  defense  with  exemplary  coolness. 
They  employed  their  few  reserves  with  the  greatest 
economy,  and  always  had  something  in  hand  to  support 
General  von  Linsingen's  extreme  left  wing. 

The  staff  of  this  group  naturally  took  a  grave  view 
of  the  situation,  but  its  resolution  was  unshaken. 
There  was  no  doubt  that,  despite  their  terrific  losses, 
the  Russians  would  soon  resume  their  offensive  and 
continue  it  for  some  time.  They  had  plenty  of  men, 
but  used  them  recklessly,  and  such  tactics  promised 
no  success,  even  against  our  thin  lines.  The  staff  of 
the  army  group  hoped  to  remain  master  of  the  situation. 

In  Kowel  I  also  saw  General  von  Bemhardi,  who 
commanded  the  sector  along  and  between  the  railway 
connecting  Kowel,  Lutsk,  and  Samy.  He  was  a  bom 
soldier,  inspired  with  an  ardent  love  for  his  country. 

In  the  evening  we  were  at  Wladimir-Wolynsk,  the 
headquarters  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Fourth  Army, 
which  was  in  General  von  Linsingen's  command.     This 


272  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

army  had  been  thoroughly  stiffened  with  German 
troops.  Its  Commander-in-chief,  Colonel-General  von 
Tertszczanski,  an  excitable  officer,  was  so  obsessed  with 
the  idea  of  the  "Austrian  prestige  "  that  he  gave  General 
von  Linsingen  a  good  deal  of  trouble.  We  dined  with 
him.  March  battalions,  as  a  guard  of  honor  for  the 
Field-Marshal,  lined  the  route  from  the  station  to  the 
mess.  The  men  made  a  very  favorable  impression 
upon  us. 

On  this  occasion  Colonel-General  von  Tertszczanski 
spoke  with  remarkable  frankness  of  the  behavior  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  troops  during  the  recent  battles. 
The  picture  he  gave  us  was  anything  but  cheerful. 

Next  morning  we  were  in  Lemberg,  the  headquarters 
of  the  Second  Austro-Hungarian  Army.  I  was  sur- 
prised by  the  beauty  and  German  appearance  of  Lem- 
berg. In  this  respect  it  formed  a  striking  contrast 
with  Cracow,  which  is  characteristically  Polish. 

In  General  von  Boehm-Ermolli  and  his  Chief  of 
Staff,  General  Bardolph,  we  found  two  very  shrewd 
and  clear-sighted  soldiers,  with  whom  it  was  a  pleasure 
to  work.  They  had  no  illusions  about  the  low  powers 
of  resistance  of  their  troops. 

At  the  end  of  July,  after  the  Russian  attacks,  the 
army  had  been  withdrawn  west  of  Brody  and  the  upper 
Sereth.  Both  officers  were  delighted  to  hear  that  a 
mixed  German  division  could  be  put  at  their  disposal 
for  use  in  the  immediate  future.  They  regarded  the 
continuation  of  the  enemy  offensive  as  a  certainty. 
We  enjoyed  the  congenial  company  of  the  officers  of 
this  staff  for  a  few  hours  longer,  and  left  them  with  the 
feeling  that  they  were  fully  confident.  But  on  the 
front,  in  spite  of  our  strong  positions,  we  anticipated 
a  critical  situation  in  view  of  the  imminent  Russian 
offensive,  as  we  could  not  possibly  send  reserves  up 
in  time. 


UNITY  OF  COMMAND  273 

In  Lemberg  I  also  had  a  few  words  with  General  von 
Seeckt,  who  took  a  serious  view  of  the  position  of  the 
Archduke  Charles's  group,  especially  south  of  the 
Dniester. 

The  Russians  had  thrust  hard  against  the  line  west 
of  Tlumacz-Ottynia,  and  in  places  reached  the  crest  of 
the  Carpathians  betv/een  Tartar  Pass  and  the  frontier 
of  Rumania. 

The  fate  of  the  Archduke  Charles's  group  was  a 
matter  of  life  and  death  to  us.  The  grave  position  in 
which  it  stood  was  naturally  of  the  greatest  concern 
to  us.  If  this  group  retired  any  farther  south  of  the 
Dniester  the  left  wing  and  then  the  right  of  the  ex- 
tended Eastern  front  would  be  carried  back  with  it. 
We  had  continually  to  allow  for  the  situation  of  this 
group.  We  gave  it  all  the  help  we  could,  although  it 
was  not  under  our  command. 

The  ist  Infantry  Division,  which  had  already  fought 
in  the  Carpathians  in  the  winter  of  191 5,  was  now,  by 
order  of  our  General  Headquarters,  on  its  way  through 
Hungary  to  this  sector.  I  should  have  preferred  to 
have  it  north  of  the  Carpathians,  as  there  was  little 
chance  that  the  Russians  would  attempt  to  envelop  our 
extreme  right  wing  between  our  front  and  the  Car- 
pathians. Their  communications  behind  their  line 
were  much  too  bad,  and  this  danger  could  never  be- 
come serious.  It  would  always  be  possible  to  meet  it 
in  time,  despite  the  incredible  railway  communications 
in  Hungary.  But  the  Austrian  General  Staff,  at 
Teschen,  feared  a  Russian  invasion  of  Hungary,  and 
their  cries  for  help  proved  stronger  than  military  con- 
siderations. 

On  the  return  journey  to  Brest-Litovsk,  where  we 
intended  to  remain  for  the  present  in  our  train,  we 
discussed  matters  with  General  von  der  Marwitz  and 
General  von  Litzmann,  who  now  commanded  mixed  Ger- 


274  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 


man  and  Austro-Hungarian  troops  in  Von  Linsingen  s 
army  group.  They  regarded  their  position,  if  the 
Russians  resumed  their  attacks — and  this  they  antic- 
ipated— as  very  grave,  basing  their  fears  on  their 
experiences  in  recent  actions.  Both  General  von  der 
Marwitz  and  General  von  Litzmann  were  splendid  sol- 
diers and  fearless  leaders,  who  had  the  well-being  and  effi- 
ciency of  their  men  very  much  at  heart. 

We  heard  the  same  story  everywhere.  The  situation 
in  the  East  remained  as  critical  as  ever. 

I  had  set  myself  the  double  task  of  consolidating 
the  front  and  training  the  troops  of  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian Army.  With  what  measure  of  success  was 
doubtful. 

II 

Our  headquarters  in  the  train  in  Brest-Litovsk 
station  was  anything  but  ideal.  We  were  really  very 
poorly  housed.  There  was  no  room  for  work.  The 
big  maps  alone  took  a  lot  of  space,  to  say  nothing  of 
our  clerical  staff.  The  way  in  which  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Hoffmann  made  the  most  of  what  he  called 
his  "salon"  was  a  source  of  continuous  amazement. 
The  other  officers  had  even  less  room,  and,  on  top  of 
all  this  the  sun  beat  pitilessly  down  on  the  roofs  of  the 
carriages  and  made  our  stay  unendurable.  I  decided, 
therefore,  to  leave  the  train  as  soon  as  possible,  and 
suggested  to  the  Field-Marshal  that  we  should  find 
quarters  in  Brest-Litovsk  itself.  The  members  of  the 
staff  had  a  mild  shock.  The  town  had  been  burned  to 
the  ground  and  was  out  of  the  question;  the  citadel 
was  a  little  prison.  The  commandant  of  the  fortress 
had  made  it  his  residence,  and  fixed  up  his  offices  there, 
but  labor  had  been  too  scarce  for  him  to  make  it  really 
suitable.  The  whole  place  was  neglected  and  over- 
grown, for  nothing  had  been  done  for  a  long  time  past. 


UNITY  OF  COMMAND  275 

Nettles  ran  wild  and  the  air  was  damp  and  musty. 
The  barracks  were  still  there,  but  there  was  not  a  stick 
of  furniture.  But  this  was  nothing;  we  had  to  decide 
something. 

I  made  arrangements  for  oiu-  headquarters  to  be 
established  in  the  citadel.  Of  course,  it  took  a  con- 
siderable time  before  everything  was  ready  and  we 
could  leave  the  train. 

I  liked  being  in  Brest,  and  did  not  leave  the  citadel. 
The  remarkably  fine  tall  willows,  with  their  boughs 
drooping  into  the  water  which  flowed  through  the 
citadel,  and  the  few  short  avenues  gave  the  whole  a 
pleasant  aspect.  Desolation  reigned  outside  the  for- 
tress. The  ugly  but  highly  important  railway  jimction 
and  the  gutted  town  offered  few  attractions. 

I  had  the  barracks  cleared  of  the  invading  creepers, 
so  that  the  air  could  get  to  the  walls  and  dry  out  the 
damp;  trees  were  also  felled  and  branches  lopped,  to 
allow  the  sun  and  air  to  get  in.  I  took  pleasure  in 
putting  things  to  rights. 

German  troops  were  needed  to  stiffen  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  front.  The  old  front  of  the  Commander- 
in-chief  in  the  East  had  already  been  so  heavily  drawn 
upon  that  no  further  demands  could  be  made  upon  it 
for  the  time  being. 

The  heavy  attack  south  of  Riga  had  just  been  re- 
pulsed, but  it  was  quite  likely  to  be  renewed. 

We  released  a  few  cavalry  regiments,  a  mixed 
division,  about  three  battalions  strong,  and  some 
batteries  under  General  Melior.  We  had  already 
promised  these  to  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army,  and 
they  were  immediately  despatched.  Our  only  reserve 
for  a  front  of  about  one  thousand  kilometers  now  con- 
sisted of  but  one  cavalry  brigade,  strengthened  by 
artillery  and  machine  guns — certainly  not  an  enviable 
position,  considering  that  we  had  to  prepare  at  any 


276  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

moment  to  send  help  to  any  point  of  an  enormous 
front.  This  is  but  one  further  example  of  what  we 
Germans  achieved.  The  cavalry  brigade  was  also 
destined  for  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army,  and  was  to 
be  attached  to  Melior's  detachment. 

Other  forces  were  available  to  General  Headquarters 
for  use  in  the  East.  The  Turkish  15th  Corps  was 
coming.  Enver  had  decided,  in  view  of  the  critical 
position  in  the  East,  to  send  an  army  corps  from  the 
Constantinople  district  to  the  Eastern  front.  The  Ger- 
man General  Headquarters  intended  to  strengthen  Von 
Linsingen's  group  with  this  division.  The  billeting 
officers  were  actually  on  the  scene  at  the  beginning  of 
August,  when  the  situation  of  the  Archduke  Charles's 
group  determined  General  Headquarters  to  deflect  the 
Turkish  corps,  which  had  only  a  few  trains  at  its  dis- 
posal, to  East  Galicia.  The  Turks  fought  well  with 
the  German  Southern  Army,  although  they  had  to 
learn  and  practise  what  to  them  were  entirely  novel 
methods  of  warfare. 

The  formation  of  the  three  divisions  which  General 
Headquarters  had  ordered  in  July  for  the  East  was 
nearly  complete,  and  I  should  have  been  glad  to  have 
had  them  at  my  disposal  at  once.  General  Head- 
quarters did  not  consent,  as  it  did  not  consider  them 
fit  for  action  yet.  A  few  days  later,  however,  two 
were  handed  over  to  us,  while  the  third  was  attached 
to  the  Archduke  Charles's  group. 

The  Russians  had  by  this  time  realized  that  they 
could  do  nothing  against  the  German  front,  and  did 
not  again  attack  north  of  the  Pripet.  They  in- 
tensified their  pressure  in  Wolhynia  and  East  Galicia 
and  brought  up  fresh  forces  to  these  points.  Even  in 
the  first  half  of  August  their  attacks  here  were  resumed. 

On  August  8  and  9  the  Russians  again  attacked  Von 
Linsingen's   group  and   the   right  wing   of   Gronau's 


UNITY  OF  COMMAND  277 

group  along  their  whole  front,  and  were  repulsed. 
Even  if  the  main  offensive  had  come  to  an  end,  severe 
fighting  was  still  in  progress,  especially  along  the 
Stochod  east  and  northeast  of  Kowel.  The  Russians 
succeeded  in  gaining  a  footing  in  a  few  places  on  the 
western  bank.  This  was  not  in  itself  of  decisive  im- 
portance, but  it  made  things  very  difficult  for  Von  Lin- 
singen's  group,  which  was  being  taxed  to  the  uttermost 
and  suffering  heavy  losses.  It  compelled  us  to  detrain 
our  cavalry  at  Kowel. 

Simultaneously  with  the  attack  on  Kowel,  Russian 
attacks  against  the  Second  Austro-Htmgarian  Army 
and  the  Archduke  Charles's  group  in  Galicia  met  with 
success.  The  right  wing  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Army  was  broken  through  at  Zaloscz;  Melior's  de- 
tachment prevented  the  worst,  but  the  front  was  so 
rickety  that  we  withdrew  it  to  Zborow.  The  two  new 
divisions  placed  at  our  disposal  were  put  under  General 
von  Eben,  commanding  the  ist  Corps,  and  they  just 
sufficed  ultimately  to  hold  the  Zborow  sector  in 
severe  and  prolonged  fighting.  They  had  come  too 
late  to  defend  the  Sereth  sector. 

When  this  was  abandoned  by  the  right  wing  of  the 
Second  Army,  the  left  wing  of  Von  Bothmer's  army, 
which  had  until  then  stood  its  groimd,  had  to  retreat  also. 
South  of  the  Dniester  the  Russians  had  again  attacked 
at  Tlimiacz,  the  Austro-Hungarian  troops  had  thrown 
them  back  and  taken  Stanislau  and  Nadwoma.  Here 
their  attacks  had  been  victorious,  but  in  the  Car- 
pathians the  German  troops,  imder  General  von  Conta 
— including  the  ist  Infantry  Division — had  denied 
them  any  success. 

I  considered  it  of  the  highest  importance  that  we 
should  not  suffer  reverses  in  Galicia,  in  view  of  their 
effect  on  Rumania.  But  the  withdrawal  of  General 
Count  von  Bothmer's  army,  notwithstanding  its  stout 


278  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

and  prolonged  assistance,  was  unavoidable  in  view  of 
events  south  of  the  Dnieper. 

It  withdrew,  keeping  touch  with  the  Austro-Hun- 
garian  Army  to  the  Zborow-Brzeszany  line  behind  the 
Zlota  Lipa,  and  bent  its  right  wing  in  the  direction  of 
Stanislau.  So,  in  the  middle  of  August  the  collapse  of 
the  Austro-Himgarian  Army  seemed  manifestly  pos- 
sible. The  attitude  of  Rimiania  grew  ever  more 
doubtful. 

From  the  middle  of  August  onward  the  new  front, 
imder  the  control  of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the 
East,  began  to  hold. 

The  Second  Austro-Hungarian  Army,  which,  after 
all,  now  received  our  cavalry  reserve  from  Kowel,  was 
placed  in  support  at  Brody.  It  was  also  so  stiffened 
with  German  troops  that  its  positions  could  be  regarded 
as  secure.  As  far  as  numbers  are  concerned,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  troops  would  have  been  quite  able 
to  hold  their  positions  without  German  help.  But 
that  was  impossible  in  their  present  condition,  and 
we  had  to  come  to  the  rescue.  We  helped  as  much  as 
we  could,  but  the  blood  shed  by  German  troops  with 
the  Austro-Himgarian  Army  could  never  be  made 
good. 

Von  Linsingen's  army  group  was  endeavoring  to  bring 
order  into  its  units  and  form  reserves.  We  sent  this 
group  the  ist  Landwehr  Division  from  Mitau,  which 
the  Russians  were  leaving  in  great  numbers. 

The  construction  of  positions  was  pushed  on,  and 
in  this  connection  we  had  to  supply  the  Second  Austro- 
Hungarian  Army  with  a  great  deal  of  barbed  wire. 
The  rear  communications  were  also  organized.  It  was 
a  case  of  doing  everything  we  had  done  farther  north 
in  the  previous  autumn,  when  the  armies  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-chief in  the  East  took  to  trench  warfare 
after  our  offensive  ended.     The  conditions  of  trench 


UNITY  OF  COMMAND  279 

construction  were  similar.  We  had  to  start  everything 
from  the  beginning. 

Of  course,  the  estabhshment  of  a  railway  network 
was,  on  the  whole,  easier,  for  whereas  the  front  was 
then  advancing  beyond  its  communications,  it  was  now 
being  forced  back  on  them.  All  the  same,  there  was  a 
great  deal  to  be  done  on  the  Austro-Hungarian  railway 
system;  new  lines  had  to  be  begiin  and  a  network  of 
field  and  light  railways  constructed  close  behind  the 
army. 

Special  lines-of -communication  arrangements  had  to 
be  made  in  Lemberg  for  the  German  divisions  in  the 
Second  Austro-Hungarian  Army,  and  the  same  applied 
to  Himgary  for  the  divisions  fighting  in  the  Carpathians. 

We  made  a  beginning  with  the  training  of  the  march 
formations  on  our  own  principles,  and  they  were  to  be 
inspected  by  German  generals.  Colonel  Prince  Oscar 
of  Prussia,  who  was  responsible  for  the  training  of  the 
Austrian  march  battaUons  in  the  German  Southern 
Army,  did  very  valuable  work. 

German  artillery  brigade-commanders  taught  the 
Austro-Hungarian  artillery,  which  stood  very  high  as 
regards  the  technical  side  of  its  work,  the  conduct  of 
an  artillery  action  as  required  in  great  modem  battles. 
We  initiated  the  practice,  though  on  a  small  scale,  of 
exchanging  officers.  Nothing  was  left  undone  that 
could  possibly  help  to  prevent  any  further  reverses  to 
the  Austro-Hungarian  Army,  such  as  we  had  witnessed 
in  June. 

There  were  very  many  matters,  great  and  small,  to 
be  attended  to,  and  the  time  spent  in  the  citadel  of 
Brest-Litovsk  passed  quickly. 

On  August  27  Rumania  declared  war  on  Austria- 
Hungary.  The  Dual  Monarchy  thereby  reaped  the 
reward  of  Himgary 's  selfish  policy  and  we  the  fruit 
of  our  passive  acquiescence. 


28o  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

On  the  28th,  at  one  o'clock  in  the  forenoon,  the  Chief 
of  the  Military  Cabinet,  General  von  Lyncker,  tele- 
phoned General  von  Hindenburg  and  myself  that  His 
Majesty  the  Kaiser  commanded  our  presence  in  Pless 
at  once. 

That  same  day,  at  4  p.m.,  we  left  Brest,  never  again 
to  return  to  the  Eastern  front.  Behind  us  lay  two 
years  of  strenuous,  imited  work,  and  mighty  victories. 


MY  APPOINTMENT  AS 
FIRST     QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL 

From  August  2p,  1916,  to  October  26^  igi8 


THE    ENTENTE   OFFENSIVE    IN   THE 
AUTUMN    OF    1916 

Germany  and  Her  Allies — The  Reasons  for  the  Campaign  Against 
Rumania — Bulgaria's  Conduct  of  the  War — Turkey's  Conduct 
of  the  War — The  General  Conduct  of  the  War — The  Military  and 
Political  Direction  of  the  German  Empire — Impressions  of  the 
Western  Front — The  Battle  of  the  Somme  and  the  First  Operations 
Against  Rimiania — On  the  Eve  of  a  Decision  in  Rumania — The 
Wallachian  Campaign. 

(Maps  X  and  XI) 


GENERAL  VON  LYNCKER  received  us  on  our 
arrival  in  Pless,  about  ten  o'clock  in  the  morning 
of  August  29.  He  informed  me  that  Field-Marshal 
von  Hindenburg  had  been  appointed  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  of  the  field  army,  and  that  I  was  to  be 
second  chief.  The  title  "First  Quartermaster-Gen- 
eral" seemed  to  me  more  appropriate.  In  my  opinion 
there  could  be  only  one  Chief  of  the  General  Staff; 
but,  in  any  case,  I  had  been  expressly  assured  that  I 
should  have  joint  responsibility  in  all  decisions  and 
measures  that  might  be  taken. 

When  His  Majesty  received  us  he  expressed  the  hope 
that  the  crisis  at  the  front  would  be  overcome,  and 
the  Imperial  Chancellor,  who  was  present  in  Pless  at 
the  time,  spoke  to  the  same  effect.  The  subject  of 
peace  was  not  touched  upon  by  him.  The  gravity  of  the 
situation  must  have  often  brought  it  to  mind.  The 
enemy's  intentions  prevented  any  steps  being  taken. 


284  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

My  position  was  a  thankless  one,  as  I  fully  realized. 
I  entered  on  my  duties  with  a  sacred  desire  to  do  and 
think  of  nothing  that  did  not  contribute  to  bring  the 
war  to  a  victorious  end.  For  this  piirpose  alone  had 
the  Field-Marshal  and  I  been  called  upon.  The  task 
was  perfectly  enormous.  The  awful  feeling  of  respon- 
sibility did  not  leave  me  for  a  single  instant.  The 
field  of  action  was  in  many  respects  entirely  new  and 
uncommonly  comprehensive.  The  amount  of  work 
involved  was  quite  unprecedented.  Never  has  Fate 
before  suddenly  placed  so  heavy  a  burden  on  human 
shoulders.  With  bowed  head  I  prayed  God  the  All- 
Knowing  to  give  me  strength  for  my  new  office. 

The  circumstances  in  which  the  Field-Marshal  and 
I  had  been  summoned  to  take  supreme  command  were 
extremely  critical.  Whereas  we  had  hitherto  been  able 
to  conduct  our  great  war  of  defense  by  that  best  means 
of  waging  war — the  offensive — we  were  now  reduced 
to  a  policy  of  pure  defense. 

The  Entente  had  gathered  up  all  its  strength  for  a 
mighty  and,  as  it  thought,  last  great  blow,  thrown 
us  on  the  defensive,  and  brought  Rumania  into  the 
field. 

It  was  to  be  expected  that  the  attacks  on  the  West- 
em  front,  in  Italy,  Macedonia,  and  south  of  the 
Pripet,  would  be  intensified,  while  the  Rumanians,  re- 
inforced by  Russians,  would  burst  into  Transylvania 
on  our  exposed  right  flank,  or  invade  Bulgaria  from  the 
Dobrudja.  Somewhere  or  other  we  were  to  receive 
our  death-blow. 

We  also  had  to  reckon  on  increased  enemy  activity 
in  the  Asiatic  theater.  We  were  engaged  in  a  battle  of 
Titans,  unparalleled  in  history.  Our  nerves  and  mus- 
cles braced  themselves  instinctively,  for  it  was  a  ques- 
tion of  saving  the  Fatherland  from  a  position  of  ex- 
treme peril,  as  we  had  done  at  Tannenberg  and  in  the 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  285 

operations  around  Lodz  in  less  complicated  but  no 
less  serious  circumstances.  At  the  moment  I  could  not 
then  fully  appreciate  how  severely  Rumania's  entrance 
into  the  war  would  affect  us  economically.  The  critical 
military  decisions  we  made  in  September  were  not  dic- 
tated by  that  aspect  of  affairs. 

In  this  death-grapple  Germany  and  her  allies  had 
been  cut  off  from  the  world  by  a  monstrous  conspiracy, 
and  thrown  back  upon  their  own  resources;  they  were 
facing  the  great  military  Powers  of  Europe,  who  had 
the  whole  world  at  their  disposal. 

After  the  failure  of  the  first  great  blow  against  France 
in  1 9 14  there  had  been  no  change  in  the  situation, 
and  Field-Marshal  von  Moltke's  prophetic  words  of 
May  14,  1890,  had  become  a  fact: 

' '  If  the  war,  which  for  more  than  ten  years  has  been 
hanging  over  our  heads  like  the  sword  of  Damocles — 
if  this  war  ever  comes,  its  duration  and  end  cannot  be 
foretold.  The  greatest  Powers  of  Europe  will  oppose 
one  another,  armed  as  they  have  never  been  before. 
Not  one  of  them  could  be  so  completely  overthrown 
in  one  or  two  campaigns  that  it  would  be  compelled 
to  admit  defeat  and  declare  its  readiness  to  accept 
the  hard  conditions  that  peace  would  mean  without 
rising  again  to  renew  the  struggle  within  a  year.  It 
might  be  a  Seven,  it  might  be  a  Thirty  Years'  War. ..." 

The  longer  the  war  lasted  the  more  acutely  we  felt 
the  overwhelming  superiority  of  the  enemy  in  numbers 
and  war  material. 

On  our  side  the  first  two  years  had  exacted  a  heavy 
toll;  the  flower  of  our  fighting  strength  lay  under  the 
sod.  But  the  army  was  still  strong  and  resolute,  and 
had  been  able  to  preserve  or  liberate,  not  only  the 
frontiers  of  the  Fatherland,  but  also  those  of  its  allies 
in  the  European  theater. 

Only  on  the  Eastern  front  had  we  now  suffered  a 


286  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

reverse,  and  that  because  the  fighting  power  of  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Army  was  still  on  the  decline. 

We  had  succeeded  in  calling  a  halt  to  our  retreat 
there.  We  were  to  retain  our  power  to  do  so,  but  it 
demanded  further  German  help.  Austria-Hungary 
continued  to  be  a  drain  on  German  blood  and  German 
war  industries.  Her  most  pressing  needs  were  coal 
and  railway  material. 

The  same  was  true  of  Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  although 
the  demand  for  troops  was  not  so  great,  but  their  con- 
cern was  for  money,  military  equipment,  and  transport 
material.  Germans  had  to  help  everywhere.  We  did 
so,  in  many  cases  without  the  necessary  return. 

The  burden  on  us  was  certainly  directly  relieved  by 
our  allies.  Without  them  the  war  would  have  been 
unthinkable;  they  did  their  share  valiantly,  but  con- 
sidered they  had  a  natural  right  to  approach  us  with  a 
constant  succession  of  demands,  although  their  efforts  in 
no  way  equaled  ours.  The  longer  the  war  lasted  the  more 
detrimental  these  constant  allied  claims  on  Germany 
became  to  the  Quadruple  Alliance  as  a  whole.  The 
whole  gigantic  burden  of  this  war  lay  on  our  shoulders. 

The  enemy  had  been  constantly  adding  to  his 
numbers  since  the  beginning  of  the  war.  Italy  had 
come  in.  All  the  Powers  had  created  new  formations 
and  summoned  all  their  auxiliaries  to  arms.  Now 
Rumania  came  in  against  us  with  250,000  men.  So, 
despite  the  adhesion  of  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  to  our 
cause,  and  the  constant  additions  to  and  changes  in  our 
war  machinery,  we  were  still  greatly  inferior  in  num- 
bers. We  had  six  millions  at  the  front  against  ten 
millions  of  the  enemy. 

The  equipment  of  the  Entente  armies  with  war  ma- 
terial had  been  carried  out  on  a  scale  hitherto  unknown. 
The  battle  of  the  Somme  showed  us  every  day  how 
great  was  the  advantage  of  the  enemy  in  this  respect. 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  287 

When  we  added  to  this  the  hatred  and  immense  de- 
termination of  the  Entente,  its  starvation-blockade  or 
strangle-hold,  and  its  mischievous  and  lying  propa- 
ganda, which  were  so  dangerous  for  us,  it  was  quite 
obvious  that  our  victory  was  inconceivable  unless 
Germany  and  her  allies  threw  into  the  scale  everything 
they  had,  both  in  man-power  and  industrial  resources, 
and  unless  every  man  who  went  to  the  front  carried 
with  him  from  home  a  resolute  faith  in  victory  and  an 
unshakable  conviction  that  the  German  Army  must  con- 
quer for  the  sake  of  the  Fatherland.  The  soldier 
on  the  battle-field,  who  endures  the  most  terrible  strain 
that  any  man  can  undergo,  stands,  in  his  hour  of 
need,  in  dire  want  of  this  moral  reinforcement  from 
homic,  to  enable  him  to  stand  firm  and  hold  out  at  the 
front. 

In  the  situation  in  which  the  Field-Marshal  and  I 
found  oiu-selves,  and  in  view  of  our  whole  conception 
of  the  character  of  this  war  and  the  enemy's  determina- 
tion to  destroy  us,  we  considered  it  essential  to  develop 
the  economic,  physical,  and  moral  strength  of  the 
Fatherland  to  the  highest  degree. 

General  Headquarters's  demands  on  the  Imperial 
Government  comprised  man-power,  war  material,  and 
moral  resolution. 

We  endeavored,  as  far  as  we  could,  to  influence  our 
allies  in  the  same  sense.  Austria  had  already  raised 
the  age  limits  of  the  Landsturm  to  fifty-five,  and 
Turkey  raised  the  limit  of  liability  to  service  to  fifty. 
So  they  made  the  utmost  use  of  their  man-power — 
at  any  rate,  on  paper. 

In  such  a  situation  General  Headquarters  had  to  de- 
vote more  attention  than  ever  to  the  question  of  using 
the  resources  of  the  occupied  territories. 

These  were  the  definite  changes  made  by  General 
Headquarters  for  the  future. 


288  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

The  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  advocated  tinrestricted 
submarine  warfare,  which  would  apply  to  neutral  ships 
also  in  the  barred  zone.  That  was  the  most  effective 
assistance  that  the  navy  could  render  the  army  in  its 
desperate  struggle. 

It  was  doubtful  whether  the  enemy's  naval  forces 
would  again  give  battle;  an  attempt  to  bring  it  on  had 
been  made  in  August,  but  without  result.  Enemy 
mine-fields  progressively  restricted  the  freedom  of 
movement  of  oiu-  High  Seas  fleet  and  limited  its  use. 

The  question  of  the  unrestricted  U-boat  war  was 
discussed  as  early  as  August  30  at  the  request  of  the 
Imperial  Chancellor. 

It  was  a  matter  of  immediate  concern  to  the  Field- 
Marshal  and  myself  that  any  part  of  our  naval  forces 
should  simply  lie  idle  in  this  contest  of  nations.  It 
was  not  enough  help  for  the  army  merely  to  keep  the 
Baltic  open  and  contribute  the  Naval  Corps  in  Flan- 
ders, while  the  operations  of  the  Entente  received  de- 
cisive assistance  from  its  navy.  Only  with  extreme 
regret  could  we  refuse  to  pronounce  in  favor  of  im- 
restricted  submarine  warfare,  on  the  ground  that,  in 
the  opinion  of  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  it  might  pos- 
sibly lead  to  war  with  Denmark  and  Holland.  We 
had  not  a  man  to  spare  to  protect  ourselves  against  these 
states,  and  even  if  their  armies  were  unaccustomed  to 
war,  they  were  in  a  position  to  invade  Germany  and 
give  us  our  death-blow.  We  should  have  been  de- 
feated before  the  effects,  promised  by  the  navy,  of 
an  imrestricted  U-boat  campaign  could  have  made 
themselves  felt. 

The  discussion,  however,  afforded  an  opportunity  of 
overhauling  our  defensive  arrangements  on  the  Danish 
and  Dutch  frontiers.  The  northern  command  at  Ham- 
burg was  instructed  to  fortify  these  frontier  lines. 
The  Governor-General  in  Brussels  was  asked  to  hurry 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  289 

on,  as  much  as  available  labor  permitted,  the  construc- 
tion of  fortified  lines  on  the  Belgian  frontier,  of  which 
a  beginning  had  already  been  made. 


II 

On  the  Western  front  the  Verdun  battle  was  dying 
down,  and  in  the  early  days  of  July  the  battle  on  the 
Somme  had  not  brought  the  Entente  the  break-through 
it  hoped  for. 

The  second  battle  of  attrition  of  the  year  1916  had 
since  then  been  in  full  swing  on  both  banks  of  the 
Somme,  and  was  raging  with  unprecedented  fury  and 
without  a  moment's  respite. 

Verdun  had  exacted  a  very  great  price  in  blood. 
The  position  of  our  attacking  troops  grew  more  and 
more  unfavorable.  The  more  ground  they  gained  the 
deeper  they  plunged  into  the  wilderness  of  shell-holes, 
and  apart  from  actual  losses  in  action  they  suffered 
heavy  wastage  merely  through  having  to  stay  in  such 
a  spot,  not  to  mention  the  difficulty  of  getting  up 
supplies  over  a  wide,  desolate  area.  The  French  en- 
joyed a  great  advantage  here,  as  the  proximity  of  the 
fortress  gave  them  a  certain  amount  of  support.  Our 
attacks  dragged  on,  sapping  oiir  strength.  The  very  men 
who  had  fought  so  heroically  at  Verdun  were  terrified 
at  this  shell-ravaged  region.  The  command  had  not 
its  heart  in  its  work.  The  Crown  Prince  had  very 
early  declared  himself  in  favor  of  breaking  off  the 
attack. 

When  the  battle  of  the  Somme  began  the  Entente  had 
a  tremendous  superiority  both  on  land  and  in  the  air. 
General  Headquarters  was  surprised  at  first.  Rein- 
forcements were  quickly  thrown  in,  but  it  had  never  suc- 
ceeded in  wiping  out  the^  enemy's  superiority  in  artil- 
lery, munitions,  and  aircraft,  even  to  a  limited  extent. 


290  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

The  Entente  troops  had  worked  their  way  farther 
and  farther  into  the  German  lines.  We  had  heavy 
losses  in  men  and  material.  At  that  time  the  front 
lines  were  still  strongly  held.  The  men  took  refuge 
•  in  dugouts  and  cellars  from  the  enemy's  artillery  fire. 
The  enemy  infantry,  coming  up  behind  their  barrage, 
got  into  the  trenches  and  villages  before  our  men  could 
crawl  out  from  their  shelters.  A  continuous  yield  of 
prisoners  to  the  enemy  was  the  result.  The  strain  on 
physical  and  moral  strength  was  tremendous,  and 
divisions  could  be  kept  in  the  line  only  for  a  few  days 
at  a  time.  They  had  to  be  frequently  relieved  and 
sent  to  recuperate  on  quiet  fronts.  It  was  impossible 
to  leave  them  behind  the  line — we  had  not  enough 
men.  The  number  of  available  divisions  was  shrink- 
ing. In  view  of  the  shortage  of  artillery,  it  was  now 
kept  in  the  line,  even  when  the  divisions  were  relieved. 
Divisions  which  were  released  by  battle- worn  divisions 
had,  in  turn,  to  leave  their  artillery  behind  them  and 
come  up  behind  the  battle-front.  The  result  was  that 
units  were  hopelessly  mixed  up. 

The  shortage  of  ammunition  increased  daily.  Gen- 
eral Headquarters  received  the  ammunition  from  the 
War  Office  in  the  form  of  ammunition-trains,  which  I 
myself  distributed  daily  among  the  armies.  I  was 
always  hearing  what  they  required,  and  knew  how 
little  I  could  give  them.  Mine  was  indeed  a  sad  and 
harassing  task. 

The  situation  on  the  Western  front  gave  cause  for 
greater  anxiety  than  I  had  anticipated,  but  at  that 
time  I  did  not  realize  its  full  significance.  It  was  just 
as  well.  Otherwise  I  should  never  have  had  the 
courage  to  make  the  important  decision  to  transfer  still 
more  divisions  from  the  heavily  engaged  Western 
front  to  the  Eastern  in  order  to  recover  the  initiative 
there  and  deal  Rumania  a  decisive  blow. 


THE   ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE 


291 


The  Field-Marshal  and  I  intended,  as  soon  as  con- 
ditions allowed,  to  go  to  the  Western  front  to  see  for 
ourselves  how  matters  really  stood  there.  Our  task 
was  to  organize  a  stiffer  defense  and  advise  generally. 
But  before  we  went  there  some  divisions  were  got  ready 
for  Rumania,  and  His  Majesty  the  Emperor  was  in- 
duced to  give  the  momentous  order  for  the  cessation 


man  attack,  Feb 
2.  1916. 
I  German 
line 

reached 
by  the 
attack. 


FIG.  9.     VERDUN,  I916. 


of  the  offensive  at  Verdtm.  That  offensive  should 
have  been  broken  off  immediately  it  assumed  the  char- 
acter of  a  battle  of  attrition.  The  gain  no  longer  ju<^H- 
fied  the  losses.  On  the  defensive  we  had  only  to  ^  Ad 
out  in  a  battle  of  attrition  forced  upon  us. 

On  the  Italian  front,  too,  the  situation  had  become 
worse.  In  the  north  the  Austrian  troops  as  early  as 
July  retired  to  the  heights  north  of  the  Asiago-Arsiero 
Hne,  and  in  the  course  of  a  further  Isonzo  battle  in 
August  had  to  abandon  positions  they  had  long  held. 


292  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Gorizia  and,  south  of  it,  a  portion  of  the  Doberdo 
Plateau  of  the  Carso  were  left  in  the  hands  of  the 
Italians.  Here,  too,  the  fighting  power  and  resolution 
of  the  Austrian  Army  had  diminished.  General  von 
Conrad,  whom  we  saw  very  shortly  afterward,  said 
that  the  army  had  already  protected  the  frontier  for 
one  and  a  quarter  years,  and  would  continue  to  do  so. 
More  he  could  not  say.  This  in  itself  was  not  particu- 
larly cheering. 

Field-Marshal  Prince  Leopold  of  Bavaria  had  taken 
over  the  command  of  the  German  Eastern  front.  I  had 
asked  that  Lieutenant-Colonel  Hoffmann  might  be 
given  my  former  position,  for  I  knew  that  then  the 
work  would  continue  on  the  same  lines.  The  army 
group  which  the  Prince  had  commanded  hitherto  was 
transferred  to  General  von  Woyrsch,  who  kept  his  own 
army  as  well.  We  anticipated  further  fighting  there 
with  a  certain  sense  of  security,  although  the  crisis, 
especially  as  regards  Von  Linsingen's  group,  was  not  by 
any  means  over. 

The  Archduke  Charles's  group  had  not  yet  been  able 
to  make  a  stand,  and  a  further  retreat  was  only  to  be 
expected. 

When  Rumania  declared  war  the  Carpathians  as- 
sumed a  new  importance.  There  was  no  longer  any 
need  for  our  southern  wing  to  carry  out  its  enveloping 
mission  between  the  Dniester  and  Moldavia,  for  the 
whole  of  Rumania  now  constituted  a  wide  field  for 
maneuver,  and  the  movement  might  have  far-reaching 
effects. 

Austria-Hungary  had  done  nothing  to  protect  her 
right  flank  and  Transylvania,  either  in  peace  or  in  war. 
The  railway  system  was  inadequate  and  the  capacity 
of  the  few  existing  lines  extremely  small.  Fortifica- 
tions had  not  been  erected,  in  order  not  to  "irritate" 
Rumania.    But  Austria-Hungary  herself  had  calmly 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  293 

looked  on  while  Rumania  btdlt  works  on  Transylvanian 
soil  close  to  the  frontier. 

At  the  eleventh  hour  weak  forces  were  hastily  con- 
centrated there  and  battalions  formed  of  miners.  But 
there  were  yawning  gaps  everywhere.  In  the  north 
Russian  as  well  as  Rumanian  troops  pushed  their  way 
across  the  frontier  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  down  to 
the  Danube  and  into  Transylvania  and  Hungary.  The 
important  mountain  passes  fell  into  the  enemy's  hands 
without  a  shot  being  fired.  Kronstadt  and  Petroszeny, 
with  their  coal-mines,  were  occupied  as  early  as  August 
29.  Rumanian  patrols  were  soon  seen  in  Hermann- 
stadt.  Orsova  was  taken  by  the  enemy.  If  the  Ru- 
manians' advance  were  not  stopped,  not  only  would 
Archduke  Charles's  army  group  be  enveloped,  but  the 
way  into  the  heart  of  Hungary  and  to  our  lines  of  com- 
munication with  the  Balkan  Peninsula  would  be  free. 
That  would  mean  our  defeat. 

We  were  now  faced  with  the  difficult  problem  of 
holding  both  the  Western  and  Eastern  fronts  against 
all  hostile  attacks,  supporting  Archduke  Charles's  army 
and  effecting  a  concentration  against  Rumania,  which 
would  be  not  merely  a  guaranty  of  defense,  but  enable 
us  to  pass  to  the  offensive.  The  execution  of  this  task 
was  made  all  the  more  difficult  by  the  appeals  of  the 
Archduke  Charles's  group  for  reinforcements,  which 
ought  really  to  have  been  sent  to  Transylvania. 

General  Headquarters  found  itself  compelled  to  with- 
draw more  and  more  divisions  from  other  fronts.  The 
concentration  against  Rumania  was  deferred.  Not  a 
single  man  more  could  be  spared  from  the  Western 
front.  The  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  received 
instructions  to  withdraw  units  from  various  points  of 
his  already  thinly  held  front,  and  to  form  new  divisions. 
Everything  was  staked  on  our  decision  to  make  the 
most  of  our  superior  mobility  in  comparison  with  the 


294  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Entente  and  deal  with  Rumania  in  one  great  strategic 
maneuver;  but  how  and  when  this  could  be  accom- 
plished could  not  be  seen  at  the  beginning  of  September. 

The  first  step  to  be  taken  in  the  carrying  out  of  our 
plans  was  to  stop  the  advance  of  the  whole  front  on  both 
sides  of  the  Carpathians,  from  the  left  to  the  right  wing. 
The  front  had  to  be  extended  into  Transylvania,  ap- 
proximately along  the  river  Maros  above  and  below 
Maros  Vasarhely,  while  we  attacked  the  Rumanians 
from  Bulgaria  (although  we  were  strong  there),  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  plan  of  the  former  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff. 

After  the  campaign  against  Serbia  had  been  brought 
to  an  end  Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen  handed  over 
the  command  of  the  Bulgarian-Macedonian  front  to 
the  Bulgarian  General  Staff,  although  he  himself  re- 
mained in  the  Balkans.  When  relations  with  Ru- 
mania became  increasingly  acute  he  had  made  prepara- 
tions for  the  opening  of  hostilities,  and  on  August  28 
had  taken  over  command  of  the  German,  Austro-Hun- 
garian,  Bulgarian,  and  Ottoman  troops  on  the  Danube 
and  the  Dobrudja  frontier.  The  only  forces  he  had 
at  his  disposal  were:  west  of  Orsova,  the  Austrian 
Danube  flotilla,  very  weak  Bulgarian  Landsturm  of  the 
older  classes,  employed  in  watching  the  Danube;  at 
Rustchuk,  Colonel  Bode's  mixed  German  detachment, 
drawn  from  the  German  troops  in  Macedonia,  and  a 
Bulgarian  infantry  division.  Other  weak  Bulgarian 
forces  were  posted  to  the  east  of  the  railway  line  from 
Bulgaria  into  the  Dobrudja.  Several  heavy  German 
batteries  and  a  Turkish  division  were  on  their  way, 
but  only  at  the  rate  of  two  to  four  trains  a  day,  as 
the  railways  of  northern  Bulgaria  could  not  cope  with 
more. 

Bulgaria's  attitude  to  Rumania  was  most  uncertain. 
"While  Germany  and  Turkey  declared  their  solidarity 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  295 

with  their  allies  immediately  after  Riimania's  declara- 
tion of  war  on  Austria-Hungary,  Bulgaria  did  not 
think  fit  to  do  so  until  September  i.  She  made  no 
definite  stipulations  as  to  her  reward  for  her  military 
assistance,  such  as  the  cession  of  the  whole  of  the 
Dobrudja.  At  that  time  the  situation  on  the  Mace- 
donian front  was  responsible  for  a  certain  reserve  on 
Bulgaria's  part. 

According  to  the  arrangements  arrived  at  between 
General  von  Falkenhayn  and  the  allies,  Field-Marshal 
von  Mackensen  was  to  cross  the  Danube  in  the  direc- 
tion of  Bucharest  with  the  troops  under  his  command. 
General  von  Conrad  had  favored  this  operation  whole- 
heartedly, because  he  thought  it  promised  correspond- 
ing relief  in  Transylvania.  The  outcome  of  this  move- 
ment might  mean  the  defeat  of  Field-Marshal  von 
Mackensen's  weak  army,  either  on  the  northern  bank 
of  the  Danube  or  by  an  advance  of  the  Rumanians  and 
Russians  over  the  Dobrudja  frontier,  which  at  that 
time  was  insufficiently  protected.  Field-Marshal  von 
Hindenburg  and  I  rejected  this  plan,  and  advocated 
the  invasion  of  the  Dobrudja  by  Field- Marshal  von 
Mackensen.  This  would  also  be  the  best  means  of 
parrying  a  possible  thrust  into  Bulgaria  from  the 
Dobrudja.  The  idea  of  crossing  the  Danube  could 
be  considered  only  when  the  operations  against  the 
Rumanian  armies  in  Transylvania  made  further 
progress.  Later  events  proved  how  dangerous  this 
crossing  was.  General  von  Conrad  accepted  the 
altered  plans  reluctantly,  the  Bulgarians  very  read- 
ily, for  the  Dobrudja  was  calling.  Enver  of  course 
agreed. 

Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen  received  instructions 
accordingly.  While  the  situation  on  the  northern  Ru- 
manian front  was  still  particularly  uncertain  and  looked 
dangerous,  we  attacked  in  the  Dobrudja. 


296  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

III 

The  bulk  of  the  Bulgarian  Army  was  on  the  Greek 
frontier.  It  was  stiffened  by  German  staffs,  about 
one  German  division,  and  other  German  troops,  par- 
ticularly artillery  and  machine  gun,  telephone, 
and  flying  units.  Further,  Bulgaria  received  from 
us,  and  in  a  considerably  less  degree  from  Austria- 
Hungary,  money  and  plenty  of  war  material.  The 
Bulgarian  railways  were  far  from  efficient.  We 
had  to  take  drastic  steps  to  improve  their  working 
condition. 

The  Entente  had  conveyed  to  Salonika  the  reorgan- 
ized Serbian  Army,  as  well  as  forces  of  its  own,  but 
had  remained  inactive.  General  Sarrail  had  been  ap- 
pointed Commander-in-chief,  and  marked  his  entry 
into  office  by  laying  a  strong  hand  on  Greece  and  form- 
ing units  of  Venizelist  troops.  In  Albania  Austro- 
Hungarian  forces  had  been  stationed  since  the  spring 
west  of  Lake  Ochrida,  south  of  Berat,  and  on  the 
lower  Vojusa.  The  Italians  had  occupied  Valona,  and 
extended  their  bridge-head  into  northern  Epirus,  which 
had  been  annexed  by  Greece. 

However,  the  Entente  front  between  the  Adriatic 
Sea  and  the  Mediterranean  was  not  yet  continuous. 
We  were  in  touch  with  Greece  by  the  very  difficult 
Koritza  route,  but  this  was  of  no  value.  Greece  was 
so  firmly  in  the  grip  of  the  Entente,  and  so  dependent 
on  it  for  her  very  existence,  that  no  one  could  seriously 
think  it  possible  to  win  her  over  to  us. 

The  Bulgarian  Army,  and  Bulgaria  herself,  were 
willing  to  continue  the  war  just  so  long  as  it  furthered 
their  national  ambition  to  become  the  chief  Power  in 
the  Balkans.  For  this  the  Bulgarian  Army,  which 
had  not,  it  is  true,  yet  completely  recovered  from  the 
effects  of  the  two   Balkan   Wars,  was  fighting.     No 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  297 

military  action  was  to  be  expected  from  Bulgaria  in 
any  other  allied  theater  of  war. 

When  Turkey  joined  Germany  in  1914  Bulgaria  had, 
as  the  price  of  her  neutrality,  demanded  Turkish  ter- 
ritory on  the  right  bank  of  the  Maritza,  and  a  belt  ten 
kilometers  wide  on  the  left  bank,  from  Adrianople  to 
the  sea.  In  return  for  her  entry  into  the  war  against 
Serbia  she  laid  claim  to  Serbian  territory,  and,  in  the 
event  of  Rumania  joining  in,  she  demanded  the  whole 
of  the  so-called  Bulgarian  Dobrudja,  which  had  been 
ceded  to  Rumania  by  the  Peace  of  Bucharest  in  19 13. 
Agreements  made  in  the  autumn  of  191 5  regarding 
the  co-operation  of  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
troops  applied  only  to  the  Serbian  campaign,  and 
no  longer  held  good.  The  territory  conquered  in  that 
campaign  had  been  placed  under  the  jurisdiction  of 
Austria-Hungary  and  Bulgaria.  The  dividing  line  was, 
approximately,  the  river  Morava  from  its  confluence 
to  Pristina-Prizrend,  and  then  the  coiu-se  of  the  river 
Drina, 

The  Headquarters  Staff  of  the  German  Eleventh 
Army  on  the  Macedonian  front  controlled  the  sector 
on  the  both  sides  of  the  river  Vardar.  Here  was  the 
bulk  of  the  German  troops,  though  we  had  detachments 
on  other  parts  of  the  front.  The  lines-of-communica- 
tion  inspectorate  was  at  Nish.  We  had  not  kept  for 
ourselves  one  lines-of-communication  area  in  Serbian 
territory.  Only  the  railways  were  under  our  admin- 
istration. We  may  thus  have  avoided  political  dif- 
ficulties, but  the  German  troops  had  to  suffer  consid- 
erable inconvenience  as  a  result  of  our  moderation. 
Incorporated  in  the  Bulgarian  Army  as  they  were,  they 
did  not  meet  with  that  assistance  which  they  had  a 
right  to  expect  so  far  away  from  home,  and  which, 
indeed,  the  Bulgarians  had  expressly  pledged  them- 
selves to  render  in  many  matters.     The  German  soldier, 


298  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

with  his  keener  insight,  fought  on  the  Macedonian  front 
just  as  devotedly  as  he  had  done  on  the  Western  and 
Eastern  fronts.  He  knew  that  even  in  the  Balkan 
Peninsula  he  was  defending  his  own  home.  Neither 
the  Bulgarian  people  nor  the  Bulgarian  Army  were 
ripe  for  such  a  lofty  view.  They  did  not  even  grasp  it 
when  German  troops  were  taken  from  the  Macedonian 
front  in  an  endeavor  to  force  a  decision  elsewhere. 

Even  before  the  Rumanian  storm-cloud  broke  the 
Bulgarian  General  Staff  had  decided  to  take  the  of- 
fensive in  the  direction  of  Salonika.  This  was  quite  a 
sound  plan  from  a  military  point  of  view.  Holding  the 
line  of  the  Struma,  with  one  flank  resting  on  the  sea, 
the  Bulgarian  left  wing  would  be  considerably  safer 
than  in  its  positions  along  the  frontier.  The  district 
east  of  the  Struma  was  occupied  on  August  27  without 
serious  fighting,  as  the  Greek  Fourth  Army  Corps, 
stationed  there,  offered  no  resistance  and  quietly  looked 
on  while  the  Bulgarian  troops  marched  past.  This 
corps  remained  in  the  neighborhood  of  Drama  and 
Kavala.  The  German  General  Headquarters  imme- 
diately ordered  our  liaison  officer  to  take  charge  of 
these  troops.  They  soon  placed  themselves  at  our 
disposal,  and,  witK  their  own  consent,  were  taken  to 
Gorlitz  for  internment  there. 

All  danger  to  the  rear  of  the  Bulgarian  Army  had 
now  been  removed.  Entente  troops  were  on  the  line 
of  the  Struma.  The  Bulgarians  did  not  advance  any 
farther,  as  their  main  thrust  via  Fiorina  had  meanwhile 
failed.  The  Bulgarians  had  crossed  the  Greek  frontier 
at  this  point  on  August  19,  with  the  massif  of  the  Malka 
Nidze,  east  of  Fiorina,  which  was  held  by  the  Serbs,  as 
their  first  objective.  The  lower  slopes  were  carried  by 
surprise,  but  the  main  attack  was  repulsed  by  a  violent 
Serbian  counter-attack.  The  Bulgarian  losses  were 
heavy.     Their  offensive  and  their  spirit  collapsed  to- 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  299 

gether.  The  King  of  Bulgaria  and  Radoslavoff,  who 
were  in  Pless  at  the  beginning  of  September,  were  full 
of  laments  and  demanded  German  troops.  Our  Gov- 
ernment strongly  supported  them  in  this,  against  our 
wishes,  and  also  urged  an  abatement  of  Bulgaria's  debt 
to  Germany,  a  matter  which  I  did  not  at  that  time 
fully  realize,  because  it  did  not  concern  me. 

It  would  have  been  contrary  to  sound  conduct  of  the 
war  to  yield  to  Bulgaria's  demand  for  German  rein- 
forcements. From  the  point  of  view  of  the  war  as  a 
whole,  more  important  matters  were  at  stake  in 
Transylvania.  General  Headquarters  refused  any  as- 
sistance. I  found  that  the  communications  between 
the  valley  of  the  Vardar  and  the  plain  of  Monastir 
were  in  no  way  adequate  to  supply  the  needs  of  the 
troops  which  were  already  there.  To  send  more  troops 
there  would  have  been  bad  policy.  Once  more  we  had, 
first  of  all,  to  put  matters  on  a  sound  footing,  even 
though  the  Bulgarians  might  have  to  surrender  a  little 
ground.  They  must  accept  the  inevitable.  We  could 
not  do  everything  with  German  troops.  But  General 
Headquarters  gave  as  much  help  as  the  situation  per- 
mitted. The  German  Army  Headquarters  was  trans- 
ferred from  the  Vardar  to  the  right  wing,  with  a  view 
to  securing  correct  tactical  handling  and  the  adoption 
of  thorough  measures  for  the  establishment  of  rear 
communications.  German  railway  troops  and  labor 
battalions  had  to  take  this  work  into  their  own  expert 
hands.  This  mountainous  country  was  exceedingly 
difficult,  and  it  took  many  months  to  do  what  should 
have  been  done  before  the  Fiorina  offensive  was 
undertaken. 

General  JekofT  was  the  Bulgarian  Commander-in- 
-chief. He  was  a  loyal  supporter  of  the  Alliance,  but 
did  not  possess  those  outstanding  qualities  which  are 
required  of  a  leader  in  a  modem  war.     Besides,  he 


300  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

lacked  the  necessary  training.  His  character  was  ir- 
reproachable, but  he  had  not  sufficient  resolution  to 
remedy  various  grave  defects  in  the  Bulgarian  Army. 
He  was  entangled  in  narrow  party  politics  and  so  for- 
got the  war.  His  Chief  of  Staff  at  that  time  was  Lukoff , 
a  man  of  unsound  judgment  and  an  intriguer  who  is 
responsible  for  the  misfortune  of  his  country  and  the 
Quadruple  Alliance. 

I  found  it  difficult  to  get  a  clear  idea  of  the  psy- 
chology of  the  Bulgarian  people.  They  appeared  to 
me  to  have  strong  national  feeling  and  to  be  quite 
ready  to  fight  for  the  position  of  First  Power  in  the 
Balkans. 

Radoslavoff  was  a  Germanophile  from  inward  con- 
viction. He  stood  and  fell  by  the  Alliance.  In  putting 
forward  demands  on  Germany  and  in  his  Greater- 
Bulgarian  policy  he  was  exceedingly  obstinate  and  gave 
free  rein  to  all  agitation  in  that  direction,  so  that  he 
could  play  off  the  national  wishes  against  us.  But  he 
forgot  that  in  so  doing  he  was  making  his  own  position 
very  much  more  difficult  for  peace  negotiations.  He 
also  did  nothing  to  enlighten  his  people  about  the 
necessity  of  the  war.  Perhaps  he  did  not  fully  realize 
it  himself. 

The  King  of  Bulgaria  was  just  as  firm  a  supporter 
of  the  Alliance.  He  was  an  uncommonly  clever  man, 
but  a  lover  of  skilful  diplomacy  rather  than  a  man  of 
action.  He  liked  to  have  several  irons  in  the  fire  and 
thought  he  could  always  postpone  decisions.  Thanks 
to  the  great  ability  with  which  he  managed  the  Bul- 
garians, this  had  been  good  enough  for  peace-time; 
but  it  was  not  enough  in  war.  I  was  particularly 
sorry  that  he  was  no  soldier,  and  therefore  did  not 
exercise  that  influence  over  the  army  which  his  high 
position  demanded  of  him. 

The  Crown  Prince  Boris,  excellently  trained  by  his 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  301 

father,  was  a  thoroughly  soldierly  personality,  and 
mature  beyond  his  years.  He  had  a  clear  understand- 
ing of  military  necessities.  Our  staffs  in  Bulgaria  and 
I  myself  liked  dealing  with  him.  These  people  cannot 
find  a  better  ruler. 

IV 

The  situation  in  Turkey  had  improved  since  the 
forces  of  the  Entente  evacuated  the  Gallipoli  peninsula. 
It  had  now  become  possible  for  Enver  Pasha  to  place 
some  troops  at  the  disposal  of  the  German  General 
Headquarters.  He  realized,  quite  rightly,  that,  as  far 
as  Turkey  was  concerned,  the  war  would  now  be  de- 
cided in  other  theaters. 

Of  course  these  troops  had  first  of  all  to  be  trained, 
clothed,  and  equipped.  That  took  time.  At  the  end 
of  July  and  the  beginning  of  August  the  Turkish 
15th  Corps  had  been  sent  to  Galicia,  and  now  an 
Ottoman  division  was  sent  to  the  neighborhood  of 
Wama.  Enver  took  these  troops  from  the  army  of 
Marshal  Liman  Pasha,  to  whom  the  defense  of  Con- 
stantinople and  the  coast  of  Asia  Minor  was  still 
committed. 

The  English  had  driven  the  Turks  out  of  the  Sinai 
peninsula.  They  were  now  busy  building  a  full-gage 
railway  and  a  pipe-line;  as  soon  as  sufficient  progress 
had  been  made  with  these  works  an  enemy  invasion 
of  Palestine  was  to  be  anticipated. 

The  Turkish  success  at  Kut-el-Amara  had  had  no 
sequel.  The  English  were  preparing  a  new  operation 
against  Bagdad,  and  this  time  it  looked  as  if  it  was  to 
be  carried  right  through.  The  resumption  of  active 
hostilities  here  was  to  be  expected  sooner  or  later. 

Both  operations  were  bound  to  succeed  if  the  English 
really  took  their  task  in  hand,  as  now  appeared  to  be 
the  case.     But  the  stouter  the  Turkish  resistance  the 


302  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

larger  the  force  they  would  have  to  employ.  For  that 
reason  the  fighting  value  of  the  Turkish  Army  was  a 
matter  of  the  greatest  importance  to  us.  The  stiffer 
the  Turks'  defense  in  Palestine  and  Mesopotamia,  and 
the  larger  the  force  absorbed  in  the  English  effort  to 
achieve  their  object,  the  more  our  burden  in  the  West 
would  be  lightened.  Of  course  in  their  Indian  con- 
tingents the  English  had  troops  at  their  disposal  which 
they  did  not  care  to  use  in  France,  so  that  their  em- 
ployment in  Asiatic  Turkey  did  not  benefit  our  situa- 
tion in  the  West.  All  the  same,  it  increased  the 
military  demands  upon  the  British. 

The  Turkish  enterprises  in  Persia  in  the  direction 
of  Hamadan  were  merely  episodes,  and  of  no  importance 
for  the  conduct  of  the  war. 

In  eastern  Asia  Minor,  west  and  south  of  the  Trebi- 
zond-Erzinjan-Mush  line,  Russians  and  Turks  stood 
facing  one  another,  inactive.  The  strengths  of  both 
armies  appeared  to  be  extraordinarily  low.  I  have 
never  been  able  to  find  out  exactly  what  the  Turkish 
strength  there  was.  We  no  longer  anticipated  any 
more  great  Russian  offensives,  because  this  theater  pre- 
sented too  many  difficulties  for  Russia,  too. 

The  Turkish  Army  was  exhausted.  To  begin  with, 
it  had  not  recovered  from  the  Balkan  War  before  it 
was  involved  in  another.  Its  wastage  from  disease 
and  in  action  was  continuously  high.  The  trust- 
worthy, brave  Anatolian  had  vanished  from  its  ranks. 
The  unreliable  Arab  auxiliaries  were  playing  an  increas- 
ingly important  part  everywhere,  but  especially  in 
Mesopotamia  and  Palestine.  The  forces  were  now  be- 
low their  paper  strength,  and  the  men  were  badly  fed 
and  still  worse  equipped.  The  lack  of  efficient  officers 
was  particularly  felt.  Liman  Pasha,  relying  on  his 
authority,  endeavored  again  and  again  to  make  his 
divisions  into  an  efficient  fighting  instrument.     He  did 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  303 

all  that  could  be  done.  When  Turkish  troops  left  his 
hands  to  come  under  German  leadership,  in  GaHcia  or 
against  Rumania,  for  example,  they  behaved  quite 
passably,  and  sometimes  well,  but  where  they  were 
under  a  Turkish  command  they  soon  forgot  what  Ger- 
man thoroughness  had  taught  them. 

Besides  money,  Turkey  received  from  us  officers  and 
technical  units,  as  well  as  war  material,  though  the 
amount  of  this  was  regulated  by  the  very  limited  num- 
ber of  trains  to  Constantinople  which  were  at  our 
disposal.  Liman  Pasha's  divisions  could  not  be 
equipped  here.  The  further  transport  of  war  material 
for  the  troops  in  Palestine  and  Mesopotamia  or  the 
Caucasus  front  was  also  so  limited  that  these  were  only 
very  poorly  equipped.  This  reduced  still  further  their 
fighting  power,  which  was  low  enough  already  on  ac- 
count of  their  small  numbers.  We  tried  to  increase 
the  capacity  of  the  Turkish  railways  by  supplying 
material  and  technical  personnel. 

The  Turkish  Government  preserved  its  attitude  of 
hostility  toward  the  other  races. 

In  spite  of  my  entreaties,  Turkey  made  no  serious 
attempt  to  break  with  her  old  policy  toward  the  Arabs. 
In  any  case,  ■  perhaps  it  would  have  been  too  late. 
English  gold  did  the  rest.  The  Arabs  turned  more  and 
more  against  the  Turks.  It  was  a  miracle  that  Turkey 
was  able  to  hold  the  Hedjaz  Railway  and  Medina  almost 
to  the  end  of  the  war. 

At  the  beginning  of  September  Enver,  too,  came  to 
Pless.  He  was  a  very  gifted  man  and  made  a  notable 
and  unusual  impression  upon  us.  He  was  a  true  friend 
of  Germany  and  there  was  a  bond  of  warm  sympathy 
between  us.  He  had  a  real  military  instinct  for  the 
art  of  war,  but  he  lacked  both  the  knowledge  of  first 
principles  and  professional  qualifications.  Nor  had  he 
received  a  thorough  training.     His  great  military  ability 


3Q4  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

had  no  chance  to  develop.  His  sending  Turkish  troops 
to  Galicia  and  against  the  Rumanians  proved  his  sound 
miHtary  judgment.  On  the  other  hand,  he  was  always 
clamoring  for  war  material  on  a  scale  that  could  not 
possibly  be  supplied.  The  majority  of  the  available 
trains  to  Turkey  via  Sofia  were  used  for  coal,  which  was 
sent  from  Upper  Silesia  to  Constantinople.  Over  and 
over  again  I  begged  Enver,  the  very  distinguished 
Talaat,  and  other  Tiu-kish  high  officials,  who  visited 
us,  to  increase  their  home  output  of  coal,  which  ap- 
peared perfectly  possible.  If  they  had  there  would 
have  been  more  transport  space  for  war  material.  I 
discussed  with  them  the  great  importance  of  railways 
in  warfare,  and  showed  them,  how  Turkey  could  help 
herself  in  this  respect.  I  made  little  impression  upon 
them  and  they  certainly  showed  no  disposition  to  ac- 
cept my  suggestions.  They  continued  to  assail  me 
with  their  demands,  although  it  was  plain  that  no 
notice  could  be  taken  of  them.  Turkey  did  practically 
nothing  to  improve  the  working  of  her  coal-mines  and 
railways. 

The  Young  Turks  were  firmly  in  power  in  Constan- 
tinople. 

The  people  themselves  held  aloof. 

When  I  took  up  my  new  duties  the  outlook  in  Turkey 
was  far  from  reassuring.  I  could  think  only  with 
apprehension  of  Mesopotamia  and  Palestine. 


Wherever  personal  discussion  was  impossible,  liaison 
with  our  alHes  was  assured  by  military  representatives. 
The  German  General  von  Cramon  was  responsible  for 
communication  between  ourselves  and  the  Austro- 
Himgarian  General  Headquarters,  and  he  fulfilled  his 
often  difficult  task  with  extraordinary  skill  and  great 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  305 

personal  tact.  Thanks  to  him,  our  relations  with  the 
Austro-Hungarian  General  Headquarters  became  stead- 
ily more  intimate.  The  Austro-Himgarian  military  rep- 
resentative at  the  German  General  Headquarters, 
Lieutenant  Field-Marshal  von  Klepsch,  kept  more 
in  the  background.  He  was  also  an  exceptionally 
gifted  man,  who  contributed  largely  to  avoidance  of 
misunderstandings,  and  was  always  ready  to  work  with 
us  in  the  spirit  of  unshakable  comradeship. 

Our  dealings  with  Bulgaria  passed  in  the  main 
through  the  hands  of  Colonel  (late  General)  Gant- 
schew,  the  Bulgarian  representative  at  our  head- 
quarters. He  was  an  uncommonly  skilful  and  clever 
personality,  who  represented  Bulgarian  interests  most 
efficiently,  without  losing  the  wider  point  of  view.  He 
was  a  loyal  friend  of  the  Alliance,  and  later,  on  the 
King's  abdication,  accompanied  him  to  Germany. 
The  German  military  representative  in  Sofia,  Colonel 
von  Massow,  who  stood  very  well  with  the  King,  was 
often  called  in  to  aid,  and  had  continually  to  smooth 
away  the  difficulties  to  which  the  pecuHar  character  of 
the  Bulgarians  so  easily  gave  rise. 

The  Turkish  military  representative,  Lieutenant- 
General  Zeki  Pasha,  an  Ottoman  of  high  rank  and  a 
loyal  friend  of  Germany,  was  a  remarkably  skilful  and 
tactful  upholder  of  his  army's  interests.  The  German 
representative  in  Constantinople,  General  von  Lossow, 
was  particularly  well  informed  on  Turkish  subjects,  and 
a  personal  friend  of  Enver  Pasha.  Naturally,  we  fre- 
quently had  recourse  to  his  services.  As  the  Chief  of 
Staff  at  the  Turkish  General  Headquarters  was  a  Ger- 
man— first,  General  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf,  and 
subsequently  General  von  Seeckt — ^relations  with  this 
body  were  naturally  particularly  intimate. 

When  the  Field-Marshal  and  I  arrived  at  Pless  the 
question  was  just  being  mooted  of  the  establishment  of 


3o6  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

a  single  command  for  the  Quadruple  Alliance  in  all 
tactical  and  strategical  matters.  I  warmly  advocated 
it  and  had  the  pleasure  of  seeing  it  carried  out.  The 
final  decision  lay  with  His  Majesty,  who  gave  per- 
mission to  the  Field-Marshal  to  do  everything  "By 
Order  of  His  Majesty."  In  practice  the  actual  control 
was  limited;  we  had  no  definite  knowledge  of  the 
quality  of  our  allies'  troops,  and  were  thus  unable,  for 
example,  to  direct  that  only  so  many  troops  should  be 
retained  on  Austria's  ItaUan  frontier.  In  practice  we 
generally  came  to  some  mutual  arrangement,  but  the 
directions  issued  by  the  German  General  Headquar- 
ters carried  with  them  a  certain  authority  which  proved 
to  be  of  great  utility. 

The  Field-Marshal  and  I  had,  accordingly,  the  con- 
duct of  operations  in  the  West,  and  in  the  East  as  far 
as  the  Dobrudja  in  the  south.  With  regard  to  the 
Rtunanian  campaign,  it  was  necessary  to  come  to  an 
arrangement  with  our  allies,  and  in  particular  with 
Austria-Hungary.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Headquar- 
ters Staff  in  Teschen  had  under  its  command  the  army 
group  of  the  Archduke  Charles  and  the  troops  that  were 
now  moving  into  Transylvania.  They  depended,  how- 
ever, so  largely  upon  the  measures  we  ourselves  were 
about  to  take  that  the  assumption  of  the  single  com- 
mand by  our  General  Headquarters  made  no  difference 
whatever  in  fact. 

The  Italian  and  Albanian  fronts  were  the  exclusive 
sphere  of  General  von  Conrad. 

Conditions  in  Macedonia,  Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  de- 
manded our  closest  attention,  but  we  could  not  have 
the  final  voice  there. 

One  result  of  the  establishment  of  the  single  com- 
mand was  that  the  general  staffs  of  the  various  allies 
had  recourse  to  us  whenever  disagreements  broke  out 
between    them.     In    Balkan    questions,    the    Bulgar 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  307 

General  Headquarters  was  very  reluctant  to  have  any- 
direct  dealing  with  Turkey  or  Austria-Hungary,  while 
the  latter,  in  its  timi,  preferred  to  deal  with  us  rather 
than  with  Bulgaria. 

VI 

His  Majesty  the  Emperor  was  Supreme  War  Lord* 
In  him  resided  the  ultimate  authority  over  the  army 
and  navy.  The  commanders-in-chief  of  the  land  and 
sea  forces  were  responsible  to  him. 

Subject  to  His  Majesty's  pleasure,  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  of  the  field  army  had  full  control  of  the 
direction  of  operations.  Decisions  of  the  first  im- 
portance required  His  Majesty's  approval.  He  had 
no  executive  authority. 

The  Emperor  was  thus  the  head  of  the  General 
Staff.  I  may  mention  that,  when  I  use  this  latter 
expression  in  these  memoirs  in  the  narrower  sense  as 
referring  to  the  General  Staff  of  the  army  in  the  field, 
I  do  so  in  accordance  with  the  current,  though  incorrect, 
practice. 

The  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  as  the  director  of  opera- 
tions at  sea,  had  the  same  status  as  the  Chief  of  the 
General  Staff  in  the  field.  As  regards  such  operations 
he  had  the  same  rights  and  duties.  The  General  Staff 
and  the  Naval  Staff  have  always  worked  well  together. 

The  Governors-General  in  Brussels  and  Warsaw  were 
directly  responsible  to  His  Majesty  and  took  their 
directions  from  the  Chancellor  in  matters  of  policy. 
In  military  questions  they  took  directions  from  General 
Headquarters — on  one  occasion  it  proved  necessary  to 
obtain  an  order  from  His  Majesty  when  we  wanted  some 
horses  from  the  Warsaw  Government. 

The  other  occupied  territories  fell  under  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  Quartermaster-General,  and  thus  under 


'3o8  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

General  Headquarters.  The  real  authorities  in  these 
areas  were  the  army  Headquarters  Staffs. 

The  Ministries  of  War  of  Prussia,  Bavaria,  Saxony, 
and  Wurttemberg  ranked  equal  to  ourselves.  They  had 
their  representatives  at  General  Headquarters,  in  the 
person  of  the  military  representatives  of  the  separate 
contingents.  The  Bavarians  were  always  changing 
their  representative.  Latterly  General  von  Hartz, 
and  after  him  General  Koberle,  held  the  position. 
Saxony  and  Wurttemberg  were  represented  by  Generals 
von  Eulitz  and  von  Graevenitz,  the  latter  being  after- 
ward succeeded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Holland.  The 
other  function  of  these  officers  was  to  uphold  the 
interests  of  their  own  armies  as  against  General  Head- 
quarters. It  must  be  clear  that  not  even  in  the  Ger- 
man Army  was  jealousy  wholly  non-existent.  If  any 
difficulties  arose  in  any  part  of  the  field,  one  national 
contingent  was  at  times  disposed  to  lay  the  blame  on 
another.  At  one  time  there  would  be  complaints  of 
too  heavy  losses,  at  another  of  too  little  opportunity  to 
shine.  There  were  also  personal  questions  to  be  settled 
with  the  military  representatives.  These  officers  co- 
operated well  with  General  Headquarters.  I  think  I 
must  have  convinced  them  that  I  attended  to  their 
interests  in  a  disinterested  spirit.  I  have  never  made 
any  difference  between  the  four  contingents.  They  all 
did  their  duty  and  all  had  their  good  and  less  good 
divisions.  Wurttemberg  alone  had  only  good  ones. 
The  Baden  divisions  deserve  the  same  praise,  although 
they  did  not  form  a  separate  contingent.  In  spite  of 
the  variety  of  the  peoples  composing  it,  the  army  held 
together  well.  It  was  only  after  a  long  period  of  nerve- 
racking  toil  that  a  certain  spirit  of  hostility  manifested 
itself  between  the  Bavarians  and  the  Prussians.  And 
this  never  applied  to  officers  of  higher  rank. 

The   Prussian   War   Ministry  was  represented   by 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  309 

Major  Stieler  von  Heydekampf,  who  gave  me  devoted 
assistance  in  my  many  difficult  tasks. 

In  many  directions  the  War  Ministries  compHed  with 
our  requests,  and  I  found  them  loyal  helpers.  When, 
however,  the  exigencies  of  war  began  to  affect  the  home 
life  of  the  people  more  and  more  intimately  the  officials 
could  not  shake  themselves  free  of  home  influences. 
They  succumbed  instead  of  rising  superior  to  them,  and 
thus  failed  to  give  the  army  that  moral  support  it  so 
urgently  needed. 

I  had  no  dealings  with  the  general  officers  command- 
ing the  home  commands,  except  on  questions  of 
patriotic  instruction.  They  were  not  under  the  orders 
of  General  Headquarters.  Under  the  Belagerungsge- 
setz  ^  they  were  absolutely  independent,  and  after  the 
creation  by  the  Reichstag  of  a  supreme  military  au- 
thority, in  the  autumn  of  1916,  they  were  made  re- 
sponsible to  the  War  Ministers,  as  was  already  the  case 
in  Bavaria. 

By  this  appointment  the  Prussian  War  Minister  be- 
came of  much  more  importance  to  the  successful  prose- 
cution of  the  war.  His  responsibility  was  much  greater, 
and  he  had  now  frankly  to  remind  the  Chancellor  of  his 
duty  to  strengthen  the  morale,  in  order  that  that  of 
the  army  should  not  suffer.  He  had  also  to  insist  that 
order  should  be  maintained  at  home  from  whatever 
quarter  it  was  threatened.  This  was  what  the  army 
expected  of  the  Prussian  War  Minister.  The  attitude 
of  the  Government  and  the  law  creating  a  supreme 
military  authority  lowered  the  status  of  the  general 
officers  commanding  the  home  commands.  Indeed, 
it  was  the  precise  object  of  that  law,  which  was  aimed 
primarily  at  them  and  all  their  works.  It  is  true  that 
in  the  interpretation  of  the  law  relating  to  associations 
and  in  the  application  of  the  censorship,  as  well  as  in 
1  Literally,  the  "  Law  of  the  Siege." 


3IO  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

many  other  matters,  it  was  a  great  disadvantage  to 
have  a  multiplicity  of  authorities,  and  it  must  have 
led  to  considerable  confusion.  One  single  firm  assertion 
of  the  Government's  authority  would  have  been  far 
better.  But  this  was  wanting,  and  the  War  Minister 
did  not  succeed  in  supplying  it.  More  and  more,  as 
the  Chancellor  yielded  to  party  pressure,  imcertainty 
and  confusion  spread  from  Berlin  to  the  provinces. 
Independent  action  on  the  part  of  the  general  officers 
.commanding  the  home  commands  became  rarer  and 
rarer.  The  law  creating  the  supreme  military  au- 
thority, which  might  have  done  good,  was  ultimately 
fatal  to  us. 

A  further  authority,  with  which  General  Head- 
quarters had  to  deal  as  of  equal  status,  was  the  Chief 
of  the  Military  Cabinet,  who  was  responsible  to  the 
Emperor  alone.  He  worked  well  and  conscientiously, 
forming  his  opinion  simply  on  the  reports  of  the  staffs. 
He  received  my  views  also  in  the  case  of  the  general 
officers  commanding  armies  and  the  home  commands. 
Beyond  this.  General  Headquarters  had  nothing  to  do 
with  personal  questions,  save  that  it  was  morally  re- 
sponsible for  officers  of  the  General  Staff,  and  also  for 
^the  award  of  decorations.  I  should  like  to  have  seen 
at  the  head  of  the  MiHtary  Cabinet  men  who  had  had 
real  personal  experience  of  the  fighting,  so  that  we  could 
rely  upon  them  to  do  justice  to  the  Corps  of  Officers. 
As  it  was,  this  body  worked  too  closely  on  the  lines 
of  its  peace-time  routine,  and  did  not  bring  strong 
characters  to  the  front. 

In  questions  of  decorations,  too,  the  importance  of 
which  must  not  be  underestimated,  the  Chief  of  the 
Military  Cabinet  had  jurisdiction.  Here,  too,  he  relied 
upon  the  reports  of  the  Army  Headquarters  staffs. 
Unfortunately,  too  long  elapsed  between  the  recom- 
mendation and  the  actual  grant  of  decorations.     It  w^as 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  311 

only  after  long  and  continuous  pressure  that  General 
Headquarters  managed  to  secure  the  grant  of  a 
' '  wounded ' '  badge. 

The  conduct  of  the  war  In  the  colonies  was  in  the 
hands  of  the  Colonial  Secretary.  In  peace-time  he  had 
not  maintained  close  touch  with  the  General  Staff  on 
the  subject  of  the  conduct  of  military  operations  in  the 
colonies.  In  1904  General  Count  von  Schlieffen  ob- 
tained the  control  of  operations  in  Southwest  Africa 
only  by  a  special  order.  The  Colonial  Office  had  not 
paid  sufficient  attention  to  the  defensive  possibilities  of 
the  colonies.  One  cannot  estimate  too  highly  the 
benefits  France  has  reaped  from  her  colonies  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  war.  Especially  in  the  summer  of 
1 918  she  carried  on  the  fighting  largely  by  means  of 
colored  troops.  We  could  never,  of  course,  have  done 
this,  but  we  might  have  reaped  greater  advantage  from 
our  colonial  possessions.  The  band  of  German  heroes 
in  East  Africa  succeeded  in  drawing  off  powerful  enemy 
forces,  which  thus  could  not  be  used  against  Turkey 
and  had  to  be  replaced  to  some  extent  by  other  troops, 
thus  weakening  the  Western  front  in  the  long  run.  I 
followed  the  campaigns  in  the  colonies  with  interest, 
and  was  surprised  that  Southwest  Africa  did  not  act 
with  more  energy.  It  should  not  have  fallen  so  rapidly. 
I  do  not  know  the  causes  of  its  fall.  The  lack  of  at- 
tention of  the  home  Government  to  questions  of  colonial 
defense  cannot  have  been  the  sole  reason.  In  East 
Africa,  in  the  autumn  of  191 7,  between  the  Rufiji  and 
the  Rovuma,  and  later,  on  Portuguese  territory  until 
the  end  of  the  war.  General  von  Lettow-Vorbeck  gave 
a  magnificent  proof  of  German  courage  in  foreign  parts. 

General  Headquarters  and  the  Chancellor  had  equal 
status.  Here,  too,  the  common  head  was  the  Emperor. 
Our  dealings  with  the  Imperial  Government  were  fre- 
quent and  not  too  pleasant.     We  did  not  meet  with 


312  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

that  spirit  of  accommodation  which  was  so  necessary 
when  we  told  the  authorities  what  the  successful 
prosecution  of  the  war  demanded  of  them,  if  the  Ger- 
man people  were  to  be  victorious. 

The  representation  of  military  interests  in  all  ques- 
tions of  foreign  policy  during  the  war  and  in  connection 
with  the  conclusion  of  peace  meant  frequent  dealings 
and  much  friction  also. 

The  machinery  of  government  in  Berlin  gave  the 
impression  of  being  extremely  clumsy. 

The  various  departments  worked  side  by  side  without 
any  real  sympathy  or  cohesion,  and  there  was  infinite 
' '  overlapping. ' '  The  left  hand  often  did  not  know  what 
the  right  was  doing.  A  Bismarck  could  have  made 
these  departments  co-operate  properly,  but  the  task 
was  beyond  our  War  Chancellors. 

Relations  between  the  General  Staff  and  the  Gov- 
ernment were  improved  and  simplified  in  February 
191 7  by  the  Chancellor  appointing  a  personal  repre- 
sentative at  General  Headquarters;  at  first  this  was 
Under-Secretary  of  State  von  Stein,  who  was  like  a 
breath  of  fresh  air  all  the  time  he  was  with  us.  In  the 
autimin  of  191 7  the  position  was  taken  by  Count 
Limburg-Stirum,  a  skilful  and  well-informed  man  of 
great  patriotism.  Dealing  with  him  was  a  real  pleasure. 
In  much  the  same  way  Colonel  (later  General)  von 
Winterfeldt  represented  the  General  Staff  at  the 
Chancellor's  department  in  Berlin.  He  worked  at  his 
difficult  task  with  devotion  and  tact. 

General  Headquarters  had  further  to  deal  with  a 
whole  series  of  imperial  offices,  and  also,  in  questions  of 
communications,  with  the  governments  of  the  larger 
states.  I  greatly  missed  the  assistance  of  a  strong 
imperial  executive.  The  disadvantages  of  oiu-  com- 
plicated constitution  were  plainly  evident.  The  desire 
for  an  Imperial  Ministry  of  War  was  expressed  to  ma 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  313 

by  several  far-seeing  Bavarian  officers  of  high  rank. 
I  could  only  agree  with  them,  and  beg  them  to  advocate 
that  view  in  Bavaria. 

The  question  of  unifying  the  constitution  of  Ger- 
many is  now  under  discussion,  and  I  trust  that  it  may 
be  achieved  as  a  further  step  in  the  development  of  our 
country.  It  must  not  be  forgotten,  in  any  such 
changes,  what  Germany  owes  to  Prussia  and  to  the 
other  states. 

The  military  attaches  in  neutral  states  were  at  the 
disposal  of  General  Headquarters,  as  in  peace-time. 
They  were  subject  to  the  ambassadors  and  did  no 
political  work.  They  reported  any  military  matters 
direct  to  the  General  Staff,  a  copy  of  their  report  being 
supplied  to  the  ambassador.  This  method  of  working 
did  not  give  rise  to  difficulties.  The  attaches  also 
worked  on  propaganda  in  agreement  with  the  am- 
bassador. In  this  branch  of  their  activities  they  re- 
ceived their  instructions  from  Colonel  von  Haeften; 

In  the  allied  countries  our  military  attaches  had 
similar  tasks.  Here,  too,  they  had  nothing  to  do  with 
politics.  Their  most  important  duty  was  to  act  as 
liaison  officers  between  our  General  Headquarters  and 
the  general  staffs  of  the  allied  armies. 

VII 

On  September  5  the  Field-Marshal  and  I  paid  our 
first  visit  to  the  West.  We  traveled  via  Charleville, 
where  General  Headquarters  had  been  established 
hitherto,  to  Cambrai,  the  headquarters  of  the  Crown 
Prince  Rupprecht  of  Bavaria. 

The  Crown  Prince  came  to  meet  us  on  our  way  into 
Charleville.  A  company  of  the  famous  Von  Rohr 
Storm  Battalion  formed  the  guard  of  honor  for  the 
Field-Marshal.     For  the  first  time  I  saw  a  single  de- 


314  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

tachment  in  full  storming  rig-out,  with  the  steel  helmets 
which  had  proved  so  extraordinarily,  so  wonderfully, 
useful.  We  had  not  had  them  in  the  East.  The 
Crown  Prince  was  greatly  pleased  at  the  abandonment 
of  the  attacks  on  Verdun,  a  course  he  had  long  and 
earnestly  desired.  He  discussed  other  matters  also, 
-and  mentioned  to  me  his  desire  for  peace;  he  did  not 
explain  how  this  was  to  be  obtained  from  the  Entente. 

In  Charleville  the  Field-Marshal  saw  the  officers  of 
Main  Headquarters.  The  division  of  General  Head- 
quarters into  two  groups,  and  the  immense  distance 
between  Pless  and  Charleville,  had  proved  very  in- 
convenient in  every  way.  The  excellent  telephone  and 
telegraph  service  was  no  substitute  for  personal  discus- 
sion. I  would  have  preferred  to  have  General  Head- 
quarters entirely  in  the  West,  although  not  at  Charle- 
ville, which  was  not  a  convenient  place.  The  German 
troops  in  France  and  Belgium  had  to  bear  the  burden 
of  the  war  in  its  most  merciless  form,  and  one's  anxiety 
to  be  geographically  near  them  was  natural  enough. 
General  Headquarters  was,  however,  compelled  to  re- 
main at  Pless,  as  the  operations  in  Rumania  required 
that  we  should  keep  in  close  touch  with  General  von 
Conrad  in  Teschen.  General  Headquarters  was,  there- 
fore, moved  to  the  East,  and  established  in  Pless, 
Kattowitz,  and  other  towns. 

The  conference  in  Cambrai  took  place  on  the  morning 
of  the  yth,  while  a  violent  struggle  was  proceeding  on 
the  Somme.  We  were  all  deeply  affected  by  that 
terrible  conflict. 

The  Western  front  was  not  at  this  time  well  or- 
ganized. The  constitution  of  the  armies  into  army 
groups  had  not  been  carried  far  enough  yet.  The 
army  group  of  Crown  Prince  Rupprecht  had  been 
created  as  a  result  of  the  August  Somme  fighting. 
It  included  the  Sixth  Army  before  Arras,  which  the 


THE   ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  315 

Crown  Prince  himself  had  thitherto  commanded,  and 
the  two  other  armies  also  engaged,  the  First  and  Second, 
under  Generals  Fritz  von  Below  and  von  Gallwitz. 
The  army  group  of  the  German  Crown  Prince  was  of 
earlier  origin;  it  consisted  of  the  Third  Army  near 
Rheims,  the  Fifth  at  Verdun,  led  by  the  Crown  Prince 
himself,  and  the  army  detachments  A  and  B  in  Alsace 
and  Lorraine. 

Not  forming  part  of  any  army  group  was  the  Fourth 
Army,  under  Field-Marshal  Duke  Albrecht  of  Wiirttem- 
berg,  on  the  right  wing  of  the  army,  and  the  Seventh 
Army,  under  Colonel-General  von  Schubert,  between 
the  two  army  groups.  At  first  we  decided  to  make  no 
change  in  these  arrangements  beyond  putting  the 
Seventh  Armyinto  the  Crown  PrinceRupprecht's  group, 
and  shortly  afterward  forming  a  special  army  group 
under  the  German  Crown  Prince.  There  were  now 
only  three  great  sections,  taking  orders  direct  from 
General  Headquarters.  The  wholesale  reorganization 
of  the  West  front  could  not  be  undertaken  until  there 
was  a  pause  in  the  fighting. 

The  Chief  of  Staff  of  the  Fourth  Army,  General  Use, 
and  Generals  von  Kuhl  and  von  Luttwitz,  the  chiefs 
of  staff  to  the  Crown  Prince  Rupprecht  and  the  Ger- 
man Crown  Prince's  groups,  gave  us  a  summary  of 
events  on  their  sectors.  Colonel  von  Lossberg  in  his 
serious  way,  and  Colonel  Bronsart  von  Schellendorf 
with  his  usual  vivacity,  supplemented  General  von 
Kuhl's  report  of  the  battle  of  the  Somme  with  more 
detailed  and  intimate  descriptions  of  events.  The  loss 
of  ground  up  to  date  appeared  to  me  of  little  importance 
in  itself.  We  could  stand  that,  but  the  question  how 
this  and  the  progressive  falling  off  of  our  fighting 
power  of  which  it  was  symptomatic  was  to  be  prevented 
was  of  immense  importance.  It  was  just  as  necessary 
to  have  a  clear  idea  of  our  fighting  capacity  as  to  know 


3i6  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

whether  our  tactical  views  were  still  sound.  The  first 
was  an  easy  matter,  the  second  of  extreme  difficulty. 
Opinions  vary  as  much  in  strategical  and  tactical  as  in 
political  and  economic  questions.  It  is  just  as  difficult 
to  carry  conviction.  The  symptoms  are  recognized, 
but  the  underlying  causes  are  the  subject  of  con- 
troversy. In  such  circumstances  a  cure  is  a  difficult 
matter.  The  army  is  a  very  conservative  body.  It 
was  so  in  peace-time  and  war  made  no  difference. 

My  mental  picture  of  the  fighting  at  Verdun  and  on 
the  Somme  had  to  be  painted  a  shade  darker  in  view 
of  what  I  had  just  heard.  The  only  relief  in  it  was 
the  heroism  of  our  German  men,  who  had  suffered  to 
the  extreme  limit  of  human  endurance  for  the  sake  of 
the  Fatherland.  I  cannot  repeat  all  the  moving  stories 
of  the  battle  which  I  heard.  The  finest  description  of 
the  battle  has  been  written  by  a  young  officer  of  the 
doughty  Hamburg  Regiment — it  is  an  epic  in  prose. 

I  began  to  realize  what  a  task  the  Field-Marshal  and 
I  had  undertaken  in  our  new  spheres,  and  what  a 
burden  we  should  lay  on  the  leaders  and  troops  in  the 
West  if  we  drew  on  them  still  further  for  our  offensive 
in  the  Southeast. 

On  the  Somme  the  enemy's  powerful  artillery,  as- 
sisted by  excellent  aeroplane  observation  and  fed  with 
enormous  supplies  of  ammunition,  had  kept  down  our 
own  fire  and  destroyed  our  artillery.  The  defense  of 
our  infantry  had  become  so  flabby  that  the  massed 
attacks  of  the  enemy  always  succeeded.  Not  only 
did  our  morale  suffer,  but,  in  addition  to  fearful  wastage 
in  killed  and  wounded,  we  lost  a  large  number  of 
prisoners  and  much  material. 

The  most  pressing  demands  of  these  officers  were  for 
an  increase  of  artillery,  ammunition,  aircraft,  and 
balloons,  as  well  as  larger  and  more  punctual  allotment 
of  fresh  divisions  and  other  troops  to  make  possible 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  317 

a  better  system  of  reliefs.  The  breaking  off  of  the 
attack  on  Verdiin  made  it  easier  to  satisfy  their  wishes, 
but  even  there  we  had  to  reckon  in  the  future  with 
considerable  wastage,  if  only  on  account  of  the  local 
conditions.  It  was  possible  that  the  French  would 
themselves  make  an  attack  from  the  fortress.  Verdun 
remained  an  open,  wasting  sore. 

It  would  have  been  better  to  withdraw  our  positions 
out  of  the  crater  area.  At  that  time  I  had  not  a 
thorough  grasp  of  the  local  difficulties  of  the  Verdun 
fighting.  After  the  Somme,  the  fortress  still  required 
the  most  consideration,  but  in  spite  of  that  the  Fifth 
Army  would  have  to  siurender  a  considerable  amount 
of  artillery  and  aircraft.  The  other  armies  would  have 
to  be  dealt  with  still  more  ruthlessly.  They  would 
have  to  hold  longer  fronts  and  release  divisions,  artillery, 
aircraft,  and  balloons  for  the  battle-front.  Weak  spots 
would  naturally  result;  but  we  should  have  to  put  up 
with  this  if  we  intended  to  hold  on  the  Somme.  That 
was  imperative,  as  no  rear  lines  had  been  prepared. 
General  Headquarters  could  at  last  count  on  a  few 
new  divisions,  which  were  gradually  got  ready. 

Conditions  on  the  battle-front  as  regards  artillery 
and  air  strength  were  bound  gradually  to  improve  as 
the  more  rapid  reinforcement  recently  introduced  be- 
gan to  have  effect ;  only  the  question  of  munitions  gave 
cause  for  anxiety,  although  I  had  already  drawn  heavily 
on  other  fronts. 

It  appeared  possible,  thanks  to  this  better  supply  of 
divisions,  that  Rupprecht's  army  group  would  gradually 
be  relieved  of  the  necessity  of  living  from  hand  to 
mouth.  It  was  then  to  be  hoped  that  a  proper  system 
of  putting  in  and  taking  out  of  divisions  in  sequence 
would  result.  I  had  to  attach  the  greatest  importance 
to  this,  in  consideration  of  the  internal  organization 
of  the  army  and  in  the  interests  of  the  men,  as  supply, 


3i8  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

both  for  men  and  horses,  was  suffering.  After  General 
Headquarters  had  given  help  in  the  matter,  I  firmly 
insisted  that  units  should  not  be  mixed  up.  Until  then 
this  had  not  been  possible,  owing  to  force  of  circum- 
stances. This  special  arrangement  did  not  get  rid 
of  the  necessity  of  continually  relieving  worn-out 
divisions  by  others.  A  very  essential,  and,  indeed, 
difficult  and  responsible,  task  of  my  Operations  Depart- 
ment was  to  have  divisions  always  ready  which  could 
immediately  be  made  available  for  the  Somme  battle. 
The  condition  of  the  troops  had  to  be  accurately  gaged 
so  that  we  could  arrange  for  their  removal  from  a 
quiet  front  for  service  on  more  or  less  important  sectors 
of  the  battle-line. 

The  reinforcements  which  were  released  for  the  battle 
could  not  be  sent  up  to  the  front  line  in  rotation.  The 
railways  were  already  considerably  overtaxed  by  the 
ordinary  traffic  to  and  from  the  battle-lines.  An 
enormous  number  of  additional  trains  had  to  be  run. 
Two  or  three  weeks  had  to  pass  before  full  effect  could 
be  given  to  this  new  arrangement.  In  that  time  all 
our  calculations  might  be  upset  by  enemy  successes 
and  new  demands  might  have  to  be  met.  That  lay 
in  the  hands  of  fate,  not  to  mention  the  enemy.  For 
the  moment  everything  had  been  done  which  the  stress 
of  circumstances  made  at  all  possible. 

In  the  province  of  tactics  it  was  necessary  to  restore 
the  supremacy  of  the  aggressive  function  of  the  artillery 
in  locating  and  destroying  the  enemy's  guns  and  in- 
fantry before  the  infantry  attack  was  launched.  We 
had  previously  had  to  renounce  this  on  account  of 
our  inferiority  in  guns  and  ammunition.  The  barrage 
had  come  to  be  regarded  as  a  universal  panacea.  The 
infantry  insisted  on  it,  but,  unfortunately,  it  had  come 
to  confuse  many  sound  theories.  A  barrage  is  all  very 
well  in  theory,  but  in  practice  only  too  often  it  collapses 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  319 

under  the  storm  of  the  enemy's  "destruction  fire." 
Our  infantry,  which  had  come  to  rely  on  the  barrage 
alone  for  protection,  was  far  too  inclined  to  forget  that 
it  had  to  defend  itself  by  its  personal  efforts. 

The  increase  in  the  number  of  the  guns  and  the 
amount  of  ammunition  required  (first  essentials  for  an 
effective  use  of  artillery)  had  to  go  hand  in  hand  with 
a  more  resolute  handling  of  the  artillery  action  by  the 
corps  staffs  and  by  better  shooting  by  means  of  aerial 
observation.  I  and  many  other  officers  advocated 
that  the  artillery  action  should  in  general  be  directed 
by  divisions  in  conformity  with  precise  orders  from 
superior  authority.  This  view  met,  of  course,  with 
opposition;  it  gradually  came  to  be  recognized  as  the 
only  sound  one.  Every  divisional  commander  was  to 
have  a  special  high  artillery  officer  for  the  direction 
and  control  of  this  arm.  The  want  of  some  such 
arrangement  had  made  itself  felt  very  deeply. 

Artillery  and  aircraft  were  to  co-operate  more  closely. 
The  airman  would  have  to  develop  a  liking  for  artillery- 
ranging  work.  A  battle  high  up  in  the  air,  with  a 
chance  of  high  honors  and  a  mention  in  Army  Orders, 
was  decidedly  more  exciting  and  wonderful  than  rang- 
ing for  the  artillery.  Comprehension  of  the  great  im- 
portance of  artillery-ranging  work  was  only  gradually 
inculcated. 

As  a  fighting  instrument  for  use  against  ground  tar- 
gets, aeroplanes  did  not  then  play  such  a  systematic 
role  as  they  did  in  191 7  and  more  particularly  in  191 8; 
but  as  early  as  the  battle  of  the  Somme  the  enemy's 
aircraft,  descending  very  low,  played  havoc  with  our 
infantry  by  machine  gun  fire,  not  so  much  by  causing 
heavy  casualties  as  by  making  the  troops  feel  that  they 
had  been  discovered  in  places  which  heretofore  they 
had  thought  afforded  safe  cover.  This  feeling  of  ap- 
prehension was  so  strong  at  first  that  rifies  and  machine 


320  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

guns  were  often  not  put  to  that  use  for  which  they 
would  have  been  most  effective. 

In  the  end  of  ends,  infantry  is  the  deciding  factor 
in  every  battle.  I  was  in  the  infantry  myself  and  was 
body  and  soul  an  infantryman,  I  told  my  sons  to  join 
the  infantry.  They  did  so,  but,  as  happened  to  so 
'many  of  our  young  men,  the  freedom  of  the  air  drew 
them  from  the  trenches.  But  the  fine  saying  of  the 
old  Directions  for  Infantry  Exercise  will  always  re- 
main true  in  war,  "The  infantry  bears  the  heaviest 
burden  of  a  battle  and  requires  the  greatest  sacrifice; 
so  also  it  promises  the  greatest  renown." 

Heavy  indeed  is  the  burden  of  the  infantry  in  this 
as  in  other  wars.  It  has  to  endure  the  heaviest  bom- 
bardments of  the  enemy,  lying  quietly  in  dirt  and  mud, 
in  damp  and  cold,  hungry  and  thirsty,  or  huddled  in 
dugouts,  holes,  and  cellars;  it  must  await  the  over- 
powering assault,  imtil,  leaving  the  safety  of  its  shelters, 
face  to  face  with  death,  it  must  rise  to  meet  the  de- 
stroying storm.  Such  is  its  life.  It  can  b^en  dured 
only  when  discipline  has  prepared  the  way  and  when 
a  deep  love  of  the  Fatherland  and  an  imperative  sense 
of  duty  fill  the  heart.  The  glory  is  great.  But  the 
highest  reward  lies  in  the  proud  consciousness  of  having 
served  the  Fatherland  more  than  all  others,  and  in  the 
sense  that  one's  own  courage  has  wrung  victory  out 
of  the  battle.  Those  who  have  stayed  at  home  cannot 
picture  it  to  themselves  too  often.  Before  such  hero- 
ism they  must  bow  the  head  in  silence  and  not  talk. 

In  appraising  achievements,  equal  justice  must  be 
done  to  all  those  who  fought  like  the  infantry;  the 
pioneers,  the  dismounted  cavalryman,  the  field-teleg- 
raphist have  equal  glory.  To  all  of  them  the  same 
fine  sentence  in  the  Training  Regulations  applies. 

In  speaking  thus  I  do  not  wish  to  belittle  what  the 
other  branches  of  the  service  accomplished.     They  all 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  321 

had  the  same  appreciation  and  care  from  General 
Headquarters.  The  airman,  too,  shares  the  feeHng  of 
victory,  the  deep  satisfaction  of  knowing  that  even  in 
the  air  a  man  has  his  worth.  But  he  was  not  subject 
to  the  disintegrating  influences  of  battle. 

The  artillery  had  to  endure  the  same  strain  as  the 
infantry.  The  longer  the  war  lasted  the  higher 
its  losses  became,  in  defense  as  in  attack.  It  became 
increasingly  clear  that  they  were  the  keystone  of  the 
battle  and  the  mainstay  of  the  front. 

All  the  same,  the  artillery  need  not  fight  with 
the  infantry  over  that  sentence  in  the  Regulations. 
The  artillery  would  certainly  be  right  if  it  contested 
the  suggestion  that  the  infantry  is  the  Queen  of  Arms. 
It  was  by  some  error  that  this  statement  had  found  its 
way  into  an  artillery  training-manual.  There  is  no 
Queen  of  Arms.  They  all  have  equal  right  to  the  title, 
for  all  are  equally  necessary.  It  is  impossible  to  get 
on  without  one  of  them. 

I  attached  great  significance  to  what  I  learned  about 
our  infantry  at  Cambrai,  about  its  tactics  and  prepara- 
tion. Without  doubt  it  fought  too  doggedly,  clinging 
too  resolutely  to  the  mere  holding  of  ground,  with  the 
result  that  the  losses  were  heavy.  The  deep  dugouts 
and  cellars  often  became  fatal  man-traps.  The  use  of 
the  rifle  was  being  forgotten,  hand  grenades  had  be- 
come the  chief  weapons,  and  the  equipment  of  the  in- 
fantry with  machine  guns  and  similar  weapons  had 
fallen  far  behind  that  of  the  enemy.  The  General 
Field-Marshal  and  I  could  for  the  moment  only  ask 
that  the  front  lines  should  be  held  more  lightly,  the 
deep  underground  works  be  destroyed,  and  all  trenches 
and  posts  be  given  up  if  the  retention  of  them  were 
unnecessary  to  the  maintenance  of  the  position  as  a 
whole,  and  likely  to  be  the  cause  of  heavy  losses.  The 
problems  of  the  reorganization  and  equipment  of  the 


322  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

infantry  could  be  dealt  with  only  step  by  step.  The 
excessive  use  of  hand  grenades  had  come  about  because 
these  could  be  usefully  and  safely  employed  from  be- 
hind shelter,  whereas  a  man  using  a  rifle  must  leave  his 
cover.  In  the  close  fighting  of  some  of  our  own  under- 
takings, and  also  in  the  large-scale  attacks  by  the  enemy 
where  the  fighting  at  any  moment  came  to  be  man  to 
man,  hand  grenades  were  readier  weapons  for  un- 
practised men  and  easier  to  use  than  rifles,  the  latter 
also  having  the  disadvantage  of  getting  dirty  easily. 
One  could  understand  that;  but  the  infantry  must  be 
prepared  to  hold  the  enemy  off  and  to  fight  from  a 
distance.  When  it  came  to  hand-to-hand  fighting  the 
superiority  of  the  enemy  in  men  was  much  too  great. 

The  infantry  soldier  had  forgotten  his  shooting 
through  use  of  grenades.  He  had  to  releam  it.  He 
had  to  reacquire  confidence  in  his  weapon,  and  that 
meant  that  he  must  become  master  of  it.  That  was 
easier  to  advise  than  to  get  accomplished.  In  the 
short  training  given  to  our  new  drafts  little  could  be 
accomplished  even  if  the  attempt  were  made.  Com- 
plete training  was  possible  only  under  the  conditions 
of  peace,  if  the  use  of  the  rifle  were  to  be  a  real  pro- 
tection when  war  came. 

In  the  case  of  the  hostile  infantry,  the  strength  of  the 
men  had  been  greatly  increased  by  machine  guns; 
we,  on  the  other  hand,  had  still  to  rely  chiefly  on  our 
men.  We  had  every  reason  to  be  sparing  of  them.  An 
important  change,  moreover,  had  occurred;  the  ma- 
chine gun  had  to  become  chief  firing  weapon  of  the 
infantry.  The  companies  must  be  provided  with  new 
light  machine  guns,  the  serving  of  which  must  be  done 
by  the  smallest  possible  number  of  men.  Our  existing 
machine  guns  in  the  machine  gun  sections  were  too 
heavy  for  the  purpose. 

In  order  to  strengthen  our  fire,  at  least  in  the  most 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  323 

important  parts  of  the  chief  theater  of  war,  it  was 
necessary  to  create  special  machine  gun  companies — • 
so  to  speak,  machine  gun  sharpshooters.  Akeady  a 
beginning  had  been  made;  it  was  necessary  to  con- 
soHdate  and  to  increase  it. 

The  fighting  power  of  the  infantry  had  to  be  further 
strengthened  by  trench-mortars  and  bomb- throwers. 
The  supply  of  all  quick-loading  weapons  had  to  be 
increased. 

Lastly,  the  formation  of  storm  troops  from  the  in- 
fantry, which  had  begun  during  the  war,  had  not  only 
to  be  regularized,  but  to  be  adapted  to  the  common 
good.  The  instruction  formations  and  the  storm  bat- 
talions had  proved  their  high  value  both  intrinsically 
and  for  the  improvement  of  the  infantry  generally. 
They  were  examples  to  be  imitated  by  the  other  men. 
But  for  this  it  was  necessary  to  have  a  training-manual 
prepared,  and  this  had  not  yet  been  done. 

The  course  of  the  Somme  battle  had  also  supplied 
important  lessons  with  respect  to  the  construction  and 
plan  of  our  lines.  The  very  deep  underground  forts 
in  the  front  trenches  had  to  be  replaced  by  shallower 
constructions.  Concrete  "pill-boxes,"  which,  however, 
unfortunately,  took  long  to  build,  had  acquired  an 
increasing  value.  The  conspicuous  lines  of  trenches, 
which  appeared  as  sharp  lines  on  every  aerial  photo- 
graph, supplied  far  too  good  a  target  for  the  enemy 
artillery.  The  whole  system  of  defense  had  to  be  made 
broader  and  looser  and  better  adapted  to  the  ground. 
The  large,  thick  barriers  of  wire,  pleasant  as  they  were 
when  there  was  little  doing,  were  no  longer  a  protec- 
tion. They  withered  under  the  enemy  barrage.  Light 
strands  of  wire,  difficult  to  see,  were  much  more  useful. 
Forward  infantry  positions  with  a  wide  field  of  fire  were 
easily  seen  by  the  enemy.  They  could  be  destroyed 
by  the  artillery  of  the  enemy,  and  were  very  difficult  to 


324  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

protect  by  our  own  artillery.  Positions  farther  back, 
with  a  narrower  firing  field  and  more  under  the  pro- 
tection of  our  own  guns,  were  retained.  They  were 
of  special  service  in  big  fights. 

The  decisive  value  of  the  artillery  observation  and 
the  consequent  necessity  of  paying  great  attention 
to  the  selection  of  positions  had  also  become  apparent. 

Here  also  there  was  much  to  be  done;  so  much  had 
changed,  so  much  become  completely  transformed. 

At  the  conference  in  Cambrai  these  various  matters 
were  merely  touched  upon.  I  got  no  more  than  general 
impressions,  but  these  were  enough  to  show  the  neces- 
sity of  altering  the  plan  of  fighting  and  of  improving  the 
army  in  tactics  and  in  equipment.  On  the  Eastern 
front  we  had  for  the  most  part  adhered  to  the  old 
tactical  methods  and  the  old  training  which  we  had 
learned  in  the  days  of  peace.  Here  we  met  with  new 
conditions,  and  it  was  my  duty  to  adapt  myself  to  them. 

I  have  always  been  interested  in  questions  of  tactics 
and  armament,  apart  from  the  fact  that  these  subjects 
formed  part  of  my  work  in  the  Great  General  Staff  at 
Berlin.  Even  at  that  time  I  had  advocated  many 
changes  which  had  now  become  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance. As  could  clearly  have  been  foreseen,  these  sub- 
jects had  now  become  questions  of  life  or  death  to  the 
army  on  the  battle-fields,  and  they  could  not  receive 
too  much  attention.  My  responsibility  to  the  army 
in  this  matter  weighed  particularly  heavy  on  me. 
If,  on  the  one  hand,  I  had  perforce  to  demand  the 
sacrifice  of  human  lives,  on  the  other  hand,  I  had  the 
nobler  task,  from  the  point  of  view  of  humanity,  of 
doing  all  I  could  to  save  German  lives. 

All  this  impelled  me  to  look  more  closely  into  the 
question  of  body  armor.  We  did,  indeed,  give  some  out 
to  the  troops,  but  it  was  never  popular,  as  the  men 
found  it  too  heavy. 


THE  ENTENTE  Ox^TENSIVE  325 

Our  conference  at  Cambrai  had  proved  profitable. 
The  quiet  dignity  of  the  assembled  army  commanders 
and  chiefs  of  staff  who  had  now  for  close  on  two  years 
been  engaged  in  great  defensive  battles  in  the  West, 
while  the  Field-Marshal  and  I  had  been  winning  bat- 
tles in  bold  offensive  in  the  East,  made  a  deep  impres- 
sion upon  me.  I  was  strengthened  in  my  determination 
to  make  the  Government  put  into  the  war  what  war 
requires.  Men,  war  material,  and  moral  resolution 
were  matters  of  life  and  death  to  the  army.  The 
longer  the  war  lasted  the  more  urgent  they  became. 
The  more  the  army  demanded  the  more  the  country 
would  have  to  find  and  the  greater  would  be  the  task 
before  the  Imperial  Government,  and  especially  the 
Prussian  War  Ministry. 

After  the  conference,  we  dined  with  the  Crown  Prince 
of  Bavaria.  It  was  only  his  sense  of  duty  that  made 
him  a  soldier;  his  inclinations  were  not  military. 
Nevertheless,  he  entered  upon  his  high  military  posi- 
tion and  applied  himself  to  the  work  it  entailed  with 
great  devotion,  and,  supported  by  his  excellent  chiefs 
of  staff,  the  Bavarian  General  Krafft  von  Dellmen- 
singen  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and  now  General 
von  Kuhl — met  all  the  great  demands  made  on  a 
Commander-in-chief.  He,  like  the  German  Crown 
Prince,  was  in  favor  of  ending  the  war  without  victory 
either  side,  but  he  had  no  idea  whether  the  Entente 
would  agree  to  this.  My  relations  with  the  Crown 
Prince  of  Bavaria  were  always  pleasant. 

Duke  Albrecht  of  Wurttemberg,  Commander-in-chief 
of  the  Fourth  Army,  who  was  also  present,  was  of  a 
more  pronounced  soldierly  temperament  than  the  two 
Crown  Princes.  I  seldom  had  the  pleasure  of  meet- 
ing him,  and  have  particularly  pleasant  recollections  of 
the  stimulating  conversation  I  had  with  him.  He  was 
a  real  personality 


326  LUDENDO-^FF'S  OWN   STORY 

In  the  afternoon  we  left  Cambrai  on  our  return 
journey  through  Belgium.  Governor-General  von  Bis- 
sing  accompanied  us  part  of  the  way.  We  arranged 
with  him  that  the  Army  of  Occupation  in  Belgium  was 
to  be  reduced,  as,  if  units  were  to  hold  longer  fronts  in 
various  parts  of  the  Western  front  in  the  near  future,  it 
was  advisable  that  Landsturm  formations  should  be  put 
into  line  here  and  there.  We  also  asked  for  his  help  in 
the  execution  of  our  plans  for  the  supply  of  war  material. 

On  my  way  next  afternoon  I  discussed  this  matter 
with  Herr  Duisburg  and  Herr  Krupp  von  Bohlen  and 
Halbach,  whom  I  had  asked  to  join  the  train.  They 
considered  it  quite  possible,  in  view  of  our  stocks  of 
raw  material,  to  increase  our  output  of  war  material 
if  only  the  labor  problem  could  be  solved. 

Early  on  the  9th  we  were  back  again  in  Pless.  I 
was  now  at  home  in  my  position  and  understood  my 
sphere  of  work.  It  was  an  enormous  field  of  labor  that 
suddenly  opened  itself  before  me,  and  many  things 
were  expected  of  me  with  which  I  had  hitherto  had 
nothing  to  do.  Not  only  had  I  to  probe  deeply  into 
the  inner  workings  of  the  war-program  and  get  a  grasp 
of  both  great  and  small  matters  that  affected  the  home 
life  of  the  people,  but  I  had  to  familiarize  myself  with 
great  world  questions  that  raised  all  sorts  of  problems. 

Our  old  offices — in  one  of  the  Kjnight's  Houses  of  the 
Prince's  castle — were  now  too  small  for  us.  Fresh  ones 
were  taken  in  the  administrative  buildings  of  the 
principality  of  Pless.  We  ourselves  occupied  the  house 
of  Herr  Nasse,  the  estate  agent  of  the  Prince  of  Pless. 
Regular  work  now  began. 

VIII 

As  was  to  be  expected,  the  Entente's  offensive  was 
continued  throughout  September  and  October,  and  even 


THE   ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  327 

later,  with  unremitting  vigor.  September  was  an  espe- 
cially critical  month.  It  was  not  made  easy  for  us  to  em- 
bark on  an  operation  in  Transylvania  against  Rumania. 

The  battle  of  the  Somme,  which  had  started  on 
July  I  with  an  attempt  at  a  break-through  on  a  large 
scale,  had  been  continued  throughout  July  with  the 
same  intention  and  in  the  same  strength.  With  the 
immediate  object  of  wearing  down  our  resistance  the 
Entente  had  continued  to  launch  big  attacks  in  great 
strength  on  all  parts  of  the  battle-front.  After  Ru- 
mania's declaration  of  war  these  attacks  were  renewed 
with  fresh  vigor,  and  the  Entente  returned  to  its  plan 
of  a  regular  break-through.  The  battles  that  were  then 
fought  are  among  the  most  fiercely  contested  of  the 
whole  war,  and  far  exceeded  all  previous  offensives  as 
regards  the  number  of  men  and  the  amount  of  material 
employed.  North  of  the  Somme,  the  attack  was  re- 
sumed as  early  as  September  3  and  lasted  until  the 
7th.  The  enemy  penetrated  into  our  positions  more 
and  more  deeply.  On  September  5,  south  of  the 
Somme,  the  French  also  attacked  on  a  wide  front,  and 
gained  ground  at  several  points. 

On  the  northern  bank  fighting  began  again  on  the 
Qth  and  lasted  until  the  17th.  We  were  thrown  back 
still  farther.  Ginchy  and  Bouchavesnes  fell  into  the 
enemy's  hands.  The  17th  was  a  day  of  heavy  fighting 
on  the  southern  bank;  we  lost  Bemy  and  Deniecourt. 
South  of  the  Somme  the  fighting  was  somewhat  less 
fierce,  though  the  hostile  artillery  fire  was  kept  up. 
North  of  the  Somme  fighting  ceased;  but  the  25th  saw 
the  beginning  of  the  heaviest  of  the  many  heavy  en- 
gagements that  made  up  the  battle  of  the  Somme. 
Great  were  our  losses.  The  enemy  took  Rancourt, 
Morval,  Geudecourt,  and  the  hotly  contested  Combles. 
On  the  26th  the  Thiepval  salient  fell.  Further  enemy 
attacks  on  the  28th  miscarried. 


\fomuem 


ImmeaurtJ^Bimuoy 
IMiraumonf 


(0^0 


B#au 
[/v  / 

'^*m  m\\je3ul,enioUi^ 
leJdecwrf 


Bdientir 


Sailly 


Bkorde. 


EXPLANATION 

■^^■a  German  line  July  I. 
1916 

;««•••  German  line  Sept.  I > 
1916 

_,^  Gennan  line  Deo  i. 
C-' —  1916 


Vciuserf 


tIerOec 


cpukf^ 


^/  ^^3^^  (BeVoy^^ 


'^    fiorqny 


.^ Wenlecourr    ,/ 

yecourt  \    "  /      rfjUj 


Presioir&L^  ^ 


'hilly 


Idfdwiep 


t.lm' 


FIG.    10.      BATTLE  OF  THE  SOMME,  1916 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  329 

The  fighting  had  made  the  most  extraordinary  de- 
mands both  upon  commanders  and  troops.  The  relief 
arrangements  inaugurated  at  Cambrai,  and  the  new 
system  of  reserves  projected  for  the  Western  front,  no 
longer  sufficed.  Divisions  and  other  formations  had  to 
be  thrown  in  on  the  Somme  front  in  quicker  succession 
and  had  to  stay  in  the  line  longer.  The  time  for  re- 
cuperation and  training  on  quiet  sectors  became 
shorter  and  shorter.  The  troops  were  getting  ex- 
hausted. Everything  was  cut  as  fine  as  possible. 
The  strain  on  our  nerves  in  Pless  was  terrible;  over 
and  over  again  we  had  to  find  and  adopt  new  expedients. 
It  needed  the  iron  nerves  of  Generals  von  Gallwitz, 
Fritz  von  Below,  von  Kuhl,  Colonels  von  Lossberg  and 
Bronsart  von  Schellendorf,  to  keep  them  from  losing 
their  heads,  systematically  to  put  in  the  reserves  as 
they  came  up,  and,  in  spite  of  all  our  failures,  eventually 
to  succeed  in  saving  the  situation.  Above  all,  it 
needed  troops  like  the  Germans! 

In  October  the  attacks  continued  in  undiminished 
force,  especially  on  the  northern  part  of  the  front. 
The  enemy  brought  up  even  more  men  and  material. 
We  sustained  losses,  yet  an  effective  stiffening  of  our 
defense  began  to  be  perceptible. 

The  struggle  continued  in  the  shell-hole  area  on  the 
northeastern  front  of  Verdun.  The  French  were  push- 
ing forward  and  we  remained  on  the  defensive.  The 
troops  were  very  exhausted.  But  there  was  no  change 
in  the  general  situation  there. 

On  the  Italian  front,  between  September  14  and  17, 
the  seventh  Isonzo  offensive  of  the  Italian  armies,  and 
the  eighth,  from  October  9-13,  had  been  beaten  off 
by  Austria-Hungary.  A  further  attack  was  to  be 
expected. 

On  the  Macedonian  front  the  Entente  had  embarked 
on  a  counter-offensive  during  the  latter  half  of  Septem- 


330  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

ber,  west  of  Lake  Ostrovo  in  the  direction  of  Fiorina, 
and  had  pushed  the  Bulgarians  back  to  the  positions 
they  had  held  in  August.  I  had  hoped  that  they 
would  find  prepared  positions  there,  but  I  soon  learned 
quite  another  story  from  the  staff  of  the  Eleventh 
Army,  which  had  taken  over  command  there.  The 
Bulgarians  had  done  nothing.  The  position  was,  of 
course,  serious,  and  Colonel  Gantschew  complained 
bitterly  of  the  bad  impression  the  fall  of  Monastir 
would  make  on  his  Bulgarians.  But  he  did  not  care 
to  think  of  the  far  worse  impression  his  Bulgarians 
made  on  us.  At  the  moment  we  could  do  nothing  for 
them.  But  I  had  come  round  to  the  view  that  we 
should  have  to  get  a  firmer  control  of  the  Bulgarian 
Army,  and  to  this  end  I  proposed  the  formation  of  a 
special  army  group  under  German  command,  but  to 
be  subject  to  the  Bulgarian  High  Command.  This 
suggestion  met  with  approval.  Gen.  Otto  von  Below, 
with  his  Chief  of  Staff,  General  von  Bockmann,  left 
Courland  and  took  over  the  command  of  the  new  army 
group  in  Uskub. 

During  the  first  half  of  October  the  position  of  the 
Bulgarian  troops  on  the  Macedonian  plain  was  grave. 

On  the  Eastern  front,  General  Headquarters  at- 
tempted first  of  all  to  convey  German  troops  to  the 
Maros  sector  in  order  to  give  the  weak  Austro-Hun- 
garian  defense  a  certain  stiffening.  That  was  our  first 
task.  Next,  a  clear  understanding  had  to  be  arrived 
at  regarding  the  direction  of  operations  against  Ru- 
mania, and  new  arrangements  had  to  be  made  north 
of  the  Carpathians.  As  General  von  Conrad  insisted 
on  Austro-Hungarian  command  in  Transylvania,  a  new 
army  group  was  formed  in  Hungary,  under  the  Arch- 
duke Charles.  He  retained  General  von  Seeckt  as  his 
Chief  of  Staff. 

The  Archduke's  former  army  group,  with  the  excep- 


THE   ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  331 

tion  of  the  troops  in  the  Carpathians,  was  placed  under 
General  von  Boehm-Ermolli,  who  retained  his  command 
of  the  Second  Austrian  Army.  The  group  so  formed 
was  placed  under  the  command  of  the  Commander-in- 
chief  of  the  East.  North  of  the  Carpathians  we  had 
got  at  last  what  we  had  been  struggHng  for  so  long — • 
definite  organization  of  command,  which  would  meet 
the  requirements  of  the  situation.  This  had  now  be- 
come urgently  necessary.  The  very  exhausted  Ger- 
man divisions  of  General  Count  von  Bothmer's  army, 
which  the  Russians  had  been  attacking  violently  for  so 
long,  needed  to  be  relieved  by  those  divisions  from  the 
old  front  of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  on 
which  less  heavy  demands  had  been  made.  The  work 
of  carrying  out  the  relief  meant  a  very  tedious  business, 
as  it  could  only  be  done  train  for  train.  Our  forces 
everywhere  were  so  weak  that,  in  view  of  the  critical 
situation,  whole  divisions  could  not  be  taken  at  once 
from  any  one  place.  This  was  impossible  in  any  case, 
as  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  had  continually 
to  release  more  and  more  troops  for  Rumania. 

Archduke  Charles's  new  army  group  comprised 
troops  in  the  Carpathians,  which  were  formed  into  the 
Austrian  Seventh  Army,  and  the  two  armies  to  be 
formed  in  Transylvania.  The  northern  one,  the  First 
Austrian  Army,  under  General  von  Arz,  was  to  be  de- 
ployed on  both  sides  of  Maros  Vasarhely  as  far  back 
as  Klausenburg,  and  the  southern,  the  German  Ninth 
Army,  under  General  von  Falkenhayn,  between  Karls- 
burg  and  Muhlbach,  with  small  detachments  farther 
south  as  far  as  Orsova.  In  this  most  important  sector 
General  von  Falkenhayn  had  an  opportunity  of  giving 
practical  proof  of  his  military  ability  as  a  leader  of 
troops  in  the  service  of  his  country. 

At  the  end  of  August  and  the  beginning  of  September, 
in  East  Galicia  and  the  Carpathians,  the  Russians  were 


332  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

putting  heavy  pressure  upon  what  was  then  the  army 
group  of  the  Archduke  Charles,  The  result  was  the 
gradual  withdrawal  of  General  Count  von  Bothmer's 
army  from  the  Zlota  Lipa  behind  the  Narajovka,  and 
a  further  loss  of  ground  by  the  Austrian  troops  in  the 
Carpathians,  particularly  near  the  Tartar  Pass  and  on 
the  frontier  of  the  Bukovina.  As  the  security  of  this 
front  was  a  vital  necessity  for  any  operation  against  the 
Rumanian  army  in  Transylvania,  there  was  nothing 
for  it  but  to  send  at  least  three  divisions,  which  were 
on  their  way  from  the  hard-pressed  Western  front  to 
Transylvania,  to  Boehm-ErmoUi,  and  the  Archduke 
Charles's  army  groups  on  the  Dniester  and  in  the 
Carpathians.  I  agreed  to  this  with  a  heavy  heart.  I 
remember  the  bitter  feelings  which  surged  up  within 
me  against  the  Austrian  Army  at  the  thought  of  our 
difficult  position  in  the  West  and  the  East,  and  the 
tasks  our  troops  were  called  upon  to  perform  on  all 
fronts.  But  there  was  no  help  for  it.  Our  interests 
were  mutual  in  the  matter. 

After  further  wavering,  our  front  against  the  Russians' 
front  was  stabilized  by  the  middle  of  September.  In 
spite  of  a  prodigious  expenditure  of  men,  further 
violent  attacks  west  of  Lutsk,  on  the  Saturtzky-Pus- 
tomity  line,  the  Graberka  sector  west  of  Brody  and 
the  heights  of  Zborow,  as  well  as  Brzeszany  and  our 
positions  on  the  Narajovka,  were  all  without  result. 
Nor  were  the  Russians  able  to  boast  of  any  notable 
gains  in  the  fighting  in  the  Carpathians  for  the  Tartar 
Pass  and  the  crest  southeast  to  Kirlibaba,  thanks  to 
the  admirable  bearing  of  the  German  troops.  Still, 
the  position  about  the  middle  of  October  was  by  no 
means  secure,  nor  was  the  Russian  power  of  offense 
in  any  way  broken.  Their  massed  attacks  continued 
with  the  same  courage,  and  where  this  failed  the  troops 
were  urged  on  from  behind  by  machine  guns.     The 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  333 

determination  to  obtain  a  victory  in  Wolhynia,  East 
Galicia,  and  in  the  Carpathians,  was  still  the  driving 
force  at  the  Russian  Headquarters. 

The  deployment  on  the  Maros  was  not  complete 
until  the  end  of  September.  A  rapid  advance  on  the 
part  of  the  Rumanians  would  have  utterly  upset  it. 
The  Rumanian  Army  moved  forward  at  a  snail's  pace, 
partly  because  its  attention  had  been  diverted  by 
Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen's  great  successes  in  his 
invasion  of  the  Dobrudja  and  partly  because  it  was  wait- 
ing for  the  Russians  to  cross  the  Carpathians.  Its  left 
wing  remained  between  Orsova  and  Hermannstadt, 
where  there  was  a  rather  stronger  concentration.  The 
bulk  of  the  army  was  debouching  from  Kronstadt  and 
the  frontier  mountains  of  Moldavia  on  an  east-and-west 
line  in  close  touch  with  the  Russian  left  wing. 

It  appears  to  have  been  the  intention  of  the  Russians 
and  Rimianians  to  descend  into  the  Hungarian  plain 
on  a  continuous  line  between  the  Carpathians  and  the 
Danube.  But  if  this  were  to  be  accomplished,  very 
strong  Russian  forces  would  have  to  be  brought  through 
the  Carpathians.  The  Rumanians  were  to  open  the 
Carpathian  passes  for  the  Russians  from  the  rear  by 
a  vigorous  irruption  into  our  concentration  area.  They 
did  the  opposite.  Unaccustomed  to  war  on  a  large 
scale,  they  made  no  use  of  the  chances  offered  them 
again  and  again  of  forcing  our  divisions  up  against  the 
Dniester  and  the  Carpathians.  They  advanced  in  an 
extraordinarily  slow  manner  and  lost  time.  Every  day 
was  a  day  gained  to  us.  The  Russians,  too,  showed  no 
capacity.  They  preferred  to  storm  the  ridge  of  the 
Carpathians  instead  of  making  a  thrust  at  our  open 
flank  through  Moldavia.  Rumania's  participation  in 
the  whole  campaign  followed  no  definite  plan.  No 
common  scheme  of  operations  had  been  settled  upon. 

After  the  first  German  troops  from  the  West,  which 


334  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

had  been  intended  for  Rumania,  had  been  moved  to 
East  Galicia  and  the  Carpathians,  we  had  to  transfer 
to  Transylvania  divisions  from  the  front  of  the  Com- 
mander-in-chief in  the  East.  We  had  to  take  the  risk 
of  weakening  the  front  there.  But  the  appearance  of 
these  troops  in  Transylvania  could  not  be  counted  on 
before  the  middle  of  September.  The  poor  railway 
communications  in  Hungary  caused  still  further  delay. 

The  Austrian  troops,  too,  were  long  in  coming  up. 
General  von  Conrad  did  not  dare  to  weaken  the  Isonzo 
front  any  further.  He  let  us  have  only  some  mountain 
brigades  from  the  Tyrol.  Even  these,  too,  could  not 
be  on  the  spot  until  very  late.  I  therefore  offered  the 
Austrian  General  Headquarters  in  Teschen  several 
Austrian  divisions  of  Von  Linsingen's  group,  which  could 
no  longer  be  employed  against  Russian  troops.  They 
were  thankfully  received.  These  divisions  could  hold 
part  of  the  line,  but  certainly  could  hardly  be  used 
for  attack. 

In  the  second  half  of  September  the  forces  which 
we  were  concentrating  in  Transylvania  gradually  in- 
creased in  numbers,  though  they  were  still  very  weak 
in  comparison  with  the  enemy.  At  the  best,  it  was  all 
a  question  of  a  few  divisions.  The  Austrian  First 
Army  had  little  fighting  value.  The  Ninth  Army  was 
capable  of  an  offensive,  and  it  was  the  center  of  gravity 
of  the  whole  operation. 

As  soon  as  their  concentration  was  completed,  about 
the  end  of  September,  both  armies  were  to  start  off, 
the  Austrian  First  Army  passing  north  of  Schassburg, 
in  a  direction  due  east,  and  the  bulk  of  the  Ninth  Army 
making  for  a  line  from  Hermannstadt  to  Kronstadt, 
The  Rumanians  were  to  be  attacked  and  thrust  back 
toward  the  east.  In  executing  this  movement,  the 
Ninth  Army  was  to  keep  its  right  wing  close  to  the 
north  side  of  the  Transylvanian  Alps,  so  as  to  cut  off 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  335 

the  Rumanian  Army  in  Transylvania  from  its  com- 
mimications  with  Wallachia.  The  operation  automati- 
cally secured  the  right  flank  of  the  army. 

The  three  divisions  of  the  Ninth  Army  concentrating 
around  Muhlbach  could  be  enveloped  from  the  region 
of  Petroseny  through  the  Vulcan  and  Szurdok  Passes, 
if  the  Rumanians  decided  to  force  their  way  past 
Hermannstadt  and  northward  over  the  Maros.  This 
possibility  was  to  be  dealt  with  first.  It  was  important 
that  we  should  throw  back  the  Rumanians  near  Petro- 
seny over  the  mountain  ridge.  The  first  German  troops 
that  came  up  were  successful  in  doing  so  on  September 
19.  When  these  had  been  brought  back  to  join  in 
the  forward  movement  from  Muhlbach  to  Hermann- 
stadt, Austrian  troops  took  over  the  defense  of  the 
passes.  The  Rumanians  succeeded  in  recovering  them 
on  the  25th,  but  by  then  they  had  lost  some  of  their 
importance. 

In  front  of  the  First  Army  the  Rumanians  had  pushed 
their  way  into  the  Gorgeny  Mountains  in  the  bend  of 
the  upper  Maros,  and  had  driven  in  the  Austrian  posts 
on  the  Maros  above  Maros-Vasarhely.  Farther  south 
they  had  reached  the  neighborhood  of  Szekely-Udvar- 
hely  and  east  of  Fogaras.  The  Hermannstadt  group, 
two  or  three  divisions  strong,  had  not  moved.  Weak 
Austrian  troops,  stiffened  by  the  Transylvanian  Cavalry 
Brigade,  which  had  been  formed  out  of  three  cavalry 
regiments  specially  for  this  purpose,  were  holding  a 
thin  line  between  Schassburg  and  Hermannstadt. 

The  operations  were  to  begin  with  a  shattering  blow 
at  the  Hermannstadt  group  by  General  von  Falken- 
hayn.  The  exit  from  the  Rotenturm  Pass  was  to  be 
closed,  and  both  armies  were  to  strike  eastward. 

The  Hermannstadt  blow  succeeded.  By  September 
26  the  Alpine  Corps,  in  a  long  flanking  march,  had 
pushed  forward  to  the  Rotenturm  Pass  in  the  rear 


336 


LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 


of  the  enemy,  whereupon  the  main  body  of  the  Ninth 
Army  attacked  on  both  sides  of  Hermannstadt.  Our 
force  was  weak,  and  the  battle  lasted  until  the  30th. 
The  Rumanians  offered  an  obstinate  resistance,  and 
also  attacked  the  Alpine  Corps  from  the  south.     How- 


Schassburg 

K.uJlC1.Armee 

Hennaorf 


jrnenrnurm, 


Joinesca 


EXPLANATION 


OrSbleici 


mmm  Bat  tie  line  1  of  the  con- 

^^  Direction  of  match  Mederated 

>  Direction  of  attack '    armies 
■Bs^  Direction  of  Rumanian  attack 


1  900000 


FIG.    II.      HERMANNSTADT,  I916. 


ever,  the  Rumanian  main  forces  moved  too  late,  and 
could  not  prevent  the  complete  overthrow  of  a  part  of 
their  army  at  Hermannstadt. 

The  Alpine  Corps,  reinforced  by  Austrian  mountain 
formations  which  were  now  arriving,  took  over  the 
.duty  of  covering  the  right  flank  of  the  army  at  the 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  337 

Rotenturm  Pass.  General  von  Falkenhayn  himself 
immediately  started  his  army  on  its  eastward  march, 
keeping  to  the  north  of  the  mountain  ridge.  To  add 
to  the  pressure  here,  the  Sgtli  German  Division  of  the 
First  Army  was  pushed  forward  past  and  to  the  west  of 
Schassburg,  to  join  the  Ninth  Army.  General  von 
Arz  started  off  simultaneously.  The  opposing  armies 
were  thus  converging  on  one  another. 

At  the  outset  the  Rumanians  were  able  to  record  a 
success  in  the  center.  They  were,  however,  beaten  by 
the  Ninth  Army  south  of  Fogaras,  and  in  a  brilliant 
pursuit,  lasting  to  October  10,  were  thrown  back 
through  the  Geister-Wald  and  Kronstadt  to  Kim- 
polung,  Sinaia,  and  Buzau  in  the  mountains  south 
of  Kronstadt.  The  pressure  which  the  Ninth  Army 
thus  brought  to  bear  was  so  strong  that  the  Rumanians 
farther  north  also  began  to  retreat,  and  the  Austrian 
First  Army  was  enabled  gradually  to  ascend  from  the 
region  in  which  the  Aluta  and  Maros  rise,  to  the  frontier 
mountains  of  Moldavia. 

Meanwhile  the  attack  of  Field-Marshal  von  Macken- 
sen  against  the  Rumanians  had  resulted  in  a  brilliant 
success.  While  a  weak  force  marched  along  the  Do- 
brudja  Railway  on  Dobric,  the  Field-Marshal,  with  the 
rest  of  his  army,  attacked  the  fortress  of  Turtukai  in 
the  early  days  of  September.  Thanks  to  the  decisive 
help  of  Bode's  weak  German  detachment,  the  result 
was  amazing.  After  a  slight  resistance,  the  best  part 
of  two  Rumanian  divisions  surrendered  on  September 
6.  Silistria  was  rushed  on  the  9th.  Dobric  had  already 
been  taken  on  the  4th.  It  was  not  possible  to  press 
forward  beyond  this  place,  as  the  Rumanian  troops 
here  were  very  quickly  reinforced  by  a  Russian  division 
and  a  division  composed  of  Austro-Hungarian  prisoners 
of  war. 

There  was  a  certain  apprehension  in  Sofia  as  to  how 


338 


LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 


the  Bulgarian  troops  would  behave  against  the  Rus- 
sians,  but   this  proved   unfounded.     The   Bulgarians 

B  t  S 


Foddni 


Kihs 


V»}^ 


.V.^VJ\ 


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W  A   L  A  C   H    E   I 


>,t1ariOW3  ^ 


ficfierr)3i/o(fa 
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^    VutraUan      ^  fit)dat . 

-  i6.9j  ^       «      ^ 

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^ ^  Muiabei 

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ISTANTZA 

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^Msngalia  ■* 


B 


v.^.^ 


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Sdiumk 


r 2 500000 


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EXPLANATION. 

Position  of  confederated 
armies,  end  of  Sept.  1916 
Direction  of  main  attack 
of  confederated  armies, 
Oct.  19.  1916.I 
Permanent  positiotl  of 
confederated  armies,  end 
of  Oct.  1916. 


FIG.    12.      BATTLES   IN   THE   DOBRUDJA,    AUTUMN  I916 

made  no  distinction  between   the  Russians   and   the 
Rumanians.     Unfortunately  their  capacity  for  attack 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  339 

or  maneuver  was  not  great.  The  Third  Bulgarian 
Army  gave  the  German  command  much  trouble  at 
times. 

Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen  kept  his  left  wing 
close  to  the  Danube,  and  exerted  his  chief  pressure 
at  this  point.  The  enemy  forces  which  were  assembling 
on  the  Kara  Omer — ten  kilometers  northeast  of  Dobric- 
Lake  Oltina  hne — were  to  be  pinned  against  the  Black 
Sea,  Bode's  German  detachment,  which  was  on  the 
left  wing,  broke  through  this  position  in  one  great 
rush,  and  pressed  onward  down  the  Danube.  The 
Bulgarians,  however,  were  not  quick  enough.  They 
attacked,  it  is  true,  but  the  enemy  withdrew  on  Sep- 
tember 15  in  an  orderly  manner.  The  Third  Bulgarian 
Army  had  let  slip  the  chance  of  a  great  success.  The 
enemy  managed  to  take  up  the  new  line  Rasova- 
Cobadinu-Tuzla,  which  had  been  fortified  before  the 
war  began. 

Attempts  to  take  this  position  as  well  had  soon  to 
be  abandoned.  The  strength  of  the  Bulgarian-Tin-kish 
troops  at  hand  at  the  time  was  insufficient.  Communi- 
cations had  to  be  restored  and  extended,  so  that  the 
necessary  ammunition  could  be  brought  up  for  the 
attack.     All  this  took  time. 

Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen  begged,  as  early  as 
the  latter  half  of  September,  for  a  German  division; 
he  could  not  carry  out  the  attack  without  it.  But  the 
decision  whether  or  not  this  request  cotdd  be  granted 
had  to  stand  over  for  the  time  being. 

While  preparations  for  the  resumption  of  the  attack 
were  in  full  swing,  we  were  suddenly  surprised  on 
October  i  by  news  from  Sofia  that  the  Rumanians 
had  crossed  the  Danube  near  Rahovo,  northeast  of 
Rustchuk,  in  strength.  The  forces  watching  the 
Danube  were  weak;  there  were  no  other  troops  handy. 
Field-Marshal   von    Mackensen    threw   against    them 


340  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

everything  he  could  scrape  together,  and  by  October  3 
the  Rumanians  were  compelled  to  retire  again  to  the 
north  bank  of  the  Danube.  The  Austrian  Danube 
flotilla  had  co-operated  effectively.  What  the  Ru- 
manian High  Command  really  intended  to  achieve  by 
this  enterprise  has  never  been  made  clear;  it  certainly 
could  not  affect  the  course  of  events  in  Transylvania 
and  the  Dobrudja. 

By  the  middle  of  October  the  general  situation  had 
improved.  On  the  Western  front  it  remained  grave 
in  the  highest  degree,  but  the  crisis  had  been  overcome 
by  the  strenuous  efforts  of  the  troops  there. 

On  the  Italian  front  two  strong  enemy  attacks  had 
been  beaten  off. 

In  Macedonia  a  reverse  was  still  to  be  feared. 

The  Rumanian  Army  in  the  Dobrudja  and  Tran- 
sylvania had  received  a  sharp  setback;  there  was  no 
change  on  the  rest  of  the  Eastern  front. 

The  plan  of  the  Entente  to  overwhelm  us  once  and 
for  all  in  the  autumn  of  1916,  a  plan  which  in  August 
and  September  still  seemed  possible  of  realization, 
was  foiled  for  the  time  being.  But  the  fighting  on  all 
the  fronts  was  not  yet  over.  At  that  time  we  did  not 
know,  as  we  do  now  in  the  light  of  subsequent  events, 
whether  the  enemy's  endurance  or  our  own  would 
give  out  first.  Rumania  was  not  yet  beaten.  As  I 
now  saw  quite  clearly,  we  should  not  have  been  able 
to  exist,  much  less  carry  on  the  war,  without  Rumania's 
com  and  oil,  even  though  we  had  saved  the  Galician 
oil-fields  at  Drohobycz  from  the  Russians. 

Since  the  Field-Marshal  and  I  assumed  the  supreme 
command  we  had  made  one  great  step  forward,  but  a 
second  was  still  to  be  taken.  It  meant  the  continued 
holding  of  the  fronts  and,  if  we  were  to  survive,  a 
victory  over  Rumania.  The  year  191 7  opened  with 
this  goal  still  before  us.     The  great  Entente  offensive 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  341 

of  191 6,  with  its  attendant  perils,  had  been  successfully- 
dealt  with.  We  could  dismiss  it  from  our  minds,  but 
we  found  ourselves  faced  with  a  future  fraught  with 
new  anxieties. 

IX 

The  second  step  to  which  we  had  to  make  up  our 
minds  in  the  middle  of  October  was  extremely  serious. 

It  was  difficult  to  strike  at  the  Rumanians  through 
the  frontier  mountains  or  across  the  Danube ;  still  more 
difficult  to  provide  new  troops  for  the  continuation  of 
the  operations. 

Of  course  we  had  given  prolonged  consideration  to 
the  question  of  how  to  continue  the  operations  against 
Rumania.  The  most  profitable  operation  would  be  the 
simultaneous  advance  of  both  army  groups,  with  their 
inner  wings  on  Galatz,  or,  rather,  if  Von  Mackensen's 
army  coijjd  push  up  to  the  mouth  of  the  Danube  below 
Galatz,  while  the  Archduke  Charles's  army  group 
pressed  forward  to  the  Sereth  above  Galatz,  taking 
care  to  secure  their  inner  flanks.  The  result  of  this 
would  be  the  annihilation  of  the  bulk  of  the  Rumanian 
Army  in  Wallachia  and  the  occupation  of  an  area  rich 
in  just  those  warlike  resources  which  we  lacked.  This 
splendid  idea  had  occurred  to  the  minds  of  the  com- 
manders on  the  spot,  as  well  as  my  own. 

Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen  received  the  division 
he  had  asked  for — the  217th — in  time  to  enable  him  to 
attack  the  enemy's  Tuzla-Cobadinu-Rasova  line,  and 
continue  his  advance  to  the  Danube. 

In  view  of  the  passive  resistance,  varied  with  violent 
attacks,  which  the  Archduke  Charles's  army  group  met 
with  in  the  frontier  mountains  from  Orsova  to  the 
Bukovina,  it  was  soon  apparent  that  the  Ninth  and 
the  Austrian  First  Armies  had  come  to  a  standstill. 
A  continuation  of  the  attack  here  was  no  longer  possible. 


342  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Other  plans  had  to  be  adopted  for  the  entire  opera- 
tions. Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen  had  to  beat  the 
enemy  in  the  Dobrudja  with  the  help  of  the  German 
division  which  was  coming  up,  though  slowly,  follow 
him  up  with  part  of  his  forces,  and  with  the  rest  effect 
a  crossing  of  the  Danube  south  of  Bucharest,  The 
Ninth  Army  of  Archduke  Charles's  army  group  was  to 
cross  the  Transylvanian  Alps  into  Wallachia.  Both 
armies  were  then  to  defeat  the  enemy  and  try  to  effect 
their  junction. 

It  was  not  yet  certain  whether  Field-Marshal  von 
Mackensen  would  cross  the  Danube  near  Tutrakan, 
Rustchuk,  or  Sistova,  and  whether  General  von  Falken- 
hayn,  with  his  main  concentration  near  Orsova,  would 
invade  Wallachia  by  way  of  the  Szurdok  or  Rotenturm 
Passes.  In  any  case,  the  troops  which  had  opposed 
the  Rumanians  up  to  now  no  longer  sufficed.  The 
Rumanian  Army  was  strong;  help  was  to  be  expected 
from  Russia.  Of  course  both  army  groups  would  have 
every  available  man  ready  for  the  invasion  of  Wallachia. 

I  would  willingly  have  reinforced  Field-Marshal 
Mackensen  with  anything  that  could  be  spared,  so  as 
to  make  his  front  the  center  of  gravity  of  the  whole 
operations.  It  was  easier  to  cross  the  Danube  than 
the  mountains  where,  moreover,  snow  had  already 
fallen.  Besides,  the  enemy's  whole  attention  was  con- 
centrated on  the  mountain  sector.  But  the  condition 
of  the  Bulgarian  railways  precluded  any  reinforcement 
of  Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen.  We  had,  therefore, 
to  decide  to  force  the  mountain  barrier  as  the  first  part 
of  the  operation ;  only  when  this  was  done  and  we  were 
well  into  Wallachia  could  the  Field-Marshal  cross  the 
Danube;  otherwise  with  his  small  force  his  position 
would  have  been  dangerous. 

The  broad  outlines  of  our  plan  were  adhered  to,  but 
the  knotty  question  had  still  to  be  decided  whether  the 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  343 

necessary  troops  for  this  operation  were  really  available. 
I  had  a  severe  struggle  with  myself.  The  wastage  on 
both  the  long  Eastern  and  Western  fronts  had  become 
very  great,  and  the  fighting  was  not  yet  over.  I  shut  my 
eyes  to  all  dangers  on  other  fronts ;  the  Commander-in- 
chief  in  the  East  had  once  again  to  give  up  two  or 
three  infantry  divisions  and  two  cavalry  divisions. 
Besides  this,  the  7th  Cavalry  Division  was  withdrawn 
from  the  General  Government  of  Belgium.  With  this 
reinforcement  the  operation  could  at  least  be  ventured 
upon,  and  in  the  middle  of  November  initiated; 
whether  it  could  prove  successful  was,  in  view  of  our 
great  weakness,  doubtful. 

While  the  new  campaign  against  Rumania  was  in 
full  swing  at  the  end  of  October  and  the  beginning  of 
November,  and  events  in  that  quarter  took  their  course, 
the  battles  on  the  other  fronts  continued. 

The  battle  of  the  Somme  continued  throughout  Oc- 
tober with  great  bitterness.  On  the  north  bank  of  the 
river  October  13,  18,  and  23  were  days  of  pitched  battles 
of  the  fiercest  description;  an  unusually  severe  strain 
was  put  upon  the  troops,  but  on  the  whole  they  stood 
their  ground;  our  resistance  had  stiffened.  A  violent 
onslaught  on  November  5  between  Bouchavesnes  and 
Le  Sars  was  also  beaten  off.  But  in  the  bitter  fighting 
that  followed  the  French  were  once  more  successful. 
On  November  13  the  English,  too,  penetrated  our 
positions  on  both  sides  of  the  Ancre — a  particularly 
heavy  blow,  for  we  considered  such  an  event  no  longer 
possible,  particularly  in  sectors  where  otu-  troops  still 
held  good  positions.  On  November  14  the  English 
were  again  successful  at  this  point.  The  i8th  was 
another  day  of  heavy  fighting,  but,  in  spite  of  the 
enemy's  great  expenditure  of  men,  ended,  on  the 
whole,  favorably  for  us. 

There  had  also  been  fighting  on  the  south  bank  of  the 


344  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Somme.  From  October  lo  onward  the  attacks  south 
of  the  Roman  road  became  still  heavier,  and  later 
fierce  fighting  also  developed  to  the  north.  Here,  on 
October  29,  we  were  successful  in  our  attack  on  La 
Maisonnette  Farm.  This  caused  general  satisfaction, 
although  in  itself  not  of  much  importance;  still,  it 
meant  a  successful  attack  for  once  on  the  Western  front. 
It  is  easy  to  understand  the  feeling  of  troops  who  take 
part  in  an  offensive  action  after  being  subjected  to 
enemy  drum-fire  for  days  on  end,  and  manage  to  make 
a  success  of  it  on  a  battle-field  which  had  hitherto  wit- 
nessed defense  only  and  many  a  disaster  to  German  arms. 

As  fighting  on  the  French  sector  of  the  Somme  battle- 
field died  down  the  position  before  Verdun  again  be- 
came critical.  The  French  attacked  on  the  24th;  we 
lost  Fort  Douaumont,  and  on  November  i  were  obliged 
to  evacuate  Fort  Vaux  also.  The  loss  was  grievous, 
but  still  more  grievous  was  the  totally  unexpected 
decimation  of  some  of  our  divisions.  The  tension  on  the 
Western  front  was  particularly  trying  at  a  time  when 
the  second  deployment  against  Rumania  was  not  yet 
complete.  Nevertheless,  uncertain  though  the  situa- 
tion was,  General  Headquarters  endured  this  new  trial, 
to  carry  through  what  had  been  recognized  as  the  only 
right  plan,  the  defeat  of  the  Rumanian  Army  and  the 
occupation  of  Wallachia. 

From  the  middle  of  November  onward  we  awaited, 
with  great  anxiety,  the  further  violent  enemy  attacks 
on  the  Somme  and  at  Verdun  which  our  invasion  of 
Rumania  was  likely  to  provoke.  But  the  lull  in  the 
fighting  which  became  noticeable  on  the  south  bank 
of  the  Somme  from  the  beginning  of  November,  and 
on  the  north  bank  toward  the  end  of  the  month,  con- 
tinued. For  the  time  being  the  Entente  had  no  longer 
the  strength,  nor  probably  the  ammunition,  to  develop 
further  attacks. 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE 


345 


On  December  14,  15,  and  16,  however,  there  was 
again  very  hard  fighting  round  Verdun.  The  French 
attacked  so  as  to  Hmit  still  further,  before  the  end 
of  the  year,  the  German  gains  of  191 6  before  this 
fortress.  They  achieved  their  object.  The  blow  they 
dealt  us  was  particularly  heavy.  We  not  only  suffered 
heavy  casualties,   but  also  lost  important  positions. 


tde  Moulainville- 

MWOOO 


FIG,  13.      BATTLES  AROUND  VERDUN,  AUTUMN  I916 


The  strain  during  this  year  had  proved  too  great. 
The  endurance  of  the  troops  had  been  weakened  by 
long  spells  of  defense  under  the  powerful  enemy  artillery 
fire  and  their  own  losses.  We  were  completely  ex- 
hausted on  the  Western  front. 

On  the  Italian  front  fighting  was  renewed  at  the 
beginning  of  November.  On  the  7th  the  ninth  Italian 
Isonzo  offensive  had  to  all  intents  and  purposes  been 
repulsed.     For  the  time  being  there  was  a  lull  in  the 


346 


LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 


fighting  there.  Italy  also  was  not  strong  enough  to 
relieve  the  pressure  on  her  ally,  Rumania.  The  Austro- 
Hungarian  troops  on  that  front  were  themselves  so 
exhausted  that  new  forces  could  not  be  spared  for  use 
against  Rumania. 

The  situation  on  the  Macedonian  front,  too,  was 
not  to  develop  in  our  favor.  Rear  communications 
with  the  Macedonian  plain  and  the  mountains  on  both 
sides  of  the  river  Cerna  were  still  far  from  complete; 


Bulgarian  line, 
end  of  Sept.  1916. 
Bulgarian  line, 
end  of  Nov.  1916. 
Principal  enemy 
attack,  Oct.  1916. 


FIG.  14.   BATTLES  IN  MACEDONIA,  1916. 


there  was  too  much  leeway  to  be  made  up.  The  Ger- 
man army  command  had  but  little  prospect  of  establish- 
ing the  Bulgarian  Army  firmly  in  the  position  from 
which  it  started.  At  an  early  stage  it  began  the  con- 
struction of  a  rear  position  north  of  Monastir,  across 
the  plain  and  over  the  wild  and  rugged  mountains  on 
both  sides  of  the  Cerna. 

In  the  middle  of  October  the  Entente  succeeded  in 
crossing  the  river  near  Brod  and  in  capturing  key 
positions  in  the  mountains.  This  caused  the  staff  of 
the  Eleventh  Army  to  move  its  line  farther  back  toward 
Monastir.     When,    about   the   middle   of   November, 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  347 

the  Entente  renewed  its  attacks,  the  Bulgarian  Army 
gave  ground  again  and  again,  and  had  to  withdraw 
fighting  to  the  position  north  of  Monastir. 

On  the  1 8  th  the  town  was  occupied  by  the  Serbs. 
The  Bulgarian  Army  had  been  considerably  shaken, 
and  we  were  obliged  to  make  up  our  minds  to  bring 
up  to  the  Macedonian  mountains  the  three  or  four 
Jager  battalions  which  were  really  intended  for  Orsova. 
There  could  now  no  longer  be  any  question  of  taking 
further  Bulgarian  troops  from  this  front  for  the  cam- 
paign against  Rumania.  As  an  immediate  effect  of 
our  invasion  of  Wallachia  at  the  end  of  November  and 
beginning  of  December,  the  Entente  began  heavy  relief 
attacks  on  our  new  positions,  which  we  held,  however, 
by  fierce  fighting.  By  throwing  in  our  last  ounce  of 
strength  we  victoriously  beat  off  further  attacks  in 
the  second  half  of  December.  Communications  im- 
proved and  supply  got  better.  The  position  on  the 
Macedonian  front  again  became  more  stable,  unfor- 
tunately not  without  our  employing  some,  even  though 
only  a  few,  German  battalions,  whose  presence  in 
Rumania  was,  of  course,  sorely  missed. 

By  the  occupation  of  the  Piraeus  and  Athens  in 
October,  the  Entente  had  in  the  mean  time  gained 
control  of  Greece  and  her  railways.  Our  enemies  pro- 
moted the  formation  on  a  larger  scale  of  contingents  of 
Venizelist  troops.  Wherever  they  went  they  increased 
their  resources  for  carrying  on  the  war,  and  this  object 
was  the  deciding  factor  in  determining  their  attitude 
toward  Greece. 

The  Royalist  troops  were  withdrawn  from  Thessaly 
in  November.  Between  Fiorina  and  Valona  a  con- 
tinuous line  was  gradually  being  established. 

On  the  front  of  the  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East 
the  Russians  made  one  more  powerful  but  abortive 
attack,  west  of  Lutsk,  on  the  Pustomity-Saturtzky  front, 


348  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

about  the  middle  of  October,  after  which,  attack  there 
gradually  died  down.  Along  the  Narajovka  they  con- 
tinued into  November.  Russia  was  at  last  exhausted. 
We  were  still  strong  enough  to  make  some  local  attacks 
that  required  little  preparation,  the  most  important 
of  which  took  place  on  the  front  of  Von  Woyrsch's  army 
group  on  November  9.  It  was  quiet  on  Western  lines 
and  was  completely  successful.  We,  too,  had  now 
come  to  the  end  of  our  strength. 

In  connection  with  the  battles  in  Rumania,  the  Rus- 
sians continued  their  attacks  in  the  Carpathians  from 
October  well  into  December. 

At  the  same  time  an  extension  of  the  Russian  front 
to  the  south  was  perceptible.  Russians  and  Ru- 
manians attacked  on  the  eastern  frontier  of  Transyl- 
vania and  Rumania.  Our  advance  in  Wallachia  pro- 
voked even  fiercer  battles,  and  brought  upon  us  strong 
Russian  massed  attacks,  which  again  produced  local 
crises  and  tried  our  nerves  severely.  The  Austrian 
First  Army,  in  the  Transylvania  frontier  mountains, 
was  in  particular  heavily  attacked,  until  Bavarian 
troops  restored  the  position  here,  too. 


At  the  end  of  October  and  the  beginning  of  Novem- 
ber, while  the  fighting  on  all  fronts  was  still  at  its  zenith 
and  the  end  was  not  yet  in  sight,  our  second  concentra- 
tion against  Rumania  was  in  full  swing.  It  was  no 
simple  task.  It  took  a  long  time,  during  which  we  had 
ample  opportunity  to  reflect  over  the  wisdom  of  our 
decision.  It  would  be  justified  by  success.  But  if  it 
failed,  what  would  then  have  been  the  verdict  passed 
on  the  campaign  against  Rumania? 

After  endless  supply  difficulties  had  been  surmounted, 
Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen's  preparations  in  the 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  349 

Dobrudja  were  complete  by  the  middle  of  October. 
His  Chief  of  Staff  was  General  Tappen,  who  had  been 
Director  of  Operations  Department  at  General  Head- 
quarters until  the  beginning  of  September.  He  applied 
himself  with  zeal  to  his  new  and  important  work,  and 
displayed  great  foresight. 

The  attack  began  on  October,  19.  By  this  time  the 
217th  Infantry  Division  had  also  come  up  and  been 
given  the  place  of  honor,  Topraisar,  which  it  was  to 
storm.  Once  more  German  blood  had  to  flow  because 
our  allies  were  not  equal  to  the  demands  made  by  this 
war.  The  enemy  had  been  considerably  reinforced, 
and,  at  the  beginning  of  October,  attempted  to  strike 
at  the  German-Bulgarian-Turkish  Army  in  the  Do- 
brudja. However,  his  attacks  were  not  co-ordinated 
nor  pressed  with  sufficient  determination.  He  let  slip 
the  opportunity  of  which  he  might  have  made  good 
use.  Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen's  attack  resulted, 
after  three  days  of  heavy  fighting,  in  a  brilliant  break- 
through. The  hostile  army  was  thrown  back  in  dis- 
order northward  over  the  Constanza-Cemavoda  Rail- 
way. The  pursuit  was  relentlessly  taken  up.  By  the 
23d  Constanza,  with  its  rich  stores  of  oil,  was  in  our 
possession,  and  soon  afterward  Cemavoda  also  fell. 
The  pursuit  was  not  relaxed  until  we  were  twenty 
kilometers  north  of  the  railway. 

Of  course,  the  question  was  raised  whether  the  army 
should  not  exploit  its  victory  further  and  press  on 
northward  right  to  the  Danube.  I  vetoed  this,  as  the 
check  to  the  Archduke  Charles's  attack  in  the  Transyl- 
vanian  mountains  had,  meanwhile,  become  an  irre- 
futable fact.  Even  if  the  Third  Bulgarian  Army,  with 
its  inadequate  communications,  had  pressed  forward  to 
the  Danube,  it  would  only  have  been  isolated  there.  It 
could  not  have  been  brought  in  to  co-operate  with  the 
Ninth  Army  in  its  invasion  of  West  Wallachia.    Yet 


350  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

that  co-operation  constituted  a  condition  precedent  to 
the  success  of  the  whole  operation.  Much  though 
General  Headquarters  regretted  it,  orders  were  issued 
for  Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen  to  cease  his  advance, 
prepare  to  cross  the  Danube  south  of  Bucharest,  and 
effect  the  crossing  in  the  greatest  possible  strength  in 
the  latter  half  of  November.  The  Field-Marshal,  on 
his  own  responsibility,  left  only  a  particularly  weak 
force  in  the  northern  Dobrudja.  It  intrenched  a  line 
here  and  of  course  its  position  continued  to  be  very 
precarious.  The  bulk  of  Mackensen's  army  was  trans- 
ferred to  Rustchuk  partly  by  forced  marches  and  partly 
by  the  very  inadequate  Dobrudja  Railway,  which  was 
gradually  getting  into  working  order  again.  Field- 
Marshal  von  Mackensen  chose  Sistova-Symnitza  for 
his  crossing-place.  For  us,  in  Pless,  this  westerly  point 
was  convenient,  as  the  Danube  Army  was  thus  brought 
nearer  to  the  parts  of  the  Ninth  Army  which  were 
forcing  their  way  into  West  Wallachia. 

The  region  of  Orsova,  the  Vulcan,  and  Szurdok 
Passes,  or  the  Rotenturm  Pass,  presented  themselves 
as  gateways  into  Wallachia  from  west  and  north. 

And  just  south  of  the  Rotenturm  Pass  General  Kjrafft 
von  Dellmensingen,  with  his  Alpine  Corps,  reinforced 
by  two  Austrian  mountain  brigades,  and,  after  the 
battle  of  Hermannstadt,  met  with  a  very  stubborn 
resistance  in  covering  the  flanks  of  the  Ninth  Army, 
which  was  pressing  forward  toward  Kronstadt.  In 
order  to  attract  the  enemy  to  his  front,  and  so  relieve 
the  burden  of  this  army,  he  had  adopted  offense  as 
the  best  means  of  defense.  In  spite  of  violent  fighting, 
in  which  the  Rumanians  often  counter-attacked,  the 
Alpine  Corps  was  able  to  gain  but  little  ground  south 
of  the  pass  by  the  end  of  October.  It  was  a  case  of 
true  mountain  warfare  in  winter,  in  all  its  characteristic 
forms,  with  all  its  stupendous  difficulties.     The  troops, 


THE   ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  351 

including  the  Austrian  mountain  brigades,  fought 
admirably,  but  it  was  a  terribly  slow  business. 

An  attempt  by  the  bulk  of  the  Ninth  Army  to  force 
the  crests  at  the  highest  and  broadest  part,  in  face  of  a 
strong  enemy  who  could  no  longer  be  surprised,  would 
also  have  been  hung  up,  as  had  been  the  fate  of  a  similar 
attack  in  October,  south  of  Kronstadt.  We  did  not 
like  having  to  select  the  western  end  for  our  attack,  as 
in  this  way  the  strategical  possibilities  would  be  dimin- 
ished; but  this  could  not  be  helped.  The  first  thing 
was  to  get  over  the  mountains  somehow.  The  Ninth 
Army  had  made  an  attempt,  at  the  end  of  October,  to 
advance  south  of  the  Vulcan  and  Szurdok  Passes. 
This  had  been  foiled  by  a  sudden  change  of  weather 
and  by  the  vigilance  of  the  enemy.  The  troops  had 
to  be  withdrawn  as  far  as  the  heights  overlooking  the 
pass.  We  had  got  some  idea  of  the  ground,  and  had 
come  to  the  conclusion  that  the  forcing  of  the  moun- 
tains at  this  particularly  narrow  spot  was  quite  prac- 
ticable. I  also  relied  on  the  assumption  that  the 
Riimanians  would  not  expect  here  the  repetition  of  an 
attack  which  had  cost  us  so  heavily ;  so  General  Head- 
quarters decided  to  choose  this  position  in  the  moun- 
tains as  our  point  of  sortie.  It  seemed  more  favorable 
than  the  region  of  Orsova,  where  the  passes  were  still 
to  be  won. 

Profiting  by  the  dearly  won  experience,  we  made 
thorough  preparations,  even  to  the  smallest  detail, 
and  the  troops  we  supplied  with  complete  mountain 
equipment.  Particular  attention  was  given  to  the 
improvement  of  the  mountain  roads  and  the  accu- 
mulation of  material,  so  that  there  might  be  no  de- 
lay in  pursuing  the  enemy.  Motor-trolleys,  for  use 
on  the  Rumanian  railways,  were  also  held  in  readi- 
ness. Rear  communication  in  Wallachia  would  be 
very  difficult,  in  spite  of  all  our  foresight,  so  long  as 


352  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

only  the  road  through  the  Szurdok  Pass  was  at  our 
disposal. 

On  November  lo  General  Kuhne  had  completed  his 
preparations,  and  the  opening  of  operations  was  fixed 
for  the  nth.  This  group,  with  four  infantry  and  two 
cavalry  divisions,  under  the  command  of  General  Count 
von  Schmettow,  was  to  concentrate  here  and  push 
forward  vigorously  through  Craiova  to  the  river  Aluta. 
This  would  mean  that  it  would  take  the  defenses  of 
Orsova  on  the  east  and  the  Rotenturm  Pass  in  the  rear. 
At  Orsova  a  weak  brigade,  including  German  cyclist 
troops  under  the  Austrian  Colonel  Szivo,  was  to  attack 
simultaneously.  General  von  Krafft,  who  was  rein- 
forced, and  the  troops  south  of  Kronstadt  were  to 
continue  their  attacks. 

November  ii  brought  complete  success  to  General 
Kuhne;  now  at  last  we  reaped  the  benefit  of  our  enter- 
prise of  the  end  of  October.  General  Kuhne  crossed 
the  mountains,  defeated  the  opposing  Rumanian  divi- 
sions in  the  battle  of  Targu  Jiu,  on  November  17,  and 
had  occupied  Craiova  by  the  21st.  On  the  23d  General 
Count  von  Schmettow,  with  his  cavalry  divisions,  had 
reached  the  Aluta  east  of  Caracal;  the  Aluta  bridge  at 
this  point  was  in  his  possession.  Farther  north  our 
infantry  had  reached  the  Aluta  opposite  Slatina.  Here, 
as  farther  up-stream,  the  bridges  had  been  completely 
destroyed.  On  the  same  day,  in  a  thick  fog,  Field- 
Marshal  von  Mackensen  had  gained  a  footing  on  the 
north  bank  of  the  Danube,  near  Symnitza.  Here  again 
the  operation  had  been  very  well  prepared.  This  is 
the  day  we  had  fixed  on  to  get  the  armies  working  in 
co-operation  by  exploiting  all  the  possibilities  of  the 
situation.  Apparently  we  had  been  successful,  but 
we  were  not  yet  at  the  end  of  our  difficulties. 

Meanwhile,  General  von  Krafft  had  fought  his  way 
farther  through  the  mountains,  but  had  not  yet  de- 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  353 

bouched  into  the  plain  at  Rininicu  Valcea  and  north 
of  Curtea  de  Arges. 

In  the  rear  of  General  Kuhne's  forces  the  Rumanians, 
fighting  bravely,  had  withdrawn  from  Orsova,  down  the 
Danube,  and  were  still  retreating,  keeping  close  to  the 
river.  Though  surrounded  on  all  sides,  they  did  not 
lay  down  their  arms  until  they  had  reached  the  con- 
fluence of  the  Aluta  at  the  beginning  of  December. 
Their  hope  that  an  attack  on  the  Danube  Army  by  parts 
of  the  Rumanian  Army  from  Bucharest  would  save 
them  was  not  fulfilled.  In  the  operations  east  of  the 
Aluta  the  orders  were  to  press  forward  relentlessly 
and  effect  a  junction  of  the  two  armies,  with  their  inner 
wings  in  the  direction  of  Bucharest.  I  attached  special 
importance  to  a  rapid  crossing  of  the  Aluta  by  General 
Kuhne's  group,  in  order  to  secure  the  left  flank  of  the 
Danube  Army.  The  other  task  of  the  Ninth  Army  was 
to  press  up  north  from  the  plain  toward  the  mountain 
frontier,  thereby  opening  the  mountain  roads  and 
enabling  more  of  our  troops  to  come  down  south. 

Field- Marshal  von  Mackensen  was  to  take  over  the 
command  of  the  Ninth  Army  also.  As  soon  as  the 
armies  had  really  effected  a  junction  and  proper  control 
had  been  assured,  the  Danube  Army  was  placed  under 
the  orders  of  General  Kosch.  The  Ninth  Army  was  to 
be  detached  from  the  Archduke  Charles's  group.  Until 
all  this  was  done  the  German  General  Headquarters 
had  to  exercise  direct  command  in  the  conduct  of  the 
operations. 

The  Danube  Army  started  its  forward  march  on 
November  25.  On  the  26th  it  crossed  the  Vedea,  and 
on  the  30th  its  left  wing,  after  heavy  fighting,  forced  its 
way  across  the  Nejlow  plain  southwest  of  Bucharest, 
while  the  right  wing,  keeping  level  with  the  left, 
advanced  down  the  Danube. 

On  the  27th  the  Alpine  Corps  had  fought  its  way  out 


354  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

of  the  Rotenturm  Pass  into  the  plain,  had  entered 
Pitesti  on  the  29th,  and  on  the  following  day,  by 
exerting  its  main  pressure  north  of  the  Arges,  gained 
ground  to  the  southeast.  This  made  it  possible  for 
the  right  wing  of  the  Kronstadt  group,  which  was 
involved  in  heavy  fighting  north  of  Kimpolung,  to 
debouch  from  the  mountains. 

Farther  back  stood  General  Fuhne.  His  infantry 
divisions  had  made  terrific  efforts  ""O  force  a  crossing 
at  Slatina,  instead  of  immediately  crossing  farther 
south  near  Caracal,  as  the  cavalry  corps  had  done, 
and  thus  gaining  time,  in  spite  of  having  to  make  a 
detour.  They  crossed  the  Aluta  only  in  the  course  of 
the  27th,  and  on  the  30th  were  still  about  eighty 
kilometers  from  the  left  wing  of  the  Danube  Army 
and  the  right  of  Von  Krafft's  group. 

The  Rumanian  High  Command  had  intended  to  hold 
up  Generals  von  Krafft  and  Kuhne,  and  attack  the 
Danube  Army.  Its  first  object  was  apparently  to  hold 
these  two  groups  on  the  mouths  of  the  mountain  passes 
at  Curtea  de  Arges  and  Rimnicu  Valcea  and  the  line 
of  the  Aluta.  When  this  was  no  longer  possible,  the 
High  Command  tried  again  and  again  to  make  its 
First  Army,  fighting  hard,  stand  on  some  line  farther 
back,  so  as  even  at  the  eleventh  hour  to  take  full 
advantage  of  its  situation  with  regard  to  the  Danube 
Army. 

On  December  i  the  left  wing  of  the  Danube  Army 
was  very  heavily  attacked  southwest  of  Bucharest  and 
pushed  back.  The  German  troops  who  had  already 
crossed  the  Nejlov  were  cut  off.  The  situation  was 
certainly  very  critical.  The  enemy's  enveloping  move- 
ment was  stopped  only  by  a  Turkish  division,  which 
was  marching  in  the  second  line.  The  Rumanian  at- 
tack was  not  pressed  home;  the  right  wing  of  the 
Ninth  Army  was  brought  up  with  all  possible  speed  to 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  355 

meet  it.  On  December  2d  the  cavalry  of  the  Ninth 
Army  was  in  position  on  the  action  front  of  the  Danube 
Army.  On  the  3d  we  had  infantry  as  well  within  reach, 
and  so  the  crisis  was  overcome.  On  the  4th  we  started 
a  counter-attack,  which  was  skilfully  evaded  by  the 
Rumanians. 

In  the  mean  time  General  Kiihne's  left  wing  had 
effected  a  junction  with  General  von  Krafft's  group  and 
forced  back  the  Rumanian  First  Army  eastward  across 
the  Arges.  Henceforward  the  Danube  Army  and  the 
Ninth  Army  fought  side  by  side.  The  success  of  the 
operation  was  assured. 

It  had  not  been  easy  to  bring  the  two  armies  into 
close  tactical  co-operation  at  the  last  moment  on  De- 
cember i.  The  attempt  had  almost  miscarried.  Even 
in  war,  accidents  of  all  kinds  have  to  be  reckoned  with. 

No  sooner  had  this  crisis  been  surmounted  than  we 
found  ourselves  faced  with  another.  Would  Bucharest 
be  defended  as  a  fortress  or  not  ?  Such  a  defense  would 
have  been  very  awkward  for  us,  for  it  would  have  pro- 
longed the  campaign  in  Rumania  considerably.  The 
season  was  already  far  advanced.  We  had  to  make 
preparations  for  the  following  year.  All  kinds  of 
material  necessary  for  attack  had  been  placed  in  readi- 
ness, and  everything  possible  had  been  done  to  hasten 
the  fall  of  the  fortress.  A  great  load  was  taken  off  my 
mind  when,  on  the  6th,  the  report  was  received  that 
our  cavalry  divisions  had  in  the  night  of  December  5 
found  the  northern  works  of  the  fortress  unoccupied 
and  blown  up.  On  the  6th  we  were  in  possession  of 
Bucharest,  Ploesti,  and  Campina.  The  Rumanians, 
under  English  orders  and  directions,  had  effected  a  very 
thorough  destruction  of  the  oil-fields. 

So  far  the  Russians  had  not  taken  any  serious  part 
in  the  fighting.  A  Russian  thrust  on  December  5, 
southeast  of  Bucharest,  was  of  no  importance.     It  is 


356  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

not  easy  to  understand  why  they  let  the  Rumanians 
be  beaten  before  they  came  in;  they  could  very  easily 
have  sent  forces  to  Wallachia.  It  was  only  because  the 
Russians  were  not  there  that  we  were  successful. 
From  this  time  onward  the  Russians  brought  up  rein- 
forcements. They  now  seemed  to  fear  for  their  own 
flank.  They  reduced  their  forces  in  the  Dobrudja  in 
order  to  be  stronger  in  Wallachia.  For  the  rest  of  the 
campaign  the  object  in  view  was  to  strike  an  even 
more  crushing  blow  at  the  Rumanians,  defeat  the 
Russians,  whose  arrival  was  now  a  certainty,  while  they 
were  assembling,  and  bring  the  operations  to  a  con- 
clusion by  reaching  the  mouth  of  the  Danube-Sereth- 
Trotusk  line.  This  was  the  shortest  line  we  could  take 
up.  Our  military-economic  situation  made  it  impera- 
tive that  we  should  secure  it. 

Mackensen's  army  group  was  to  exert  its  main  press- 
ure in  the  direction  of  Buzau-Focsani,  break  any 
attempts  at  resistance  in  the  plain  by  an  enveloping 
movement  from  the  mountains,  and,  for  the  rest,  push 
forward  down  both  banks  of  the  Danube. 

General  von  Conrad  had  agreed  that  the  right  wing 
of  Archduke  Charles's  army  group  should  join  in  the 
attack  against  the  Trotusk. 

The  battles  east  of  the  Bucharest-Ploesti  line  now 
assumed  a  different  character  from  the  former  ones. 
Our  troops  were  tired  and  could  attack  the  enemy  only 
frontally.  The  possibility  of  outflanking  the  enemy 
was  only  slight,  as  he  was  increasing  his  forces,  espe- 
cially in  the  mountains.  The  Russians  were  soon  in 
great  strength ;  they  fought  better  than  the  Rumanians. 
The  supply  of  ammunition,  which  was  now  needed  in 
larger  quantities,  was  a  slow  business,  as  communica- 
tions had  become  much  worse.  Heavy  rain  set  in, 
and  was  followed  toward  the  new  year  by  an  unusually 
severe  frost. 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  357 

On  December  10  the  Danube  Army  and  the  Ninth 
Army,  on  the  Jalomnitsa  and  at  Misil,  southeast  of 
Buzau,  were  facing  the  Rumanian  and  Russian  troops 
in  prepared  positions.  Yet  they  succeeded  in  quickly 
breaking  down  their  resistance,  crossing  the  Jalomnitsa 
on  the  12  th,  and  taking  Buzau,  after  hard  fighting, 
on  the  15th. 

On  the  17th  this  army  group  was  already  in  the  plain, 
before  another  strong  position  between  the  Danube, 
near  the  mouth  of  the  Calmatuiu,  and  the  mountains 
to  the  southwest  of  Rimnicu  Sarat.  In  the  mountains 
west  and  northwest  of  those  positions  the  Rumanians 
were  in  close  touch  with  the  troops  facing  the  Arch- 
duke Charles's  army  group. 

Meantime,  Field  -  Marshal  von  Mackensen  had 
ordered  the  Bulgarian  Third  Army  also  to  take  up 
a  position  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube.  With- 
out meeting  any  serious  resistance,  it  pushed  on  as 
far  as  the  mouth  of  this  river,  which  was  actually 
reached  on  December  24.  It  then  wheeled  in  the 
direction  of  the  Braila  right-bank  bridge-head,  at  and 
down-stream  from  Macin.  In  the  plain  west  of  the 
Danube  the  army  group  could  not  attack  until  am- 
munition had  been  brought  up.  After  a  very  violent 
struggle,  the  Ninth  Army  broke  through  the  Russian 
and  Rumanian  positions  at  Christmas,  and  forced  the 
enemy  to  withdraw  his  whole  front  toward  the  upper 
Sereth,  more  particularly  in  the  direction  of  Braila  and 
Focsani. 

South  of  the  Sereth,  however,  the  enemy's  resistance 
was  in  no  way  broken,  and  fighting  in  Wallachia  went 
on  well  into  January.  Our  men  were  in  sore  need  of 
rest.  I  was  worried  as  to  how  I  was  to  get  them  out 
of  this  comer  again  to  the  larger  theaters  of  war. 
Everything  possible  had  been  done  to  put  the  Rumanian 
railways  into  working  order  again,  but  they  could  cope 


358  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

with  only  a  very  limited  amount  of  traffic.  We  also 
made  preparation  to  transport  troops  by  way  of  the 
Danube,  but,  with  an  unusually  severe  winter  setting  in, 
we  had  to  reckon  with  the  freezing  up  of  the  river.  In 
spite  of  all  our  efforts,  it  would  in  any  case  take  a  long 
time  to  get  all  our  troops  away.  At  last,  after  another 
violent  battle,  the  Danube  Army  took  Braila  on  January 
4.  It  reached  the  Sereth,  down-stream  to  the  conflu- 
ence of  the  Buzau.  Keeping  touch  with  the  Danube 
Army,  the  Ninth  Army  had  pushed  forward  to  the 
Sereth  in  the  course  of  continuous  engagements,  in 
which  the  Russians  pressed  us  particularly  hard  on 
the  6th.  On  the  8th  the  Ninth  Army  captured  Focsani 
and  the  region  north  of  the  town  as  far  as  the  Putna. 

The  attacks  which  the  Archduke  Charles's  army 
group  had  initiated  about  Christmas  toward  the  Trotusk 
had  made  no  progress  whatever.  The  great  exhaustion 
of  the  troops,  the  time,  and  the  weather  all  demanded 
the  conclusion  of  the  campaign.  The  line  which 
Mackensen's  army  group  now  occupied  was  approxi- 
mately the  one  we  had  intended  to  reach.  The  attack 
was  broken  off.  The  armies  dug  themselves  in  on  the 
line  on  which  they  stood. 

The  second  stage  of  the  Rumanian  campaign  was 
over,  thus  bringing  it  to  an  end.  It  had  been  an  opera- 
tion rich  in  great  deeds  of  valor  of  our  brave  troops, 
in  tremendous  decisions  of  the  leaders,  from  junior 
officers  to  General  Headquarters  itself,  also  in  terrible 
anxieties,  which  no  one  felt  more  intensely  than  I. 

We  had  beaten  the  Rumanian  Army ;  to  annihilate  it 
had  proved  impossible.  We  had  done  all  that  was 
possible,  but  found  ourselves  obliged  to  leave  forces  in 
the  Dobrudja  and  Wallachia  which  we  had  been  able 
to  use  on  the  Eastern  and  Western  fronts  and  in  Mace- 
donia before  Rumania  came  into  the  war.  In  spite 
of  our  victory   over   the   Rumanian   Army,  we   were 


THE  ENTENTE  OFFENSIVE  359 

definitely  weaker  as  regards  the  conduct  of  the  war  as 
a  whole. 

With  the  termination  of  the  campaign  in  Rumania 
the  fighting  of  the  autumn  of  1916  was  decidedly  to 
our  advantage.  This  triumph  was  obtained,  not  only 
on  the  battle-fields  of  Transylvania,  Wallachia,  and  the 
Dobrudja,  where  it  had  found  its  outward  expression, 
but  also  in  the  struggle  on  the  Western  front,  on  the 
Isonzo,  in  Macedonia,  and  the  East.  It  had  been  a 
concentration  of  our  whole  war  strength,  with  one  aim 
— to  ward  off  the  Entente's  onslaught  and  to  retain  the 
possibilities  of  existence.  This  onslaught  had  collapsed, 
and  the  resoiu-ces  of  Wallachia  were  at  our  disposal. 
The  immense  superiority  of  the  Entente  in  men  and 
war  material  had  been  overcome  by  the  bearing  of 
our  troops  and  the  assurance  and  initiative  of  our 
leadership. 

In  defense,  the  German  troops,  in  spite  of  many 
reverses,  had  proved  their  worth;  the  Austrian  troops 
had  succumbed  to  the  Russians;  the  Bulgarians  had 
frequently  disappointed  us;  and  the  Turks  had  done 
what  we  expected  of  them. 

In  the  battles  of  movement  of  the  Rumanian  cam- 
paign, German  leadership  had  once  more  manifested 
its  superiority.  The  German  troops,  carrying  their 
allies  with  them,  had  beaten  a  strong  enemy  through 
bold,  independent  action.  Where  we  were  on  the 
defensive,  the  enemy  had  been  successful  only  by 
employing  masses  of  technical  war  material.  Where 
that  factor  was  absent,  the  German  once  more  proved 
his  superiority. 

On  all  sectors  of  the  vast  front  the  German  Army, 
as  indeed  every  man  individually,  had  given  of  its  best, 
literally  to  the  last  ounce.  This  alone  had  made  victory 
possible,  a  victory  the  laurels  of  which  world  history 
will  award  to  the  German  soldiers.     We  now  urgently 


36o  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

needed  a  rest.     The  army  had  been  fought  to  a  stand- 
still and  was  utterly  worn  out. 

The  enemy,  too,  seemed  weary.  But  he  still  had 
the  strength  to  deliver  his  so  successful  blow  near 
Verdun.  His  superiority  in  numbers  enabled  him  to 
relieve  his  troops  more  frequently.  We  had  to  reckon 
with  their  speedy  recovery. 


.Il' 


THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF  1916 

The  Superiority  of  the  Enemy  in  Man-power  and  War  Material — 
The  Question  of  Peace — The  Question  of  Submarine  Warfaretr- 
President  Wilson  as  an  Intermediary  for  Peace — The  Emperor 
Charles  and  His  Counselors. 


NOTWITHSTANDING  the  successful  dose  of  the 
year  191 6,  the  outlook  for  the  coining  year  was 
exceedingly  grave.  It  was  certain  that  in  191 7  the 
Entente  would  again  make  a  supreme  effort,  not  only 
to  make  good  its  losses,  which  it  was  certainly  in  a 
position  to  do,  but  to  add  to  its  strength  everywhere 
and  swell  its  superiority  in  numbers.  Though  they  had 
not  yet  recovered,  our  worn-out  troops  would  have  to 
take  the  offensive  as  early  as  possible,  and  on  a  greater 
scale  than  in  the  autumn  of  19 16,  if  they  were  to  achieve 
ultimate  victory. 

France  had  already  given  her  children.  The  bat- 
talions consisted  now  of  three,  instead  of  four  com- 
panies. But  she  possessed  in  her  colonies  extraordinary 
resources  in  man-power,  on  which  she  drew  in  ever- 
increasing  measure. 

England  brought  her  army  up  to  strength  and  set 
about  increasing  it. 

Russia,  in  particular,  produced  very  strong  new  for- 
mations. Divisions  were  reduced  to  twelve  battalions, 
the  batteries  to  six  guns,  and  new  divisions  were  formed 
out  of  the  surplus  fourth  battalions  and  the  seventh 
and  eighth  guns  of  each  battery.  This  reorganization 
meant  a  great  increase  in  strength. 


362  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

The  Rumanian  Army  was  to  be  reorganized  and 
trained  by  French  officers.  Thanks  to  the  natural 
affinity  of  the  two  races  and  the  influence  of  France 
on  Rumanian  thought,  and  particularly  on  the  Ru- 
manian Army,  it  was  only  to  be  expected  that  the 
French  officer  soon  became  familiar  with  the  psychology 
of  the  Rumanian  Army  and  accomplished  a  great  deal. 

We  had  to  reckon  with  new  formations  of  Austro- 
Hungarian  prisoners  of  war  and  Venizelist  Greeks. 

Against  this  Germany  and  her  allies  had  nothing  to 
throw  into  the  scale.  The  increase  in  the  artillery 
which  General  Headquarters  had  in  view,  and  the 
creation  of  thirteen  new  divisions  which  was  under  con- 
sideration, were  not  a  real  addition  to  our  strength, 
as  they  weakened  the  existing  formations.  We  could 
form  the  infantry  battalions  only  by  drawing  on  cur- 
rent reserves  and  reducing  battalion  strengths. 

The  creation  of  a  Polish  army  would  have  been  a  real 
reinforcement,  but  it  was  soon  seen  that  this  would 
not  be  possible.  There  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  drain 
Germany  and  the  allied  countries  of  all  their  man- 
power that  was  in  any  way  available. 

.  .  .  Dangerous  additional  strength  was  given  to  the 
enemy's  numerical  superiority  by  the  ever -increasing 
devotion  of  their  industries  to  war  purposes.  Far- 
reaching  restrictions  on  labor  were  passed  into  law  in  the 
Entente  countries,  and  accepted  without  serious  pro- 
test ;  ample  labor  force  was  available,  and  there  was  no 
shortage  of  raw  materials ;  the  output  per  man  had  not 
fallen,  and  life,  in  short,  pursued  its  normal  course. 
The  seas  of  the  world  were  open  to  the  Entente.  The 
United  States  was  now  giving  help  on  the  largest  scale 
and  breaking  new  ground.  The  technical  equipment 
of  the  Entente  armies  grew  continually  stronger  and 
more  complete,  reaching,  indeed,  an  unprecedentedly 
high  level.     This  was  demonstrated  with  pitiless  clarity 


THE   SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF   1916    363 

on  the  Western  front.  In  the  East,  too,  the  campaign 
of  19 1 6  had  shown  a  sensible  increase  in  supply, 
especially  in  ammunition.  Russia  had,  to  some  extent, 
established  a  war  industry  of  her  own,  in  part  in  the 
Donetz  coal-basin,  and  had  greatly  increased  her  out- 
put. Japan  was  steadily  giving  better  deliveries. 
With  the  completion  of  the  Murman  Railway,  and  the 
improvement  of  the  trans-Siberian  line,  an  increased 
import  from  Japan,  America,  England,  and  France  was 
inevitable.  In  every  theater  of  war  the  Entente  was 
able  to  add  to  its  numerical  superiority  an  enormous 
additional  strength  in  every  department  of  technical 
supply,  and  to  destroy  oiu*  troops  on  a  still  greater  scale 
than  had  been  achieved  on  the  Somme  and  at  Verdun. 

Much  could  be  done  and  had  to  be  done  by  our  in- 
dustries to  increase  our  strength,  but  plainly  no  httle 
time  would  elapse  before  any  arrangements  to  this 
end  could  be  carried  into  effect.  It  was  clear  that 
our  munition  factories,  in  spite  of  their  immense  out- 
put, and  however  many  workmen  they  might  have, 
would  never  be  able  to  overtake  the  enemy,  so  long 
as  the  enormous  industrial  areas  of  the  latter  continued 
to  work  iindisturbed  under  what  were  virtually  peace 
conditions.  In  the  then  circumstances  it  seemed  im- 
possible to  achieve  equality  of  forces. 

With  our  sensible  inferiority  in  numbers  and  equip- 
ment, training  our  defensive  warfare  became  more 
important.  It  was  obvious  that  our  army  must  be 
equipped,  organized,  and  trained  to  the  highest  pitch, 
and  everything  possible  was  done  to  achieve  this. 
We  knew,  however,  only  too  well  that  the  enemy 
would  soon  adapt  himself  to  our  new  tactics  and  that 
our  advantage  was  only  temporary. 

The  Supreme  Army  Command  had  to  bear  in  mind 
that  the  enemy's  great  superiority  in  men  and  material 
would  be  even  more  painfully  felt  in  19 17  than  in  1916. 


t 


V 


364  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

It  was  plainly  to  be  feared  that  early  in  the  year 
"Somme  fighting"  would  burst  out  at  various  points 
on  our  fronts,  and  that  even  our  troops  would  not  be 
able  to  withstand  such  attacks  indefinitely,  especially 
if  the  enemy  gave  us  no  time  for  rest  and  for  the  ac- 
cumulation of  material.  Our  position  was  unusually 
difficult,  and  no  way  of  escape  was  visible.  We  could 
not  contemplate  an  attack  ourselves,  having  to  keep 
our  reserves  available  for  defense.  There  was  no  hope 
of  a  collapse  of  any  of  the  Entente  Powers.  If  the  war 
lasted  our  defeat  seemed  inevitable.  Economically  we 
were  in  a  highly  unfavorable  position  for  a  war  of  ex- 
haustion. There  was  weakness  at  home.  Questions 
of  the  supply  of  foodstuffs  caused  great  anxiety,  and 
so,  too,  did  questions  of  morale.  We  were  not  under- 
mining the  spirits  of  the  enemy  populations  with  starva- 
tion, blockades,  and  propaganda.  The  future  looked 
dark,  and  our  only  comfort  was  to  be  found  in  the  proud 
thought  that  we  had  hitherto  succeeded  in  defying  the 
enemy  superiority  in  numbers,  and  that  our  line  was 
everywhere  beyond  our  frontiers. 

II 

The  Field-Marshal  and  I  were  fully  at  one  in  this 
anxious  view  of  the  situation.  Our  conclusion  was  no 
sudden  one,  but  had  gradually  grown  upon  us  since  we 
took  over  our  posts  at  the  end  of  August  191 6.  As  a 
result  of  our  opinion  the  construction  had  been  begun 
as  early  as  September  of  powerful  rear  positions  in  the 
West;  the  Siegfried  line,  running  from  Arras,  west  of 
Cambrai,  St.-Quentin,  La  Fere,  Bailly-sur-Aisne,  to 
flatten  the  wide  salient  from  Albert,  Roye,  southwest 
of  Noyon,  Soissons,  Bailly-sur-Aisne,  in  which  the 
Somme  fighting  had  made  a  large  indentation ;  and  the 
Michael  line,  which  lay  to  the  south  of  Verdun  and  in 


THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF   1916    365 

front  of  the  line  Etain-Gorz,  to  cut  off  the  salient  of 
St.-Mihiel.  These  strategic  positions  had  the  great 
advantage  of  shortening  the  front  and  economizing 
forces,  and  their  occupation  was  prepared  in  detail. 
Whether  we  should  retire  on  them,  and  how  the  posi- 
tions would  be  used,  was  not  of  coiu-se  decided  in 
September  191 6;  the  important  thing  then  was  to  get 
them  built.  This  made  comprehensive  measures  neces- 
sary, and  I  demanded  heavy  labor  supplies  from  home. 
These,  however,  sufficed  only  for  the  West,  and  corre- 
sponding positions  in  the  East  had  to  be  left  unbuilt. 

The  construction  of  positions,  the  training  of  the 
army  for  defensive  warfare,  and  the  enlistment  of  the 
civilian  population  for  war  work  constituted  weapons  of 
war  of  the  greatest  importance.  They  were  capable 
of  postponing  the  decision,  if  the  Government  once 
succeeded  in  bringing  the  people  whole-heartedly  into 
support  of  the  war,  but  they  could  never  lead  to  victory. 
The  future  was  thus  full  of  obscurity,  and  the  soldier 
could  not  reckon  on  chances,  so  that  the  questions  of 
peace  and  submarine  warfare  became  of  the  highest 
importance.  There  was  the  problem  of  obtaining 
peace,  the  chance  of  defeat  without  unrestricted  sub- 
marine warfare,  and  the  possibility  of  victory  by  means 
of  such  a  campaign,  accompanied  by  an  attack  by  our 
surface  fleet  and  a  defensive  war  on  land. 

The  description  "unrestricted  submarine  warfare" 
is  not  wholly  apt,  any  more  than  is  "submarine  warfare 
without  regard  to  consequences." 

The  Chancellor  was,  in  September  1916,  giving  con- 
sideration to  a  possible  negotiation  for  peace  through 
President  Wilson.  Many  circles  in  Germany  were  ill 
disposed  to  such  a  step,  since  the  attitude  of  benevolence 
adopted  by  the  United  States  toward  the  Entente  had 
raised  incieasing  bitterness  among  us,  and  the  Govern- 
ment could  with  difficulty  disregard  this  opinion.    The 


366  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Chancellor  nevertheless  proposed  to  His  Majesty  that 
instructions  should  be  given  to  Ambassador  Count 
Bemstorff  to  induce  the  President  at  the  earliest  pos- 
sible moment,  and  in  any  case  before  the  presidential 
election  at  the  beginning  of  November,  to  make  a 
proposal  of  peace  to  the  Powers.  I  was  fully  in  agree- 
ment with  the  suggestion,  and  secretly  very  pleased 
that  it  was  made,  although  I  was  skeptical  of  success, 
owing  to  my  view  of  the  enemy's  desire  for  our  de- 
struction. Their  prospects  for  191 7  were  so  much  more 
favorable  than  ours  that,  even  while  I  hoped  for  it,  I 
had  grave  doubts  as  to  the  success  of  any  offer  from 
President  Wilson.  I  waited  with  the  greatest  eagerness 
to  learn  whether  he  would  make  a  proposal  in  October, 
but  his  re-election  in  November  and  the  whole  of  the 
month  of  November  passed  without  his  making  up  his 
mind  to  do  so,  and  I  gave  up  any  hope  of  his 
intervention. 

Count  Burian  then  came  forward  with  the  proposal 
that  the  Quadruple  Alliance  should  itself  make  a  direct 
offer  of  peace  to  the  enemy.  I  was  equally  skeptical 
as  to  the  success  of  this  scheme,  but  thought  that  it 
should  be  tried:  the  only  thing  to  avoid  at  all  costs 
was  any  display  of  weakness.  This  would  have  had  a 
very  bad  effect  on  the  army  and  the  public,  and  would 
have  encouraged  the  Entente  to  redouble  its  efforts 
for  our  destruction.  So  far  as  he  permitted,  I  co- 
operated with  the  Chancellor  in  the  matter.  In  order 
to  avoid  giving  the  enemy  the  false  impression  that 
weakness  was  our  motive  for  the  proposal,  I  asked  that 
it  should  not  be  carried  out  until  the  campaign  in 
Rumania  had  been  brought  to  a  conclusion.  Bucharest 
fell  on  December  6,  and  with  that  I  regarded  the 
military  position  as  so  secure  that  I  had  no  objection 
to  the  publication  of  the  peace  note.  The  proposal  for 
compulsory   auxiliary   service,   which  had  meanwhile 


THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF   1916    367 

been  passed  into  law,  gave  the  appearance  of  a  de- 
termination to  continue  fighting  if  our  offer  was 
rejected. 

His  Majesty  took  a  most  earnest  interest  in  the 
peace  offer,  displaying  clearly  his  high  sense  of  his 
responsibility  to  bring  peace  to  the  world  at  the  earHest 
possible  moment.  On  December  12  the  peace  offer  of 
the  Quadruple  Alliance  was  made.  There  followed  an 
exchange  of  views  as  to  the  conditions  of  peace  which 
we  would  be  prepared  to  offer,  which  was,  however, 
destined  to  meet  its  end  in  the  despatch  to  Count 
Bernstorff  of  January  29,  191 7. 

The  reception  of  our  offer  by  the  Entente  press  was 
wholly  unfavorable.  It  soon  became  clear  that  it 
would  be  impossible  to  come  to  an  understanding. 
The  Entente  had  its  hands  tied  by  arrangements  and 
secret  agreements  that  could  be  carried  out  only  if  we 
were  completely  defeated.  The  answer  of  the  Entente, 
given  on  January  30,  was  such  as  to  leave  no  doubt  of 
its  intention  to  annihilate  us.  The  objection,  that 
the  tone  of  our  offer  had  from  the  first  made  any 
acceptance  impossible,  was  quite  unsound.  Our  whole 
position  compelled  us  to  adopt  a  tone  of  confidence. 
I  advocated  this  from  the  military  point  of  view. 
Our  troops  had  done  marvels.  How  would  they  be 
affected  by  our  adopting  any  other  tone?  It  was 
essential  that  the  peace  offer  should  not  impair  the 
fighting  quality  of  the  army,  and  it  did  not  do  so,  for 
it  was  only  an  episode,  and  the  morale  of  the  troops 
was  still  good.  If  the  Entente  had  honestly  desired  a 
peace  of  justice  and  reconciliation  it  could  and  should 
have  entered  into  negotiations  and  brought  forward 
its  demands.  Had  negotiations  broken  down  on  any 
demand  for  annexations  on  the  part  of  the  German 
representatives  it  would  have  been  easy  for  the  En- 
tente,  in    the   light   of   such   an   attitude,    to   stir   its 


368  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

peoples  to  renew  the  war,  while  we  in  such  a  position 
would  have  been  quite  unable  to  reconcile  the  German 
people,  who  were  already  longing  for  peace,  to  any- 
further  fighting.  Still  less  would  our  weary  allies  have 
continued  to  fight  at  our  side.  This  simple  reasoning 
shows  convincingly  that  when  we  made  our  offer  we 
were  genuinely  ready  for  a  peace  of  justice  and 
reconciliation. 

The  attitude  of  the  Entente  on  this  and  on  every 
subsequent  occasion  shows  equally  clearly  that  it 
wanted  no  negotiations  that  might  display  to  the  world 
our  sincere  desire  for  peace.  It  feared  that  in  its  own 
camp  this  would  lead  to  a  weakening  in  the  desire  for 
our  destruction  and  wished  also  that  peace,  when  it 
came,  should  be  definitely  a  peace  of  defeat  and  emas- 
culation for  us. 

Meanwhile  President  Wilson  had  at  last,  on  December 
20,  addressed  a  note  to  all  the  belligerent  Powers, 
inviting  an  expression  of  "their  views  as  to  the  terms 
on  which  the  war  could  be  brought  to  an  end."  The 
President  apparently  desired  to  find  an  agreement  by 
means  of  a  compromise  between  the  demands  of  the 
two  sides.  He  had  in  mind  a  peace  without  victor  or 
vanquished.  The  note  was  delivered  on  December  21. 
The  German  Government  had  been  informed  of  the 
President's  intention  in  November.  Presumably  the 
Government  was  by  this  time,  after  the  long  delay,  in 
doubt  as  to  whether  the  President  would  in  fact  carry 
out  his  intention,  but  I  am  not  aware  in  any  detail 
of  the  Government's  attitude  at  that  time. 

As  early  as  December  26  the  governments  of  the 
Quadruple  Alliance  proposed  an  early  meeting  of 
representatives  of  the  belligerents  in  some  neutral 
country.  They  were  at  variance  with  Wilson's  proposal 
to  the  extent  that  they  preferred  direct  negotiations 
with  their  opponents;  this  may  well  have  been  in  part 


THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF  1916   369 

due  to  regard  for  the  strong  trend  of  public  opinion  in 
Germany  against  the  United  States.  The  Entente  re- 
mained wholly  hostile.  Its  answer  of  January  12  was 
a  confirmation  of  its  note  of  December  30,  being  perhaps 
still  more  strongly  imbued  with  the  intention  of  de- 
stroying us.  The  voice  of  the  latter  answer  is  the 
voice  of  the  iron  Lloyd  George,  who  at  the  beginning  of 
December  had  assumed,  in  form  as  well  as  in  substance, 
the  reins  of  power  in  England.  It  is  useful  to  re-read 
the  answers  of  the  Entente  to  our  offer  of  peace  and  to 
Wilson's  note.  The  judgment  of  many  people  as  to  the 
possibility  of  a  peace  of  understanding  will  then  become 
clearer. 

Thus  failed  the  two  efforts  to  achieve  peace.  By  the 
will  of  the  Entente  the  war  had  to  continue,  and  to  be 
decided  by  force  of  arms.  It  was  to  be  victory  or 
defeat.  The  results  were  further  preparations  on  a 
large  scale,  the  maintenance  of  our  determination  to 
fight — this  our  proposals  were  designed  to  achieve — 
and  at  the  same  time  the  employment  of  every  weapon 
in  Germany's  arsenal. 

Ill 

The  Field-Marshal  and  myself,  in  our  view  of  the 
whole  situation  and  in  our  only  too  correct  doubt  as  to 
the  success  of  the  peace  proposals,  had  already  had 
under  consideration,  as  part  of  our  military  problems, 
the  possibility  of  carrying  on  the  submarine  campaign 
in  an  intensified  form.  Unrestricted  submarine  war- 
fare was  now  the  only  means  left  to  secure  in  any 
reasonable  time  a  victorious  end  to  the  war.  If  sub- 
marine warfare  on  this  scale  could  have  a  decisive 
effect — and  the  navy  held  that  it  could — then  in  the 
existing  situation  it  was  our  plain  military  duty  to  the 
German  nation  to  embark  on  this  form  of  warfare. 


370  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

As  has  been  mentioned,  we  had  both  spoken  against 
the  proposal  for  unrestricted  warfare  on  August  30, 
expressing  the  view  that  the  time  was  not  yet  ripe  for 
it.  Chancellor  von  Bethmann  stated  this  quite  clearly 
at  the  time,  and  added  that  thenceforth  the  decision  to 
carry  on  the  submarine  warfare  in  the  form  of  ' '  block- 
aded area"  fighting  would  depend  on  the  declaration 
of  the  Field-Marshal — that  is  to  say,  unrestricted  sub- 
marine warfare  was  to  start  when  the  Field-Marshal 
wished  it  to  start.  The  Chancellor  spoke  to  the  same 
effect  in  the  Reichstag  on  September  28.  The  ques- 
tion of  the  expediency  of  the  submarine  campaign  had 
meanwhile  led  to  grave  differences  of  opinion  among 
the  political  parties,  and  had  excited  unusual  passions. 
While  the  parties  of  the  Right  were  enthusiastically  in 
favor  of  its  adoption,  the  Left,  which  was  more  in 
touch  with  the  Government,  was  equally  strongly  op- 
posed. Von  Bethmann's  statement  for  the  first  time 
brought  the  Supreme  Army  Command  into  the  field 
of  politics  to  support  the  Government.  This  I  re- 
gretted deeply,  and  in  my  view  the  statement  should 
not  have  been  made.  The  Supreme  Army  Com- 
mand had  consistently  held  aloof  from  all  political 
activity,  and  had  no  wish  to  alter  its  policy  in  this 
respect,  so  that  the  political  excitement  created  by 
Von  Bethmann's  step  was  all  the  more  embarrassing 
to  the  Field-Marshal  and  myself.  Nevertheless,  the 
Supreme  Army  Command  came,  in  fact,  more  and 
more  to  be  regarded  as  responsible  for  the  adoption  or 
non-adoption  of  unrestricted  submarine  warfare. 

At  the  beginning  of  October  we  had  discussed  the 
question  of  adopting  this  weapon  with  the  Chief  of 
the  Naval  Staff.  In  the  course  of  the  correspondence 
with  the  Chancellor  on  the  matter  we  again  urged  him 
on  October  5  to  settle  the  question  of  responsibility. 
He  replied  on  the  6th  with  the  statement  that  the  de- 


THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF   1916    371 

cision  really  lay  with  the  Emperor,  as  the  War  Lord  of 
the  Empire,  but  that  it  was  also  a  question  of  foreign 
policy,  owing  to  its  effect  on  neutrals;  the  Chancellor 
accordingly  was,  constitutionally,  the  only  person  re- 
sponsible, and  could  not  transfer  the  burden  to  any 
one  else;  but  the  attitude  of  the  Field-Marshal  to  the 
matter  would  naturally  have  the  greatest  weight  with 
him.  This  standpoint  was  unexceptionable.  The 
Field-Marshal  was  not  in  a  position  to  take  any 
of  the  Chancellor's  responsibility,  and  had  never  even 
thought  of  doing  so;  I  quite  agreed  with  him.  The 
Chancellor's  declaration  was,  however,  a  substantial 
change  of  front  when  compared  with  his  earlier  state- 
ments, which  had  been  made  on  the  assumption  that 
we  were  opposed  to  the  submarine  warfare. 

In  October  1916  submarine  cruiser  warfare  began, 
ships  being  stopped  and  searched.  This  met  with 
some  success,  and  had  a  disturbing  effect  upon  the 
economic  situation  of  the  enemy.  This  success  spoke 
well  for  the  submarine  weapon,  but  the  enemy's  de- 
fensive measures  against  our  boats  were  soon  improved, 
and  results  fell  off  considerably. 

In  estimating  the  economic  effects  of  the  various 
lorms  of  submarine  warfare  we  were  compelled  to  rely 
upon  the  judgment  of  the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  and  of 
the  Chancellor.  The  Supreme  Army  Command  was  in 
constant  communication  with  both  these  authorities 
on  the  whole  matter,  and  in  particular  on  the  question 
of  the  expediency  of  adopting  unrestricted  warfare. 

After  our  victories  in  Rumania  the  Supreme  Army 
Command  did  not  expect  that  either  Holland  or  Den- 
mark would  enter  the  war  against  us.  It  was,  however, 
unwise  to  take  any  risks,  the  unrestricted  campaign 
could  obviously  not  be  instituted  before  the  Rimianian 
campaign  was  at  an  end  and  our  troops  there  had  re- 
turned home  and  arrived  on  the  Western  and  Eastern 


372  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

fronts.  It  was  soon  clear  that  this  would  not  be  the 
case  before  the  beginning  of  February.  It  also  seemed 
plain  that  we  should  have  to  hold  our  hands  to  see 
whether  any  success  would  be  achieved  by  any  inter- 
vention by  President  Wilson,  along  the  lines  indicated 
by  our  Government  in  September,  or  by  our  own 
offer  of  peace.  If  the  end  of  the  war  should  appear 
to  be  in  sight,  submarine  warfare  on  the  lines  proposed 
would  be  unnecessary.  There  was  really  no  room  for 
doubt.  The  result  of  our  efforts  for  peace  would  be 
sure  to  be  known  by  the  end  of  December  or  early  in 
January,  and  this,  too,  seemed  to  point  to  the  beginning 
of  February  as  the  date  for  opening  the  unrestricted 
campaign,  if  this  should  prove  necessary. 

The  Government  had  by  now  lost  its  early  anxiety  as 
to  the  attitude  of  Holland  and  Denmark,  and  none 
was  felt  as  to  Switzerland,  Spain,  Sweden,  or  Norway. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  thought  it  very  probable  that  the 
United  States  would  join  in  the  war  against  us.  The 
Supreme  Army  Command  had  to  take  into  account,  in 
dealing  with  the  military  situation,  the  views  thus 
expressed  in  the  responsible  quarters.  It  would  involve 
an  addition  to  the  armed  forces  of  the  Entente  of  five 
or  six  divisions  in  the  first  year  after  America  entered 
the  war,  and  later  on,  if  the  submarine  war  did  not  have 
a  decisive  effect,  a  serious,  indeed  a  vital  increase  in 
the  strength  of  the  enemy.  It  could  not  be  doubted 
that  America,  if  she  came  into  the  war,  would  arm 
herself  in  the  same  way  that  England  had  done,  and 
that  the  Entente  would  lead  the  United  States  from  one 
energetic  step  to  another.  I  had,  however,  no  serious 
fear  as  to  any  increased  output  of  munitions  in  the 
States,  as  they  were  already  working  with  aU  their 
might  for  the  Entente. 

The  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  a  friend  of  the  Chan- 
cellor, but  at  the  same  time  a  warm  partizan  of  the 


THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF   1916    373 

unrestricted  submarine  war,  was  confident  that  the 
campaign  would  have  decisive  results  within  six 
months.  The  loss  of  freight  space  and  the  reduction  of 
oversea  imports  would  produce  economic  difficulties  in 
England  that  would  render  a  continuance  of  the  war 
impossible.  In  forming  this  view  he  did  not  rely 
merely  upon  his  own  professional  judgment,  but  was  also 
supported  by  the  opinions  of  distinguished  German 
economists.  The  shortage  of  shipping  would  cut  down 
the  transport  of  munitions,  and  in  particular  the 
transport  from  England  to  France,  which  traffic  could 
also  be  directly  attacked.  The  number  of  sub- 
marines in  commission  was  sufficient  for  the  work, 
and  our  Admiralty  was  also  of  the  opinion  that  con- 
struction, if  it  was  pressed  to  the  utmost,  would 
amply  cover  losses.  In  1916,  after  submarine  war- 
fare had  really  been  abandoned  in  principle,  construc- 
tion had  not  been  pressed  very  vigorously.  The 
question  of  crews  could,  it  was  thought,  be  solved. 
They  would  have  to  be  drawn  mainly  from  the  second- 
line  fleet,  which  consisted  of  the  oldest  ships,  but  the 
other  vessels  also  would  have  to  release  officers  and 
engineers  in  the  prime  of  their  service  years. 

The  siuface  fleet  was  not,  of  course,  to  fall  below  a 
certain  standard  of  strength.  It  had  to  be  maintained 
at  a  sufficient  level,  in  the  face  of  the  enemy  forces, 
which  were  constantly  increasing  through  new  construc- 
tion, and  might  be  further  strengthened  by  the  adhesion 
of  the  Americans,  to  assist  in  the  maintenance  of  the 
submarine  campaign.  It  had  the  duty  of  instuing  the 
passage  of  the  submarines  through  the  enemy  mine- 
fields. It  remained,  in  fact,  sufficiently  formidable  to 
thwart  every  attempt  of  the  enemy  to  interrupt  sea 
traffic  in  the  Baltic. 

The  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  also  hoped  that  the 
declaration  of  unrestricted  warfare  would  have  a  de- 


374  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

terrent  effect  upon  neutral  shipping,  which  had,  up  to 
then,  been  of  great  assistance  to  the  Entente.  He  was 
quite  convinced  of  the  necessity  for  the  strongest  sup- 
port, on  this  point,  from  poHtical  quarters,  which 
proved  in  the  event  to  be  sometimes  lacking. 

The  amount  of  shipping  necessary  for  the  transport 
of  troops  from  America  to  France  and  for  the  supply  of 
reinforcements  was  discussed.  Our  navy  reckoned  that 
the  freight  space  required  for  the  transport  of  an  army 
with  baggage  and  reinforcements  amounted  to  five 
British  register  tons  per  man.  This  estimate  was  con- 
firmed by  our  experience  in  the  attack  on  Oesel  in  the 
autumn  of  191 7.  It  would  thus  be  necessary,  in  order 
to  transport  1,000,000  American  soldiers  in  a  reasonable 
time,  to  employ  5,000,000  tons  of  shipping  space. 
Such  a  quantity  of  shipping,  in  view  of  the  necessity 
for  maintaining  supplies  to  the  Western  Powers,  could 
not  be  spared  even  temporarily. 

The  economic  value  of  the  campaign  was  the  subject 
of  varying  opinion  in  our  Government.  The  Ministry 
of  the  Interior  gradually  came  round  (and  this  only 
after  the  campaign  had  begun)  to  a  view  of  its  high 
value,  and  the  Chancellor  adopted  this  view  also. 

With  my  knowledge  of  the  military  situation  and  my 
firm  views  as  to  the  determination  of  the  enemy  I  did 
not  accept  literally  the  estimates  of  our  Admiralty  as 
to  the  probable  effects  of  unrestricted  submarine  war- 
fare ;  I  knew,  moreover,  that  questions  of  transport  and 
of  economics  generally  are  very  difficult  to  decide.  I 
did,  however,  think  it  safe  to  reckon  that  it  would  have 
a  decisive  effect  within  twelve  months— that  is  to  say, 
before  America  could  throw  her  new  formations  into 
the  scale.  I  hoped  that,  with  the  measures  already 
taken  and  to  be  taken,  we  could  hold  out  for  this 
period  on  land,  assuming  that  the  submarine  campaign 
produced  sufficient  disturbance  of  the  enemy's  economy 


THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF   1916    375 

to  reduce  his  industrial  output  of  war  material,  and 
cut  down  substantially  his  shipments  of  munitions  to 
France.  For  the  first  few  months  I  attributed  the 
greatest  importance  to  the  latter  point. 

I  was  greatly  impressed  with  the  seriousness  of  the 
position  by  a  tour  which  I  took  of  the  Western  front 
at  the  middle  of  December,  with  a  view  to  reviewing  the 
whole  situation,  and  telegraphed  my  views  to  Berlin; 
at  that  time  I  had  already  abandoned  hope  of  any 
success  from  our  offer  of  peace.  In  a  long  discussion 
on  December  23  the  Field-Marshal  expressed  to  the 
Chancellor  his  view  that  the  adoption  of  unrestricted 
submarine  warfare  was  essential.  The  latter  on  the 
24th  stated  that  he  was  ready  to  initiate  discussion  on 
the  matter  as  soon  as  the  answer  expected  from  the 
Entente  to  our  peace  proposal  had  brought  the  matter 
more  or  less  to  finality;  he  repeated,  however,  his 
declaration  of  October  6  to  the  effect  that  the  adoption 
of  the  campaign  was  a  question  of  foreign  policy,  and 
that  he  and  he  alone  bore  and  could  bear  the  constitu- 
tional responsibility  for  the  step.  Our  view  of  the 
matter  had  not  changed.  The  Chancellor  had  his 
responsibilities  to  bear,  and  we  had  ours.  In  a  tele- 
gram to  Von  Bethmann  the  Field-Marshal  made  his 
position  clear  in  the  following  words :  "...  Your  Excel- 
lency as  Chancellor  can,  of  course,  claim  the  sole  re- 
sponsibility, but  I  must  clearly  work,  with  all  my 
strength  and  with  a  full  sense  of  my  responsibility,  for 
the  victorious  end  of  the  war,  to  see  that  everything 
is  done  which  I  hold  as  proper  for  the  achievement  of 
that  end."  That  was  the  right  and  duty  of  the  Supreme 
Army  Command,  just  as  it  was  the  right  and  duty  of  the 
Chancellor,  in  this  difficult  and  momentous  question, 
to  support  his  own  opinion  with  all  the  prestige  of  his 
high  office.  If  there  were  differences  of  opinion,  the 
decision  lay  with  His  Majesty. 


376  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

As  it  seemed  probable  that  the  answer  of  the  En- 
tente, both  to  our  offer  of  peace  and  to  Wilson's  pro- 
posal for  intervention,  would  be  a  refusal,  the  Chan- 
cellor came  to  Pless  to  discuss  the  question  as  early  as 
the  end  of  December,  but  nothing  definite  was  then 
decided.  The  actual  decision  was  arrived  at  on  Janu- 
ary 9,  after  the  receipt  of  the  answer  to  our  peace 
offer,  and  in  the  certainty  that  a  like  reply  would  be 
given  to  President  Wilson,  at  a  meeting  presided  over 
by  His  Majesty.  The  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  ex- 
pressed the  views  stated  above;  he  advised  that  the 
campaign  would  be  decisive  in  a  few  months,  and 
urged  its  adoption.  The  Field-Marshal  reported  our 
view  of  the  situation,  and  also  advised  its  adoption. 
The  Chancellor  stated  the  effect  that  the  use  of  this 
weapon  might  have  upon  neutrals,  and  in  particular 
upon  the  United  States.  He  thought  it  possible,  and 
indeed  probable,  that  the  United  States  would  enter  the 
war,  and  anticipated  difficulties  with  regard  to  the 
provisioning  of  Belgitmi  by  the  Entente.  He  regarded 
our  offer  of  peace  as  having  failed;  he  saw  no  other 
possibility  of  achieving  peace,  not  even  by  a  new  at- 
tempt on  the  part  of  Wilson  (the  note  of  December  i8 
had  already  failed) ;  he  had  no  hope  of  a  separate  peace, 
and  he  did  not  anticipate  any  improvement  in  our 
position  through  the  collapse  of  one  of  our  enemies, 
§uch  as  subsequently  happened  in  the  case  of  Russia. 
The  likelihood  of  this  happening  would,  of  course,  have 
altered  the  whole  situation  and  would  have  had  the 
greatest  weight  in  the  formation  of  our  opinions.  The 
Chancellor's  judgment  as  to  our  military  position  was 
the  same  as  our  own.  Wliile  we  felt  compelled  reso- 
lutely to  draw  the  inevitable  and  serious  inference,  and 
act  upon  it,  the  Chancellor,  as  his  nature  was,  remained 
undecided,  but  came  to  such  conclusions  as :  "  The  de- 
cision to  embark  upon  the  campaign  depends  upon  the 


THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF   1916    377 

effects  which  are  to  be  expected  from  it, "  and,  "If  the 
miHtary  authorities  regard  it  as  essential,  I  am  not  in  a 
position  to  withstand  them,"  and,  "If  success  beckons, 
we  must  take  the  step." 

However,  with  a  full  sense  of  his  political  responsi- 
bility, the  Chancellor  did  advise  the  adoption  of  the 
campaign,  as  did  His  Majesty's  other  advisers.  The 
Emperor  fell  in  with  their  views  and  commanded  that 
the  campaign  should  open  on  February  i ;  he  directed, 
however,  that  time  should  be  given  to  neutral  vessels 
in  the  blockaded  area  to  leave  ic,  and  to  neutral  vessels 
on  their  way  to  the  area  to  complete  their  voyages. 

The  Chancellor  then  prepared,  in  co-operation  with 
the  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff,  the  notes  to  neutral  Powers 
as  to  the  declaration  of  the  blockade  area  around  Eng- 
land, along  the  west  coast  of  France,  and  in  the  Medi- 
terranean.    These  were  to  be  delivered  on  January  31. 

The  Chief  of  the  Naval  Staff  gave  the  detailed  in- 
structions for  operations  in  the  blockaded  area,  making 
various  concessions  to  the  wishes  of  the  Foreign  Office 
in  order  to  lessen  the  danger  of  a  rupture  with  America. 
We  were,  of  course,  quite  in  accord  with  this. 

The  Supreme  Army  Command,  on  its  side,  took  cer- 
tain precautionary  measures  in  the  northern  army  dis- 
trict, in  order  to  be  ready  for  all  eventualities,  although 
the  Chancellor  had  no  anxiety  as  to  the  attitude  of 
Holland  and  Denmark. 

The  construction  of  defensive  positions  in  northern  , 
Schleswig  had  made  good  progress,  and  there  was  no  ' 
need  to  do  more  than  to  reinforce  the  frontier  guard 
with  a  few  cavalry.     An  army  corps  staff  was  moved 
thither  temporarily,  in  order  to  accustom  itself  to  local 
conditions.     On  our  Dutch  frontier  the  frontier  troops  ) 
were  grouped  in  divisional  formations  and  placed  under  i 
an  army  corps  staff  that  was  stationed  at  Munster.  j 
The  construction  of  defensive  works  was  here  much  in  I 


378  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

arrears.  Not  too  much  had  been  done,  either,  on  the 
Dutch-Belgian  frontier,  owing  to  shortage  of  men. 
Further  defensive  measures  were  merely  worked  out 
on  paper,  and  the  troops  released  from  the  operations  in 
Rumania  were  to  carry  them  out  only  if  necessity 
arose,  and  were  otherwise  to  be  employed  on  the 
Western  front.  They  were  in  the  first  instance  moved 
into  Belgium. 

IV 

In  the  middle  of  January  the  Supreme  Army  Com- 
mand received  from  the  Foreign  Office  a  transcript  of  a 
despatch  from  Count  Bemstorff  of  January  lo,  to  the 
effect  that  the  note  dealing  with  armed  merchant- 
vessels  "would  frustrate  President  Wilson's  proposals 
for  intervening  to  negotiate  peace."  This  surprised 
me,  as  all  idea  of  any  definite  intervention  by  the 
President  had  vanished.  Count  Bemstorff  could  not 
be  referring  to  anything  else  than  the  step  taken  by  the 
President  on  December  i8,  which  was  not  officially 
answered  by  the  Entente  until  January  12,  but  was 
definitely  put  an  end  to  by  that  answer,  as  we  had 
anticipated.  I  was  unaware  of  any  new  step  or  pro- 
posal, and  so  was  the  Chancellor.  He  accordingly  re- 
plied to  Bemstorff  on  January  16,  "We  are  resolved 
to  take  the  risk"  (of  rupture  and  even  of  war  with  the 
United  States).  This  cablegram  had  probably  not 
reached  Count  Bemstorff  when  he  wired  again  to  the 
Foreign  Office:  "Unless  military  considerations  are 
absolutely  decisive,  it  would  be  highly  desirable  to 
postpone  institution"  (of  the  unrestricted  warfare). 
"Wilson  believes  he  can  secure  peace  on  the  basis 
proposed  by  us  of  equality  of  rights  for  all  nations." 

In  forwarding  us  this  cablegram  the  Secretary  of 
Foreign  Affairs  wrote  that  he  had  urged  the  Chief  of 
the  Naval  Staff  to  lessen  the  danger  of  a  rupture  with 


THE   SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF   1916    379 

America  by  fixing  certain  definite  periods  of  grace  for 
neutral  ships,  which  the  ambassador  had  proposed.  I 
at  once  rephed  that  we  agreed  to  this.  It  is  clear 
that  the  Foreign  Office  had  not  concluded,  even  from 
this  second  communication  from  Bernstorff,  that  there 
was  any  modification  of  the  general  situation,  for  the 
Secretary  would  otherwise  have  mentioned  it. 

I  never  had  a  clear  understanding  of  the  correspon- 
dence between  the  Government  and  the  Ambassador; 
indeed,  I  learned  of  it  only  in  fragments. 

I  knew  nothing  of  the  progress  of  the  negotiation 
with  the  United  States.  The  Chancellor  and  the 
Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs  complained  of  the  dif- 
ficulties of  communication  and  of  the  resulting  am- 
biguities. They  had,  of  course,  to  use  every  possible 
chance  to  avoid  a  rupture  with  the  United  States,  in 
spite  of  the  existence  of  the  unrestricted  campaign. 

On  January  29,  unexpectedly,  so  far  as  I  was  con- 
cerned, Chancellor  von  JBethmann  and  Secretary  Doctor 
Zimmermann  arrived  at  Pless.  We  were  bidden  to 
attend  a  discussion  with  the  Emperor  over  a  new  pro- 
posal for  intervention  by  President  Wilson.  The 
Chancellor  read  a  despatch  which  he  had  drafted  for 
transmission  to  Count  Bernstorff,  in  which  he  proposed 
that  we  should  declare  for  peace  on  the  status  quo  ante 
basis. 

So  far  as  I  remember,  the  despatch  proposed  the  sub- 
mission to  President  Wilson,  then  or  on  any  later  oppor- 
tunity, the  following  claims  as  the  basis  for  possible 
peace  negotiations: 

"Restoration  of  the  portions  of  Upper  Alsace  oc- 
cupied by  France. 

"A  frontier  securing  Germany  and  Poland  strategi-^ 
cally  and  economically  against  Russia. 

"Restoration  of  colonies  on  the  basis  of  an  agree 
ment   securing   to   Germany  colonial  possessions  cor 


u 


38o  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

responding  to  her  population  and  her  economic 
interests. 

"Return  to  France  of  the  territory  occupied  by 
Germany,  subject  to  strategic  and  economic  rectifica- 
tion of  frontiers,  and  to  financial  compensation. 

"Restoration  of  Belgium,  subject  to  definite  guaran- 
ties for  Germany's  safety,  which  would  be  negotiated 
with  the  Belgian  Government. 

"Economic  and  financial  adjustment  on  the  basis 
of  the  exchange  of  conquered  territories  given  up  by 
either  side  to  the  other  on  the  conclusion  of  peace. 

"Indemnity  to  German  concerns  or  subjects  injured 
by  the  war. 

"Renunciation  of  all  economic  measures  or  treaties 
calculated  to  interfere  after  the  conclusion  of  peace 
with  normal  trade  or  commimication,  and  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  commercial  agreements  necessary  thereto. 

"The  guaranteeing  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas." 

These  are  the  only  German  conditions  which  ever 
reached  the  enemy  from  our  side  with  any  co-operation 
on  my  part. 

The  Chancellor  did  not  suggest  a  postponement  of 
the  unrestricted  campaign,  but  the  ambassador  was 
authorized  to  explain  that  our  Government  was  ready 
to  order  the  cessation  of  the  campaign  immediately 
any  basis  for  peace  negotiations  was  worked  out  that 
offered  any  real  hope  of  success.  The  Field-Marshal 
and  I  agreed  to  this. 

The  whole  discussion  took  place  in  one  of  the  Em- 
peror's rooms  and  occupied  but  little  time.  The 
Emperor's  birthday  presents  were  still  lying  about,  and 
I  remember  in  particular  a  fine  picture  of  the  cruiser 
Emden.  I  know  no  more  than  the  above  as  to  the  cir- 
cumstances surrounding  this  diplomatic  step,  nor  the 
course  which  it  followed.  I  mentioned  to  the  Field- 
Marshal,  after  the  discussion  was  over,  my  resentment 


THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF   1916    381 

at  the  manner  in  which  our  co-operation  in  these 
tremendously  important  decisions  had  been  obtained. 
Although  we  had  no  clear  knowledge  of  the  situation, 
we  had  to  bear  our  share  of  the  moral  responsibility. 

On  January  31  our  note  as  to  the  declaration  of  the 
submarine  campaign  was  delivered  in  Washington,  as 
also,  I  assume,  was  the  Government's  above-mentioned 
proposal  of  January  29. 

After  January  9  there  were  no  military  reasons  what- 
ever to  cause  either  the  Field-Marshal  or  myself  to 
modify  our  views  as  to  the  urgent  need  for  the  un- 
restricted campaign. 

According  to  a  report  from  the  Chief  of  the  Naval 
Staff  in  Vienna,  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  also 
decided  to  wage  unrestricted  warfare  with  its  sub- 
marines. I  welcomed  with  gratitude  this  loyal  act  on 
the  part  of  our  allies,  which  I  had,  of  course,  confidently 
expected.  The  new  campaign  could  be  really  effective 
only  if  it  included  the  Mediterranean,  where  prospects 
of  success  seemed  particularly  good;  the  important 
thing  was  to  sink  as  much  shipping  as  possible.  Gen- 
eral von  Conrad  had  also  advocated  the  adhesion  of 
Austria  to  the  campaign. 

When,  later,  in  191 8,  Count  Czemin  stated  that  he 
had  adopted  this  policy  in  order  to  avoid  a  quarrel 
with  Germany,  he  stated  something  that  was  quite  new 
to  me.  There  was  never  any  idea  of  bringing  military 
pressure  to  bear  upon  Austria-Hungary. 

In  judging  public  opinion  on  the  matter  at  home,  I 
regarded  as  a  very  imiportant  element  the  sitting  of  the 
Reichstag  of  February  27,  in  which  it  appeared  that, 
after  the  failure  of  our  peace  offer,  the  German  people 
were  practically  unanimous  in  supporting  the  Govern- 
ment. The  leader  of  the  Majority  Socialists,  Herr 
Scheidemann,  while  refusing  any  responsibility  for  the 
submarine  campaign,  spoke  as  follows: 


382  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

"Every  one  will  understand  the  deep  satisfaction 
which  we  felt  when  we  learned  that  the  Government 
had  made  an  offer  of  peace  to  the  world,  based  on  views 
similar  to  our  own.  When  the  enemy's  notorious  reply 
to  Wilson  stripped  the  veil  from  his  plans  for  conquest 
and  annihilation,  the  determination  to  defend  our 
country  resolutely  was  again  restored.  There  was  then 
but  one  voice — anything  rather  than  such  a  peace! 
No  one  had  expected  that  the  enemy  would  accept  the 
German  invitation  to  a  conference  without  some  show 
of  reluctance,  without  emphasizing  his  own  strength, 
without  a  certain  maneuvering  for  position  and  pre- 
liminary negotiation;  but  it  is  equally  certain  that  no 
one  had  anticipated  a  tone  so  brutal  and  provocative, 
or  a  peace  program  so  extravagant,  so  utterly  at 
variance  with  the  facts  of  the  situation.  They  will 
never  wipe  away  the  stain  of  the  crime  against  hu- 
manity committed  by  their  brutal  refusal  of  Germany's 
peace  offer.  Lloyd  George  is  the  true  godfather  of  our 
Government's  resolution  to  adopt  the  unrestricted  sub- 
marine campaign.  Once  this  resolution  has  been  made, 
and  the  campaign  has  begun,  we,  too,  can  but  hope 
with  all  our  hearts  that  it  will  bring  us  peace  quickly. 
We  trust  in  the  national  strength,  now  fully  mobilized, 
to  achieve  what  our  enemies  hold  to  be  impossible. 
Our  honor,  our  existence,  our  free  economic  develop- 
ment, must  come  unimpaired  out  of  this  terrible 
struggle." 

That  was  a  noble  profession  of  faith,  and  in  the  face 
of  the  enemy's  will  to  annihilation,  a  call  to  fight  to 
the  last.     One  hoped  that  it  might  be  realized. 


V        On  November  21,  191 6,  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph 
passed  to  his  long  rest.     The  cohesion  of  the  peoples 


THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  END,  OF   1916    383 

of  the  double  monarchy  had  depended  upon  him.  He 
had  not,  it  is  true,  succeeded  in  giving  new  life  to  the 
monarchy,  for  the  advisers  whom  he  chose  were  not 
strong  enough  for  the  task.  He  was  a  loyal  friend 
of  the  alliance,  even  if  he  never  forgot  1866,  when 
Prussia  and  Austria  had  fought  for  hegemony  in 
Germany. 

At  the  beginning  of  April  191 6  the  fiftieth  anni- 
versary of  Field-Marshal  von  Hindenburg's  entry  into 
the  service  was  celebrated  in  Kovno.  I  made  a  short 
speech  on  that  occasion,  and  chanced  to  mention,  with- 
out adding  any  comment,  that  the  Field-Marshal,  in 
the  first  year  of  his  service,  had  taken  part  in  the  cam- 
paign of  1866.  My  speech  had  hardly  been  reported 
when  I  received  a  letter  from  Chancellor  von  Beth- 
mann,  to  the  effect  that  offense  had  been  caused  in 
Vienna  by  my  reference  to  the  campaign  of  1866.  He 
begged  me  to  prevent  it  being  reported,  but  that  was 
already  impossible.  I  was  as  much  surprised  by  the 
attitude  of  the  Vienna  court  as  by  the  letter  from 
Berlin.  The  1866  campaign,  it  appears,  had  left  a  deep 
and  permanent  impression  on  the  Emperor  Francis 
Joseph.  In  that  campaign  he  had  lost  his  confidence 
in  his  army  and  he  never  fully  regained  it,  although 
he  worked  hard  for  it,  and  held  high  the  old  traditions 
of  his  Imperial  force. 

His  death  was  an  irreparable  loss  to  us. 

The  murdered  heir,  the  Archduke  Francis  Ferdinand, 
was  not  the  man  of  action  he  was  commonly  held  to  be. 
Indeed,  he  was  naturally  vacillating  and  irresolute, 
and  by  no  means  friendly  to  Germany.  Our  Emperor 
made  great  efforts  to  turn  the  Archduke  and  his  wife 
to  a  friendly  attitude  to  us.  His  death  was  a  tragedy 
and  its  results  disastrous;  they  have  brought  about 
for  Austria,  after  four  years  of  war,  the  fate  that  Russia, 
the  real  author  of  the  tragedy,  intended;   true,  Russia 


384  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

has  ruined  herself  in  the  process.  The  murdered  heir 
would  not  have  been  the  man  to  have  taken  over  the 
guidance  of  the  double  monarchy  after  the  death  of  the 
aged  Emperor;  the  separatist  tendencies  had  grown 
too  strong  during  the  war.  Mismanagement  had  in- 
creased. In  many  districts  there  was  bad  morale, 
both  in  the  army  and  among  people.  War  weariness 
was  growing,  and  the  longing  for  peace  was  greater 
every  day.  It  would  have  required  no  ordinary  man 
to  restore  the  fighting  spirit  to  the  double  monarchy 
and  bring  new  life  into  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army. 

I  first  saw  the  Emperor  Charles  in  December  19 14 
as  Archduke.  He  gave  the  strong  impression  of  youth- 
fulness.  At  the  beginning  of  November  19 16  I  saw 
him  again.  He  had  grown  up  and  become  more 
manly,  and  spoke  well  on  military  subjects.  The  bur- 
den of  his  new  and  high  position  was,  however,  to 
become  too  heavy  for  him.  Anxiety  grew  upon  him. 
He  was  always  striving,  and  at  the  same  time  gave 
way  to  many  men  and  in  many  matters.  He  was  con- 
scious of  the  internal  political  difficulties  of  his  double 
monarchy,  and  had  plans  for  a  league  of  the  peoples  of 
Austria  vmder  the  House  of  Hapsburg ;  at  the  same  time 
he  was  unable  to  bring  the  Hungarians  to  a  less  selfish 
policy,  and  could  not  make  them  abandon  their  food- 
stuffs blockade  against  Austria.  It  was  characteristic 
of  him  that  he  pardoned  the  Czech  leaders  who  had 
openly  worked  against  the  monarchy;  his  fear  of  the 
Czech  movement,  and  the  whole  weakness  of  the 
Government  and  the  monarchy,  were  rendered  notori- 
ous by  this  conduct.  The  only  consequence  was  an 
encouragement  of  the  separatist  tendencies  among  his 
non-German  peoples,  and  grave  mistrust  among  his 
Germans,  who  stood  firm  in  their  loyalty  to  their 
Imperial  house.  The  army,  too,  felt  it  as  a  slight, 
especially  the  German  officers  and    men,   who  were 


THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF   1916    385 

fighting  courageously  for  the  Imperial  house  and  the 
double  monarchy.  Countless  of  their  German  brothers 
had  met  their  death  on  the  field  of  battle  through 
Czech  troops  going  over  to  the  enemy. 

The  Emperor  Charles,  although  by  no  means  a  con- 
vinced supporter  of  the  alliance,  held  firmly  to  Ger- 
many. He  wanted  peace,  but  in  his  anxiety  to  achieve 
it  he  went  too  far  in  his  letters  to  his  brother-in-law, 
Prince  Sixtus. 

The  Emperor  Charles  attached  great  importance  to 
his  position  as  supreme  commander  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Army.  At  his  wish  the  stipulations  govern- 
ing the  supreme  command  of  the  forces  of  the  Quad- 
ruple Alliance  were  altered  and  somewhat  weakened. 
Without  being  truly  soldierly,  he  wanted  to  give  his 
best  to  his  army. 

The  Empress  Zita,  who  had  great  influence  over  her 
husband,  had  strong  political  opinions.  She  was,  un- 
fortunately, wholly  unfriendly  to  us  and  in  the  hands 
of  priests  who  were  not  well  disposed  to  Germany. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  was  Count  Czernin, 
a  man  of  cleverness  and  wide  experience,  an  educated 
and  amiable  personality,  and  far  above  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse.  In  the  main,  he  pursued  the  same  path  as  the 
Chancellor  in  Berlin.  He  desired  peace,  but  only  hand 
in  hand  with  Germany.  He  must  be  given  the  tribute 
of  praise,  that  he  was  loyal.  At  the  same  time  he  held 
earnestly  and  with  uncommon  ability  the  brief  for 
the  double  monarchy.  In  dealing  with  his  Imperial 
master  he  showed  calmness  and  firmness.  Neverthe- 
less, he  gave  his  authority  to  the  pardon  to  the  Czechs 
and  to  the  Emperor's  uncertain  policy  toward  the 
subject  peoples.  He  remained  in  office,  although  he 
did  not  approve  of  the  pardon,  and  although  this  step, 
symptomatic  as  it  was  of  the  impending  collapse  of  the 
double  monarchy,    was  bound   to   make  peace  more 


386  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

difficult  and  to  strengthen  the  hopes  of  the  Entente 
for  victory. 

Personally  I  had  a  great  liking  for  the  Count  and 
took  no  little  pleasure  in  his  conversation,  but  he,  un- 
fortunately, was  too  ready  to  repeat  the  Wilhelmstrasse 
gossip  about  my  "dictatorship."  I  often  explained  to 
him  how  unfounded  this  supposition  was. 

General  von  Arz  was  made  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Army,  in  the  place  of 
General  von  Conrad,  who  took  over  the  command  of 
the  army  group  on  the  Tyrol  front.  I  had  always  been 
on  terms  of  the  greatest  confidence  with  General  von 
Conrad,  so  that  from  the  personal  point  of  view  I  saw 
with  unmixed  regret  this  great  general  leave  his  office. 

My  relations  with  General  von  Arz  were,  however, 
to  become  even  more  intimate.  He  was  a  convinced 
friend  of  the  German  Empire  and  the  German  Army. 
During  the  summer  campaign  of  1915  he  had  com- 
manded the  6th  Austro-Hungarian  Army  Corps  as  part 
of  the  Eleventh  Army,  and  in  close  co-operation  with 
German  troops  had  led  it  with  such  ability  as  to  earn 
for  himself  and  his  corps  the  highest  German  regard. 
As  commander  of  the  First  Army  in  Transylvania  he 
achieved  everything  that  was  humanly  possible  with 
the  material  at  his  disposal.  He  achieved  a  large 
measure  of  cordial  relation  between  the  German  and 
the  Austro-Hungarian  troops  in  his  army,  and  devoted 
himself  whole-heartedly  to  their  training.  Perhaps  not 
so  agile  of  mind  as  General  von  Conrad,  he  was  a 
soldier  of  sound  grasp,  who  did  his  utmost  to  improve 
the  army  and  to  get  for  it  from  the  country  everything 
it  needed.  He  did  the  best  that  could  be  done,  without 
achieving  anything  decisively  great.  He  improved  as 
time  went  on. 

General  von  Arz  selected  as  his  director  of  operations 
General   von   Waldstatten,   a  capable  and  ambitious 


THE  SITUATION  AT  THE  END  OF   1916    387 

officer,  who  earned  the  confidence  of  his  chief  and  of  the 
army. 

Good  Haison  and  co-operation  between  ourselves  and 
the  Austrian  headquarters  was  thus  a  certainty  for 
the  future. 


THE  REASONS  FOR  THE  FURTHER 

PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR,  AND 

THE  CONDITION  OF  THE  FORCES 

The  Auxiliary  Service  Law — The  Hindenburg  Program — The  Supplies 
of  Raw  Material — The  Question  of  Food-supplies — The  Importance 
of  Rumania  in  the  Conduct  of  the  War — The  Fight  Against  the 
Home  Front — The  Deterioration  of  the  People's  Morale  and  the 
Control  of  the  Press — Propaganda — The  Troops  and  Their  Leaders 
— The  Polish  Question. 


THE  war  called  upon  us  to  gather  together  and  throw 
into  the  scale  the  last  ounce  of  our  strength,  either 
in  the  fighting  line  or  behind  the  lines,  in  munitions 
work  or  other  work  at  home  or  in  Government  service. 
Each  citizen  could  serve  his  country  only  in  one  post, 
but  in  some  way  his  strength  should  be  used  to  that 
end.  Service  to  the  State  was  the  important  thing. 
In  general  the  distribution  of  forces  among  the  army, 
the  navy,  and  home  services  was  carried  out  by  the 
Supreme  Army  Command  in  co-operation  with  the 
civil  officials  concerned.  The  former  alone  could  super- 
vise the  whole  matter  in  detail,  for  even  the  Prussian 
Minister  of  War  had  but  an  insufficient  and  partial 
view  of  the  forces  at  the  enemy's  disposal  and  of  the 
needs  of  the  situation. 

Up  to  this  time  the  army  in  the  field  had  received 
adequate  reinforcements  from  returned  wounded  (of 
whom,  thanks  to  our  admirable  medical  service,  a  very 
high  proportion  came  back  to  the  line),  from  the  yearly 


FURTHER  PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR   389 

classes  as  they  were  called  up,  and  from  re-examinations 
and  comb-outs.  We  were  forced  to  send  men  of  nine- 
teen to  the  front ;  younger  men  could  not  be  sent.  The 
medical  standards  were  reduced,  and  the  vast  majority 
of  the  available  men  called  up.  It  was  still  necessary, 
however,  not  merely  to  send  into  the  army  all  the  men 
then  available,  but  also  to  find  some  new  source  of 
supply  beyond  these ;  in  particular  it  was  vital  to  reduce 
the  numbers  of  exemptions.  At  the  same  time,  we  had 
to  find  the  labor  needed  for  the  work  behind  the  lines, 
where  the  construction  of  positions  was  of  simply  incal- 
culable importance,  and  to  keep  up  the  war  industries 
at  home. 

"Fit  for  garrison  duty  only"  was  always  a  thorn  in 
my  side.  When  everything  was  at  stake,  why  should 
not  the  garrison  duty  man,  who  was  employed  at  the 
front,  csLTTy  a  rifle  as  much  as  the  "general  service" 
man?  The  men,  however,  looked  upon  their  garrison 
duty  classification  as  a  sort  of  passport  to  safety.  The 
Supreme  Army  Command  never  succeeded  in  adjust- 
ing this  conception  to  the  urgency  of  the  army's  needs 
or  in  getting  rid  of  the  ill  effects  of  this  classification. 
An  order  of  the  Minister  of  War,  issued  in  the  autumn 
of  19 1 8,  was  too  late  to  do  any  good.  In  the  mean 
time,  the  standard  of  fitness  for  general  service  had 
been  again  revised,  and  below  the  class  of  "garrison 
duty  in  the  field  or  at  home"  there  was  created  another, 
"labor  duty." 

The  system  of  re-examination  and  control  generally 
at  home  seemed  to  me  to  be  defective.  Complaints  of 
the  most  incredible  shirking  were  always  being  made. 
I  urged  the  War  Ministry  to  act  energetically,  which 
was  only  bare  justice.  I  never,  however,  was  able  to 
feel  that  in  this  respect  things  were  as  they  should  be 
for  the  sake  of  morale  in  the  field  and  at  home. 
^  The  (AuxiUary  Service)  law  left  untouched  labor  that 


390  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

shotdd  have  been  devoted  to  the  State.  The  duty  of 
service  was  laid  only  on  men  between  seventeen  and 
forty-five.  I  regarded  this  limitation  as  quite  inap- 
propriate in  view  of  the  iron  necessities  of  the  war. 

As  early  as  September  1916  the  Chancellor  received 
the  first  demands  of  the  Supreme  Army  Command  for 
the  unsparing  application  of  all  forces.  We  insisted 
emphatically  on  the  point  of  view  that  in  war  the 
strength  of  every  citizen  belongs  to  the  State,  and  that 
accordingly  every  German  from  fifteen  to  sixty  should 
be  under  an  obligation  to  serve,  an  obligation  which, 
with  certain  limitations,  lay  on  women,  too.  The  duty 
could  be  fulfilled  by  service  at  the  front,  or  by  work,  in 
the  widest  sense,  at  home,  and  was  in  no  sense  Hmited 
to  workmen  in  the  ordinary  meaning  of  the  word, 
although  it,  of  course,  fell  mainly  upon  them. 

The  introduction  of  compulsion  for  war  services  was  of 
the  greatest  moral  importance,  placing,  as  it  did,  every 
German  at  the  service  of  the  State  in  these  anxious 
times,  in  accordance  with  the  oldest  principles  of  Ger- 
man law.  It  should  also  have  had  the  great  practical 
advantage  of  giving  the  Government  the  control  over 
rates  of  wages.  It  was  one  of  the  most  crying  injus- 
tices of  the  war — and  must  have  been  so  felt  by  the 
troops — that  they,  who  were  risking  their  lives  daily, 
were  much  worse  off  than  any  of  the  workmen  who 
hved  in  safety.  While  the  soldier  was  fighting  for  him- 
self, his  wife  and  children,  he  could  think  only  with 
anxiety  of  his  future  and  the  maintenance  of  his  family. 
The  separation  allowances  were  in  no  way  sufficient. 
The  longing  to  get  back  home,  which  could  be  suffi- 
ciently explained  by  the  desire  for  personal  safety,  had 
also  a  higher  motive  in  family  affection.  The  same 
feeling  kept  many  a  man  at  home,  and  gave  to  service 
in  the  face  of  the  enemy  an  air  of  punishment.  This 
was  a  thoroughly  unsatisfactory  position. 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    391 

The  pay  of  the  fighting  men  shoiild  have  been  raised 
— and  I  attempted,  without  any  real  success  in  the 
face  of  official  opposition  at  home,  to  have  it  raised — 
and  the  wages  of  workmen  should  have  been  kept  down 
to  a  reasonable  level.  This  would  have,  of  course, 
involved  considerable  reductions  in  war  profits,  for 
wages  and  profits  necessarily  stand  in  close  inter- 
relation. Such  a  course  would  have  saved  consider- 
able sums,  thus  easing  our  budget  and  conserving  oiu- 
capital.  I  was  not  unaware  of  the  difficulties  of  the 
problem,  having  regard  for  the  universal  rise  in  prices 
due  to  the  shortage  of  raw  materials,  but  I  hoped  that 
it  would  be  solved  and  that  the  way  to  a  sound  position 
would  be  discovered.  A  law  establishing  the  general  duty 
of  service  would  have  shown  the  way  to  the  solution. 

The  introduction  of  general  conscription,  coupled 
with  that  of  compulsory  civilian  service,  was  not  of 
itself  sufficient.  It  was  essential,  too,  to  see  that 
the  labor  thus  obtained  was  profitably  used,  and  that 
the  State  did  not  lose  the  benefit  of  it. 

It  was  clear  to  me  that  measures  of  this  sort  would 
involve  far-reaching  interference  with  administration, 
with  trade,  and  with  private  Hfe.  It  was  also  not  to 
be  forgotten  that  too  many  restrictions  tend  to  stultify 
individual  effort.  Opposition  was  bound  to  arise,  even 
when  the  demands  made  did  no  more  than  correspond 
with  the  iron  necessity  of  the  war.  Self-seeking  and 
profit-hunting  were  already  firmly  rooted.  We  had, 
however,  to  show  the  people  the  way  to  victory,  to 
make  them  see  the  facts  clearly  and  settle  their  own 
destiny.  The  Reichstag,  and  with  it  the  whole  people, 
had  to  share  the  responsibility.  On  Occober  30,  1916, 
the  Chancellor  was  especially  urged  to  secure  this  end. 
I  hoped  that  the  Government  would  be  prepared  to 
adoDt  the  great  principle  of  universal  service,  and  to 
bring  the  people  to  consider  what  further  strength 


392  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

they  could  devote  to  their  country.  It  required  an 
unselfish  understanding  on  the  part  of  the  people,  to 
shake  themselves  free  from  the  self-seeking  of  domestic 
politics,  to  devote  themselves  wholly  to  the  war,  and 
to  translate  into  action  the  proposals  of  the  Supreme 
Army  Command. 

The  Government  did  not  take  these  steps.  I  had 
still  at  that  time  unlimited  confidence  in  the  German 
people  and  the  German  working-class.  The  war  was 
life  or  death  for  us  all;  this  should  be  made  clear  to 
the  workers,  and  then,  as  I  believed,  they  would  be 
certain,  in  their  knowledge  of  the  great  danger  threaten- 
ing them  and  their  country,  to  range  themselves  behind 
the  Supreme  Army  Command  and  to  give  even  more 
than  they  had  already  given.  The  German  workman 
had  already  done  wonders,  but  he  could  still  do  more. 
Just  as  troops,  in  the  hour  of  peril,  are  enabled  to  do 
their  utmost  through  patriotism  inculcated  by  disci- 
pline, so  in  a  long  war  the  people  are  held  together  and 
kept  on  their  feet  by  firm  leadership  and  a  clear  con- 
ception of  the  danger  threatening  their  country.  The 
enthusiasm  of  the  moment  passes — that  is  inevitable — 
and  it  must  be  replaced  by  discipline  and  understand- 
ing.    That  this  could  be  achieved  I  had  no  doubt. 

Even  without  any  new  legislation  the  Government 
could  help  us.  The  laws  dealing  with  a  state  of  siege 
and  with  war  services  gave  the  necessary  powers  to 
obtain  the  labor  required,  but  the  Government  lacked 
the  necessary  determination  to  apply  them  properly. 
The  administration  of  these  laws,  however,  would 
amotmt  to  a  mere  application  of  force,  from  which, 
on  reflection,  I  saw  little  hope  of  real  success.  I 
thought  that  it  would  be  better  to  have  a  law  supported 
by  the  approval  of  the  whole  people,  one  which  would 
make  plain  to  the  whole  world  our  determination  to 
hold  out.     This,  too..  I  explained  to  the  Chancellor. 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    393 

At  last,  after  two  months'  delay  and  after  much 
imedifying  pressure  from  the  Supreme  Army  Com- 
mand, the  Government  made  up  its  mind,  in  November, 
to  introduce  into  the  Reichstag  the  Auxiliary  Service 
bill,  which  was  passed  on  December  2.  It  was  neither 
fish  nor  fowl  and  very  different  from  what  we  had 
desired.  The  bill  departed  too  far  from  the  principle 
of  universal  liability  to  service,  which  we  had  laid 
down  in  September,  and  gave  no  security  that  the 
labor  strength  obtained  would  be  so  employed  as  to 
produce  the  maximum  results.  In  practice,  the  law, 
largely  owing  to  the  manner  in  which  it  was  admin- 
istered, was  but  a  shadow  of  the  reality  we  desired,  a 
reality  which  would  have  devoted  the  whole  strength 
of  the  nation  to  the  nation's  service,  and  so  supplied 
reinforcements  for  the  army  and  labor  for  the  army 
and  for  home  industries.  In  the  whole  text  of  the 
statute  the  first  paragraph  alone  bears  any  resemblance 
to  what  the  Supreme  Army  Command  had  aimed  to 
secure. 

The  provisions  did  not  cover  even  women,  although 
there  were  many  available  to  replace  men  at  their  work 
and  release  them  for  the  army. 

In  spite  of  everything,  I  gave  the  law  at  first  a  warm 
welcome.  Friend  and  foe  alike  attributed  to  it,  as  a 
sign  of  our  determination,  a  far  higher  value  than  it 
really  possessed.  In  connection  with  our  successes  in 
Rumania,  it  was  bound  to  have  considerable  moral 
effect. 

I  followed  the  course  of  the  discussions  in  the  Reichs- 
tag with  unmixed  regret.  This  was  the  first  time  in 
the  war  that  I  had  the  opportunity,  and  also,  in  my 
position  as  Quartermaster-General,  the  duty,  to  do  so. 
The  Supreme  Army  Command  obtained  by  this  means 
an  insight  into  the  spirit  of  the  population  that  was 
of  decisive  importance  for  the  issue  of  the  war.     It  was 


394  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

certain  that  the  Government  was  in  a  very  dehcate 
position  in  deaHng  with  the  difficult  labor  questions. 
It  should  have  followed  a  strong  war  policy,  instead  of  a 
weak  and  submissive  domestic  policy.  Why  did  it  not 
boldly  and  clearly  make  the  whole  people  share  the 
responsibility  for  the  result  of  the  war?  Certain  parties 
in  the  Reichstag  seemed  unable  to  realize  the  necessity 
of  postponing  party  interests  for  the  general  good  in 
the  hour  of  peril.  The  Government,  the  Reichstag,  and 
a  great  part  of  the  population  had  never  yet  under- 
stood the  character  of  modem  warfare,  which  lays 
claim  upon  all  one's  resources,  nor  had  they  ever  realized 
the  importance  to  ultimate  victory  of  their  full  co- 
operation in  the  fight.  The  Supreme  Army  Command 
had  again  and  again  to  emphasize  that  the  war  meant 
life  or  death  to  Germany. 

It  soon  became  clear  that  the  Auxiliary  Service  law 
was  not  merely  insufficient,  but  positively  harmful  in 
operation.  It  was  particularly  irritating  to  the  troops 
to  find  auxiliary  workers,  at  the  same  work  and  in  the 
same  positions,  being  far  better  paid  than  the  men 
who  had  been  called  up  for  service  under  the  previous 
legislation  and  were  now  under  military  command. 
These  grievances  were  increased  by  the  circumstance 
that  exempted  men  were  paid  the  same  wages  as  free 
workmen — that  is  to  say,  as  the  auxiliary  workers. 
This  was  wholly  unjust  and  unfair.  On  the  lines  of 
communication  there  were  still  greater  contrasts. 
Troops  withdrawn  from  the  heavy  fighting  at  the  front 
saw  auxiliary  workers  and  women  workers  working  in 
peace  and  safety  for  wages  far  higher  than  their  own 
pay.  This  was  bound  to  embitter  the  men  who  had  to 
risk  their  lives  day  by  day  and  to  endure  the  greatest 
hardships,  and  of  necessity  increased  their  dissatis- 
faction with  their  pay.  The  employment  of  highly 
paid  auxiliaries  on  the  lines  of  communications   was 


FURTHER    PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    395 

thus  a  two-edged  sword.  There  was  something  fun- 
damentally imsound  in  such  conditions. 

The  measures  introduced  in  September  with  a  view  to 
bringing  up  all  possible  man-power  had  thus  had  but 
a  very  scanty  result.  The  latent  strength  among  the 
people  had  not  been  properly  brought  out;  in  part  it 
had  escaped  control,  and  in  part  it  was  being  wasted. 
Too  many  men  who  should  have  gone  to  the  army 
were  left  at  home.  The  efforts  of  the  Supreme  Army 
Command  had  failed;  the  conviction  was  forced  upon 
us  that  the  German  people  were  no  longer  soimd  at 
heart. 

To  increase  the  esteem  in  which  war  work  and 
auxiliary  service  were  held  I  proposed  the  institution 
of  the  Auxiliary  Service  Cross.  Later  on  I  was  one  of 
the  first  to  receive  it,  and,  having  regard  for  the  tre- 
mendous importance  I  attributed  to  the  carrying  out 
of  the  work  demanded  by  the  Supreme  Army  Command, 
wore  it  as  proudly  as  my  other  decorations,  even  if 
with  a  certain  melancholy.  I  was  thinking  of  the 
working  of  the  Auxiliary  Service  law,  which  disap- 
pointed me  more  and  more  heavily  as  time  went  on. 

To  obtain  the  necessary  skilled  workers  for  the  in- 
creased production  of  war  material  the  Supreme  Army 
Command  had  to  draw  heavily  upon  the  resources  of  the 
army  in  man-power,  weakening  the  fighting  forces 
correspondingly.  In  the  winter  of  1916-17  alone 
125,000  men  were  sent  back  home,  to  be  returned  to 
the  army  as  soon  as  they  could  again  be  spared.  I 
pressed  persistently  for  arrangements  to  be  made  as 
rapidly  as  possible  between  the  military  and  the  in- 
dustrial world  for  the  formation  of  a  body  of  sub- 
stitute skilled  labor,  and  for  the  employment  of  dis- 
abled men  and  of  women  in  such  work.  It  is  true  that 
a  great  deal  was  done,  but  nowhere  was  the  energy 
used  that  oiu*  position  demanded. 


396  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   '    ORY 

It  came  in  the  end  to  this,  that  the  exempted  men 
formed  a  privileged  class,  and  it  was  no  longer  possible 
to  exercise  any  control  over  them. 

The  increase  in  war  industries,  no  doubt,  brought 
enormous  material  reinforcement  to  the  army,  but  it 
also  cost  us  a  heavy  price  in  man-power.  The  more 
acute  this  situation  became,  and  the  greater  the  need 
of  increased  man-power  owing  to  the  constantly  in- 
creasing strength  of  the  enemy,  the  more  did  the 
Supreme  Army  Command  hold  it  to  be  its  duty  to  the 
country,  to  the  army,  and  to  each  individual  soldier 
fighting  at  the  front  to  insist  on  the  men  at  home  really 
working  hard.  No  more  men  could  be  withdrawn  or 
withheld  from  the  army.  The  fall  in  labor  output 
which  could  not  be  wholly  explained  by  working  and 
living  conditions,  and  the  strikes,  were  each  deadly 
and  direct  blows  against  the  country's  capacity  for  the 
fight.  They  were  a  sin  against  the  man  at  the  front, 
and  also,  according  to  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  Em- 
pire, an  act  of  high  treason  against  the  country.  With- 
out political  guidance,  and  infatuated  by  agitators, 
some  of  the  members  of  the  German  working-class  have 
precipitated  their  country,  their  fellows,  and  them- 
selves into  immeasurable  misery;  this  will  always  re- 
main as  a  terrible  indictment  against  them. 

The  Government  should  have  made  especial  en- 
deavors to  influence  the  working-class  by  full  explana- 
tion of  the  seriousness  of  our  position,  and  should  also 
not  have  hesitated  to  use  force  if  the  end  could  not 
otherwise  have  been  achieved. 

The  Supreme  Army  Command  knew  only  too  well 
that  in  questions  of  the  return  of  troops  to  civil  life 
there  were  cases  of  favoritism,  which  of  necessity  had 
the  same  embittering  effects  as  the  shirking  at  home. 
Often  and  often  I  begged  the  Ministry  of  War  to  put 
a  stop  to  this. 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    397 

It  was  inevitable  that,  in  our  difficult  position,  we 
had  recourse  to  the  occupied  territories.  The  Ministry 
of  War  had  already  tackled  this  question,  and  the  em- 
ployment of  Belgian  workmen  in  Germany  had  actually 
begun.  The  Supreme  Army  Command  requested  the 
Governor-General  to  comply  with  the  wishes  of  the 
War  Ministry  and  of  the  industries  generally,  and  did 
this  all  the  more  earnestly  because  at  that  time  the 
Government  had  not  met  even  the  army's  demands 
for  additional  man-power  to  the  extent  of  passing  the 
Auxiliary  Service  law. 

The  conscription  of  workmen  for  Germany  was  in  the 
interest  of  the  Belgians  themselves,  since  the  number  of 
unemployed  had  reached  a  high  figure.  This  conscrip- 
tion, after  discussion  with  the  officials  in  Berlin,  was 
extended.  With  these  extended  enlistments,  which  at 
first  were  carried  too  far,  there  were  cases  of  hardship 
which  it  would  have  been  better  to  avoid.  They  were 
in  the  main  brought  about  by  the  Belgians  themselves, 
who  often  denounced  their  fellow-countrymen,  for  one 
reason  or  another,  as  being  out  of  work,  when  this  was 
not  the  case.  The  Governor-General  put  a  stop  to  these 
abuses  as  soon  as  he  discovered  them.  In  the  course  of 
time  many  Belgian  workmen  removed  to  Germany,  with- 
out any  further  complaints  being  heard.  We  also  con- 
scripted Belgian  workmen  for  work  in  the  occupied 
regions.  In  the  Belgian  refugee  press  and  in  the  En- 
tente propaganda,  as  was  to  be  expected,  there  was  a 
mad  outcry  against  this  procedure.  The  fact  that 
similar  cries  were  raised  in  Germany  merely  shows  a 
very  childish  judgment  on  the  war.  The  military  au- 
thorities were  acting  from  patriotic  duty  and  not 
arbitrarily. 

We  also  obtained  man-power,  although  not  so  much 
as  one  might  have  hoped,  from  Poland  and  the  other 
then  occupied  territories,  as  well  as  from  those  which 


398  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

we  acquired  later  on.  We  acted  everywhere  with  the 
greatest  consideration,  and  avoided  any  appearance  of 
oppressing  foreign  populations  with  the  air  of  a  high- 
handed conqueror;  we  had  too  keen  a  sense  of  what 
was  due  from  us,  and  such  conduct  was  not  in  accord- 
ance with  our  views. 

Prisoners  of  war  were  of  the  utmost  importance  in  all 
fields  of  war  activity.  We  could  not  have  kept  our 
economic  structure  together  without  the  aid  of  the 
enormous  numbers  of  Russians  taken  in  the  East.  Cor- 
respondingly, of  course,  the  prisoners  taken  from  us 
involved,  not  merely  a  sensible  loss  of  strength  to  us, 
but  also  an  increase  in  the  labor  force  available  to  the 
enemy.  WHienever  we  took  prisoners,  it  had  to  be  de- 
cided whether  they  were  to  be  employed  in  the  occupied 
districts  or  to  be  sent  on  into  Germany.  In  this 
respect,  too,  the  greatest  consideration  was  shown  to 
the  authorities  at  home,  even  when  the  army  was 
in  the  greatest  need  of  men. 

II 

Side  by  side  with  the  effort  to  obtain  further  man- 
power from  the  home  country  went  the  preparation  of 
the  program  for  munitions  production,  for  the  execution 
of  which  a  part  of  the  man-power  in  question  was  to 
serve.  We  needed,  above  all,  more  guns,  ammunition, 
and  machine  guns,  and  then  larger  supplies  of  many 
other  things. 

The  guns  were  needed,  not  only  for  new  arming,  but 
also  for  changes  in  arming,  to  replace  older  patterns 
by  newer,  and  finally,  too,  to  take  the  place  of  the 
many  worn  guns.  In  the  battles  of  Verdun  and  the 
Somme  we  suffered  heavy  losses  in  guns,  not  merely 
through  enemy  sheUing,  but  also  by  the  heavy  demands 
made  upon  the  material  by  the  excessive  firing. 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    399 

Our  heavy  artillery  was  well  supplied  with  high- 
angle  guns,  but  the  number  of  fiat  trajectory  weapons 
was  not  so  satisfactory,  and  we  accelerated  their  pro- 
duction, as  fire  falling  well  into  the  back  areas  had  been 
found  very  effective,  rendering  supply  and  reUef  to  the 
front  lines  more  difficult,  and  during  actual  operations 
hindering  the  distribution  of  orders  and  the  employ- 
ment of  reserves. 

The  heaviest  flat  trajectory  guns  were  also  increased. 
His  Majesty  exerted  himself  in  particular  to  see  that 
the  navy  should  give  up  guns  from  the  vessels  that 
were  taken  out  of  commission.  The  heaviest  guns  had 
to  rely  too  much  on  the  railway  lines,  and  thus  were  tied 
too  closely  to  certain  areas.  Mechanical  transport  was 
brought  into  more  frequent  use  than  before,  particu- 
larly for  ammunition  supply. 

A  gun  and  a  howitzer  of  longer  range  were  in  course  of 
introduction  into  the  field  artillery. 

It  was  necessary  to  decide  what  number  of  guns  was 
to  be  produced  monthly  in  order  to  cover  all  require- 
ments. This  was  a  difficult  matter.  In  the  case  of  the 
heavy  artillery  we  decided  correctly,  but  for  the  field- 
artillery  we  estimated  too  high.  As  soon  as  this  was 
recognized,  the  demand  was  reduced;  but  this  of 
necessity  caused  a  little  uncertainty.  Factories  can- 
not be  rearranged  in  a  day,  and  each  change  involves 
time  and  a  diminution  in  production.  It  was  thus 
necessary  to  exercise  the  greatest  caution  in  deciding 
on  any  new  construction.  This  was  the  reason  why 
we  were  not  so  insistent  on  the  introduction  of  a  special 
weapon  for  the  infantry  as  the  events  proved  that  we 
might  have  been. 

For  defense  against  the  tanks,  field-gun  06,  which 
penetrated  the  tanks,  was  sufficient;  the  only  thing 
necessary  was  to  turn  it  out  in  sufficient  quantities. 

At  this  time  the  increased  production  of  ammunition 


400  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

depended  upon  the  question  of  explosives,  and  this  in  its 
turn  depended  upon  the  possibihtyof  obtaining  or  manu- 
facturing the  necessary  materials.  Sulphur  and  nitro- 
gen were  particularly  important.  It  was  a  very  difficult 
task  to  solve  the  problem  of  their  supply.  We  aimed 
at  doubling  approximately  the  previous  production. 
This  was  gradually  reached,  in  spite  of  many  obstacles, 
including  heavy  explosions  and  shortage  of  coal.  When 
the  explosives  program  was  carried  out,  steel  began  to 
get  scarce;  in  short,  we  had  one  trouble  after  another 
before  we  succeeded  in  increasing  the  mimitions  pro- 
duction to  the  desired  point. 

A  point  deserving  special  attention  was  the  supply 
of  the  various  sorts  of  ammunition  to  the  troops. 
There  were  too  many  varieties ;  it  was  nothing  less  than 
a  work  of  art  for  battery  commanders  to  estimate 
their  supplies,  and  for  the  staffs  to  get  the  right  sup- 
plies up  to  the  right  place  at  the  right  time.  Our  fuses 
were  not  of  satisfactory  construction.  The  pre-war 
fuses  were  not  simple  enough,  and  it  was  essential  to 
get  the  best  design.  We  were  considerably  hindered 
by  having  to  go  sparingly  with  supplies  of  copper  and 
brass,  owing  to  the  shortage  of  supplies.  In  spite  of  the 
efforts  of  the  Artillery  Testing  Commission,  it  was  a 
very  long  time  before  we  had  reliable  fuses,  which 
worked  in  such  a  way  as  to  burst  the  shell  close  to  the 
ground  at  the  instant  of  contact.  The  shell  fragments 
thus  scattered  far  and  wide  over  the  surface  of  the 
ground,  instead  of  being  buried.  We  soon  abandoned 
shrapnel,  the  training  of  the  troops  being  insufficient 
for  such  delicate  work.  Shells  with  sensitive  fuses  were 
everywhere  preferred. 

Gas  production,  too,  had  to  keep  pace  with  the  in- 
creased output  of  ammunition.  The  discharge  of  gas 
from  cylinders  was  used  less  and  less,  the  troops  being 
opposed  to  it  from  first  to  last,  and  the  use  of  gas-shells 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    401 

increased  correspondingly.  Our  yellow  cross  shell  was 
greatly  feared  by  the  enemy.  The  fear  of  injury  from 
their  own  gas  still  remained  very  strong  with  our  men 
and  did  not  abate  until  much  later.  Privy  Councilor 
Haber  rendered  valuable  service  in  connection  with  the 
conduct  of  gas  fighting. 

Smoke  shells,  too,  were  now  manufactured. 

The  infantry  was  supplied  with  a  light  machine  gun, 
which  might  well  have  been  lighter  and  more  simple, 
for  it  required  too  many  carriers.  It  was  necessary 
to  come  to  a  decision,  however,  for  the  manufacture 
had  to  begin;  it  lasted  months  and  months.  Each 
company  of  infantry  was  to  receive,  at  first  four,  and 
later  six,  of  these  hght  guns. 

Our  older  heavy  machine  gun  was  good,  and  the 
men  liked  it.  The  artillery  was  shortly  afterward 
equipped  with  this  for  protection  against  raids  and 
for  anti-aircraft  work. 

The  supply  of  armor-piercing  bullets  to  the  infantry 
for  use  against  aircraft  and  tanks  was  increased,  and 
the  Ministry  of  War  also  undertook  the  construction 
of  further  rapid-fire  weapons  for  the  infantry,  as  well 
as  of  weapons  of  heavier  caliber,  to  render  effective 
aid  against  tanks. 

Great  attention  had  to  be  bestowed  upon  the  manu- 
facture of  motor-lorries.  Our  horses  were  getting 
worse  and  worse,  and  remounts  came  forward  slowly. 
We  had  to  build  lorries  to  replace  horse  transport,  al- 
though here,  too,  we  were  met  with  difficulties  as  to 
supplies  of  material.  We  also  needed  lorries  for  carry- 
ing troops.  The  enemy,  backed  by  his  enormous  in- 
dustries, found  it  easier  and  easier,  not  merely  to  move 
his  reserves  quickly  in  lorries,  but  also  to  use  them 
on  an  increasing  scale  for  bringing  troops  up  from 
billets  to  the  line  and  taking  them  back  again,  thus 
achieving  an  important  economy  of  physical  and  moral 


402  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

strength.  We  had  to  be  content  if  we  could  find  lorries 
enough  for  troop  movements  in  cases  of  the  greatest 
urgency. 

The  time  had  not  yet  come  for  us  to  undertake  the 
construction  of  tanks. 

Our  aircraft  industry  took  a  quite  exceptional  posi- 
tion. The  opposing  armies  were  competing  one  with 
another  to  produce  the  fastest  and  fastest-climbing 
machines.  Each  passed  the  other  in  turn,  and  our 
industry  was  often  ahead.  Especially  in  1918  we  had 
some  remarkable  designs,  to  which,  together  with  their 
own  courage,  our  flying  men  owed  their  victories. 

In  the  preceding  passages  I  have  dealt  merely  with 
some  of  the  more  important  supplies,  in  which  great 
increases  were  necessary,  but,  in  fact,  increases  in  all 
material  were  essential.  Barbed  wire,  for  example, 
was  as  urgently  required  as  small-arm  ammunition. 
To  decide  the  volume  of  the  various  materials  to  be 
manufactured,  one  had  to  weigh  one  against  another 
and  consider  their  relative  importance  and  the  prob- 
able future  requirements.  The  whole  program  con- 
stituted a  piece  of  highly  difficult  brainwork,  based 
on  prophecy,  for  which  a  great  part  of  the  credit  is 
due  to  Colonel  Bauer,  of  my  staff.  It  was  definitely 
settled  only  after  repeated  discussion  in  Berlin,  and 
received  the  name  of  the  Hindenburg  program,  al- 
though the  program  put  forward  by  the  Supreme  Army 
Command  was  not  confined  to  the  proposals  for  muni- 
tions production,  but  included,  in  addition,  a  demand 
for  the  increase  of  both  our  man-power  and  the  mainte- 
nance of  morale. 

It  was  clear  that  considerable  time  would  be  re- 
quired for  the  carrying  out  of  the  Hindenburg  pro- 
gram,; indeed,  its  very  introduction  was  the  cause  of 
disturbance,  which  for  the  moment  tended  rather  to 
reduce  than  to  increase  production.     There  were  many 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    403 

inevitable  irritations  to  overcome.  As  soon  as  matters 
were  more  or  less  in  order  we  were  met  with  the  dif- 
ficulty that  the  factories  which  in  peace-time  had  been 
employed  in  the  manufacture  of  locomotives,  and  had 
been  altered  to  work  on  direct  munitions  production, 
had  to  berestored  for  locomotive  manufacture,  ourmeans 
of  communication  being  by  now  in  need  of  thorough 
overhauling.  Their  munitions  manufacture  had,  of 
course,  to  be  handed  over  to  other  factories,  and  all 
works  had  to  be  used  to  the  utmost.  The  increased 
output  demanded  extensions  of  the  factories,  and  this 
involved  time.  In  other  places,  works  had  to  be 
abandoned  or  amalgamated.  The  whole  constituted  a 
far-reaching  interference  with  oiu-  industry,  and  all 
the  more  so  as  there  was  much  in  arrears  to  catch  up. 

A  good  deal  of  time  was  bound  to  elapse  before  work 
began  on  the  Hindenburg  program,  and  still  longer 
before  the  raw  material  became  material  of  war.  The 
program  itself,  too,  had  to  be  revised  and  cut  down. 
As  things  became  clearer,  it  could  be  seen  that  the 
necessary  labor  for  the  whole  program  could  not  be 
obtained  without  endangering  the  supply  of  men  for 
the  army  and  navy.  At  a  later  stage  the  view  was 
expressed  that  the  whole  program  had  been  a  mistake, 
and  that  the  Supreme  Army  Command  would  have 
been  better  advised  to  leave  the  War  Ministry  to  con- 
tinue its  work  as  before,  merely  giving  orders  to  the 
Ministry.  The  Field-Marshal  and  I  could,  however, 
deal  only  with  what  we  found,  and  that  was  a  shortage 
of  supply  and  equipment  for  the  army,  in  spite  of  the 
presence  of  the  War  Minister  at  General  Headquarters, 
and  of  the  fact  that  the  shortage  was  an  open  secret. 
Of  course,  it  would  have  been  far  better  to  have  had, 
in  place  of  this  sudden  expansion  of  the  war  works,  a 
systematic  switching  over,  on  a  scale  corresponding  to 
the  situation,  from  peace  to  war  work  of  all  our  in- 


404  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

dustries,  either  planned  in  peace-time  or,  at  any  rate, 
consistently  carried  through  in  the  first  two  years  of 
the  war.  The  Supreme  Army  Command,  however, 
had  to  act  in  a  situation  where  these  ideal  conditions 
were  not  present.  It  is  always  the  same.  At  first 
nothing  adequate  is  done;  the  critics  object  to  this, 
but  have  no  specific  details  to  attack.  If  something  is 
actually  done,  if  anything  is  created,  even  if  something 
is  constructed  on  a  really  great  scale,  then  there  is 
something  for  criticism  to  seize  upon.  It  is  easy  to  be 
right  after  the  event.  Neglect  and  inactivity  are,  in 
truth,  however,  the  most  serious  crimes;  they  are 
worse  than  any  mistakes  in  action.  The  Hindenburg 
program  did  really  become  a  program,  and  it  achieved 
more  than  the  other  parts  of  the  great  scheme,  in  which 
we  could  not  intervene. 

The  factories  got  really  running  at  last.  The  Hin- 
denburg program  was  carried  into  execution  and  be- 
came a  real  achievement,  thanks  to  the  Munitions 
Production  Office  created  out  of  the  Ordnance  De- 
partment. This  office  was  under  the  control  of  General 
Coupette,  who  was  especially  concerned  with  technical 
and  industrial  questions;  he  had  the  co-operation  of 
his  two  important  and  powerful  seconds-in-command. 
Major  Stadtlaender  and  Colonel  Wurtzbacher.  The 
army  knows  well  what  it  owes  to  this  office  and  to  the 
men  at  the  head  of  it. 

Our  industry  kept  our  fighting  forces  supported;  it 
must  always  have  the  honor  and  credit  of  that.  When 
it  was  once  informed  what  demands  were  to  be  made 
upon  it,  it  went  to  work  of  its  own  accord  to  fulfil  its 
task  and  gave  ever  better  and  better  results.  That  it 
insured  to  itself  a  correspondingly  good  reward  from 
the  Government  was  only  reasonable,  in  view  of  the 
great  risk  and  the  large  capital  outlay  involved  in 
fulfilling  our  demands;   just  as  reasonable,  in  fact,  as 


FURTHER  PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    405 

the  workers'  desire  for  good  wages.  I  opposed,  if  only 
in  the  soldiers'  interests,  all  extravagance  and  selfish- 
ness. It  was  the  duty  of  the  Government  to  insure 
by  all  necessary  measures  that  our  economic  position 
was  not  made  any  worse  by  the  enormous  demands  of 
the  Hindenburg  program.  Taxation  could  serve  only 
as  a  partial  remedy.  Profiteering  was  the  deadliest 
sin,  and  our  inability  to  eradicate  it  was  a  matter  of  the 
greatest  regret  to  me  from  the  point  of  view  of  morale 
at  home  and  in  the  field.  Many  times  I  made  an 
effort  to  get  to  the  bottom  of  it.  The  war  profiteer  is 
a  loathsome  phenomenon,  and  he  and  the  corruption 
of  his  influence  have  done  us  incalculable  harm. 

On  the  suggestion  of  the  Supreme  Army  Command, 
changes  had  meanwhile  been  made  in  the  Ministry  of 
War. 

A  "War  Office"  was  estabhshed  as  the  central  office 
for  the  control  of  all  branches  of  the  work  of  the  war. 
In  this  the  replacement  and  labor  departments  worked 
out  questions  of  man-power,  the  raw-material  depart- 
ment attended  to  supplies  of  material,  and  the  above- 
mentioned  Munitions  Production  Office  looked  after 
manufactures.  The  hopes  which  I  placed  in  the  War 
Office  for  obtaining  all  the  available  man-power  were 
not  fulfilled.  Even  this  office  seemed  to  look  at  all 
such  questions  from  the  point  of  view  of  domestic 
politics,  instead  of  placing  before  everything  the  needs 
of  the  war.  I  had  also  hoped  that  it  would  succeed  in 
bringing  employers  and  workmen  nearer  together,  for 
the  desire  for  rapprochement  was  present  in  many 
quarters. 

The  problem  of  manufacture  would  have  been  much 
simpler  if  the  War  Office  had  been  given  control  from 
the  start  of  all  war  work,  including  therein  pioneers' 
tools,  motor-lorries,  and  aircraft.  This  was  not  prop- 
erly done. 


4o6  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Efforts  were  also  made  in  the  occupied  territories  and 
in  Poland  and  Belgium  to  stimulate  war  work.  This 
was  possible  only  to  a  limited  extent,  owing  to  the 
fluctuations  in  the  war  position  with  which  we  had  to 
reckon  and  the  shortage  of  labor.  There  were  also  at 
times  other  difficulties.  For  example,  the  Belgian 
workmen  in  the  huge  small-arms  industries  of  the 
Liege  district  were  ready  to  work  only  if  they  received 
an  assurance  that  the  weapons  they  manufactured 
would  not  be  used  by  German  troops  on  the  Western 
front.     This  assurance  could  not  be  given. 

We  were  thus  compelled  to  remove  from  many  places 
the  machinery  which  was  suitable  for  war  purposes 
and  transport  it  to  Germany,  where  it  could  be  put  to 
useful  ends. 

Ill 

The  obtaining  and  distribution  of  raw  materials  in 
Germany  was  intrusted  to  the  safe  hands  of  Colonel 
Koeth,  who  in  his  department  worked  with  the  genius 
proper  to  the  Great  War.  He  achieved  great  things  in 
the  direction  of  getting  materials  out  of  the  occupied 
territories.  The  supply  of  materials  from  neutral  and 
allied  countries  was  in  the  control  of  a  special  depart- 
ment of  the  Prussian  Ministry  of  War,  with  which 
Colonel  Koeth  worked  in  close  Haison.  Coal  and  rolling- 
stock  were  not  within  the  scope  of  his  department. 

Colonel  Koeth  gave  the  army  all  that  it  urgently 
needed,  and  with  regard  to  our  dependence  on  foreign 
countries,  nothing  more  could  be  done.  The  supply  of 
raw  material  was  insured  far  ahead.  The  people,  how- 
ever, suffered  considerably.  Clothing  and  footwear  were 
very  short.  Prices  ran  terribly  high,  gravely  increasing 
the  cost  of  living  and  all  the  difficulties  associated 
with  it.  This  caused  me  anxiety.  The  Supreme  Army 
Command,  in  the  interests  of  the  efficient  conduct  of 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    407 

the  war,  could  not  tolerate  it,  and  made  many  appeals 
on  the  point  to  the  Government,  unfortunately  with- 
out success. 

Our  dependence  upon  foreign  countries  had  grave 
effects,  and  I  attached  great  importance  to  the  produc- 
tion of  substitute  textile  fibers.  I  instructed  Lieuten- 
ant-Colonel Schmidt-Reder  to  investigate  the  matter. 
He  put  himself  into  touch  with  the  various  Govern- 
ment offices  and  with  the  textile  industry,  and  he  is 
mainly  responsible  for  such  success  as  was  achieved. 
I  hope  that  his  industry  will  bring  benefit  to  his  coun- 
try. It  may  be  an  incalculable  blessing  for  the  German 
people  if  they  learn  how  to  grow  for  themselves  the 
products  hitherto  imported  from  abroad. 

To  obtain  the  various  raw  materials  a  large  number  of 
semi-ofhcial  companies  were  established.  I  was  not 
in  a  position  to  judge  whether  and  to  what  extent  they 
were  necessary,  but  it  is  quite  clear  that  in  operation 
they  were  productive  of  infinite  friction. 

The  question  of  transportation  lay  at  the  root  of  all 
questions  of  keeping  up  the  fight  at  home.  This  ques- 
tion, in  its  turn,  depended  upon  locomotives,  wagons, 
and  staff,  and  was  closely  bound  up  with  the  coal-supply. 
Minister  von  Breitenbach  sacrificed  a  great  deal  in 
every  direction  for  the  needs  of  the  army.  Both  per- 
sonnel and  material  were  strained  to  the  utmost,  and 
the  locomotives,  in  particular,  were  ill  used.  In  the 
first  place,  matters  were  improved  somewhat  by  re- 
turning factories  to  the  work  of  locomotive  and  wagon 
construction.  The  Supreme  Army  Command  also 
helped  the  Minister  of  PubHc  Works  in  other  ways, 
even,  although  with  great  reluctance,  by  releasing  men 
to  such  an  extent  as  to  weaken  the  army.  This  was, 
however,  unavoidable,  for  it  was  essential  to  give  some 
relief  to  the  railway  workers.  In  many  respects  we 
had  prepared  for  a  short  war,  and  in  this  and  other 


4o8  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

matters  had  to  reshape  ourselves  to  meet  a  long  one. 
Military  demands  on  the  railways  at  home  still  re- 
mained very  high.  We  had  seized  all  of  the  Belgian 
locomotives,  and  also  certain  engines  and  wagons  in 
North  France,  but  these  were  not  nearly  enough. 
The  material  taken  in  Russia  could  not  be  used,  owing 
to  the  difference  of  gage. 

Our  allies  also  laid  great  burdens  upon  our  stock  of 
engines  and  wagons.  On  the  Austro-Hungarian  rail- 
ways there  were  many  hundred  German  locomotives 
and  some  ten  thousand  German  wagons.  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey,  too,  received  both  men  and  material  from  us. 
We  had  just  recently  captured  material  in  Rumania, 
but  the  enemy  had,  on  the  other  hand,  taken  several 
thousand  German  wagons  to  Moldavia  and  kept  them 
there.  The  occupied  districts,  with  their  long  lines, 
required  an  army  of  railwaymen,  and  material  in 
corresponding  scale. 

The  Supreme  Army  Command,  through  the  Director 
of  Railways,  made  a  series  of  proposals  to  the  Minister 
for  procuring  greater  moderation  in  the  use  of  material 
at  home,  as,  e.g.,  by  the  limitation  of  traffic.  Similar 
steps  were  taken  in  the  occupied  districts.  The  limita- 
tions, which  were  impracticable,  and,  indeed,  im- 
possible of  full  realization  under  the  then  conditions, 
had  ultimately  to  be  carried  into  effect  under  the  op- 
pressive armistice  conditions  and  the  revolution.  It 
may  be  realized  how  strained  the  transport  situation 
was  at  this  time  when  I  state  that  powder  and  explosive 
factories,  on  which  everything  depended,  were  at  a 
standstill  for  days  on  end.  There  was  coal  to  be  had, 
but  the  railways  could  not  bring  it  to  them.  Things 
became  so  bad  that  I  had  to  have  daily  reports  on  the 
supplies  to  the  powder-factories. 

The  Director  of  Railways,  Colonel  von  Oldershausen, 
and  his  second-in-command.  Major  von  Stockhausen, 


FURTHER  PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    409 

set  themselves  to  their  exacting  office  with  the  greatest 
intelligence.  They  remained  throughout  in  the  closest 
touch  with  the  military  directors  of  railways  of  the 
allied  countries  and  with  the  transport  Ministers  of  the 
German  states.  The  existence  of  the  various  German 
railway  administrations  made  the  problem  essentially 
more  difficult.  We  suffered  for  not  having  achieved 
greater  unity  prior  to  the  war,  and  for  not  having  in- 
sisted on  all  the  states  keeping  to  the  same  standards. 
Bavaria,  for  example,  had  considerably  fewer  heavy 
locomotives  per  kilometer  than  Prussia,  and  the  spare 
parts  required  by  the  two  countries  were  different.  A 
great  deal  could  have  been  done  to  improve  matters 
without  any  alteration  of  the  Imperial  constitution. 

Transport  difficulties  were  also  increased  by  the  fact 
that  there  was  no  unity  of  controller  management  of 
canal  and  river  navigation.  Up  to  this  time  it  had  not 
been  developed  in  accordance  with  what  was  urgently 
necessary,  and  these  arrears  had  to  be  made  good.  A 
special  inland  water  transport  department  was  estab- 
lished, and  at  my  request  the  Admiralty  asssited  us  by 
recruiting  the  necessary  men. 

Transport  conditions,  which  had  been  very  bad  in  the 
winter  of  191 6-1 7,  improved  later.  They  were  severely 
strained  in  the  winter  of  191 7-18,  but  not  so  badly  as 
in  the  spring.  The  Minister  of  Labor,  for  his  part, 
made  every  effort  to  do  whatever  was  necessary  to  meet 
the  situation. 

Coal  and  iron  are  the  basis  of  all  war  industry.  We 
were  able  to  improve  our  position  considerably,  even 
in  our  dealings  with  the  neutrals,  by  means  of  the 
Longwy  and  Briey  basin,  the  Belgian  coal-fields,  and 
parts  of  the  coal  areas  of  northern  France  and  of 
Poland,  which  last  we  managed  jointly  with  Austria- 
Hungary.  We  began  to  develop  coal  in,  northeast 
Serbia,  and  attempted  to  stimulate  Turkey  to  make  a 


410  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

better  use  of  her  deposits.  We  gave  our  allies  coal, 
and  received  in  return  nothing  but  lignite  from  Austria- 
Hungary  for  Saxony  and  Bavaria.  In  return  for  coal 
and  iron,  neutral  countries  gave  us,  among  other  things, 
foodstuffs  and  money  to  improve  our  exchange,  besides 
horses.     Thus  did  coal  and  iron  show  their  power. 

The  shortage  of  coal  at  home  became  considerably 
more  acute  in  the  winter  of  191 6-17.  It  had  a  serious 
effect  on  the  morale,  and  called  for  strong  measures. 
The  coal-supply  in  Germany  was  not  properly  con- 
trolled, and  output  had  fallen.  As  I  have  already 
explained,  I  proposed  to  the  Chancellor  in  February 
191 7  the  appointment  of  a  special  Coal  Commissioner. 
Mining  Privy  Councilor  Stutz  was  the  first  person  who 
succeeded  in  bringing  order  into  the  coal  question,  or, 
at  any  rate,  in  overcoming  the  greatest  causes  of 
friction,  and  achieving  a  fair  compromise  between  the 
demands  for  coal  for  domestic  fuel,  for  light  and  power, 
for  agriculture  and  industry,  for  the  railways  and  the 
navy.  I  found  it  very  difficult  in  Ma}^  and  June  191 7, 
when  still  suffering  from  the  great  impression  made 
upon  me  by  the  great  Entente  offensive  in  the  West 
and  the  extraordinary  losses  which  this  caused  us,  to 
weaken  the  army  further  by  releasing  fifty  thousand 
workmen  at  his  request.  This  should  be  remembered 
while  reading  the  history  of  that  period.  I  must  em- 
phasize once  more  the  fact  that  such  a  weakening  of  the 
army  laid  upon  the  Supreme  Army  Command  a  greater 
duty  than  ever  to  the  men  in  the  fighting  line,  to  con- 
tinue incessantly  pressing  for  the  increase  of  labor  out- 
put and  the  better  employment  of  man-power  in 
Germany.  The  army  never  recovered  the  men  thus 
released,  and  labor  output  even  fell  off  considerably. 
That  was,  of  course,  a  heavy  blow  to  us. 

Iron  was  not  so  plentiful  as  coal.  It  was  difficult  to 
turn  out  sufficient  quantities  of  steel,  especially  of  hard 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    411 

steel.  We  obtained  large  quantities  of  iron  ore  from. 
Sweden,  and  even  the  ores  at  Poti  in  trans-Caucasia 
were  of  vital  importance  to  us.  Scrap,  too,  was 
needed  for  steel  production.  W^e  removed  it  from  the 
occupied  districts  in  large  quantities.  Many  a  factory 
building  had  to  be  sacrificed  to  our  war  industry,  under 
the  pressure  of  the  blockade  and  the  necessities  of  the 
war,  in  order  to  furnish  old  iron  for  the  steel  of  our 
weapons  and  ammunition.  The  output  of  steel  grad- 
ually became  sufficient.  Then  the  steel  had  to  be  dis- 
tributed for  the  various  manufactures — i.e.,  for  guns, 
ammunition,  barbed  wire,  and,  in  particular,  the  ration 
destined  for  the  improvement  of  the  railways  had  to 
be  cut  down. 

Besides  coal,  iron,  and  steel,  the  material  for  sub- 
marines, lorries  and  aircraft,  and  lubricants,  created 
some  of  our  gravest  problems.  For  lubricants  we  had 
to  rely  upon  Austria-Hungary  and  Rimiania.  As  the 
former  country  could  not  supply  enough  oil,  and  every 
effort  for  sufficient  increases  in  her  output  failed,  the 
Rumanian  oil  was  of  decisive  importance.  But  even 
when  we  had  this  source,  the  question  of  rolling-stock 
remained  very  serious  and  impeded  both  the  carrying 
on  of  the  war  and  life  at  home.  In  191 8  the  stocks 
in  the  Caucasus  promised  better  times.  In  our  eco- 
nomic condition  then,  our  home  production  of  benzol 
could  not  be  substantially  increased.  Besides,  benzol 
was  not  suitable  for  submarines  and  aircraft.  When, 
toward  the  end  of  the  war,  we  did  decide  to  supply 
benzol  for  our  aircraft,  this  was  done  solely  on  account 
of  the  shortage  of  petrol  and  in  the  face  of  the  cer- 
tainty that  we  were  thereby  reducing  the  fighting  ca- 
pacity of  our  airmen  and  increasing  the  dangers  to 
which  they  were  exposed.  Both  stocks  and  consump- 
tion required  constant  supervision.  The  employment 
of  automobiles  had  to  be  limited  more  than  ever,  and 


412  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

even  that  of  motor-lorries  in  quiet  periods,  in  order 
to  be  able  to  make  full  use  of  them  at  critical  times.  I 
could  not  claim  any  better  supplies  for  the  army. 

The  shortage  of  oil  at  home  was  serious.  The 
country  districts  did  not  obtain  sufficient  for  the 
winter.  The  peasants  had  to  pass  the  long  winter 
evenings  in  the  dark,  which  was  very  bad  for  their 
spirits.  It  is  characteristic  of  Germany  that  little  was 
ever  said  about  this  great  inconvenience.  For  a  time 
some  of  our  transport  difficulties  were  due  to  the  bad 
lubricants  used  on  the  locomotives,  which  froze  very 
easily.  Private  automobiles  were  practically  not  used 
at  all  in  Germany.  The  whole  rolling-stock  situation 
was  one  of  the  greatest  anxiety  and  called  for  in- 
cessant watching.  It  was  not  until  the  autumn  of 
191 8  that  I  achieved  my  desire  that  the  supplies  for 
the  army  and  the  navy  should  be  under  the  same  con- 
trol. The  supply  of  material  for  the  army  and  at 
home  was  already  under  one  and  the  same  authority — 
that  of  the  Director  of  Mechanical  Transport. 

The  Supreme  Army  Command  constantly  urged  the 
importance  of  taking  every  step  necessary  for  the  pro- 
duction of  substitute  materials,  but  many  inevitable 
natural  difficulties  stood  in  the  way. 

The  raw  materials  for  trench  warfare,  timber  and 
rubble,  were  drawn  in  increasing  proportions  from  the 
occupied  territories,  but  Germany  too  had  to  send 
large  quantities. 

In  questions  of  raw  material,  I  could  busy  myself 
only  with  the  general  underlying  problems.  But  even 
these  demanded  a  thorough  study,  and  I  had  to  keep 
myself  constantly  au  courant  of  the  matter,  in  order 
properly  to  deal  with  isolated  questions  of  v'tal  im- 
portance that  came  up  for  decision. 

In  such  a  war  it  was  inevitable  that  the  occupied 
territories  would  have  to  supply  raw  materials.    Firm- 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    413 

ness  gradually  achieved  a  great  deal  in  this  direction. 
The  Supreme  Army  Command  asked  the  Provisional 
Governments  in  Poland  and  Belgium  to  assist  in  this 
direction.  In  all  essentials,  the  same  principles  were 
followed  in  all  the  territories.  It  is  obvious  that  this 
involved  hardship  for  the  local  populations,  but  equally 
obvious  that  these  steps  had  to  be  taken. 

Every  intelligent  person  will  admit  that  in  many 
cases  we  might  have  acted  in  more  practical  fashion. 
The  task  was,  however,  at  once  novel  and  pecuHarly 
difficult  to  grasp,  owing  to  the  changing  needs  of  the 
war.  In  spite  of  all  our  needs,  we  acted  with  a  leniency 
that  was  carried  almost  too  far  when  compared  with 
the  extreme  steps  taken  at  home.  Germany  had  to 
siurender  her  church-bells,  but,  on  a  suggestion  made 
by  Chancellor  von  Hertling  to  His  Majesty,  Belgium 
was  allowed  to  retain  hers. 

The  occupied  territories  were  of  great  help  to  us 
both  at  the  front  and  at  home.  The  getting  of  ma- 
terials from  these  districts  employed  large  bodies  of 
men,  just  as  war  work  at  home  did,  but  we  had  to  make 
this  sacrifice  to  live. 

Out  allies  were  induced  by  the  Ministry  of  War  to 
take  their  part  in  supplying  Germany  with  raw  ma- 
terials, mainly  for  the  manufacture  of,  or  else  in  pay- 
ment for,  the  munitions  supplied  to  them  by  us.  The 
Ministry  also  managed  the  copper-mines  at  Bor  in 
northeastern  Serbia,  which  were  of  the  greatest  help. 
The  Supreme  Army  Command  was  called  in  to  help 
only  when  Turkey  or  Bulgaria,  in  accordance  with  the 
old  traditions,  were  behindhand  in  delivery  of  ma- 
terials and  required  some  stimulus  to  make  them  fulfil 
their  undertakings. 

In  the  problem  of  supplying  materials  for  the  army, 
German  scientists,  many  thanks  to  them,  helped  us 
with  all  their  formidable  powers. 


414  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN^  STOR\ 

In  all  questions  relating  to  the  increase  of  our  strength 
at  home  I  was  strongly  supported  by  Colonel  Bauer 
and  Major  von  Harbou.  They  worked  in  exemplary 
fashion. 

IV 

The  question  of  food-supplies  was  of  equal  importance 
to  the  people  and  the  army,  to  man  and  beast. 

The  work  of  the  army  in  the  field  depended  in  a  high 
degree  upon  their  rations.  That  and  leave  are  the  two 
decisive  matters  in  morale.  I  thus  had  to  give  to  the 
question  of  food  my  full  attention. 

The  reduction  in  morale  at  home  was  equally  due 
to  the  food  situation.  The  human  body  did  not  re- 
ceive, especially  in  albumen  and  fats,  the  necessary 
nourishment  for  the  maintenance  of  physical  and 
mental  vigor.  In  wide  circles  a  certain  decay  of  bodily 
and  mental  power  of  resistance  was  to  be  seen,  produc- 
ing an  unmanly  and  hysterical  attitude  which  enabled 
enemy  propaganda  to  encourage  the  pacifist  leanings  of 
many  Germans.  In  the  summer  of  191 7  my  first 
glimpse  into  this  situation  startled  me  considerably. 
This  attitude  was  a  tremendous  element  of  weakness. 
It  was  all  a  question  of  human  nature.  It  could  be 
eHminated  to  some  extent  by  strong  patriotic  feeling, 
but  in  the  long  run  could  be  finally  defeated  only  by 
an  improvement  in  nourishment.  More  food  was 
needed.  We  had  to  find  new  sources  of  supply,  to  con- 
serve our  stocks,  and,  above  all,  to  increase  our  own 
production.     This  last  was  the  most  important. 

The  occupation  of  Wallachia  was  a  definite  step. 
Other  measures  were  needed  to  assist  further.  The 
need  for  the  employment  of  straw  and  timber  for  fodder, 
and  perhaps  even  for  human  food,  was  constantly 
insisted  upon  by  the  Supreme  Army  Command,  as  was 
the  gathering  of  leaf -hay  for  fodder.    Just  as  we  had  to 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    415 

get  every  ounce  of  strength  out  of  the  people  to  carry 
on  the  war,  so  we  had,  with  the  assistance  of  otu* 
scientists,  to  win  everything  from  nature  that  could 
be  worked  up  into  food  for  man  and  beast. 

The  necessity  for  preserving  foodstuffs  from  spoiling 
led,  among  other  steps,  to  potato-drying,  of  which  I 
was  strongly  in  favor. 

For  the  increase  in  agricultural  production  supplies 
of  artificial  manures  in  sufficient  quantities  and  at 
reasonable  prices  were  essential. 

The  Supreme  Army  Command  took  every  step  to 
secure  these  supplies,  which  were  all  the  more  im- 
portant, as  natural  manure  became  shorter  in  supply 
owing  to  the  reduced  stocks  of  animals  and  the  shortage 
of  straw,  and  also  as  intensive  cultivation  increased. 
We  obtained  the  necessary  phosphates  from  the  oc- 
cupied territories  of  northern  France  and  Belgium, 
and  were  constantly  urging  on  the  Chancellor  and  the 
Treasury  the  necessity  for  extending  the  artificial 
nitrogen  factories. 

The  question  of  prices  was  a  matter  for  the  home 
authorities.  It  was  complicated  by  political  con- 
siderations. In  the  then  conditions  of  socialist  agita- 
tion against  the  country  generally  and  the  agrarian 
party,  who  were  raising  the  price  of  bread  against  the 
poor,  and  of  the  already  serious  difficulties  of  living, 
the  Government  lacked  the  courage  to  take  the  long 
view  and  regulate  the  maximum  prices  adequately. 
Agriculture,  suffering  from  very  high  costs  of  produc- 
tion, and  faced  by  the  need  to  prepare  for  carrying  on 
after  the  war,  was  often  quite  incapable  of  working 
profitably  on  the  basis  of  the  then  maximum  prices. 
SuppHes  were  not  sufficient  for  the  population,  and  the 
low  prices  did  not  even  insure  that  they  were  all 
brought  to  market.  The  non-expert  bodies,  whose 
duty  it  was  to  see    that    all    stocks  were  delivered, 


4i6  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

were  incapable  of  doing  so.  They  often  irritated  and 
estranged  the  country  people.  The  individual  did  not 
even  receive  his  official  ration,  which  of  itself  was 
fixed  too  low  to  maintain  his  full  strength.  As  a 
result,  both  town  and  country  set  about  to  help  them- 
selves. Illicit  trading  and  hoarding  increased  and 
there  was  soon  no  sure  ground  to  be  seen  in  the 
problem. 

Producers  kept  sufficient  supplies  for  themselves,  and 
more  besides,  and  even  if  their  whole  consumption  was 
of  little  importance  when  spread  over  the  whole  popu- 
lation, their  conduct  was  bound  to  embitter  feeHng. 

The  great  mass  of  the  people,  especially  the  middle 
class,  including  officials  and  officers  with  fixed  salaries, 
suffered  real  hardship.  A  few,  no  doubt,  succumbed 
to  temptation  in  the  difficult  times,  and  helped  them- 
selves, but  the  majority  were  literally  starved.  This 
came  as  an  additional  burden  over  and  above  all  the 
other  difficulties  suffered  by  the  middle  classes.  And 
yet  this  class,  oppressed  in  every  direction  and  suffering 
silently,  did  its  duty  to  the  very  end. 

The  workmen  were  better  looked  after.  They  ad- 
justed their  demands  for  increased  wages,  which  they 
supported  by  striking,  to  the  illicit  trading  prices. 
True,  an  appreciable  number  of  the  working-classes 
also  suffered  hardship,  but,  in  contrast  to  the  middle 
classes,  they  really  had  enough  to  live  on. 

Illicit  trading  became  of  the  most  serious  importance 
in  domestic  politics.  It  grew  with  the  length  of  the 
war.  The  more  people  at  home  lost  interest  in  the  war 
the  more  their  natural  instincts,  having  now  no  op- 
posing force,  pressed  them  more  strongly  forward. 
lUicit  trading  and  hoarding  took  continually  more  and 
more  disgusting  forms,  and  these  and  the  dechning 
morale  interacted  on  one  another  with  increasingly 
disastrous  results.     Our  system  of  control  with  maxi- 


FURTHER  PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    417 

mum  prices  had  failed.  Production  did  not  increase, 
and  yield  fell  off,  through  shortage  of  labor,  lack  of 
manure,  and  bad  weather.  The  many  suggestions 
which  the  Supreme  Army  Command  made  to  the 
Chancellor  for  combating  illicit  trading,  extravagant 
middlemen's  profits,  and  high  wages,  which  had  to  be 
defeated  if  we  were  to  maintain  our  capacity  to  fight, 
met  with  no  response. 

The  whole  thing  was  a  farce.  The  fear  lest  the 
maximum  prices  for  agricultural  produce  should  be 
fixed  too  high  actually  contributed  greatly  to  increasing 
the  general  cost  of  living  and  widening  the  gulf  between 
town  and  country.  The  discontented  elements  knew 
how  to  make  capital  out  of  all  these  occurrences.  Our 
enemies'  starvation  blockade  triumphed  and  caused  us 
both  physical  and  spiritual  distress. 

My  own  view  of  the  system  of  control  was  that  the 
sooner  it  was  removed,  and  free  trading  again  per- 
mitted, the  better;  in  respect  to  certain  articles  of  food, 
even,  I  thought  it  should  be  removed  at  once.  On  the 
other  hand,  my  view  was  that  a  wide  development  of 
co-operative  societies  and  unions  of  producers,  as 
auxiliaries  of  the  Government,  was  urgently  required. 
These  were,  however,  not  yet  sufficiently  established  in 
all  districts.  It  was,  above  all,  important  that  the 
prices  for  various  products  should  be  raised  and  should 
be  fixed  early  enough  to  enable  farmers  to  make  their 
arrangements  accordingly.  The  commissariat  chief, 
who  shared  my  views,  put  them  energetically  before  the 
War  Food  Office.  It  would  seem  that  England,  with 
her  system  of  minimum  prices,  chose  the  better  coiurse, 
for  her  production  certainly  increased  enormously. 

The  farmers  worked  well.  The  large  owners  in  par- 
ticular achieved  wonders.  The  country  has  again  been 
able  to  see  that,  just  as  the  army  is  the  basis  of  order, 
so  our  agriculture  is  the  foundation  of  our  economic, 


4i8  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

indeed,  even  of  our  political,  life.  If  we  had  only  borne 
this  in  mind  before  the  war,  our  way  would  have  been 
easier.  It  is  now  the  foremost  duty  of  the  State  to 
make  good  what  was  then  neglected,  and  that  of  our 
agriculture  to  promote  intensive  cultivation. 

I  had  many  confidential  discussions  with  both  the 
presidents  of  our  War  Food  Office,  Von  Batocki  and 
Von  Waldow.  Different  as  they  were  from  each  other, 
they  were  both  full  of  the  sense  of  their  grave  respon- 
sibility, of  iron  loyalty,  and  deep  patriotism. 

The  army  often  helped  the  people.  With  the  heavy 
duties  they  had  to  undertake,  the  troops  were  no  better 
off  than  the  men  at  home.  I  acted  throughout  with 
the  deep  conviction  that  the  army  and  the  people  in 
all  respects  were  the  same.  The  Supreme  Army  Com- 
mand, indeed,  always  acted  on  that  principle.  In 
Berlin  people  seemed  at  times  to  have  the  idea  that  the 
army  and  the  people  were  two  different  bodies,  with 
different  stomachs.  This  view  was  a  sorry  demonstra- 
tion of  how  little  the  war  was  understood  at  home.  Very 
reluctantly  the  Supreme  Army  Command  had  often  to 
reduce  temporarily  the  rations  of  meat,  bread,  po- 
tatoes, and  fats,  and  also  of  oats  and  hay.  This  was 
done  to  support  the  people  at  home  and  keep  them  fit 
for  the  war.  The  War  Food  Office,  however,  thor- 
oughly understood  the  army's  needs,  and  especially  the 
fact  that  the  men  in  the  front  line  were  deserving  of  the 
greatest  consideration. 

The  men  often  did  not  have  enough,  even  when  they 
received  the  full  allotted  ration.  The  food  was,  be- 
sides, too  monotonous.  I  heard  many  complaints  from 
the  Commander-in-chief  on  this  point,  but  I  could 
not  remedy  any  matters  in  detail.  At  home,  the  troops 
in  depots  did  not  get  enough  to  eat,  and  many  difficulties 
arose. 

Luxuries  became  rarer  and  rarer' 


FURTHER  PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    419 

The  horses  in  particular  suffered,  their  rations  being 
wholly  insufficient.  Their  com  ration  was  too  small, 
and  great  difficulties  were  experienced  with  their  other 
fodder. 

The  commissariat  had,  at  the  beginning  of  the  war, 
to  combat  many  difficulties,  due  to  its  peace  organiza- 
tion, and  had  insufficient  personnel.  At  a  later  stage 
it  was  fully  equal  to  its  responsible  work.  Its  devoted 
and  self-sacrificing  work  was  of  great  service  both  to 
the  command  and  to  the  men. 

Liaison  was  always  good  between  the  departments 
of  the  Supreme  Army  Command  and  the  director  of 
the  administration  department  of  the  Ministry  of  War, 
General  von  Oven,  who  fought  with  me  at  Liege,  and 
between  the  command  and  the  War  Food  Office. 
There  was  mutual  give  and  take.  The  sins  of  omission 
of  the  pre-war  period,  however,  the  insufficient  eco- 
nomic preparation  for  the  war,  and  the  failure  to  ac- 
cumulate stocks  of  all  necessary  supplies  before  it 
began,  were  not  susceptible  of  remedy. 

In  the  later  period  of  the  war  we  helped  the  civilian 
authorities  in  their  supply  problems  with  motor-lorries 
and  also  by  requisitioning  wagons,  and  in  particular 
in  distribution  from  the  stations  of  the  larger  towns. 
We  had  to  put  up  with  the  difficulties  thereby  caused 
by  the  army.  Harvest  leave  was  given  far  beyond  the 
usual  numbers.  The  potato-supply  at  home  was 
helped  by  reducing  the  requisition  of  railway  wagons. 

The  occupied  territories  helped  us  with  foodstuffs. 
The  Hnes-of -communication  inspectorate  drew  on  them 
in  particular  for  meat,  and  saw  to  it  that  their  agricult- 
ure was  carried  on  along  the  best  lines.  Wherever 
troops  were  stationed  for  any  length  of  time  they 
themselves  worked  hard  both  in  cultivating  and  harvest- 
ing; but  frequent  movements  prevented  us  from  gain- 
ing much  benefit  from  this.     In  the  year  191 7  only 


420  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Rumania  enabled  Germany,  Austria-Hungary,  and 
Constantinople  to  keep  their  heads  above  water. 

The  measures  taken  by  the  Entente  relieved  us  of 
anxiety  as  to  the  feeding  of  Belgium. 

We  obtained  substantial  supplies  from  neutral  coun- 
tries, and  in  particular  from  Denmark,  Holland,  and 
Switzerland.  In  our  purchases  we  acted  through  a 
special  German  company,  and  did  not  deal,  like  the 
Entente,  with  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  in  ques- 
tion, allowing  them  to  make  a  profit.  Rightly  or 
wrongly,  this  caused  considerable  discontent  and  in- 
dignation among  our  allies  and  the  neutrals,  and 
ultimately  also  at  home. 

The  food  situation  in  Austria-Hungary  was  always 
exceedingly  strained.  Hungary  had  enough.  I  did, 
it  is  true,  undertake  the  supply  of  a  very  considerable 
part  of  the  army,  but  it  gave  no  assistance  to  starving 
Austria.  In  the  latter  country  the  Czech  farmers  re- 
fused to  supply  the  more  scantily  supplied  districts 
inhabited  by  Germans.  The  clumsy  Austrian  system 
of  government  created  additional  difficulties,  so  that, 
in  spite  of  orders  of  Draconian  severity,  there  was  never 
any  real  hope  of  procuring  the  necessary  supplies  or  of 
distributing  them  properly.  I  shall  never  forget  the 
way  in  which  a  high  Austrian  official  begged  me  to  help 
him  against  Hungary  in  the  question  of  supplies.  The 
army  starved  in  part,  as  did  German  Austria,  and 
especially  Vienna. 

Although  agriculture  was  very  primitive,  the  situa- 
tion in  Bulgaria  was  better,  but  the  system  of  govern- 
ment was  rotten,  control  on  the  lines  of  communica- 
tion was  bad,  and  the  army  supplies  were  managed  on 
antiquated  lines.  The  army  often  ran  short  of  sup- 
plies. It  was,  nevertheless,  possible  to  hope  that  Bul- 
garia would  be  self -providing  in  the  long  run. 

The  Turkish  supply  system  was  absolutely  rotten, 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    421 

its  agriculture  was  the  most  primitive  possible,  even 
iron  plows  being  unknown.  Our  Minister  of  Agricult- 
ure, Baron  von  Schorlemer,  had  made  efforts  to  im- 
prove Turkish  agriculture,  but  the  Government  dis- 
played not  the  least  understanding  or  perception  in  the 
matter.  It  asked  for  motor  plows  to  bring  more 
land  under  cultivation,  but  never  dreamed  of  taking 
proper  steps  to  increase  production.  Turkey,  espe- 
cially Constantinople,  was  thus  in  need  of  help  in 
supplies. 

In  the  autumn  of  1916  the  idea  was  mooted  of  es- 
tablishing a  central  supply  office  for  the  Quadruple 
Alliance,  under  German  control.  It  was  a  specious 
suggestion,  but  supply  in  the  four  countries  really  de- 
pended upon  wholly  different  considerations  and  could 
never  have  been  managed  on  the  same  principles.  In 
the  end  they  would  all  have  lived  on  Germany.  The 
idea  was  quite  rightly  abandoned. 


The  great  importance  of  Rimiania,  or,  more  correctly, 
of  Wallachia,  has  already  been  noticed  in  various  con- 
nections. We  had  now  the  task  of  collecting  from  this 
territory  what  we  needed,  and  of  transporting  it  to  the 
consumers.  Rumania  and  the  Dobrudja  were  put  un- 
der a  regular  government.  Having  regard  for  the  pre- 
dominant part  which  we  Germans  had  taken  in  the 
conquest  of  the  country,  I  strove  to  have  this  govern- 
ment placed  in  German  hands.  In  view  of  the  pecul- 
iarities of  our  allies  and  their  business  methods,  this 
certainly  offered  the  best  guaranty  for  the  permanent 
proper  consideration  of  our  rights  and  interests,  and 
our  allies  agreed  to  the  course  proposed. 

A  definite  settlement  of  the  Bulgars  in  the  whole  of 
the  Dobrudja  was  not  in  our  interests.     That  portion 


422  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

which  was  originally  Bulgar,  having  only  been  ceded 
to  Rumania  after  the  second  Balkan  War,  was  immedi- 
ately resumed  by  them,  in  accordance  with  the  treaty 
of  the  autumn  of  191 5.  It  was  thus  settled  with  for 
the  time  being.  In  the  then  position  of  the  world, 
handing  over  to  Bulgaria  the  rest  of  the  Dobrudja,  in- 
cluding the  line  from  Cernavoda  to  Constanza,  would 
have  been  equivalent  to  handing  over  the  third  and 
last  trade  route  from  Central  Europe  to  Turkey,  which 
already  controlled  the  routes  via  Salonika  and  Sofia. 
This  monopoly  would  be  bound  to  have  a  bad  effect 
upon  our  trade  with  Turkey,  which  suffered  enough 
through  the  selfish  attitude  of  Austria-Hungary.  In 
the  Dobrudja  the  interests  of  Germany  were  identical 
with  those  of  Turkey  and  Austria.  Nevertheless, 
Vienna  in  all  Bulgarian  questions  took  a  very  am- 
biguous attitude  toward  us.  It  was  thus  uncertain 
what  position  would  be  adopted  by  the  Austrian  head- 
quarters. My  intentions  ran  to  a  certain  extent  coun- 
ter to  Bulgaria's  interests.  I  had,  meanwhile,  the 
satisfaction  that  all  the  allies  agreed  to  the  establish- 
ment of  German  control  over  the  lines  of  communica- 
tion in  the  Dobrudja.  This  was  placed  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  von  Mackensen,  and  covered  the 
district  from  the  southern  frontier  of  the  former  Ruma- 
nian Dobrudja  to  a  line  some  twenty  kilometers  north 
of  the  Cernavoda-Constanza  line.  The  rest  of  the  Do- 
brudja fell  within  the  army  zone  of  the  Third  Bulgarian 
Army  and  thus  lay  under  Bulgar  control. 

The  Bulgars  soon  caused  considerable  difficulties  to 
the  German  authorities  in  the  Dobrudja,  who  were 
under  the  command  of  Gen.  Kurt  von  Unger.  The 
matter  was  even  brought  before  the  Supreme  Army 
Command.  I  stood  firm  against  the  Bulgarian  desire 
to  control  the  lines  of  communication,  and  was 
greatly  strengthened  by  the  attitude  of  the  German 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    423 

officials,  who  fought  with  spirit  against  the  selfish 
actions  of  our  allies.  The  administration  of  the  dis- 
trict was  bound  to  suffer  from  this  friction,  but  General 
von  Unger  and  his  German  subordinates  saw  to  it  that 
the  rich  oil  stocks  at  Constanza  and  the  other  materials 
were  transported  out  of  the  district,  and  thus  were  put 
to  the  use  that  really  lay  in  the  interests  of  ourselves 
and  our  allies.  The  land  was  cultivated  as  well  as 
was  possible  in  the  difficult  circumstances.  If  the 
Bulgar  troops  did  not  receive  the  supplies  from  the 
Dobrudja  that  it  could  have  yielded,  the  fault  lay 
solely  with  the  attitude  adopted  by  them  and  their 
Government. 

The  population  in  this  districi  enjoyed  our  protection 
until  toward  the  end  of  the  war.  The  complete  sur- 
render of  the  southern  part  thereof  to  Bulgaria  under 
the  Peace  of  Bucharest  was  not  further  carried  out. 

We  had  reserved  the  right  to  buy  materials  in  the 
army  zone  of  the  Third  Bulgar  Army.  The  Bulgars 
felt  themselves  injured  by  this  and  put  many  difficulties 
into  our  way. 

The  administration  set  up  in  Wallachia  contained  a 
strong  Austrian  element,  which  was  naturally  far  from 
convenient.  We  had,  however,  to  put  up  with  this  on 
the  simple  ground  that  Germany  had  not  the  strength 
to  carry  out  ever>'thing  herself.  In  many  cases  the 
Austro-Hungarian  officials  made  our  life  a  burden; 
they  feared  an  increase  of  German  influence  in  Ru- 
mania, and  sought  to  obtain  for  themselves  advantages 
of  every  description.  Bulgaria,  too,  made  the  ad- 
ministration more  difficult,  acting  at  first  in  a  most 
arbitrary  manner.     Turkey  was  loyal. 

The  administration  was  called  "military";  it  was 
under  Field-Marshal  von  Mackensen,  and  thus  also 
under  the  Supreme  Army  Command,  and  not  directly 
under  His  Majesty,  as  were  the  Governments  of  Belgium 


424  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

and  Poland;  the  influence  of  the  Foreign  Office  could 
be  traced  in  this.  The  military  governor  was  Gen. 
Tulff  von  Tschepe  und  Weidenbach,  who  had  previously 
administered,  in  191 5,  the  then  occupied  parts  of 
Poland,  so  far  as  they  were  not  in  the  army  zones. 
His  second-in-command  was  at  first  General  von 
Bergmann,  and  later  Colonel  Hentsch,  who  during  the 
Rumanian  campaign  had  been  Quartermaster-General 
of  Von  Mackensen's  staff  and  had  a  fine  grasp  of  ad- 
ministrative and  economic  problems. 

Under  the  military  governors  were  German  and 
Austrian  lines-of-communication  commandants. 

The  military  government  did  not  cover  the  whole  of 
Wallachia,  a  narrow  strip  remaining  part  of  the  lines- 
of-communication  and  army  zone  of  the  Ninth  and  the 
Danube  Armies.  The  whole  district  was,  however, 
administered  on  the  same  principles. 

The  Rumanian  officials  and  judges  had  for  the  most 
part  remained  at  their  posts,  and  those  that  had  fled 
could  be  replaced  by  other  Rumanians.  The  adminis- 
trative problems  were  thus  simpler  than  those  that 
had  previously  confronted  the  Commander-in-chief  on 
the  Eastern  front,  and  were  mainly  economic.  These 
were,  of  course,  of  the  utmost  importance.  The  ap- 
pointment of  the  military  governor's  staff  and  the 
selection  of  lines-of-communication  commandants 
were  made  with  an  eye  to  this  circumstance. 

There  were  highly  satisfactory  supplies  of  agricult- 
ural produce  of  all  sorts,  in  particular  of  wheat  and 
maize,  but  also  of  pease,  beans,  plums,  eggs,  and  wine. 
The  autumn  sowing  was  undertaken  at  once.  Every- 
thing was  done  to  encourage  production.  The  sowing 
of  winter  wheat  was  most  important,  as  we  had  to 
reckon  on  the  Rumanian  harvest  for  the  critical  period 
before  the  Hungarian  harvest  in  July  and  our  own  in 
August.     Vegetables  were  also  of  importance  to   us, 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    425 

and  their  production  was  made  as  profitable  as  pos- 
sible. The  stocks  of  cattle  had  been  greatly  reduced 
by  the  war,  and  those  that  remained  were  now  used 
for  draft.  The  export  of  meat  was  thus  confined  to 
very  moderate  limits. 

In  obtaining  the  products  of  Rumania  the  military 
administration  worked  with  the  officials  of  the  Central 
Purchasing  Company,  which  had  been  active  in  Ru- 
mania before  that  country  entered  the  war.  Its  in- 
dependent attitude  did  not,  however,  meet  with 
approval. 

The  stocks  of  oil  that  we  found  in  Rumania  were  not 
large.  The  boring-plant  had  been  absolutely  destroyed 
and  the  wells  very  cleverly  blocked  up.  The  EngUsh 
Colonel  Thomsen  had  fulfilled  admirably  his  duty  of 
making  it  difficult  for  us  to  exploit  the  oil-fields.  His 
work  was  not,  it  is  true,  of  decisive  assistance  to  the 
Entente,  but  it  did  materially  reduce  the  supplies  of 
our  army  and  home.  We  must  attribute  our  shortage 
in  part  to  him.  The  military  administration  brought 
in  men  acquainted  with  the  Rumanian  oil  industry, 
and  applied  itself  energetically  to  its  second  most  im- 
portant task,  the  restoration  of  the  oil  output,  both  by 
repairing  blocked  wells  and  by  new  borings,  and  by 
the  re-establishment  and  resumption  of  working  of  the 
refineries.     The  output  increased,  although  very  slowly. 

To  many  people  in  Vienna,  suffering  severe  privation 
and  not  well  disposed  toward  us,  it  seemed  that  we 
were  not  proceeding  quickly  enough  with  the  gathering 
of  the  harvests  and  the  resumption  of  oil  working,  and 
in  February  191 7  complaints  came  from  Vienna  and 
were  repeated  to  me  from  Berlin.  I  was  uncertain  for 
a  moment  whether  the  work  was  really  being  well  done. 
I  was,  however,  able  to  judge  of  the  difficulties  to  be 
overcome  in  Rumania  from  my  own  experiences  in 
Kovno,  and  I  did  not  let  myself  be  deceived.     In  April 


426  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

the  complaints  ceased,  and  the  Government  was  gen- 
erally approved. 

The  distribution  of  the  stocks  from  the  Dobrudja  and 
Wallachia  was  carried  out  in  accordance  with  special 
agreements  with  the  allies.  There  was  no  great  dif- 
ficulty in  settling  on  a  basis  for  the  distribution  of  the 
oil,  but  the  sharing  of  the  agricultural  products  of 
Wallachia  was  one  of  the  most  unpleasant  tasks  of  the 
Quartermaster-General,  General  Hahndorff,  whose  clear 
idea  and  wide  understanding  of  war  economics  made 
him  particularly  suited  for  the  task.  Bulgaria  stood 
aside  from  the  distribution  of  the  Rumanian  stocks,  as 
she  was  receiving  the  Dobrudja  harvest.  Turkey  re- 
ceived only  a  small  quantity,  having  been  allotted  ad- 
vances from  the  large  stocks  lying  in  the  Dobrudja. 
The  real  question  was  thus  one  of  an  arrangement 
between  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary,  or,  more  cor- 
rectly, Austria  alone.  The  Austrian  negotiators  made 
huge  demands.  We  took  a  leaf  from  their  book  and 
made  equally  large  claims.  The  happy  medium 
proved  here,  too,  after  bitter  discussions,  to  be  the 
way  to  agreement,  and  ultimately  to  satisfaction  on 
both  sides.  Of  course,  representatives  of  our  War 
Food  Office  were  brought  into  the  negotiations,  and  the 
general  lines  of  our  case  were  settled  in  advance  in 
discussion  with  them.  The  Supreme  Army  Command 
needed  to  intervene  only  in  especially  critical  decisions. 

For  the  transport  of  oil,  com,  etc.,  it  was  in  general 
possible  to  re-establish  the  communications  which  had 
served  the  export  from  Wallachia  before  Rumania 
entered  the  war.  The  Rumanian  railways  were  re- 
stored for  this  purpose,  which  took  a  certain  time. 
The  Danube  navigation  was  recommenced  at  once. 
Austria-Hungary  regarded  the  Danube  as  its  exclusive 
province,  but  Colonel  von  Oldershausen  estabHshed  our 
interests   in    the   navigation.     The    German    Danube 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    427 

Shipping  Company,  the  Bavarian  Lloyd,  increased  its 
activities. 

Our  transport  arrangements  always  fulfilled  the  de- 
mands made  upon  them.  The  expected  increase  in  oil 
exports  was  prepared  for  in  advance  by  increased  con- 
struction of  tank  wagons  and  tank  ships.  A  pipe  line 
was  laid  from  Ploesti  to  Giurgiu;  in  peace-time  it  had 
probably  never  been  completely  laid. 

Just  as  previously  in  the  district  of  the  Commander- 
in-chief  in  the  East,  so  here  in  Rumania,  also,  all 
German  officials  connected  with  Wallachia  were  fully 
conscious,  not  only  of  the  vital  importance  of  their 
work  for  the  prosecution  of  the  war,  but  also,  as  we 
all  hoped,  of  the  advantage  which  it  would  be  to 
their  country  when  peace  came. 

VI 

The  German  people,  at  home  and  in  the  line,  have 
suffered  and  endured  much  in  the  four  long  years  of 
war.  The  war  has  deeply  disturbed  and  injured  the 
sentiments  of  the  people  and  the  whole  national  morale. 

The  blockade  of  extermination  and  starvation  and 
the  enemy  propaganda  which  have  operated  in  close 
association  in  the  fight  against  the  German  race  and 
the  German  people  were  a  heavy  burden,  and  a  burden 
that  grew  ever  heavier  as  the  war  lasted.  The  blockade 
worked  successfully.  Propaganda,  which  had  found 
fruitful  soil  at  home,  now  turned  its  attention  directly 
to  the  men  at  the  front,  who  also  were  now  receptive. 
Blockade  and  propaganda  began  gradually  to  under- 
mine our  spirits  and  to  shake  the  beHef  in  ultimate 
victory.  The  eminently  justified  longing  for  peace 
began  to  assume  forms  that  bordered  on  weakness, 
dividing  the  people  and  deoressing  the  morale  of  the 
army. 


428  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Poisonous  weeds  grew  in  this  soil.  All  German 
sentiment,  all  patriotism,  died  in  many  breasts.  The 
ego  came  to  the  front.  The  war  profiteer  of  every 
variety,  not  excluding  the  political  type,  which  took 
advantage  of  the  country's  danger  and  the  Govern- 
ment's weakness  to  snatch  political  and  personal  ad- 
vantages, spread  wider  and  wider.  [Our  spiritual  ca- 
pacity to  continue  was  incalculably  weakened.  We 
lost  confidence  in  ourselves. 

The  idea  of  revolution,  preached  by  enemy  propa- 
ganda and  by  the  Bolshevists,  found  the  Germans  in  a 
receptive  frame  of  mind,  and  gained  ground  in  the 
army  and  navy  through  the  Independent  Socialists. 
Heresy  grew  among  the  masses  of  our  people.  The 
German  people,  at  home  and  at  the  front,  had  received 
their  death-blow. 

When  I  was  appointed  Quartermaster-General  Ger- 
many was  just  at  the  beginning  of  this  development, 
and  its  future  course  could  not  be  prophesied.  One 
thing,  however,  was  absolutely  certain — that  we  could 
not  watch  it  as  idle  spectators. 

Something  had  now  been  achieved  against  the  starva- 
tion blockade;  we  had  broken  through  it  in  Rumania. 
Nobody  knew  whether  we  would  ever  have  another 
chance  to  break  through,  or  how  we  would  use  it. 

Before  the  enemy  propaganda  we  were  like  a  rabbit 
before  a  snake.  It  was  exceptionally  clever  and 
worked  on  a  very  large  scale.  Its  suggestions  had  a 
strong  effect  on  the  masses;  it  worked  well  together 
with  the  actual  campaigning,  and  was  imscrupulous 
as  to  the  means  it  used. 

The  German  people,  who  had  not  yet  learned  the 
art  or  the  value  of  silence,  had,  in  their  blameworthy 
frankness,  shown  by  their  speech,  their  writings,  and 
their  actions  the  best  line  of  attack  for  the  enemy 
propaganda. 


FURTHER  PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    429 

The  German  people  had  themselves  coined  the 
phrase  "Prussian  militarism,"  although  this  very 
Prussian  militarism,  the  spirit  of  selfless  loyalty,  the 
surrender  of  the  individual  to  the  conception  of  the 
State,  had  created  Prussia  and  achieved  for  Germany 
its  magnificent  development.  People  mistook  un- 
essential phenomena  for  the  essence  of  militarism,  and 
failed  to  appreciate  the  national  strength  which  rested 
therein.  It  should  not  have  been  resisted,  but  en- 
couraged. Even  high  officials  of  the  Government  used 
the  word  reproachfully  to  me  during  the  war,  so  that 
one  can  hardly  blame  the  many  who  thought  they  were 
acting  wisely  in  turning  against  "militarism,"  even 
if  they  could  not  tell  clearly  the  meaning  of  the  word. 
True,  many  a  man  knew  full  well  what  the  end  of 
such  a  fight  was;  authority  was  at  stake. 

The  Entente  knew  quite  well  the  strength  of  this 
"Prussian  militarism."  It  knew  why  it  fought  against  it. 
It  knew,  too,  what  it  was  doing  when  it  stirred  up  the 
Germans  against  their  officers,  in  the  last  resort  the 
supporters  of  the  power  of  the  State.  It  acted  with 
sure  aim  when  it  worked  against  Prussia  in  South 
Germany,  when  it  attacked  the  Emperor,  the  symbol 
of  our  unity,  when  it  railed  against  the  Crown  Prince 
and  promised  our  people  the  riches  of  heaven  if  it  should 
once  get  rid  of  its  Imperial  house  and  its  other  dynasties. 

Later  on  the  enemy  propaganda  attacked  me  also. 
The  army  and  the  people  were  to  be  robbed  of  their 
confidence  in  the  Supreme  Army  Command,  the  belief 
in  ultimate  victory  was  to  be  shattered,  and  faith  was 
to  be  destroyed  in  the  man  who  strove  to  oppose 
strong  resistance  to  the  Entente. 

By  working  on  our  democratic  sentiments  the  enemy 
'propaganda  succeeded  in  bringing  our  form  of  govern- 
ment into  discredit  in  Germany  and  in  the  whole 
world  as  being  autocratic,  although  our  Emperor  had 


430  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

not  the  same  power  as  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  and  although  the  right  of  voting  for  the  Reichs- 
tag, the  great  representative  body  of  the  Empire, 
rested  on  a  more  democratic  basis  than  that  of  many 
other  countries. 

The  enemy  propaganda  aimed  ever  more  directly  at 
breaking  up  the  unity  of  the  German  Empire  and  at 
separating  Germany  from  her  ruling  house  and  her 
dynasties  and  governments  from  their  people;  this 
was  revolution  pure  and  simple. 

The  propagandists  were  clever  in  understanding  the 
effects  of  such  phrases  as  "peace  of  understanding," 
"disarmament  after  the  war,"  "league  of  nations," 
and  so  on,  on  the  peaceful  and  unpolitical  German 
people,  only  too  ready  to  follow,  in  conscious  or  un- 
conscious self-deception,  this  attractive  but  deceptive 
phantasm. 

In  this  connection  the  propagandists'  story  that  the 
peace  of  the  world  had  been  disturbed  by  German  plans 
of  world  dominion  fell,  too,  on  fruitful  soil. 

In  plain  fact  the  German  Government  in  the  post- 
Bismarck  period  had  had  no  great  political  aim  what- 
ever beyond  the  maintenance  of  peace  save,  perhaps, 
that  it  aimed  at  increasing  the  colonial  possessions  of 
the  country.  It  scarcely  thought  of  world  politics  or 
policy;  it  had  no  clear  conception  why  it  made  its  way 
to  Bagdad.  Living  as  we  have  done  since  1870-71 
a  life  of  constant  preference  of  the  apparent  over  the 
real,  of  judging  by  externals,  we  have  no  doubt  over- 
estimated our  own  strength  and  thought  too  little 
of  the  forces  that  were  working  against  us.  We  spread 
out  over  the  world  without  having  a  firm  footing 
in  Europe.  After  gaining  Alsace-Lorraine  and  estab- 
lishing the  Empire,  the  German  people  were  satisfied 
in  Europe.  Increase  of  our  colonial  possessions,  and 
the  securing  of  a  better  position  in  the  world  by  the 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    431 

widening  of  our  markets,  had  become  a  necessity  for 
us.  This  was,  however,  to  be  obtained  only  by  force. 
Our  people,  on  the  other  hand,  aimed  at  an  equal 
place  in  peacefiil  competition.  Preoccupied  with  busi- 
ness and  political  doctrines,  our  people  did  not  know 
that  other  peoples  would  find  it  difficult  to  distinguish 
this  peaceful  aim  from  the  desire  for  world  mastery. 

The  maintenance  of  peace  was  a  great  object.  Just 
as  we  could  \\4n  a  war  of  defense  only  by  attacking, 
so  we  could  keep  peace  only  by  clear  and  strong  policy, 
carried  on  on  well-defined  principles.  This  our  politics 
did  not  succeed  in  doing.  It  expressed  itself  unex- 
pectedly, clumsily.  The  peoples  who  were  ill  disposed 
to  us  took  advantage  of  this  to  form  a  combine  against 
us.  Even  those  who  had  hitherto  been  opposed  to  one 
another  combined  against  us.  In  other  ways  we  showed 
ourselves  uncertain  and  irresolute,  and  this,  too,  brought 
us  no  friends. 

Many  Germans  felt  grave  anxiety  in  this  position 
and  gave  sharp  expression  to  their  fears  in  all  direc- 
tions. In  contrast  to  their  Government,  they  had  far- 
seeing  ideas.  These  utterances  were,  however,  merely 
those  of  private  persons,  and  had  no  more  importance 
or  meaning  for  us  than  corresponding  statements  had 
in  other  countries.  This  habit  of  speaking  out  was 
not  changed  during  the  war.  The  war  aims  of  the 
Governments  and  peoples  of  the  Entente  were  always 
more  far-reaching  than  the  dreams  of  individual  Ger- 
mans.    We  know  this  now  to  our  cost. 

Plans  for  world  dominion  demand  a  strong  national 
feeUng.  This,  in  spite  of  the  foundation  of  the  Em- 
pire in  187 1,  we  have  never  achieved.  Our  Govern- 
ment in  the  post-Bismarck  period  did  nothing  to  cul- 
tivate it.  On  the  contrary,  we  lost  it  as  we  lost  our 
strength  of  will.  In  our  poHtical  thought  we  have  re- 
mained too  "federal,"  and  have  retained  too  deep  in- 


432  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

ternal  political  divisions.  We  came  into  the  world  too 
soon,  without  any  national  sentiment,  and  in  our  sense 
of  world  citizenship,  bom  of  foreign  influences,  we  have 
never  found  the  true  level  between  thinking  nationally 
and  thinking  internationally,  between  our  domestic 
and  our  external  interests. 

Contrary  to  the  arguments  oi  the  enemy  propaganda, 
no  dreams  of  world  mastery,  no  "nationalism"  of  the 
German  Government,  endangered  the  peace  before 
1 9 14  or  have  prevented  its  conclusion  during  the  war. 
After  all,  propaganda  did  not  set  out  to  tell  the  truth, 
but  merely  to  break  down  the  determination  and  the 
fighting  spirit  of  the  German  people  and  to  spread  views 
that  would  serve  its  own  ends. 

At  last  it  found  the  catchword  of  the  "right  of  self- 
determination."  A  problem  seemingly  based  on  a  most 
acceptable  truism,  but,  in  truth,  not  to  be  solved  with- 
out oppression,  when,  as  is  so  often  the  case,  national- 
ities are  mixed.  The  phrase  fitted  the  case  of  Austria- 
Hungary  better  than  it  fitted  us,  but  it  also  had  its 
effect  upon  Germany  and,  in  the  long  run,  in  the  inter- 
pretation given  to  it  by  fear  and  hatred,  it  was  destined 
to  work  us  grave  injury  through  the  construction  given 
to  it  by  Germans. 

In  the  last  stages  of  the  war,  and  quite  openly  from 
the  beginning  of  1918  onward,  propaganda  worked  ever 
more  clearly  for  the  social  revolution,  side  by  side  with 
the  political  revolution.  The  war  was  painted  as  being 
waged  by  the  upper  ten  thousand  at  the  expense  of  the 
workers,  and  the  victory  of  Germany  as  the  workers' 
misfortune. 

The  enemy  propaganda,  and  Bolshevism,  which  aimed 
at  a  world  revolution,  were  working  for  the  same  ends  in 
Germany.  England  gave  China  opium,  our  enemies 
gave  us  the  revolution,  and  we  accepted  the  poison 
and  distributed  it,  as  the  Chinese  distribute  opium. 


FURTHER  PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    433 

While  the  enemy  propaganda  was  doing  increasing 
harm  to  the  German  people  and  the  army  and  navy, 
it  also  succeeded  in  maintaining  the  determination  to 
fight  in  its  own  countries  and  armies,  and  in  working 
against  us  in  neutral  countries. 

ResponsibiUty  for  the  war,  the  Belgian  atrocities,  the 
ill-treatment  of  prisoners,  our  political  immorality  and 
treachery,  our  mendacity  and  brutality,  the  arbitrary 
Government  of  Prussianized  Germany,  the  enslave- 
ment of  the  German  people,  all  these  reproaches  were 
cleverly  invented,  for  the  purposes  of  the  campaign 
of  lies  against  us  and  had  the  greatest  effect  all  over  the 
world.  Side  by  side  with  these,  the  catchwords  of  the 
fight  for  democracy  against  militarism,  autocracy,  and 
the  Junker,  of  the  war  for  civilization  and  for  the  free- 
dom of  the  smaller  nations,  and  other  phrases  of  the 
sort  in  ideal  guise,  of  infinite  effect  upon  men  who  do  not 
see  too  clearly.  The  public  opinion  of  the  world  was 
within  their  power.  For  the  American  soldiers  the 
war  became,  as  it  were,  a  crusade  against  us. 

In  the  neutral  countries  we  were  subjected  to  a  sort 
of  moral  blockade.  The  way  to  the  soul  of  the  neutrals 
was  barred  to  us.  We  had  not  the  means  to  open  it. 
We  alone  did  wrong;  everything  that  the  Entente  did 
was  morally  right  and  the  obvious  course  to  follow. 
Germany  was  the  world  oppressor,  and  the  policy  of 
the  Entente,  and  that  alone,  was  pursuing  true  moral 
aims,  at  once  freeing  the  world  and  making  it  happier. 
In  neutral  countries,  which  now  must  know  the  truth, 
we  lost  all  credit,  while  that  of  the  enemy  rose  to  great 
heights.  We  had,  it  is  true,  our  friends,  but  they  had 
no  weight. 

Similar  work  was  done  in  the  countries  allied  to  us. 
The  object  was  to  separate  us  from  our  allies. 

Propaganda  was  an  old  and  powerful  weapon  in 
England's  hands.     The  East  India  Company  had  strik- 


434  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

ing  success  with  it  in  the  conquest  of  India.  Schools 
were  set  up  in  England.  England  was  the  only  coun- 
try that  long  ago  had  employed  this  weapon  of  politics 
and  war  with  a  clear  vision,  and  on  a  really  large  scale, 
in  the  service  of  its  national  world-encircling  policy. 

"To  threaten  countries  with  the  aid  of  revolution  has 
for  many  years  been  the  policy  of  England,"  said  Bis- 
marck sixty  years  ago.  He  was  thinking  of  the  speech 
of  Canning  on  December  12,  1826,  in  which  chat  Prime 
Minister  threatened  in  a  public  sitting  of  the  House  of 
Commons  that  England  controlled  the  winds  of  JEohis, 
and  could  at  any  time  unchain  the  powers  of  revolu- 
tion. "If  we,"  he  said,  "take  part  in  a  war,  we  shall 
see  gathered  under  our  standards  all  the  restless  and 
dissatisfied  (whether  with  or  without  a  cause)  of  any 
country  with  whom  we  are  in  conflict."  ^ 

Even  before  the  war  careful  watchers  had  clearly 
observed  the  propagandist  activities  of  our  present 
enemies.  They  were  then  already  working  systemati- 
cally against  us.  It  was  mainly  their  propaganda  that 
England  and  France  had  to  thank  for  the  success  of 
their  policy  of  undermining  our  position  in  the  world. 
The  disarmament  proposals  of  the  Tsar  were  their 
handiwork,  and  well  adapted  to  the  undiscriminating 

^  The  speech  of  Canning  to  which  the  writer  refers  will  hardly  bear 
the  interpretation  given  in  the  text.  According  to  the  official  report, 
Canning,  in  dealing  with  the  proposal  to  make  war  against  Spain  on 
the  side  of  Portugal,  after  pointing  out  that  the  war  between  Spain  and 
Portugal,  if  it  broke  out,  would  be  a  "war  of  opinions,"  based  on 
Spanish  hatred  of  the  constitutional  government  of  Portugal,  continued 
as  follows: 

"If  into  that  war  this  country  shall  be  compelled  to  enter,  we  shall 
enter  into  it  with  a  sincere  and  anxious  desire  to  mitigate  rather  than 
exasperate — and  to  mingle  only  in  the  conflict  of  arms,  and  not  in 
the  more  fatal  conflict  of  opinions.  But  I  much  fear  that  this  coimtry 
(however  earnestly  she  may  endeavor  to  avoid  it)  could  not,  in  such 
case,  avoid  seeing  ranked  under  her  banners  all  the  restless  and  dis- 
satisfied of  any  nation  with  which  she  might  come  into  conflict." 

The  reference  to  the  winds  of  ^olus  comes  somewhat  later  in  the 
speech  and  is  unconnected  with  any  suggestion  for  encouraging  revo- 
lution in  enemy  countries. 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    435 

credibility  of  many  circles  in  Germany.  The  wide  dis- 
tribution in  the  English  worid  was  also  part  of  the  same 
work.  It  would  have  been  better  if  it  had  never  been 
written.  We  were  to  be  cut  off  from  the  world  by 
Renter.  Our  political  leaders  apparently  failed  to  ob- 
serve the  influence  of  the  present  Entente  countries  on 
the  press  of  the  world,  although  their  attention  was 
drawn  to  it  often  enough.  They  also  did  not  see  the 
effect  of  the  little  groups  of  French  culture  in  the 
capitals  of  neutral  countries  with  their  opinions  on 
those  countries. 

Even  the  Masonic  lodges  of  the  world,  as  had  long 
been  planned  by  England,  worked  with  the  whole 
mysterious  strength  of  this  most  powerful  of  all  secret 
societies  in  the  service  of  the  Anglo-Saxon,  and  thus, 
for  us,  of  international  politics.  Only  the  national 
lodges  in  Prussia  remained  free  of  this  influence. 

In  all  the  enemy  countries  strong  propaganda  or- 
ganizations had  been  established  under  the  guidance 
of  experienced  statesmen  and  politicians.  Under  a 
united  leadership  they  worked  everywhere  with  united 
strength  on  clear  and  simple  principles,  and  with 
ample  funds.  They  had  branches  in  neutral  countries, 
where  they  achieved  their  aims  with  that  utter  lack 
of  conscience  which  is  so  characteristic  of  the  Entente. 
Special  organizations  dealt  with  the  encouragement  of 
national  aspirations,  particularly  in  Poland  and  among 
the  Letts,  and  no  doubt  also  among  the  peoples  of 
the  Dual  Monarchy,  especially  the  Czechs  and  southern 
Slavs. 

While  on  the  field  of  battle  we  held  the  initiative  al- 
most to  the  very  end,  the  enemy  carried  on  the  war  of 
intellect  from  the  start  with  a  united  front,  attacking 
along  the  whole  line,  and  finding  auxiliaries  in  the  many 
deserters  in  the  neutral  states,  and  also,  alas!  support 
in  Germany  itself. 


436  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

In  England  the  whole  propaganda  service  was  placed 
under  Lord  Beaverbrook,  with  three  directors,  of 
whom  Lord  Northcliffe  attended  to  the  enemy  coun- 
tries, Kipling  to  home  propaganda,  and  Lord  Rother- 
mere  to  the  work  in  neutral  countries.  While  England 
preferred  to  work  principally  in  economical  and  political 
propaganda,  military  and  culture  questions  were  es- 
pecially the  function  of  France.  This  is  typical  of  the 
point  of  view  of  our  enemies.  America,  which  at  first 
assisted  only  financially  (undertaking  50  per  cent, 
of  the  whole  propaganda  expenses  of  the  Entente), 
later  took  an  active  part  in  the  work. 

Italy,  Belgium,  and  the  remaining  Allies,  generous- 
ly aided  by  American  money,  were  also  active  in 
propaganda. 

The  expressed  aim  of  the  American  and  English 
propaganda  became  ever  more  and  more  the  achieve- 
ment of  an  internal  revolution  in  Germany. 

Lloyd  George  knew  what  he  was  saying  when  at  the 
end  of  the  war  he  expressed  to  Lord  Northcliffe  the 
thanks  of  England  for  the  work  he  had  done.  He  had 
proved  himself  a  master  in  mass  suggestion. 

We  found  ourselves,  bit  by  bit,  attacked  by  enemy 
propaganda,  by  speech  and  writing,  through  the  neutral 
countries,  especially  across  our  land  frontiers  with 
Holland  and  Switzerland,  and  also  through  Austria- 
Hungary  and  in  our  very  own  country,  and,  last  of  all, 
through  the  air,  with  such  cleverness  and  on  such  a 
large  scale  that  many  people  could  no  longer  distinguish 
between  enemy  propaganda  and  their  own  sentiments. 
Propaganda  wounded  us  all  the  more  deeply  in  that 
we  had  to  carry  on  the  war,  not  with  strong  battalions, 
but  with  good  ones.  The  value  of  masses  in  war  can- 
not be  denied,  and  without  soldiers  there  can  be  no 
fighting.  But  numbers  alone  are  nothing  without  the 
spirit  that  animates  them ;  this  is  true  both  at  home  and 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    437 

in  the  field.  We  have  fought  the  world,  and  we  could 
fight  the  world  with  confidence,  so  long  as  our  spirits 
were  sound.  Just  so  long,  too,  we  held  prospects  of 
success,  and,  which  is  the  same  thing,  did  not  have  to 
bow  to  our  enemy's  desire  to  destroy  us.  When  our 
moral  strength  failed  us  the  whole  position  was  changed. 
We  no  longer  fought  to  the  last  drop  of  blood  and  many 
Germans  were  no  longer  ready  to  die  for  their  country. 

The  breaking  of  our  morale  at  home,  with  its  effect 
on  our  fighting  capacity,  the  war  against  the  home 
front  and  the  spirit  of  the  army,  were,  it  is  true,  the 
main  means  whereby  the  Entente  hoped  to  conquer 
us,  after  it  had  given  up  the  hope  of  a  military  victory. 
I  had  no  doubt  on  this  point. 

In  the  spring  of  191 8  a  far-seeing  Entente  statesman 
made  the  following  remarks: 

"In  London  and  Paris  there  is  to-day  a  general 
fundamental  belief  that  the  German  Army  on  the 
Western  front  will  never  be  conquered  by  purely 
military  means.  But  it  is,  nevertheless,  clear  that  the 
Entente  will  win,  and  that  by  the  internal  conditions 
in  Germany  and  the  Central  Powers,  which  will  lead 
to  the  fall  of  the  Imperial  house.  At  latest  in  the 
autumn  of  this  year  the  revolution  will  break  out  in 
Germany.  It  is  quite  clear  to  us  that  there  are  in- 
fluential circles  in  Germany  who  would  regard  nothing 
as  so  bad  as  a  military  victory  of  Ludendorff." 

This  fitted  strangely  well  the  words  of  Sprobel, 
Member  of  the  Prussian  Diet  and  editor  of  Vorwarts, 
in  1915: 

"I  confess  quite  openly  that  a  complete  victory  of 
the  Empire  would  not  be  in  the  interests  of  Social 
Democracy." 

I  was  reluctant  to  write  these  lines  and  let  them  go 
out  to  the  world.  But  truth  is  truth  and  these  words 
were  spoken. 


438  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

VII 

The  Chancellor  was  responsible  for  the  maintenance 
of  morale  at  home.  General  Headquarters  would  have 
been  glad  to  undertake  direct  counter-propaganda  by- 
explanation,  but,  in  accordance  with  its  duty,  it  always 
approached  the  Chancellor  and  begged  him  to  act. 

It  was  his  duty  to  remove  the  unfortunately  only  too 
justified  grounds  for  popular  dissatisfaction,  and  es- 
pecially to  take  steps  against  the  abuses  and  excesses 
in  war  industries.  They,  with  their  regretable  ac- 
companying disadvantages,  were  bound  to  awaken  much 
indignation  and  to  damage  the  morale  of  wide  circles 
of  society  in  a  manner  calculated  to  do  infinite  harm  to 
our  strength  in  the  war.  Profit-hunting,  luxury,  and 
selfishness  overcame  all  honorable  influences,  but  short 
rations  also  blunted  the  finer  perceptions.  Men  stand- 
ing in  the  trenches  fighting  the  enemy  had  to  fear  that 
their  jobs  and  their  trades  were  being  taken  from 
them  by  others.  It  is  very  painful  to  look  back  and 
see  how  the  German  sincerity  and  honesty,  the  spotless 
personal  cleanliness  and  the  selfless  thought  for  one's 
country  were  lost,  and  in  their  place  came  a  wholly 
un-German  idea,  that  the  interests  of  oneself  were 
the  only  law  of  life. 

The  Chancellor  should  have  told  the  people  whither 
they  were  drifting,  and  explained  to  them  the  whole 
of  their  serious  situation.  The  Government  should 
have  explained  again  and  again  what  was  at  stake, 
that  an  endurable  peace  could  be  won  only  from  a 
defeated  enemy,  and  that  we  would  otherwise  be  the 
victims  of  a  peace  of  violence.  Only  victory  could 
save  us  from  the  latter  or  bring  us  the  former. 

Our  political  and  intellectual  immaturity  and  lack 
of  critical  faculty,  which  rendered  us  unable  to  per- 
ceive the  emptiness  of  catch  phrases  and  impossible 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    439 

promises,  were  and  are  the  cause  of  our  misfortunes. 
I  had  always  hoped  that  the  people  would  force  their 
way  through  phrases,  catchwords,  and  political  trickery 
to  a  view  of  the  facts  that  really  corresponds  to  realities. 
I  was  disappointed.  The  more  the  fire  of  domestic 
politics  raged  the  more  the  gulf  between  class  and  class, 
town  and  country  deepened,  so  the  more  did  phrases, 
catchwords,  and  criminal  delusions  hold  sway.  Soon 
parties  and  party  aims  were  of  more  importance  than 
the  country.  The  broad  mass  of  the  bourgeoisie,  a  con- 
fused mob,  always  knowing  better  than  any  one  else  and 
lacking  all  discipline,  went  its  own  way  and  stood 
isolated  in  its  mental  arrogance,  its  reluctance  to  act, 
its  lack  of  character.  It,  too,  had  no  sense  of  its  re- 
sponsibility to  the  country.  It  never  thought  what 
infinite  damage  it  was  bringing  on  the  country  and  on 
itself.  The  lack  of  restraint  and  principle  in  wide 
masses  of  the  people,  the  agitation  of  the  Independent 
Socialists,  found  no  counterweight  among  the  bour- 
geoisie. It  is  a  sad  thing  that  in  the  hour  of  need 
usually  clear-thinking  men  should  lose  their  heads  and 
take  no  action  while  they  are  robbed  of  aU  for  which 
they  have  hitherto  lived. 

The  bourgeoisie  must  share  the  blame  for  the  collapse 
of  the  country. 

The  foundation  on  which  the  proud  edifice  of  our 
army  is  built  up  was  splitting;  the  spring  that  should 
renew  our  fighting  strength  was  muddied. 

Our  War  Chancellors  have  done  nothing  to  put  right 
the  damage  and  clear  the  minds  of  the  people.  They 
had  no  creative  ideas;  they  never  gathered  the  people 
together  and  led  them,  like  the  great  dictators,  Clemen- 
ceau,  Lloyd  George,  and  Wilson.  What  General 
Headquarters  could  achieve  by  patriotic  education 
and  by  transferring  oiir  foreign  propaganda  to  home 
uses  amounted  only  to  giving  crumbs  to  the  himgry. 


440  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

The  mind  of  the  German  people  remained  rudderless 
and  uncaptained,  the  prey  of  every  influence  that  came. 
Ignorant  and  deluded,  it  sought  after  phantoms  which 
could  never  be  reached.  It  was  thus  only  too  com- 
prehensible that  it  should  hold  to  those  who,  either  in 
fatal  stupidity  or  accursed  and  criminal  deliberation, 
offered  it  what  it  had  long  yearned  for,  and  that  it  did 
not  understand  the  men  who  saw  the  dangers  of  such 
conduct,  and  who,  in  anxious  care  for  oiu-  future  and 
sacred  love  for  our  country  of  our  fathers,  still  urged 
them  to  fight  on.  It  was  a  sorry  thing  that  these  men, 
although  they,  too,  longed  for  peace,  were  soon  branded 
as  "never-endians." 

The  press  furnished  an  exact  mirror  of  the  party 
quarrels  that  divided  the  German  people  and  of  their 
mental  development  during  the  war.  Only  a  part  of 
the  press  remained  true  to  itself.  Another  part,  from 
idealism,  from  motives  of  party  poHtics,  or  simply 
from  a  sense  of  business,  assumed  as  an  established  fact 
that  improvement  in  the  world  that  the  advocates  of  a 
peace  by  luiderstanding  had  invented,  and  abandoned 
the  views  it  had  held  in  1914.  Finally,  there  were 
newspapers  who  were  ashamed  of  their  attitude  in  the 
auttuim  of  1 9 14,  and  of  all  their  thoughts  of  a  good 
peace.  It  even  seemed  painful  to  them  to  be  reminded 
of  such  manly  thoughts.  Even  diuing  the  war  they 
slandered  Germany  to  her  sons  and  did  everything 
possible  to  destroy  the  belief  in  German  strength.  In 
these  papers,  too,  were  challenges  against  our  civil 
authority  and  order,  to  which  the  declarations  of  war 
against  oiir  social  order  were  joined.  I  watched  this 
development  with  deeply  woimded  patriotic  feelings. 
These  were  serious  warnings  to  take  care,  lest  grave 
damage  should  be  done  to  our  fighting  capacity,  a 
Mene  Tekel  for  the  moral  strength  of  the  German 
people,  and  thus,  too,  of  the  German  Army.     All  this 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    441 

lay  plain  for  otir  enemies  to  see,  and  much  besides,  and 
they  no  doubt  gladly  drew  the  inevitable  inferences 
therefrom. 

In  August  1 9 14  the  whole  press,  fully  convinced, 
had  ranged  itself  on  the  side  of  the  war  of  defense  and 
had  uttered  fine  words  of  determination  as  to  the  neces- 
sity of  carrying  the  war  to  a  successful  issue.  Un- 
fortunately, there  was  later  a  change  of  tone  in  part 
of  the  press.  It  failed  to  realize  that  such  a  war  of 
defense  could  not  be  ended  by  a  peace  of  imderstand- 
ing,  but  only  through  victory,  luiless  we  were  to  be 
defeated  and  become  the  victims  of  imbearable  condi- 
tions. As  with  the  Government  and  the  people,  so 
also  in  this  part  of  the  press  the  thoughts  of  an  imder- 
standing  with  the  enemy  grew  stronger  than  the 
thoughts  of  victory,  with  all  its  heavy  demands  on  an 
already  suffering  people.  Many  of  the  most  widely 
circulating  papers  became  the  prophets  of  the  new 
outlook,  based  on  the  reconciliation  of  the  peoples. 
They  attacked  violently  those  who  were  unwiUing  to 
believe  in  the  enemy's  readiness  for  peace  or,  at  any 
rate,  were  imwilHng  to  weaken  our  own  fighting 
strength,  until  the  enemy  had  given  some  irrefragable 
proof  thereof;  they  attacked,  too,  those  who  thought 
it  accordingly  necessary  to  keep  their  sword  as  sharp, 
and  the  arm  that  wielded  it  as  strong,  as  was  possible. 

In  this  connection  another  idea  was  put  forward,  that 
the  war  could  never  be  ended  by  a  military  decision — 
that  is  to  say,  by  force  of  arms.  No  doubt  the  co- 
operation of  the  Government  was  required  to  enhance 
the  effect  of  the  miHtary  successes.  But  the  last  word 
rested  with  the  mass  of  the  population,  there  was  no 
doubt.  Were  people  really  so  ignorant  of  the  enemy's 
real  desire  to  destroy?  Did  not  they  understand  the 
mind  and  the  speeches  of  a  Lloyd  George  or  a  Clemen- 
ceau?     Why  fight  another  battle  if  it  is  really  un- 


442  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

necessary  to  achieve  victory  or  to  escape  defeat  ?  Had 
they  no  idea  of  the  state  of  mind  of  the  man  who  had 
to  leave  his  home,  his  wife,  and  children,  his  secure 
post,  and  to  undergo  hardship  and  danger,  if  it  is,  after 
all,  useless,  if  he  is  merely  risking  the  future  of  himself 
and  his  family?  Could  one  not  understand  the  man 
who,  in  continual  danger,  alone  on  a  dark  night  in  a 
muddy  crater  area,  has  to  work  forward  to  some  point 
where  hell  awaits  him,  or  the  man  who  is  due  to- 
morrow for  the  long-awaited  leave,  and  who  to-day 
has  to  go  on  fighting,  and  perhaps  to  die?  Ideas  were 
thought  out  that  were  to  bless  the  world,  thoughts  ran 
far  into  the  future,  and  the  hard  reality  of  the  present 
was  forgotten.  No  one  remembered  the  agony  of 
conscience  of  the  soldier  who  had  to  risk  his  life. 

We  were  thinking  of  every  imaginable  thing;  we 
ought  to  have  been  thinking  of  the  war  alone. 

The  press  lacked  the  single  guidance  which  was  so 
remarkable  with  the  enemy.  Unled,  it  could  so  easily 
become  not  merely  a  useless,  but  positively  a  danger- 
ous, weapon  of  war.  That  this  was  not  the  case  in 
purely  military  questions,  but  that,  on  the  contrary, 
it  followed  in  noteworthy  manner  the  instructions 
given  to  it,  is  a  proof  of  its  readiness  to  submit  to  a 
firm  leadership  based  on  mutual  trust.  There  were, 
it  is  true,  a  few  straying  sheep,  but,  in  the  main,  my 
request  that  military  events  should  be  discussed  from 
this  or  that  point  of  view  was  fulfilled.  Here  I  must 
express  my  thanks  for  this.  The  quite  comprehensible 
efforts  to  satisfy  the  reader's  craving  for  novelty  some- 
times resulted  in  news,  even  of  a  purely  military  char- 
acter, really  exclusively  designed  to  further  the  aims 
of  enemy  propaganda,  finding  its  way  into  our  press 
from  neutral  or  enemy  sources.  When  one  adds  the 
sensational  padding  and  heading  of  such  news  that  is 
so  dear  to  a  section  of  our  press,  then  our  enemies  could 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    443 

not  desire  better  helpers  in  their  propaganda  work. 
It  is  not  in  my  natiire  to  seek  the  causes  of  such  stu- 
pidity in  ill-will  or  sensation-mongering.  Short-sight- 
edness was  often  at  the  bottom  of  such  cases,  and 
oftener  still  the  great  difficulties  under  which  the  press 
worked,  the  calling  up  of  many  trained  men  throwing 
an  undue  amount  of  work  onto  the  editorial  staff. 

In  the  impression  that  I  had  gained  of  the  situation 
I  appealed  in  December  191 6  to  the  Chancellor  to 
establish  under  his  direct  supervision  a  bureau  for  the 
single  control  of  the  whole  press  of  the  Empire  in  all 
branches.  I  have  always  regarded  the  management 
of  this  matter  by  the  Foreign  Office  as  a  most  un- 
fortunate arrangement,  for  that  office  thus  gained  an 
influence  in  internal  politics  which  would  have  been 
better  excluded.  Of  course,  the  interests  of  this  de- 
partment should  be  represented  and  respected,  but 
the  final  control,  respecting  the  interests  of  all  de- 
partments, could  be  held  only  by  the  Chancellor,  under 
whom,  by  the  constitution,  all  the  departments  are 
set,  and  by  whom  all  their  interests  are  to  be  recon- 
ciled. In  November  1916,  at  the  request  of  the 
Chancellor,  I  appointed  Lieutenant-Colonel  Deutel- 
noser  to  be  attached  to  him,  in  the  hope  that  after  the 
departure  of  Privy  Councilor  Hammann  something 
definite  might  be  achieved  by  this  appointment.  The 
work  which  was  allotted  to  the  lieutenant-colonel  did 
not  correspond  to  my  expectations.  In  details  my 
demands  had  been  directed  to  securing  the  control  of 
all  the  press  sections  of  the  civil  departments  by  some 
person  of  authority  directly  under  the  Chancellor;  the 
close  co-operation  of  this  authority  with  the  War 
Press  Bureau  and  the  Press  Department  of  the  Ad- 
miralty; the  limitation  of  the  Press  Department  of  the 
Foreign  Office  to  questions  of  external  politics,  and  the 
intensification  of  its  work  in  connection  with  enemy, 


444  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

neutral,  and  allied  newspapers;  and.  finally,  the  repre- 
sentation and  promotion  of  the  economic  interests  of 
the  press  by  a  central  office. 

Chancellor  von  Bethmann-HoUweg  refused  all  my 
demands. 

The  united  leadership  of  the  press  would  have  been 
a  means  of  again  calling  into  life  a  determined  attitude 
of  the  German  people  and  of  getting  rid  of  separatist 
tendencies.  Explanatory  counter-propaganda,  which 
should  be  more  thorough,  should  have  begun  instantly 
the  enemy  propaganda  hit  us.  The  speeches  of  states- 
men and  leading  thinkers,  and  oral  propaganda  gen- 
erally, should  have  been  added.  Every  German,  man 
or  woman,  should  have  been  told  daily  what  the  loss 
of  the  war  would  mean  to  us.  Pictures  and  the  mov- 
ing pictiues  should  have  been  forced  to  preach  the 
same.  An  explanation  of  our  dangers  would  have  had 
a  different  effect  from  the  thought  of  war  profits  or 
talking  and  writing  of  the  peace  of  understanding. 
And,  what  is  equally  important,  it  would  have  pre- 
served us  from  our  greatest  danger  and  have  served 
the  cause  of  peace.  I  attempted  to  achieve  it,  and 
aroused  considerable  opposition. 

The  press  of  Saxony,  Wiirttemberg,  and  Baden  re- 
tained an  independent  position,  but  took  great  trouble 
to  achieve  co-operation  with  us.  The  Bavarian  press 
went,  more  and  more  as  time  passed,  its  own  way  in 
all  respects. 

All  dealings  with  the  press  were  made  considerably 
more  difficult  by  the  lack  of  any  single  representation. 
Its  organization  was  as  confused  as  that  of  the  corre- 
sponding imperial  bodies.  There  was  the  ' '  Press  Com- 
mittee," formed  out  of  Berlin  press  representatives,  the 
Union  of  German  Newspaper  Publishers,  and  the  Im- 
perial Union  of  the  German  Press.  These  organizations, 
again,  were  not  similarly  constituted.    Here  we  had 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR   445 

editors,  their  publishers,  and  many  other  differences 
that  showed  how  various  they  were.  This,  to  my  re- 
gret, really  made  impossible  a  strong,  consistent  rally- 
ing of  our  public  opinion.  I  have  always  estimated 
the  influence  of  the  press  very  highly,  not  only  that 
of  the  capital,  but  also  the  provincial. 

The  representatives  of  the  press  were  always  per- 
sonally welcome  to  me,  so  far  as  my  work  allowed. 

Communications  between  General  Headquarters  and 
the  newspapers  went  through  the  War  Press  Bureau. 
This  was  formed  in  October  191 5,  out  of  various  de- 
partments that  had  been  established  in  the  acting 
General  Staff  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  whose  duties 
were  to  read  the  home  and  foreign  press  and  to  act 
as  censors.  In  the  year  191 7  the  function  was  added 
of  attending  to  patriotic  education. 

The  most  important  civil  departments  of  the  Empire 
and  Prussia  had  liaison  sections  at  the  War  Press 
Bureau,  and  by  the  side  of  it  stood  the  Press  Depart- 
ment of  the  Naval  Staff.  The  War  Press  Bureau  has 
always  worked  in  the  closest  co-operation  with  these 
departments. 

The  War  Press  Bureau,  in  accordance  with  its  in- 
structions, has  always  refrained  from  exercising  any 
political  influence  upon  the  German  press.  All  state- 
ments to  the  contrary  are  false,  as  are  the  suggestions 
that  it  acted  as  a  sort  of  separate  political  agent  for 
General  Headquarters. 

The  importance  of  the  War  Press  Bureau  lay  in  its 
rigid  organization,  in  the  personnel  of  its  co-operators, 
and  in  the  lack  of  any  unifled  imperial  organization. 
The  press  was  conscious  of  this.  Its  discontent  was 
directed  not  so  much  against  the  War  Press  Bureau 
as  against  all  the  various  press  offices,  which  had  no 
proper  organization  or  control. 

The  majority  of  the  unjustified  attacks  made  upon 


446  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

this  bureau  in  the  Reichstag  were  almost  all  due  to 
ignorance  of  the  exact  scope  of  its  functions.  They 
merely  show  how  impossible  it  was  for  General  Head- 
quarters, with  the  available  means,  to  achieve  any  im- 
provement in  morale.  The  War  Press  Bureau  was 
there,  and  people  could  form  unfavorable  judgments 
upon  it,  but  they  did  not  inquire  into  causes  and  assist 
me  to  get  a  large  imperial  bureau. 

The  discussions  that  took  place  twice  weekly  with 
the  members  of  the  Berlin  press  and  the  provincial 
press  represented  in  Berlin,  at  which,  in  addition  to 
representatives  of  the  War  Press  Bureau,  there  were 
also  present  members  from  the  Naval  Staff  and  from 
all  the  imperial  offices,  were  of  assistance  only  to  a 
section  of  the  press.  Speeches  were  accordingly  given 
from  time  to  time  by  officials  of  the  imperial  offices  to 
representatives  of  the  provincial  press  in  different 
parts  of  the  country. 

One  important  function  of  the  War  Press  Bureau 
was  the  study  of  the  press  of  neutral  and  enemy 
countries. 

At  the  front  the  army  newspapers  had  become  more 
and  more  important.  The  Press  Office  of  the  General 
Staff  of  the  army  in  the  field  supplied  it  with  material, 
and  at  the  same  time  sent  to  small  and  medium-sized 
journals  at  home  accounts  of  particularly  heroic  deeds 
of  officers  and  men  at  the  front. 

In  occupied  France  and  in  the  prisoners'  of  war  camps 
the  Gazette  des  Ardennes  did  splendid  work,  winning  the 
respect  even  of  our  enemies  through  its  fairness  and 
reliability.  The  same  may  be  said  of  the  Russische 
Bote,  which  was  written  in  German  and  pubHshed  under 
the  direction  of  the  Ministry  of  War. 

The  war  correspondents  of  the  great  German  daihes 
were  grouped  in  press  headquarters  in  the  East  and 
West,  and,  so  far  as  the  military  situation  allowed,  were 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    447 

informed  as  quickly  and  completely  as  possible  of 
every  new  event,  being  given  complete  individual 
freedom.  Within  the  necessary  limits,  they  took  part 
in  the  life  of  the  troops  and  of  the  staffs. 

There  were  further  renowned  military  writers  who 
described  the  war  from  a  position  of  authority. 

It  was  the  duty  of  the  War  Press  Bureau  to  secure 
uniformity  of  military  views  in  the  press  at  home,  and 
obedience  to  the  censorship  regulations  laid  down  by 
General  Headquarters.  It  kept  in  touch  with  the  same 
object  with  the  press  controls  in  the  occupied  districts, 
and  from  time  to  time  took  similar  steps  in  co-operation 
with  the  military  press  censorships  of  our  allies. 

The  censorship  arrangements  of  General  Head- 
quarters extended  to  everything  which  might  hinder  the 
effective  prosecution  of  the  war,  but  it  limited  itself 
to  this.  At  the  same  time,  the  head  censorship  office 
communicated  to  the  military  authorities  at  home  the 
general  principles  laid  down  by  the  Imperial  authori- 
ties. This  led  to  serious  misunderstandings  and  to  the 
adoption  of  untenable  points  of  view.  It  happened 
more  than  once  that  the  home  military  chiefs  described 
as  instructions  from  General  Headquarters  censorship 
instructions  which  were  merely  passed  to  them  in  this 
way  by  the  head  censorship  office,  thus  naturally 
created  feeling  against  us.  The  control  of  the  press 
was  no  part  of  the  duty  of  the  head  censorship  office, 
but  simply  of  the  General  Officers'  Corps.  The  office 
gave  advice  to  the  supreme  military  authority  (the 
Minister  of  War)  when  asked  to  do  so,  and  kept  him 
informed  of  any  events  that  in  its  opinion  required  his 
attention.  General  Headquarters  was  thus  not  in  a 
position  to  take  direct  action  against  any  newspaper, 
but  could  merely  draw  the  attention  of  the  Govern- 
ment, and  in  particular  of  the  War  Ministry,  or  in 
urgent  cases  of  the  Acting  General  Staff,  if  it  thought 


448  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

that  the  attitude  of  this  or  that  paper  was  injiirious  to 
the  prosecution  of  the  war. 

There  was,  legally  speaking,  no  political  censorship. 
This  was  a  mistake,  and  the  cause  of  much  mischief. 
The  Government  itself  often  approached  the  head 
censorship  office  with  the  request  that  it  would  issue 
instructions  in  one  sense  or  another.  When  I  saw 
more  clearly  into  this  method  of  operation  I  protested 
against  such  an  employment  of  the  military  censorship 
and  put  a  stop  to  it. 

The  subordination  of  the  head  censorship  to  General 
Headquarters  was  not  a  happy  arrangement.  The 
office  had  been  created  in  the  conditions  of  the  early 
days  of  the  war,  as  an  auxiliary  of  the  General  Staff. 
All  censorship  must  excite  opposition,  and  this  will,  of 
necessity,  grow  louder  as  pacifist  feeling  increases  and 
home  political  movements  feel  their  activities  limited. 
General  Headquarters  suffered  much  from  such  pro- 
tests. The  appointment,  in  the  autumn  of  191 6,  of 
the  Minister  of  War  as  the  head  of  all  military  offices 
at  home  did  something  to  ease  my  position  over  against 
the  press.  Unfortunately  the  Minister  refused  in  191 7 
to  take  over  the  head  censorship  office. 

The  press  of  our  allies  was  more  securely  controlled 
by  their  Governments  than  was  the  case  with  us;  in 
Bulgaria  and  Turkey,  however,  it  had  not  the  im- 
portance it  possessed  in  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary. 
Out  allies  also  exercised  a  severe  political  censorship. 

In  Austria-Hungary  the  Government  failed  to  take 
any  steps  to  maintain  the  morale  or  to  rally  the  popu- 
lation to  the  fight.  In  their  last  fight  for  existence  the 
Governments  of  the  Double  Monarchy  were  in  no  sense 
the  leaders  of  its  peoples. 

There  was  little  expression  of  opinion  in  Turkey,  and 
only  a  little  more  in  Bulgaria,  where  also  the  Govern- 
ment failed  to  lead  the  people. 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    449 

It  was,  of  necessity,  very  painful  to  see  how  often 
Germany  was  misunderstood  in  the  press  of  her  alHes. 
Our  Nibelungen  loyalty,  after  all,  was  no  mere  empty 
word,  and  the  German  blood  spilt  on  foreign  fields 
should  have  earned  us  proper  recognition.  In  the  end 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Nicolai  succeeded  in  making  definite 
arrangements  for  the  publication  of  military  news  in  the 
press  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  which  removed  part 
of  the  trouble.  Tours  of  journalists  from  the  allied 
countries  were  also  expected  to  bring  useful  enlighten- 
ment, but  did  not,  in  fact,  make  much  difference. 

In  this  matter  also  our  Government  failed  to  take 
any  effective  action.  It  should  have  undertaken  ex- 
planatory propaganda  on  a  large  scale  among  our  allies, 
and  thus  have  done  good  service  for  the  country  for  the 
post-war  period  as  well. 

Bit  by  bit  the  military  foreign  propaganda  depart- 
ment estabHshed  branches  in  the  allied  countries. 


VIII 

Good  propaganda  must  keep  well  ahead  of  actual 
political  events.  It  must  act  as  pacemaker  to  policy, 
and  form  public  opinion  without  the  consciousness  of 
the  people.  Before  political  aims  can  be  realized,  the 
world  has  to  be  convinced  of  their  necessity  and  moral 
justification.  What  one  desires  to  achieve  must  be 
presented  as  simply  a  logical  conclusion  from  events. 
We  made  no  use  of  propaganda  abroad;  indeed,  we 
hardly  knew  of  it,  although  at  home  skilful  work  was 
done  against  certain  persons.  Our  political  aims  and 
decisions,  offered  to  the  world  as  sudden  surprises, 
seemed  often  to  be  brutal  steps  taken  on  the  spur  of 
the  moment.  This  could  have  been  skilfully  avoided 
by  broad  far-sighted  propaganda. 

While  we  had  not  been  ready  for  propaganda  work 


450  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

in  time  of  peace,  we  were  also  lacking  in  the  necessary 
equipment  therefor.  We  had  no  world  telegraph 
service,  with  its  chain  of  cable  and  wireless  stations. 
Efforts  to  remedy  this  had  not  yet  been  carried  to  frui- 
tion. We  lacked  a  leading  journal  on  a  strong  national 
basis,  possessing  influence  abroad  and  weight  at  home, 
like  The  Times  in  England,  the  Temps  in  France,  and  the 
Novoe  Vremya  in  Russia.  All  these  three  papers  were 
independent,  and  stood  on  strong  national  platforms. 
The  journals  from  which  foreigners  received  direct  in- 
formation from  Germany  were  all  devotees  of  inter- 
nationalism, fundamentally  opposed  to  our  form  of 
government,  and  gave  a  false  and  one-sided  picture  of 
our  life  and  thought  and  of  the  conditions  in  Germany, 

In  the  matter  of  propaganda,  we  had  much  to  catch 
up;  we  had  to  undertake  the  fight  against  the  enemy 
at  home  and  to  work  with  all  oiu-  strength  for  the 
extension  of  the  submarine  warfare,  which  was  then 
just  decided  upon.  We  could  not  renoiince  the  use  of 
weapons  of  decisive  effect. 

I  learned  from  discussions  which  I  had  with  leading 
men  that  there  was  still,  even  during  the  war,  consider- 
able ignorance  as  to  the  real  necessity  of  a  propaganda 
possessed  of  living  ideas  and  capable  of  seizing  the 
popular  imagination.  The  attitude  of  the  Government 
was  lukewarm  and  doubting.  The  authorities  did  not 
yet  understand  the  essence  of  the  matter.  They  were 
opposed  to  propaganda  on  the  ground  that  it  was  too 
much  like  quack  advertising,  whereas  true  propaganda 
works  in  such  a  way  that  its  activities  are  not  observed ; 
it  works  silently.  Doubtless  because  it  knew  its  own 
weakness,  the  Government  thought  that  any  wide  and 
powerful  counter-organization  on  our  part  against  the 
enemy  propaganda  would  be  more  or  less  a  hopeless 
undertaking.  This  point  of  view  or  the  remark, 
"Our  cause  is  good,  we  need  no  advocate,"  could  not 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    451 

help  us;  we  had  every  reason  to  take  action,  not 
merely  expressly  to  defend  ourselves,  but  also  to  move 
from  defense  to  attack.  Only  so  could  we  treat  our 
enemy  as  he  treated  us  and  hold  our  own  in  the  mighty 
World  War. 

When  I  came  to  General  Headquarters  I  found  only 
very  scanty  arrangements,  hardly  deserving  of  the  name 
of  propaganda  organization. 

I  leave  undiscussed  the  Erzberger  Bureau,  as  I  have 
no  knowledge  of  its  activities.     It  was  later  given  up. 

In  the  summer  of  191 6  General  Headquarters  had  re- 
quested the  Government  to  establish  a  strong  propa- 
ganda organization.  After  many  obstacles  had  been 
overcome,  especially  in  connection  with  the  Foreign 
Office,  the  military  office  of  this  department  was 
set  up. 

Side  by  side  with  this  office,  which  was  set  up  for 
purely  military  purposes,  the  Foreign  Office  took  up 
the  question  of  the  establishment  of  similar  bodies  for 
political  and  economic  propaganda.  It  was  only  with 
this  understanding  that  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff 
in  the  field  had  founded  the  military  office.  All  the 
three  bodies  were  on  similar  lines,  laid  down  by  the 
Foreign  Office,  to  carry  on  wide  and  energetic  counter- 
propaganda,  not  merely  contenting  themselves  with 
weak  defenses  to  the  enemy's  lies,  but  attacking  the 
enemy  propaganda.  The  political  and  economic  propa- 
ganda service  of  the  Foreign  Office  was,  unfortunately, 
confined  to  a  press  and  pamphlet  service,  which  was 
mainly  devoted  to  influencing  the  press  by  means  of 
denials,  discussions  of  political  events,  and  exposures 
of  enemy  weaknesses.  It  was  like  dropping  water  on 
a  hot  stone,  and  was  not  of  the  least  importance. 

In  the  military  department  of  the  Foreign  Office, 
Colonel  von  Haeften  gradually  built  up  a  large  organi- 
zation.    This  was  under  General  Headquarters,   but 


452  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

was  in  the  main  financed  by  the  Foreign  Office,  which 
received  in  return  the  right  of  joint  control  and  of 
dictating  Hnes  of  policy,  rights  of  which  it  made 
virtually  no  use. 

Colonel  von  Haeften  is  an  officer  of  unusually  high 
intelligence  and  of  burning  patriotism,  who  under- 
takes every  task  with  an  energy  bom  of  his  idealism, 
and  who  possesses  the  gift  of  constructive  work  and 
of  carrying  his  fellows  with  him.  What  has  been 
achieved  is  in  all  essentials  the  work  of  himself  and  his 
colleagues. 

By  word  and  picture,  and,  above  all,  by  means  of 
the  moving  pictures.  Colonel  von  Haeften  sought  to 
obtain  a  secure  footing  in  neutral  countries. 

Oral  propaganda  was  held  to  be  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance. The  passing  of  news  from  mouth  to  mouth 
was  considered  to  be  the  best,  because  it  is  the  most 
dangerous  means  of  propaganda.  The  idea  is  planted, 
and  no  man  knows  whence  it  comes. 

Propaganda  by  pictures  and  films  was  encouraged  by 
the  formation  of  a  special  graphic  department,  the 
"picture  and  film  office,"  and  later  of  the  Universal 
Film  Company,  Limited.  The  film  is  a  means  of 
popular  education,  and  Colonel  von  Haeften  desired  to 
employ  it  as  such  after  the  war,  his  war  organization 
being  designed  to  that  end.  Pictures  and  films,  and 
illustrations  in  poster  form,  penetrate  farther  and  have 
a  stronger  effect  than  writing,  and  thus  have  a  greater 
influence  on  the  great  masses  of  the  people. 

At  the  same  time,  press  propaganda  was  carried  on 
by  telegraphic,  wireless,  and  correspondence  service, 
other  propaganda  with  pamphlets  and  lectures,  and 
work  was  also  done  in  connection  with  the  neutral 
War  Press  camp.  Above  all,  Colonel  von  Haeften 
sought  by  quick  news  distribution  to  find  the  way  into 
the  hostile  portions  of  the  neutral  press. 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    453 

Art  propaganda  was  also  encouraged.  Here  we  per- 
haps did  too  much.  The  Foreign  Office  attached  great 
importance  to  this,  having  indeed  taken  it  up  some 
time  earHer. 

At  our  embassies  abroad  and  in  neutral  countries, 
and  also  in  the  occupied  districts  in  the  East,  branch 
military  propaganda  offices  were  established  as  organs 
of  Colonel  von  Haeften,  working  up,  with  an  eye  to  the 
special  circumstances  of  the  country,  the  material  sup- 
plied from  the  central  organization,  and  then  distribu- 
ting it.  They  worked  in  the  closest  touch  with  the 
ambassador. 

It  was  quite  impossible  that  Colonel  von  Haeften 
alone  could  succeed  in  making  up  all  the  ground  that 
we  had  lost  in  the  long  years  before  and  after  the  out- 
break of  war,  and  in  fighting  on  equal  terms  against  the 
enemy  propaganda  and  the  public  opinion  commanded 
by  it  in  the  neutral  countries,  let  alone  in  penetrating 
into  the  enemy  countries  themselves.  The  insular 
position  of  England  and  America  made  this  impossible. 
The  lines  of  attack  upon  France  lay  through  Spain  and 
Switzerland.  From  Spain  we  were  cut  otf,  and  there 
was  nothing  left  but  the  narrow  Swiss  frontier,  as  was 
the  case  with  Italy  also. 

The  German  propaganda  kept  on  its  feet  only  with 
difficulty;  in  spite  of  all  its  trouble,  its  achievements, 
in  comparison  with  its  mighty  task,  were  insufficient. 
We  wrought  no  real  effect  on  the  enemy  peoples. 
Among  them  a  strong  Government,  determined  and 
with  its  heart  in  the  war,  crushed  with  relentless  violence 
every  sentiment  of  weakness  or  softness  that  stirred, 
and  every  discussion  about  peace,  above  all,  about  a 
real  "peace  of  imderstanding." 

In  neutral  countries,  and  among  our  allies,  too,  we 
achieved  nothing  important. 

We  also  attempted  to  carry  on  propaganda  on  the 


454  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

enemy  fronts.  In  the  East  the  Russians  were  the 
creators  of  their  own  collapse,  and  our  work  there  was 
of  secondary  importance.  In  the  West  the  front  was 
not  rendered  open  to  infection  by  the  destruction  of 
morale  at  home,  and  no  success  awaited  the  propaganda 
that  we  gradually  introduced. 

Matters  would  have  been  different  if  the  Chancellor 
had  supported  Colonel  von  Haef  ten  with  all  the  strength 
of  his  high  office  and  with  real  good-will.  I  often 
begged  him  to  do  something  definite.  It  became  in- 
disputably essential  to  establish  an  Imperial  Ministry 
of  Propaganda.  I  laid  all  the  more  weight  on  this,  as 
propaganda  by  the  speeches  of  statesmen  proved  its 
worth  ever  more  and  more.  Lord  Northcliffe  was  quite 
right  when  he  said  that  the  speech  of  an  English 
statesman  was  worth  twenty  thousand  pounds,  that 
if  it  was  copied  in  the  German  press  it  was  worth 
fifty  thousand  poimds,  and  that  if  the  Germans  did 
not  reply  to  it  it  was  worth  one  hundred  thousand 
pounds.  We  had  no  effective  answer  to  the  barrage 
of  speeches  from  enemy  statesmen,  and  we  never  even 
thought  of  suppressing  them.  The  fight  against  these 
speeches  could  not  be  undertaken  by  the  military  de- 
partment of  the  Foreign  Office,  nor  could  it  be  done  by 
anybody  save  an  imperial  office  possessing  special 
authority.  At  last  a  hesitating  step  was  taken  in  this 
direction  in  August  191 8,  with  quite  incomplete  results; 
besides,  it  was  then  too  late. 

Under  these  conditions  it  was  quite  impossible  to 
achieve  any  unity  of  propaganda  between  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary,  as  was  so  remarkably  well  done 
among  our  enemies.  We  regarded  everything  as  a 
"home"  question  that  concerned  only  the  one  country 
or  the  other,  instead  of  realizing  that  we  were  but  one 
body,  against  which  the  enemy  had  raised  his  threaten- 
ing arm  for  one  destructive  blow. 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR   455 

The  army  had  no  help  from  the  strong  propaganda 
directed  from  home.  While  her  army  was  victorious 
on  the  field  of  battle,  Germany  failed  in  the  fight  of 
intellects  against  the  enemy  peoples. 


IX 

In  the  autumn  of  191 6  the  army  received  only  scant 
moral  support  and  encouragement  from  home,  although 
there  had  not  yet  been  any  misunderstandings.  The 
army  was  tired  and  very  exhausted,  but  its  spirits  were 
good  and  its  morale  was  high. 

There  was  close  and  mutual  Uaison  between  the  army 
and  the  homeland. 

Leave  was  given  as  generously  as  possible.  The 
number  of  men  who  obtained  leave  of  absence  was 
always  less  than  the  authorities  or  myself  would  like 
it  to  have  been.  Apart  altogether  from  the  military 
situation,  transport  conditions  made  it  impossible  to 
grant  leave  on  the  scale  which  I  would  have  desired. 
In  times  of  fighting  stress  leave  had  to  be  cut  down. 

The  sick  and  wounded  took  home  news  of  the  army, 
and  the  army  had  news  of  home  conditions  from  the 
stream  of  reinforcements  and  returned  wounded. 

The  letter,  newspaper,  and  parcel  post  worked  well, 
and  the  army's  choice  of  newspapers  was  not  limited. 
Only  certain  organs  of  the  Independent  Social  Demo- 
crats were  forbidden.  The  right  to  ban  any  newspaper 
lay  with  the  army  staffs.  I  know  of  only  a  few  isolated 
instances  in  which  this  right  was  exercised. 

The  army  was  still  receiving  adequate  reinforcements. 
These  had,  however,  to  be  used,  not  only  for  filling 
the  ranks  of  existing  formations,  but  also,  however 
reluctantly,  for  forming  new  divisions,  which  were 
needed  to  give  us  a  freer  hand  for  operating  against 
the   expected   attacks   in   the   East   and   West.     The 


456  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN   STORY 

thirteen  divisions  thus  constructed  at  a  cost,  it  is 
true,  of  reducing  battalion  strength,  were  expected  to  be 
ready  for  the  field  in  the  spring  of  191 7. 

One  result  of  the  trench  warfare  was  that  troops 
who  were  short  of  special  companies  established  works 
companies  of  all  varieties.  These  were,  of  course,  per- 
manently retained  in  their  sectors,  the  men  remaining 
behind  when  their  divisions  were  removed.  All  sorts 
of  difficulties  arose  from  this,  and  everything  suffered. 
A  permanent  works  company  was  therefore  formed  in 
every  division  out  of  the  men  engaged  in  this  special 
work,  who  ipso  facto  left  their  old  formations.  The 
battalions  mainly  affected  by  this  were  again  reduced  in 
numbers,  a  step  necessary  in  any  case,  as  the  young 
company  commanders  were  not  equal  to  supervising 
properly  the  work  of  some  two  hundred  men  when  out 
of  action  or  to  leading  them  in  the  field. 

An  artillery  commander  was  allotted  to  each  division. 
Many  new  formations  were  established  in  the  field  and 
in  the  heavy  artillery.  A  special  army  field-artillery  was 
set  up,  working  wholly  outside  the  divisional  formations, 
and  intended  to  strengthen  the  divisional  artillery  in 
the  fighting-line.  Nine  batteries  were  insufficient  for 
a  divisional  front  of  two  to  three  kilometers,  artillery 
requirements  having  risen  to  incredible  heights. 

The  new  organization  was  accompanied  by  new 
arming. 

Our  air  forces,  in  particular  our  aeroplanes,  were 
further  developed.  They  had  attained  such  strength 
that  it  seemed  necessary  to  place  them  under  a  special 
General  Officers'  Corps,  which  should  be  directly  under 
the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  in  the  field.  The  first 
commander  of  the  air  forces  was  General  von  Hoppner. 
This  officer,  who  had  proved  his  worth  as  chief  of  an 
army  General  Staff  and  as  a  commander,  now  did  all 
that  lay  in  his  power  to  develop  this  branch  of  the  future. 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    457 

His  second  in  command  was  Colonel  Thomsen,  who 
had  hitherto  himself  commanded  the  air  forces.  In 
spite  of  the  efforts  of  the  General  Staff  in  peace-time, 
we  had  begun  the  war  with  insufficient  air  weapons. 
Germany  and  the  German  Army  owe  it  to  the  enormous 
constructive  energy  of  Colonel  Thomsen  and  of  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Siegert,  who  worked  at  home,  that  our 
aircraft  developed  from  success  to  success  during  the 
war.  At  the  moment,  the  most  important  thing  was  to 
increase  our  pursuit  squadrons,  and  to  provide  them 
with  a  good  fighting-machine,  without,  however,  re- 
ducing the  supply  of  other  varieties.  Considerable  at- 
tention was  also  devoted  to  bombing  squadrons. 

The  airship  disappeared  from  the  weapons  of  the 
army.  It  provided  too  large  a  target.  The  navy  con- 
tinued its  employment. 

Anti-aircraft  armament  was  perfected  and  increased 
in  supply,  and  defensive  arrangements  at  the  front  and 
at  home  were  organized  on  the  most  complete  scale.  This 
cost  us  men  and  material,  which  the  front  had  to  do 
without. 

Trench  warfare  offered  no  scope  for  cavalry.  The 
formation  of  regiments  of  dismounted  cavalry,  in  bat- 
talion strength,  out  of  the  cavalry  regiments,  which  had 
already  been  undertaken,  was  now  continued,  and  the 
Landsturm  and  Landwehr  squadrons  were  broken  up. 
Their  horses  were  used  for  the  artillery  reorganization 
and  for  baggage- trains.  The  casualties  in  horses  were 
extraordinarily  high,  and  the  import  from  neutral 
countries  was  hardly  worth  reckoning.  The  homeland 
and  the  occupied  districts  could  not  cover  the  losses. 
There  were  many  reasons  for  the  shortage.  Our  finer 
breeds  had  proved  their  worth,  but  our  lighter  horses 
were  not  of  sufficiently  good  strain,  and  their  breeding 
had  not  been  adequately  developed.  The  heavier  horses 
turned  out  to  be  quite  unequal  to  the  stress  of  war. 


458  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

General  Headquarters  was  compelled  to  distribute  the 
columns  and  trains  which  had  hitherto  been  part  of  the 
divisional  organizations,  among  the  armies,  and  to 
attach  them  permanently  to  districts.  With  the  con- 
tinual relieving  of  the  divisions  involved  in  defensive 
fighting,  the  burden  on  the  railways  through  the  carry- 
ing of  heavy  baggage  became  too  great.  I  much  re- 
gretted the  new  arrangements  which  we  were  thus  com- 
pelled to  adopt,  for  the  supervision  and  care  exercised 
by  the  divisions  were  better  than  those  of  the  armies  and 
groups. 

The  construction  of  positions  in  the  West  was  sys- 
tematically revised,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  new 
theory  of  deep  organization  of  all  positions,  and  also 
with  the  closest  attention  to  the  natural  formation  of 
the  ground.  In  the  East  the  positions  could  keep  more 
of  their  old  design.  In  addition  to  the  construction  of 
the  two  great  strategic  lines  in  the  West  there  was  much 
work  to  be  done  there  at  all  parts  of  the  line,  the  posi- 
tions in  Flanders,  to  the  east  of  Arras,  and  at  Verdun 
being  deepened,  while  the  Alsace-Lorraine  line,  where, 
so  far,  not  enough  had  been  done,  was  also  strength- 
ened. The  army  worked  hard  at  these  positions,  the 
men  understanding  that  they  were  digging  for  their 
lives.  The  labor  that  we  received  from  home  was 
insufficient  for  the  many  works  that  required  con- 
struction along  the  far-flung  front.  We  were  thus 
forced,  unfortunately,  to  employ  troops  on  the  work, 
and  their  time  for  rest  and  training  was  lost,  it  being 
impossible  to  fulfil  both  requirements.  The  armies 
wanted  to  continue  construction,  which  seemed  to  them 
the  most  vital,  while  Lieutenant-Colonel  Wetzell  and 
I  emphasized  the  necessity  for  training.  There  was  a 
good  deal  of  compromise  in  the  matter. 

For  the  education  of  the  men  for  the  coming  great 
defensive  battles,  the  "defensive  fighting"  orders  were 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    459 

worked  out.  Colonel  Bauer  and  Captain  Geyer,  who 
had  a  well-developed  sense  of  tactics  and  a  clear  mode 
of  expression,  deserve  the  greatest  praise  for  this 
work. 

In  sharp  contrast  to  the  form  of  defense  hitherto  em- 
ployed, which  had  concentrated  in  regular  and  easily 
recognizable  lines,  a  broad  defense  was  now  organized 
in  deep  formations,  mobile  and  handled  in  loose  groups. 
At  the  end  of  the  fighting  the  position  should,  of  course, 
still  be  held  by  us,  but  the  infantryman  need  no  longer 
say  to  himself,  "Here  I  must  stand  or  fall,"  but  had, 
on  the  contrary,  the  right,  within  a  limited  range,  to 
give  way  in  any  direction  before  strong  enemy  fire. 
Any  part  of  the  line  that  was  lost  was  to  be  recovered 
by  counter-attack.  The  group  (of  a  non-commissioned 
officer  and  eight  men),  the  importance  of  which  had 
been  strongly  emphasized  by  many  intelligent  com- 
manders before  the  war,  now  became  officially  the 
unit  of  the  infantry  in  fighting  disposition.  The  posi- 
tion of  the  non-commissioned  officer  as  group  leader 
thus  gained  in  importance.  Tactics  became  more  and 
more  individualized.  Having  regard  for  the  ever  more 
scanty  training  of  our  reinforcements  in  officers,  non- 
commissioned officers,  and  men,  and  the  consequent 
falling  off  in  discipline,  it  would  have  been  a  perilous 
undertaking,  one,  indeed,  in  which  failure  was  regarded 
as  probable  by  many  soldiers  of  position,  to  have  made 
any  greater  demands  on  the  subordinate  leaders  and 
the  rank  and  file. 

The  controversy  raged  furiously  in  my  staff;  I  myself 
had  to  take  part,  and  advocated  the  new  tactics.  The 
new  Operations  Order  reaped  advantages  from  every 
lesson  we  had  gained  in  the  Somme  battles,  both  as 
to  the  employment  of  artillery  and  aircraft  and  as  to 
the  co-operation  of  the  various  branches.  The  order 
became  a  standard  text-book  for  the  whole  army,  and 


46o  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

for  the  forces  of  our  allies,  so  far  as  conditions  with  them 
permitted.  Without  this  last  limitation  the  order 
presented  dangers,  for  it  made  demands  upon  the  men 
which  could  be  fulfilled  only  by  troops  which,  if  no 
longer  of  first-class  training,  were  at  any  rate  thoroughly 
devoted  and  disciplined. 

This  "Defensive  Fighting"  order  had  as  its  comple- 
ment the  "Training  Regulations  for  Infantry  in  War," 
which  was  drawn  up  in  the  Headquarters  Staff  of 
Gen.  Fritz  von  Below.  This  document  demonstrates 
this  great  leader's  thorough  grasp  of  the  character  of 
our  infantry.  My  staff,  too,  worked  out  a  great  number 
of  further  orders  for  special  branches  and  for  field  forti- 
fications. The  training  order  for  the  artillery  was  not 
completed  in  the  course  of  the  winter,  but  its  main 
points  were  contained  in  "Defensive  Fighting."  It 
had  become  clear  in  the  course  of  the  war  that  the 
"gunners"  could  not  be  neglected,  but  that,  on  the 
contrary,  their  importance  was  increasing.  In  order  to 
assist  in  their  development,  special  monthly  periodicals 
dealing  with  the  guns  and  gunnery  were  prepared  by 
the  Director  of  Artillery  at  General  Headquarters  and 
distributed  to  the  troops. 

In  all  quarters  there  was  a  real  spirit  of  activity  in 
the  army.  We  kept  in  close  touch  with  the  feeling  of 
the  army,  which  was  supplied  with  the  best  that  could 
in  any  manner  be  obtained. 

Orders  on  paper  were  of  themselves  useless;  they 
had  to  be  ground  into  the  flesh  and  blood  of  officers  and 
men.  We  set  up  a  course  at  Valenciennes  for  command- 
ers of  higher  rank  and  for  General  Staff  officers,  to  get 
rid  of  any  ignorance  as  to  the  nature  of  defensive  fight- 
ing. The  German  Crown  Prince  established  a  similar 
institution  at  Sedan. 

Numerous  and  varied  courses  were  established  by  the 
armies,  in  particular  for  the  training  of  junior  officers 


FURTHER  PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR   461 

as  company  commanders,  and  for  non-commissioned 
officers. 

For  all  branches  the  foundation  of  everything  was  the 
maintenance  and  improvement  of  discipline,  without 
which  no  army  can  continue  to  exist.  Discipline  was 
also  required,  at  this  stage  of  the  war,  to  counter- 
balance the  many  disadvantages  affecting  the  life  of  the 
troops.  The  frequent  alterations  of  formations  and  the 
constant  changes  of  position  made  the  accommodation 
constantly  less  comfortable,  and  the  danger  of  the  men 
seizing  anything  they  wanted  grew  greater.  The  im- 
portance of  "Meum"  and  "TuMm"  was  lost  sight  of. 
Clothing  and  equipment  had  deteriorated,  and  were 
consequently  more  difficult  to  keep  in  order.  Many 
causes,  not  the  least  of  which  was  the  want  of  lighting 
arrangements  in  the  dugouts,  led  to  a  neglect  of  outward 
appearances.  The  men  "let  things  rip."  Life  at  the 
front  was  bound  to  have  an  effect  upon  them.  Upon 
strong  characters  it  had  a  stimulating  effect,  but  these 
were  rare,  and  the  morale  of  the  bulk  was  siu-e  to  stiff er 
increasingly  so  the  longer  the  war  lasted.  Any  thinking 
soldier  would  know  that.  It  had,  indeed,  been  the 
case  in  every  war.  The  necessity  for  moral  support 
from  home  to  maintain  the  feeUng  of  duty  and  discipline 
at  the  front  was  all  the  stronger,  and  the  homeland 
could  give  such  support  only  if  its  own  morale  was  high. 
The  manner  in  which  the  troops  behaved  themselves 
in  public  places  and  their  saluting  were  sure  tests  of 
the  condition  of  the  army.  Their  conduct  was  by  no 
means  always  good  in  this  respect. 

The  infantry  was  trained  in  the  new  formations,  and 
in  musketry;  courses  for  group  and  company  com- 
manders were  continued  everyw^here. 

The  training  of  machine  gunners  was  carried  out  on 
the  most  generous  scale,  and  a  special  shooting-range 
built  for  the  sharpshooter  detachments. 


462  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

On  our  artillery  ranges  the  artillery  improved  its 
training  in  gunnery  and  its  co-operation  with  aircraft. 
The  dilution  brought  about  by  the  extensive  new  forma- 
tions had  to  be  remedied  by  careful  training  on  all  parts 
of  the  front. 

Trench-mortar  batteries  also,  as  well  as  pioneers 
and  signalers,  were  allotted  special  schools  and  training- 
grounds,  on  which  they  studied  the  particular  uses  of 
their  weapons;  but  the  ofl&cers  were  trained  also  in 
other  branches. 

Training  was  carried  on  without  interruption,  both 
in  the  line  and  behind.  The  life  was  much  the  same 
as  in  peace-time.  Everywhere  efforts  were  made  to 
fit  the  army  for  its  heavy  task  and  to  keep  the  losses 
within  bounds. 

At  home,  work  proceeded  on  similar  lines.  Condi- 
tions grew  more  and  more  difficult,  the  instructional 
personnel  becoming  obsolete.  Food-supplies  were 
short,  and  depot  units  were  too  much  in  touch  with 
home  and  not  in  sufficiently  close  touch  with  the  army. 
I  always  sought  to  transfer  the  training  of  reinforce- 
ments as  far  as  possible  to  recruit  depots  behind  the 
front.  A  start  was  made  in  this  direction,  and  matters 
were  carried  farther  at  a  later  stage. 

Natiu-ally,  all  the  leaders,  myself  included,  took  pre- 
cautions that  the  troops  should  not  become  tired  or 
stale  under  training.  Physical  rest  was  an  absolute 
necessity  for  the  very  maintenance  of  discipline,  and 
it  was  only  by  adequate  stays  in  rest-billets  that  men 
could  rid  themselves  of  the  effects  of  strain.  They  had 
to  be  provided  with  comfortable  quarters.  Proper  re- 
covery was  impossible  in  empty  huts,  and  we  had  to 
take  over  furniture  and  fittings  from  the  civil  popula- 
tion. Unfortunately  this  did  not  always  remain  in  the 
district,  the  troops  taking  it  with  them  when  they  were 
moved.     As  for  amusements,  there  were  the  military 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR   463 

bands  which  were  very  popular,  numerous  physical 
games,  performances  of  various  sorts,  and  libraries  of 
books. 

The  ranks  of  the  regular  non-commissioned  officers 
were  greatly  thinned.  Many  of  them  had,  like  the 
regular  officers,  fallen  in  battle  and  others  had  been 
transferred  to  new  formations  or  sent  home  for  in- 
structional duties.  The  men  promoted  from  the  troops 
at  the  front  to  take  their  places  had  not  had  sufficient 
training  in  leadership  or  in  care  for  the  men.  Discipline 
was  impaired  by  life  in  the  trenches,  where  differences 
of  rank  disappeared  for  the  time,  and  the  risk  that  the 
new  non-commissioned  officers  could  not  obtain  the 
requisite  degree  of  authority  was  inevitable.  The  bulk 
of  the  non-commissioned  officers  proved  to  be  excellent 
subordinate  leaders  in  the  field  and  trustworthy  aids 
to  the  officers;  they  fulfilled  their  difficult  work  loyally, 
and  the  country  owes  them  a  debt  of  gratitude. 

The  officers  were  fully  conscious  of  their  important 
duties  as  trainers  and  teachers  of  their  men.  This,  too, 
will  in  the  end  be  recognized.  In  peace-time  it  took 
from  twelve  to  fifteen  years  before  an  officer  commanded 
his  company.  By  that  time  the  accomplishments  which 
fitted  him  for  his  task — service,  experience,  handling  of 
men,  care  for  his  subordinates — ^had  become  second 
nature  to  him.  During  the  war  young  men  of  two  or 
three  years'  service  had  to  lead  companies.  Many 
succeeded,  but  others  were  lacking  in  various  respects. 
The  capacity  for  such  leadership  is  a  gift,  the  result 
of  upbringing  and  of  human  tact.  Zeal  and  courage 
were  not  of  themselves  sufficient.  Everything  was  done 
at  home  and  at  the  front  to  insure  the  thorough  training 
of  company  leaders,  but  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  com- 
plaints of  the  men  as  to  their  inexperience  had  only  too 
much  justification.  This  was  a  matter  of  the  greatest 
seriousness,   involving  the  danger  of  destroying  the 


464  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

admirable  relations  that  had  hitherto  existed  between 
officers  and  men. 

The  excellent  regular  officers,  so  often  the  object  of 
attacks,  were  no  longer  available;  they  lay  beneath 
the  turf.  In  the  short  period  of  the  war  it  was  impos- 
sible to  train  a  new  generation  of  these  men  with  the 
same  high  professional  quahties,  the  same  thorough 
knowledge,  and  the  same  sense  of  responsibility  for 
their  men  as  had  been  possessed  by  the  men  trained 
through  a  long  course  of  years.  Nothing  could  pro- 
vide a  more  striking  justification  of  our  whole  army 
system  than  the  events  of  this  war.  A  well-known 
Social  Democratic  member  of  the  Reichstag,  who  vis- 
ited me  as  a  war  correspondent  at  Kovno,  emphasized 
especially  how  fundamentally  he  had  been  compelled 
to  alter  his  opinion  of  the  regular  officers.  He  said 
that  in  his  view  they  looked  after  their  men  with  the 
most  thorough  devotion  and  understanding,  and  that 
officers  drawn  from  the  non-active  list  found  it  difficult 
to  keep  pace  with  them.  I  was  greatly  gratified  by 
this  frank  and  striking  admission. 

In  the  circumstances  there  should  have  been  more 
frequent  promotion  of  regular  non-commissioned  of- 
ficers to  commissioned  rank.  This  was  done  here  and 
there.  My  former  regimental  clerk  in  Dusseldorf  was 
an  officer  in  an  active  regiment  as  early  as  the  autumn 
of  1914. 

Owing  to  the  insufficient  training  and  lack  of  experi- 
ence, especially  in  routine  duty,  of  the  company  com- 
manders, the  position  of  battalion  commander  became 
more  prominent  and  important.  Unfortunately,  bat- 
talion commanders  were  often  drawn  from  the  non- 
active  list,  and  were  thus  naturally  somewhat  deficient 
in  knowledge  of  routine  duties,  although,  owing  to  their 
greater  age,  they  were  more  reliable.  The  war  must 
have  made  heavy  demands  upon  men  of  their  age,  for 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR   465 

in  defensive  fighting  they  had  to  go  into  the  front  Hne 
again  and  again.  Both  their  health  and  their  nerves 
were  subjected  to  the  greatest  strain.  They  did  ad- 
mirable work  in  battle,  as  admirable,  indeed,  as  that 
of  the  battalion  leaders  of  the  active  list. 

The  duties  of  regimental  commanders  were  varied 
and  exceptionally  arduous.  They  were  everywhere  di- 
rectly responsible  for  their  troops,  and  had  to  answer 
to  their  superiors  for  the  appearance  and  morale,  the 
success  or  failure,  the  weal  or  woe,  of  every  single  man 
under  their  command.  The  outward  appearance  and 
the  true  value  of  the  troops,  and  especially  of  the 
officers,  were  indicative  of  the  personality,  the  will,  the 
capacity,  of  the  commander.  He  had  to  inspire  his 
ofificers  and  men  with  his  own  spirit;  he  was  their 
example  and  their  stay,  their  counselor  and  friend  in 
rest  and  in  the  line. 

In  trench  warfare  it  was  more  difficult  for  him  to 
influence  his  officers  and  men,  but  in  the  end  he  could 
make  his  impression  upon  them.  These  regimental 
commanders  were  often  wounded,  and  frequent  changes 
were  thus  necessary.  There  was  often  insufficient  time 
for  a  commander  to  gain  the  confidence  of  his  regiment. 
Some  commanders,  however,  retained  their  regiments 
for  very  long  periods,  sometimes  for  almost  the  whole 
of  the  war.  Some  of  them,  owing  to  heavy  losses,  had 
to  renew  their  regiments  completely  three  or  four  times. 
That  involved  too  heavy  a  demand  upon  them,  al- 
though no  doubt  something  of  the  traditions  of  the 
regiment  survived  all  through. 

Next  to  the  regimental  commander  the  most  promi- 
nent position  was  occupied  by  the  divisional  com- 
mander, his  position  being  similar  to  that  of  the 
general  officer  commanding  in  peace-time.  Hard  as 
General  Headquarters  strove,  it  proved  impossible,  in 
the  constant  troop  movements  involved  by  position 


466  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

warfare,  to  maintain  corps  formations;  this  was  a 
decided  general  disadvantage.  The  divisions  gradually 
acquired  in  every  respect  greater  independence,  and 
the  divisional  commander  thus  became  more  prominent. 
Through  his  headquarters  passed  all  threads  from 
above  and  below,  for  combatant  work,  training,  and 
administration.  He  was  the  educator  of  his  troops. 
It  was  impossible  to  devote  too  much  care  to  the 
selection  of  these  officers. 

The  General  Staff  officer  was,  so  to  speak,  a  specialty. 
As  the  war  became  more  technical,  his  duties  were  more 
difficult.  It  was  no  longer  sufficient  for  him  to  have  a 
general  knowledge  of  the  uses  of  all  arms.  He  had  to 
be  a  good  artilleryman  and,  in  addition,  to  possess  a 
clear  knowledge  of  the  use  of  aircraft,  of  the  signal 
service,  of  the  supply  of  reinforcements,  and  of  a  thou- 
sand other  things,  while  he  further  had  to  master  many 
details  which  the  divisional  commander  had  no  time 
to  settle.  In  spite  of  every  effort  to  keep  them  reason- 
ably brief,  the  orders  which  he  had  to  draft  grew  ever 
longer  and  more  complicated.  The  more  technical  the 
war  became  the  more  did  these  orders  grow  into 
veritable  works  of  art,  involving  infinite  skill  and 
knowledge.  There  was  no  other  way,  if  things  were  to 
be  properly  co-ordinated.  All  this  complication  often 
compelled  the  General  Staff  officer  to  keep  many  mat- 
ters in  his  own  hand.  Precautions  had  to  be  taken 
that  the  independence  of  other  headquarters  did  not 
suffer  through  this  procedure,  and  that  the  commander, 
too,  was  not  "shelved."  I  could  not  have  permitted 
either  of  these  developments. 

The  commanders  maintained  their  position.  They 
were  the  leaders  and  trainers  of  their  troops,  and  could 
not  be  in  too  close  touch  with  them.  The  General  Staff 
officer  was  their  helper  and  adviser  and  was  responsible 
for  the  smooth  and  co-ordinated  working  of  the  ma- 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    467 

chinery.  Their  tasks  were  different,  but  there  was 
plenty  for  both  to  do;  they  had  this  in  common,  that 
they  had  to  take  the  greatest  care  of  the  troops.  The 
General  Staff  officer  of  the  division  had  no  separate 
responsibility,  this  falling  on  the  corps  and  army  lead- 
ers, so  far  as  that  was  possible  in  conditions  in  the  field. 
The  duty  of  the  General  Staff  officer  was  to  keep  in  the 
background  and  to  work  without  ceasing. 

The  selection  and  training  of  General  Staff  officers 
was  difficult.  I  accepted  only  officers  who  had  fought 
in  the  front  line.  War  experience,  however,  and  the 
education  given  in  the  special  courses  held  at  Sedan, 
formed  no  real  substitute  for  the  thorough  training  of 
peace-time.  General  Headquarters  did  have  some 
complaints  from  the  troops  against  them,  mainly  on 
account  of  their  youth,  but  on  the  whole  they  were 
highly  respected.  General  Headquarters  itself  re- 
quired a  large  number  of  officers,  who  were  thus  lost 
to  the  fighting  branch.  I  had  to  take  young  men,  to 
avoid  the  withdrawal  of  too  many  officers  capable  of 
commanding.  I  found  among  my  officers  thus  selected 
many  clever,  manly,  and  honorable  men,  who  under- 
stood their  work  and  carried  it  out  with  tact.  The 
Socialist  leader,  whom  I  have  already  mentioned,  told 
me  (also  in  contradiction  to  his  former  views)  that  he 
regarded  the  staff  as  the  soul  of  the  conduct  of  the  war. 
And  so  it  was. 

I  have  been  told  since  the  end  of  the  war  that  from 
personal  motives  the  General  Staff  did  not  render  me 
true  reports,  but  always  gave  too  favorable  a  descrip- 
tion of  the  situation.  This  allegation  is  not  true  and 
is  an  insult  to  the  General  Staff,  to  which  the  army 
owes  an  immeasurable  debt. 

I  have  always  had  the  greatest  respect,  not  merely 
for  the  General  Staff,  but  also  for  officers  in  general.  I 
regarded  the  officers  as  the  backbone  of  the  army.     In 


468  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

one  of  my  last  drafts,  in  October  1918,  I  stated  that  in 
my  view  they  were  called  upon  to  take  a  decisive  part 
in  the  reconstruction  of  the  country. 

Our  officers  fulfilled  their  duty.  Their  terrible  losses 
are  a  proof  of  that.  It  cannot  be  urged  as  a  reproach 
against  them  that  many  of  their  number  had  insufficient 
experience,  for  this  was  due  simply  to  war  conditions 
and  to  their  heavy  losses.  These  inexperienced  men, 
at  any  rate,  knew  how  to  go  bravely  to  their  death. 
In  the  stress  and  danger  of  battle  the  men  always  relied 
upon  and  looked  up  to  their  officer,  even  when  he  was 
but  a  boy.  Even  if  the  officers  never  achieved  the  right 
attitude  to  their  men,  if  some  of  them  were  even  bravely 
lacking  in  their  duty  to  the  ranks,  that  is  nothing  against 
the  Officers'  Corps  in  general.  Things  were  what  in 
war  they  must  be. 

In  the  long  period  of  trench  warfare,  the  subordina- 
tion of  the  minor  leaders  increased  to  a  regretable 
extent.  This  was  a  most  unfortunate  development, 
due  in  part  to  the  ample  supply  of  telephones,  but  also 
to  some  extent  to  the  inexperience  of  the  subordinate 
leaders.  Every  leader  needed  scope  for  his  activities. 
Again  and  again  I  insisted,  both  with  the  various 
staffs  and  at  General  Headquarters,  that  tliere  should 
be  no  limitation  of  these  leaders'  authority,  which 
would  be  fundamentally  wrong  organization. 

The  training  of  the  army  for  defensive  fighting  in- 
volved most  varied  tasks  for  General  Headquarters. 
I  had  the  gratification  of  knowing  that  the  General 
Staff  in  the  West  was  in  agreement  with  our  policy 
and  measures. 

Of  course,  at  the  end  of  January  19 17  nothing  had 
been  completed.  The  new  formations  and  reforma- 
tions were  still  under  way.  The  army  was  beginning 
gradually  to  strengthen  itself.  The  troops  had  suf- 
fered   severely.     The   general   principles   of    the   new 


FURTHER  PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR   469 

regulations  were  understood,  but  had  not  been  thor- 
oughly instilled  into  the  troops.  The  supply  of  ma- 
terial was  still  in  arrears.  In  spite  of  all  our  pains, 
in  spite  of  incessant  labor,  the  strain  on  the  Western 
front  had  not  been  greatly  relieved. 

In  the  East  and  in  Rumania  also  work  was  proceed- 
ing energetically  on  the  same  lines  as  in  the  West. 
The  Commander-in-chief  in  the  East  and  General  von 
Mackensen  were  intrusted  with  the  necessary  modifica- 
tions for  the  conditions  of  that  theater.  In  the  main, 
the  troops  there  were  in  the  same  state  as  in  the  West. 

Training  was  also  intensified  in  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Army,  but  progress  here  was  slow. 

General  von  Below  had  also  taken  charge  of  the 
Bulgarian  Army,  but  we  were  unacquainted  both  with 
their  language  and  their  national  sentiment.  It  was 
very  difficult  for  us  to  make  much  progress  in  the  face 
of  Bulgarian  mistrust  of  German  tutelage.  Neverthe- 
less, the  spirit  of  the  Bulgarian  Army  began  to  improve, 
although  the  Bulgarian  General  Headquarters  itself  did 
nothing  actively  to  assist  in  the  training. 

In  the  Turkish  Army,  Liman  Pasha  alone  worked 
seriously.  The  Turkish  troops  in  Galicia  and  Rumania 
were  trained  on  German  lines,  and  not  without  success. 
There  they  were  satisfactory,  while  on  other  fronts 
they  counted  as  second  rate. 

General  Headquarters  did  all  it  could  to  strengthen 
oiu-  fighting  forces  in  quality.  Meanwhile,  however, 
the  attempt  to  increase  our  forces  through  the  forma- 
tion of  a  Polish  army,  and  thus  to  wipe  out  the  nu- 
merical superiority  of  the  enemy,  had  been  a  sorry 
failure. 


The  emplojnnent  of  the  fighting  strength  of  the  Poles, 
whom  we  had  freed  from  the  Russian  yoke,  was  im- 


470  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

portant  for  the  successful  prosecution  of  the  war.  I 
had  ahready  earlier  given  the  matter  my  consideration, 
and  ultimately  I  sanctioned  recruiting  for  the  Polish 
Legion.  They  would  not,  however,  join  us.  The  Rus- 
sian Poles  held  absolutely  aloof,  and  there  seemed  no 
prospect  of  any  alteration  in  the  composition  of  the 
Polish  Legion,  which  was  drawn  mainly  from  Galician 
Poland. 

In  the  earlier  stages  of  the  war  Poland  counted  upon 
becoming  independent  with  the  help  of  Russia.  A 
manifesto  of  the  Grand  Duke  Nicholas  had  promised 
the  restoration  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland  within  its 
former  frontiers,  under  the  kingship  of  the  Tsar  of 
Russia,  and  this  had  doubtless  made  a  great  impression 
upon  all  the  Poles.  They  could  not  expect  to  gain  their 
independence  by  throwing  in  their  lot  with  us,  unless 
we  could  overthrow  Russia.  This  we  had  to  attempt 
also  on  military  grounds.  It  seemed  to  me  possible 
that  Poland  would  give  her  sons  to  a  fight  for  freedom 
from  Russia.  Here,  as  indeed  in  many  other  matters, 
their  interests  were  really  identical  with  ours. 

When  I  became  Quartermaster-General,  on  August 
29,  I  found  that  there  was  an  agreement  in  existence, 
made  on  August  11  in  Vienna  by  the  Chancellor  with 
Baron  von  Burian,  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  the 
double  monarchy,  which  bound  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary  to  establish  an  independent  kingdom  of 
Poland,  with  a  hereditary  monarchy  and  a  constitu- 
tional government  and  a  national  army  under  a  single 
leadership,  which  was  to  be  intrusted  to  Germany. 
The  proposed  foundation  of  this  state  was  to  be  an- 
nounced by  both  countries  as  soon  as  possible,  but  it  was 
not  to  be  actually  established  until  later.  Vilna  was  to 
be  included  in  the  new  territory,  whose  frontiers,  to  the 
extent  that  this  could  be  achieved  in  the  treaty  of  peace, 
were  to  be  extended  as  far  as  possible  to  the  East. 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    471 

This  new  Poland  was  to  be  accepted  as  a  member  of 
the  alliance  of  the  two  empires  and  its  foreign  policy 
was  to  be  formed  in  accordance  with  this  association. 

The  two  Central  Powers  guaranteed  to  each  other 
their  hitherto  existing  Polish  possessions  and  provided 
for  the  frontier  modifications  which  would  have  to  be 
made  for  the  better  security  of  their  territory  at  the 
expense  of  Russian  Poland.  Such  claims  were  to  be 
limited  to  strict  military  necessities.  In  the  autumn 
of  1914  and  191 5  Von  Bethmann  had  frequently  asked 
for  my  views  as  to  the  proper  demarcation  of  this 
frontier. 

Views  differed  as  to  the  economic  future  of  Poland. 
Von  Bethmann  aimed  at  its  incorporation  in  the  Ger- 
man customs  union,  but  this  went  too  far  for  Baron 
von  Burian,  who  wished  to  see  a  separate  Polish  tariff 
system.  Expression  was  given  to  the  desire  of  both 
parties  that  the  customs  and  transport  restrictions 
which  still  separated  the  German  and  Austro-Hungarian 
districts  should  be  as  far  as  possible  eliminated. 

No  reservations  were  made  for  the  possibility,  which 
was  certainly  highly  unlikely,  of  a  separate  peace  with 
Russia. 

It  was  clear,  and  the  characters  of  both  Von  Beth- 
mann and  Baron  von  Burian  made  it  certain,  that  this 
agreement  could  not  have  been  reached  without  very 
long  discussions,  which  had  probably  started  as  early 
as  the  year  1915. 

In  any  case,  the  Chancellor  had  stated  on  April  5, 
191 6,  that  the  Polish  question  was  ripe  for  settlement, 
and  that  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  woiild  have  to 
find  the  solution. 

The  General  Governor  in  Warsaw  had  also  attacked 
the  problem  of  raising  a  PoUsh  army  and  had  arrived 
at  conclusions  highly  favorable  thereto. 

The  establishment  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland,  with 


472  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

an  army  of  its  own,  was  now  decided  upon  by  this 
agreement.  The  General  Governor  of  Poland  regarded 
the  formation  of  this  army  as  not  merely  possible,  but, 
as  a  result  of  his  inquiries,  as  containing  high  promise 
of  success.  The  uncommonly  difficult  military  situa- 
tion made  an  equalization  of  strength  more  than  urgent. 
General  Headquarters  felt,  of  course,  compelled  to  take 
up  the  proposal  for  the  formation  of  a  Polish  army. 
Any  hesitation  would  have  been  wrong,  for  it  was  a 
question  of  victory  or  defeat,  life  or  death,  for  Germany. 
What  might  arise  later  could  be  left  to  be  dealt  with 
when  it  did  arise.  The  position  of  the  war  at  the  be- 
ginning of  September  had  made  only  too  clear  to  all 
of  us  the  danger  in  which  we  stood. 

There  were  shortly  afterward  held  in  Pless  a  series 
of  discussions  of  the  Polish  question,  at  which  General 
von  Beseler  was  present,  between  the  officials  respon- 
sible for  the  policy  and  military  operations  of  Germany 
and  Austria-Hungary.  These  were  of  im.portance  to 
me  only  so  far  as  they  dealt  with  the  possibility  of 
obtaining  a  Polish  army  to  reinforce  our  own. 

General  von  Beseler  held  to  his  favorable  view,  al- 
though General  von  Conrad  uttered  a  strong  warning 
against  any  optimistic  attitude.  The  former  stated 
that  a  fundamental  condition  for  complete  success  was 
the  proclamation  of  the  kingdom  and  the  establishment 
of  a  homogeneous  government  in  Poland  by  the 
amalgamation  of  the  two  Governments  of  Lublin  and 
Warsaw.  Until  that  was  done  the  Poles  would  not  be 
convinced  that  the  Central  Powers  were  really  in  earnest 
as  to  the  carrying  out  of  their  Polish  proposals.  I 
thought  that  there  must  be  a  great  deal  of  truth  in  this. 
In  the  interests  of  the  creation  of  this  new  army,  I 
pressed  the  proposed  amalgamation  of  the  two  Govern- 
ments earnestly  upon  Baron  von  Burian.  The  statesmen 
could  not  come  to  any  agreement.     The  wishes  of  the 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    473 

double  monarchy  and  the  fear  of  domestic  difficulties  were 
more  important  to  Baron  von  Burian  than  the  interests 
of  the  common  prosecution  of  the  war.  The  amalga- 
mation of  the  two  Governments,  advocated  by  General 
Headquarters  and  by  General  von  Beseler,  was  dropped. 
General  von  Beseler,  nevertheless,  thought  that  it 
would  still  be  possible  to  form  an  army  if  the  Central 
Powers  proclaimed  the  establishment  of  the  Polish 
Kingdom.  He  proposed  that  for  the  start  four  or  five 
divisions  should  be  formed,  for  which  the  Polish  Legion 
should  form  the  nucleus.  He  hoped  to  be  able  to  place 
these  divisions  at  the  disposal  of  General  Headquarters 
in  April  191 7,  and  then  to  proceed  with  the  formation 
of  further  ones.  It  was  not  much,  but  it  did  offer 
us  the  hope  of  some  increase  of  strength.  The  war 
might  still  last  for  years,  and  every  new  addition  to 
our  forces  should  be  welcomed.  The  military  situa- 
tion compelled  us  to  agree  to  General  von  Beseler's  pro- 
posal, and  General  Headquarters  accordingly  adopted 
the  policy  which  he  held  to  be  possible. 

The  Imperial  Government  now  undertook  the  carry- 
ing out  of  the  program  of  Von  Bethmann  and  Baron 
von  Burian  for  the  creation  of  the  Kingdom  of  Poland, 
while  we  discussed  with  General  von  Beseler  and  the 
Austro-Hungarian  General  Staff  the  raising  of  a  Polish 
army. 

Under-Secretary  Wahnschaffe  entreated  me  to  express 
to  Minister  von  Lobell  my  views  as  to  the  necessity  for 
the  Polish  army.  I  did  so,  stating  in  a  private  letter 
that  the  real  ground  of  this  necessity  was  the  iron  need 
of  more  men  for  the  war. 

I  was  not  acquainted  with  the  details  of  the  proceed- 
ings in  Berlin.  The  Chancellor  and  General  von  Beseler 
warmly  advocated  the  raising  of  the  Polish  army  and 
the  establishment  of  the  kingdom.  There  was,  how- 
ever, in  many  quarters  in  Germany  considerable  oppo- 


474  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

sition  to  this  latter  step.  Rumors  soon  circulated  from 
Berlin  that  I  was  the  author  of  the  plan.  I  repeatedly 
requested  the  Government  to  explain  the  matter  prop- 
erly, but  there  was,  unfortunately,  in  spite  of  my 
request,  not  a  statesman  to  be  foimd  who  was  willing 
to  present  the  whole  position  in  its  true  aspect.  Just 
as  in  the  question  of  the  submarine  campaign,  so  now, 
in  the  autumn  of  1916,  General  Headquarters  was  for 
the  second  time  involved  without  any  act  of  its  own 
in  a  political  controversy;  on  this  occasion,  moreover, 
the  result  was  to  hinder  the  work  of  the  war.  Was  it 
surprising  that  I  felt  absolutely  disgusted  by  this 
procedure?  Everybody  who  worked  with  me  knows 
that  I  was  always  ready  for  frank  discussion,  and 
listened  willingly  to  arguments  against  my  views,  but 
that  I  insisted  on  absolute  honesty. 

I  was  called  in  by  the  Chancellor  to  assist  in  drafting 
the  proclamation  for  the  foundation  of  the  Kingdom 
of  Poland. 

In  my  view  the  proclamation  was  ambiguous,  and 
I  said  so. 

The  declaration  of  the  kingdom  on  November  5 
and  the  steps  taken  to  form  a  Polish  army  proved  to 
be  a  plowing  of  the  sands.  We  soon  saw  that  General 
von  Conrad  had  correctly  foreseen  events.  I  had  to 
abandon  finally  all  hope  of  our  army  being  strengthened 
by  Polish  troops.  General  von  Beseler,  too,  recognized 
that  he  had  been  mistaken.  Thus  ended  for  good  the 
question  of  forming  a  Polish  army.  The  idea  of  form- 
ing any  sort  of  national  troops  in  Poland,  which  was 
mooted  from  time  to  time  subsequently,  and  was  at 
times  advocated  by  General  von  Beseler  and  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  Government,  was  henceforth  received  un- 
favorably at  GeiAcral  Headquarters.  In  view  of  the 
ambiguous  attitude  of  Poland,  any  arming  of  that 
country  presented  dangers  which  it  was  as  much  our 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR    475 

duty  to  avoid  as  it  had  previously  been  to  make  the 
attempt  to  obtain  reinforcements  from  that  country. 

Any  amount  of  time  and  energy  was  wasted  on  these 
fruitless  negotiations,  in  which  the  only  point  of  in- 
terest was  provided  by  the  perseverance  with  which  the 
Austro-Hungarian  statesmen  pursued  their  anti-Ger- 
man ends  in  Poland. 

The  formation  of  a  Polish  army  failed  for  political 
reasons,  Poland  apparently  preferring  to  achieve  her 
ends  against  Germany  and  Austria-Hungary  with  the 
aid  of  the  Entente.  Man-power  she  had  in  plenty, 
even  after  sending  labor  to  Germany  and  Austria- 
Hungary.  In  this  sense  the  man-power  question  had 
no  influence  upon  the  problem  of  the  formation  of  an 
army.  Naturally,  we  continued  to  make  every  effort 
to  recruit  labor  in  Poland  on  the  largest  possible  scale 
and  to  make  use  of  the  country  for  the  prosecution  of 
the  war. 

To  attribute  the  present  conditions  in  Poland  and 
our  Eastern  districts  to  our  attempt  to  establish  the 
kingdom  shows  a  complete  lack  of  proportion.  If  the 
kingdom  had  never  been  proclaimed,  if  the  attempt 
had  never  been  made  to  raise  an  army,  events  would 
have  followed  the  same  course,  for  their  true  causes 
are  to  be  sought  in  history,  in  the  strong  national 
sentiment  of  the  Poles  and  the  traditional  hostility 
between  Poles  and  Germans. 

In  the  discussions  concerning  the  establishment  of 
the  Kingdom  of  Poland  and  the  formation  of  the  Polish 
army  we  touched  also  upon  the  possibility  of  a  separate 
peace  with  Russia,  and  the  difficulties  which  inevitably 
arose  for  the  conclusion  of  such  a  peace  from  the  Polish 
ambitions  of  the  Central  Powers.  A  separate  peace 
with  Russia  has  always  been  prominent  in  the  thought 
of  the  German  people;  as  early  as  the  autumn  of  1914 
I  received  "authentic"  news  of  the  presence  of  Count 


476  LUDENDORFF'S  OWN  STORY 

Witte  in  Berlin.  This  was,  of  course,  no  more  than 
an  empty  rumor,  England  and  France  having  then 
much  too  firm  a  hold  on  Russia.  Stiirmer  had  for  a 
long  time  now  been  the  Premier,  and  there  was  again 
talk  of  the  possibility  of  peace  being  secured  through 
his  activities.  Naturally,  peace  with  Russia  would 
have  been  more  welcome  to  me  than  the  whole  Polish 
army,  with  the  whole  Kingdom  of  Poland  thrown  in, 
to  which,  as  a  native  of  the  province  of  Posen,  I 
naturally  had  a  strong  instinctive  repulsion.  The 
Polish  army  could  at  best  provide  only  a  few  divisions, 
which  were  not  to  be  weighed  in  the  scale  against  the 
relief  which  we  should  experience  by  the  disappearance 
of  Russia  from  the  ranks  of  our  enemies.  It  was  a  very 
simple  calculation,  upon  which  I  need  not  waste  words 
here.  The  difficulty  was  that,  here  as  elsewhere,  wishes 
and  hopes  did  not  bring  peace,  and  that  the  Govern- 
ment and  the  diplomats  did  not  seem  to  get  farther 
than  wishes  and  hopes.  Doubtless  they  felt  that  there 
was  no  real  ground  for  these  hopes,  or  they  would  not 
have  arranged  in  August  for  their  Polish  program, 
which  was  aimed  directly  against  Russia.  They  did 
not  proceed  beyond  considerations  of  the  question  such 
as  might  be  held  at  any  time.  There  was  never  any 
real  talk  of  even  a  reasonable  possibility  of  getting 
into  touch  with  Stiirmer  nor  the  remotest  suggestion 
of  any  move  on  his  part.  No  one  really  believed  in  the 
possibility  of  concluding  peace  with  Russia.  The 
military  situation  in  September  and  October  did  not 
favor  it,  even  although  the  Entente  must  have  per- 
ceived by  October  that  its  great  autumn  campaign  of 
191 6  would  not  succeed.  On  October  21  the  Chancellor 
stated  that  there  was  then  no  prospect  of  a  separate 
peace  with  Russia,  who  was  much  too  closely  dependent 
upon  England. 

To  establish  for  General  Headquarters  the  guiding 


FURTHER   PROSECUTION  OF  THE  WAR   477 

principles  for  the  further  prosecution  of  the  war  and 
to  strengthen  our  forces,  I  had  a  great  field  of  activity 
to  cultivate.  I  could,  of  course,  not  do  all  the  plowing 
and  sowing  with  my  own  hand.  Where  I  found  in- 
telligent co-operation  and  the  same  serious  view  of  the 
situation  as  I  held  myself,  I  sowed  good  seed;  it  often 
sprouted  but  scantily,  however,  and  the  field  gave  no 
yield.  Weeds,  too,  grew  up  and  choked  what  had  so 
far  grown  well. 


END    OF    VOL.   I 


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